Keep the recommendation to disable kernel modules

[kconfig-hardened-check.git] / kernel_hardening_checker / checks.py

diff --git a/kernel_hardening_checker/checks.py b/kernel_hardening_checker/checks.py
index d1c83db483e553e7c62bd3827ca8c5a660bb3045..d95d301fb1f0ea3e25564a601dd44519a6a3f994 100644 (file)
--- a/kernel_hardening_checker/checks.py
+++ b/kernel_hardening_checker/checks.py
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ def add_kconfig_checks(l, arch):
     cc_is_gcc = KconfigCheck('-', '-', 'CC_IS_GCC', 'y') # exists since v4.18
     cc_is_clang = KconfigCheck('-', '-', 'CC_IS_CLANG', 'y') # exists since v4.18
 
-    modules_not_set = KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'MODULES', 'is not set')
+    modules_not_set = KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'MODULES', 'is not set') # radical, but may be useful in some cases
     devmem_not_set = KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'DEVMEM', 'is not set') # refers to LOCKDOWN
     bpf_syscall_not_set = KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'lockdown', 'BPF_SYSCALL', 'is not set') # refers to LOCKDOWN
 
@@ -580,7 +580,6 @@ def normalize_cmdline_options(option, value):
 # TODO: draft of security hardening sysctls:
 #    what about bpf_jit_enable?
 #    vm.mmap_min_addr has a good value
-#    kernel.modules_disabled=1
 #    nosmt sysfs control file
 #    vm.mmap_rnd_bits=max (?)
 #    kernel.sysrq=0
@@ -604,15 +603,17 @@ def add_sysctl_checks(l, arch):
     l += [SysctlCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'dev.tty.ldisc_autoload', '0')]
     l += [SysctlCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled', '1')]
     l += [SysctlCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'kernel.kptr_restrict', '2')]
-    l += [SysctlCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'kernel.yama.ptrace_scope', '3')]
     l += [SysctlCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'dev.tty.legacy_tiocsti', '0')]
     l += [SysctlCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'vm.unprivileged_userfaultfd', '0')]
           # At first, it disabled unprivileged userfaultfd,
           # and since v5.11 it enables unprivileged userfaultfd for user-mode only.
 
+    l += [SysctlCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'clipos', 'kernel.modules_disabled', '1')] # radical, but may be useful in some cases
+
     l += [SysctlCheck('harden_userspace', 'kspp', 'fs.protected_symlinks', '1')]
     l += [SysctlCheck('harden_userspace', 'kspp', 'fs.protected_hardlinks', '1')]
     l += [SysctlCheck('harden_userspace', 'kspp', 'fs.protected_fifos', '2')]
     l += [SysctlCheck('harden_userspace', 'kspp', 'fs.protected_regular', '2')]
     l += [SysctlCheck('harden_userspace', 'kspp', 'fs.suid_dumpable', '0')]
     l += [SysctlCheck('harden_userspace', 'kspp', 'kernel.randomize_va_space', '2')]
+    l += [SysctlCheck('harden_userspace', 'kspp', 'kernel.yama.ptrace_scope', '3')]