This module contains knowledge for checks.
"""
-# pylint: disable=missing-function-docstring,line-too-long,invalid-name
+# pylint: disable=missing-function-docstring,line-too-long
# pylint: disable=too-many-branches,too-many-statements,too-many-locals
-from .engine import StrOrNone, ChecklistObjType, KconfigCheck, CmdlineCheck, SysctlCheck, VersionCheck, OR, AND
from typing import List
+from .engine import StrOrNone, ChecklistObjType, KconfigCheck, CmdlineCheck, SysctlCheck, VersionCheck, OR, AND
def add_kconfig_checks(l: List[ChecklistObjType], arch: str) -> None:
if arch in ('X86_64', 'ARM64', 'ARM'):
l += [vmap_stack_is_set]
if arch in ('X86_64', 'X86_32'):
- l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS', 'y')]
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'DEBUG_WX', 'y')]
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'WERROR', 'y')]
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'X86_MCE', 'y')]
- l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'RETPOLINE', 'y')]
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'SYN_COOKIES', 'y')] # another reason?
microcode_is_set = KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'MICROCODE', 'y')
l += [microcode_is_set] # is needed for mitigating CPU bugs
cpu_sup_intel_not_set)]
l += [OR(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'X86_MCE_AMD', 'y'),
cpu_sup_amd_not_set)]
+ l += [OR(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'CPU_MITIGATIONS', 'y'),
+ KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS', 'y'))]
+ l += [OR(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'MITIGATION_RETPOLINE', 'y'),
+ KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'RETPOLINE', 'y'))]
+ l += [OR(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'MITIGATION_RFDS', 'y'),
+ cpu_sup_intel_not_set)]
+ l += [OR(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'MITIGATION_SPECTRE_BHI', 'y'),
+ cpu_sup_intel_not_set)]
if arch in ('ARM64', 'ARM'):
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'HW_RANDOM_TPM', 'y')]
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'IOMMU_DEFAULT_DMA_STRICT', 'y')]
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'IOMMU_DEFAULT_PASSTHROUGH', 'is not set')] # true if IOMMU_DEFAULT_DMA_STRICT is set
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'STACKPROTECTOR_PER_TASK', 'y')]
if arch == 'X86_64':
- l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION', 'y')]
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'RANDOMIZE_MEMORY', 'y')]
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'X86_KERNEL_IBT', 'y')]
- l += [OR(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'CPU_SRSO', 'y'),
+ l += [OR(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION', 'y'),
+ KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION', 'y'))]
+ l += [OR(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'MITIGATION_SRSO', 'y'),
+ KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'CPU_SRSO', 'y'),
cpu_sup_amd_not_set)]
l += [AND(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'INTEL_IOMMU', 'y'),
iommu_support_is_set)]
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'DEBUG_ALIGN_RODATA', 'y')]
# 'self_protection', 'kspp'
+ l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'LIST_HARDENED', 'y')]
+ l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES', 'y')]
+ l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT', 'is not set')]
+ l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'PAGE_TABLE_CHECK', 'y')]
+ l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'PAGE_TABLE_CHECK_ENFORCED', 'y')]
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION', 'y')]
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED', 'y')]
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM', 'y')]
vmap_stack_is_set)]
kfence_is_set = KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'KFENCE', 'y')
l += [kfence_is_set]
- l += [AND(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'a13xp0p0v', 'KFENCE_SAMPLE_INTERVAL', 'is not off'),
+ l += [AND(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'KFENCE_SAMPLE_INTERVAL', 'is not off'),
kfence_is_set)]
randstruct_is_set = OR(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'RANDSTRUCT_FULL', 'y'),
KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT', 'y'))
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR', '32768')]
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'SYN_COOKIES', 'y')] # another reason?
if arch == 'X86_64':
- l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'SLS', 'y')] # vs CVE-2021-26341 in Straight-Line-Speculation
+ l += [OR(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'MITIGATION_SLS', 'y'),
+ KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'SLS', 'y'))] # vs CVE-2021-26341 in Straight-Line-Speculation
l += [AND(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'INTEL_IOMMU_SVM', 'y'),
iommu_support_is_set)]
l += [AND(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'AMD_IOMMU_V2', 'y'),
if arch == 'ARM64':
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN', 'y')]
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'SHADOW_CALL_STACK', 'y')]
+ l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'UNWIND_PATCH_PAC_INTO_SCS', 'y')]
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'KASAN_HW_TAGS', 'y')] # see also: kasan=on, kasan.stacktrace=off, kasan.fault=panic
if arch == 'X86_32':
- l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION', 'y')]
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'HIGHMEM64G', 'y')]
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'X86_PAE', 'y')]
+ l += [OR(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION', 'y'),
+ KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION', 'y'))]
l += [AND(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'INTEL_IOMMU', 'y'),
iommu_support_is_set)]
- # 'self_protection', 'clipos'
- l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'clipos', 'SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT', 'is not set')]
-
- # 'self_protection', 'a13xp0p0v'
- l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'a13xp0p0v', 'LIST_HARDENED', 'y')]
- l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'a13xp0p0v', 'RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES', 'y')]
-
# 'security_policy'
if arch in ('X86_64', 'ARM64', 'X86_32'):
l += [KconfigCheck('security_policy', 'defconfig', 'SECURITY', 'y')]
l += [KconfigCheck('security_policy', 'kspp', 'SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM', 'is not set')]
l += [KconfigCheck('security_policy', 'kspp', 'SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP', 'is not set')]
l += [KconfigCheck('security_policy', 'kspp', 'SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS', 'is not set')] # refers to SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
- l += [KconfigCheck('security_policy', 'a13xp0p0v', 'SECURITY_SELINUX_DEBUG', 'is not set')]
+ l += [KconfigCheck('security_policy', 'kspp', 'SECURITY_SELINUX_DEBUG', 'is not set')]
l += [OR(KconfigCheck('security_policy', 'a13xp0p0v', 'SECURITY_SELINUX', 'y'),
KconfigCheck('security_policy', 'a13xp0p0v', 'SECURITY_APPARMOR', 'y'),
KconfigCheck('security_policy', 'a13xp0p0v', 'SECURITY_SMACK', 'y'),
KconfigCheck('security_policy', 'a13xp0p0v', 'SECURITY_TOMOYO', 'y'))] # one of major LSMs implementing MAC
+ # N.B. We don't use 'if arch' for the 'cut_attack_surface' checks that require 'is not set'.
+ # It makes the maintainance easier. These kernel options should be disabled anyway.
# 'cut_attack_surface', 'defconfig'
l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'defconfig', 'SECCOMP', 'y')]
l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'defconfig', 'SECCOMP_FILTER', 'y')]
l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'OABI_COMPAT', 'is not set')]
l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'X86_MSR', 'is not set')] # refers to LOCKDOWN
l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'LEGACY_TIOCSTI', 'is not set')]
+ l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'MODULE_FORCE_LOAD', 'is not set')]
l += [modules_not_set]
l += [devmem_not_set]
l += [OR(KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'IO_STRICT_DEVMEM', 'y'),
l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'clipos', 'STAGING', 'is not set')]
l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'clipos', 'KSM', 'is not set')] # to prevent FLUSH+RELOAD attack
l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'clipos', 'KALLSYMS', 'is not set')]
- l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'clipos', 'MAGIC_SYSRQ', 'is not set')]
l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'clipos', 'KEXEC_FILE', 'is not set')] # refers to LOCKDOWN (permissive)
l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'clipos', 'USER_NS', 'is not set')] # user.max_user_namespaces=0
l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'clipos', 'X86_CPUID', 'is not set')]
l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'clipos', 'EFI_CUSTOM_SSDT_OVERLAYS', 'is not set')]
l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'clipos', 'AIO', 'is not set')]
# l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'clipos', 'IKCONFIG', 'is not set')] # no, IKCONFIG is needed for this check :)
+ l += [OR(KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'clipos', 'MAGIC_SYSRQ', 'is not set'),
+ KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'a13xp0p0v', 'MAGIC_SYSRQ_DEFAULT_ENABLE', '0x0'))]
# 'cut_attack_surface', 'lockdown'
l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'lockdown', 'EFI_TEST', 'is not set')] # refers to LOCKDOWN
l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'a13xp0p0v', 'KGDB', 'is not set')]
l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'a13xp0p0v', 'CORESIGHT', 'is not set')]
l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'a13xp0p0v', 'XFS_SUPPORT_V4', 'is not set')]
- l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'a13xp0p0v', 'MODULE_FORCE_LOAD', 'is not set')]
l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'a13xp0p0v', 'BLK_DEV_WRITE_MOUNTED', 'is not set')]
l += [OR(KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'a13xp0p0v', 'TRIM_UNUSED_KSYMS', 'y'),
modules_not_set)]
l += [KconfigCheck('harden_userspace', 'clipos', 'COREDUMP', 'is not set')]
l += [KconfigCheck('harden_userspace', 'a13xp0p0v', 'ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS', 'MAX')] # 'MAX' value is refined using ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MAX
if arch == 'X86_64':
- l += [KconfigCheck('harden_userspace', 'a13xp0p0v', 'X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK', 'y')]
+ l += [KconfigCheck('harden_userspace', 'kspp', 'X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK', 'y')]
def add_cmdline_checks(l: List[ChecklistObjType], arch: str) -> None:
l += [OR(CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'spectre_v2_user', 'is not off'),
AND(CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'mitigations', 'auto,nosmt'),
CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'spectre_v2_user', 'is not set')))]
+ l += [OR(CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'spectre_bhi', 'is not off'),
+ AND(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'MITIGATION_SPECTRE_BHI', 'y'),
+ CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'mitigations', 'auto,nosmt'),
+ CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'spectre_bhi', 'is not set')))]
l += [OR(CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'spec_store_bypass_disable', 'is not off'),
AND(CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'mitigations', 'auto,nosmt'),
CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'spec_store_bypass_disable', 'is not set')))]
l += [OR(CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'gather_data_sampling', 'is not off'),
AND(CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'mitigations', 'auto,nosmt'),
CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'gather_data_sampling', 'is not set')))]
+ l += [OR(CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'reg_file_data_sampling', 'is not off'),
+ AND(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'MITIGATION_RFDS', 'y'),
+ CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'mitigations', 'auto,nosmt'),
+ CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'reg_file_data_sampling', 'is not set')))]
if arch == 'ARM64':
l += [OR(CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'kpti', 'is not off'),
AND(CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'mitigations', 'auto,nosmt'),
'pti', # See pti_check_boottime_disable() in arch/x86/mm/pti.c
'spectre_v2', # See spectre_v2_parse_cmdline() in arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
'spectre_v2_user', # See spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline() in arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+ 'spectre_bhi', # See spectre_bhi_parse_cmdline() in arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
'spec_store_bypass_disable', # See ssb_parse_cmdline() in arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
'l1tf', # See l1tf_cmdline() in arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
'mds', # See mds_cmdline() in arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
'ssbd', # See parse_spectre_v4_param() in arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c
'spec_rstack_overflow', # See srso_parse_cmdline() in arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
'gather_data_sampling', # See gds_parse_cmdline() in arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+ 'reg_file_data_sampling', # See rfds_parse_cmdline() in arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
'slub_debug', # See setup_slub_debug() in mm/slub.c
'iommu', # See iommu_setup() in arch/x86/kernel/pci-dma.c
'vsyscall', # See vsyscall_setup() in arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c
return value
-# TODO: draft of security hardening sysctls:
+# Ideas of security hardening sysctls:
# what about bpf_jit_enable?
# vm.mmap_min_addr has a good value
# nosmt sysfs control file
projects / kconfig-hardened-check.git / blobdiff