This module contains knowledge for checks.
"""
-# pylint: disable=missing-function-docstring,line-too-long,invalid-name
-# pylint: disable=too-many-branches,too-many-statements
+# pylint: disable=missing-function-docstring,line-too-long
+# pylint: disable=too-many-branches,too-many-statements,too-many-locals
-from .engine import KconfigCheck, CmdlineCheck, SysctlCheck, VersionCheck, OR, AND
+from typing import List
+from .engine import StrOrNone, ChecklistObjType, KconfigCheck, CmdlineCheck, SysctlCheck, VersionCheck, OR, AND
-def add_kconfig_checks(l, arch):
+def add_kconfig_checks(l: List[ChecklistObjType], arch: str) -> None:
assert(arch), 'empty arch'
# Calling the KconfigCheck class constructor:
efi_not_set = KconfigCheck('-', '-', 'EFI', 'is not set')
cc_is_gcc = KconfigCheck('-', '-', 'CC_IS_GCC', 'y') # exists since v4.18
cc_is_clang = KconfigCheck('-', '-', 'CC_IS_CLANG', 'y') # exists since v4.18
+ if arch in ('X86_64', 'X86_32'):
+ cpu_sup_amd_not_set = KconfigCheck('-', '-', 'CPU_SUP_AMD', 'is not set')
+ cpu_sup_intel_not_set = KconfigCheck('-', '-', 'CPU_SUP_INTEL', 'is not set')
modules_not_set = KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'MODULES', 'is not set') # radical, but may be useful in some cases
devmem_not_set = KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'DEVMEM', 'is not set') # refers to LOCKDOWN
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'BUG', 'y')]
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'SLUB_DEBUG', 'y')]
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'THREAD_INFO_IN_TASK', 'y')]
- gcc_plugins_support_is_set = KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'GCC_PLUGINS', 'y')
- l += [gcc_plugins_support_is_set]
iommu_support_is_set = KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'IOMMU_SUPPORT', 'y')
l += [iommu_support_is_set] # is needed for mitigating DMA attacks
l += [OR(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'STACKPROTECTOR', 'y'),
KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX', 'y'),
modules_not_set)] # DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX was before v4.11
l += [OR(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'REFCOUNT_FULL', 'y'),
- VersionCheck((5, 5)))] # REFCOUNT_FULL is enabled by default since v5.5
+ VersionCheck((5, 4, 208)))]
+ # REFCOUNT_FULL is enabled by default since v5.5,
+ # and this is backported to v5.4.208
+ l += [OR(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'INIT_STACK_ALL_ZERO', 'y'),
+ KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL', 'y'))]
if arch in ('X86_64', 'ARM64', 'X86_32'):
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'RANDOMIZE_BASE', 'y')]
+ vmap_stack_is_set = KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'VMAP_STACK', 'y')
if arch in ('X86_64', 'ARM64', 'ARM'):
- l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'VMAP_STACK', 'y')]
+ l += [vmap_stack_is_set]
if arch in ('X86_64', 'X86_32'):
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'DEBUG_WX', 'y')]
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'WERROR', 'y')]
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'X86_MCE', 'y')]
- l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'X86_MCE_INTEL', 'y')]
- l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'X86_MCE_AMD', 'y')]
- l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'RETPOLINE', 'y')]
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'SYN_COOKIES', 'y')] # another reason?
microcode_is_set = KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'MICROCODE', 'y')
l += [microcode_is_set] # is needed for mitigating CPU bugs
l += [OR(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'MICROCODE_INTEL', 'y'),
+ cpu_sup_intel_not_set,
AND(microcode_is_set,
- VersionCheck((6, 6))))] # MICROCODE_INTEL was included in MICROCODE since v6.6
+ VersionCheck((6, 6, 0))))] # MICROCODE_INTEL was included in MICROCODE since v6.6
l += [OR(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'MICROCODE_AMD', 'y'),
+ cpu_sup_amd_not_set,
AND(microcode_is_set,
- VersionCheck((6, 6))))] # MICROCODE_AMD was included in MICROCODE since v6.6
+ VersionCheck((6, 6, 0))))] # MICROCODE_AMD was included in MICROCODE since v6.6
l += [OR(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'X86_SMAP', 'y'),
- VersionCheck((5, 19)))] # X86_SMAP is enabled by default since v5.19
+ VersionCheck((5, 19, 0)))] # X86_SMAP is enabled by default since v5.19
l += [OR(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'X86_UMIP', 'y'),
KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'X86_INTEL_UMIP', 'y'))]
+ l += [OR(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'X86_MCE_INTEL', 'y'),
+ cpu_sup_intel_not_set)]
+ l += [OR(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'X86_MCE_AMD', 'y'),
+ cpu_sup_amd_not_set)]
+ l += [OR(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'CPU_MITIGATIONS', 'y'),
+ KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS', 'y'))]
+ l += [OR(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'MITIGATION_RETPOLINE', 'y'),
+ KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'RETPOLINE', 'y'))]
+ l += [OR(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'MITIGATION_RFDS', 'y'),
+ cpu_sup_intel_not_set)]
+ l += [OR(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'MITIGATION_SPECTRE_BHI', 'y'),
+ cpu_sup_intel_not_set)]
if arch in ('ARM64', 'ARM'):
+ l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'HW_RANDOM_TPM', 'y')]
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'IOMMU_DEFAULT_DMA_STRICT', 'y')]
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'IOMMU_DEFAULT_PASSTHROUGH', 'is not set')] # true if IOMMU_DEFAULT_DMA_STRICT is set
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'STACKPROTECTOR_PER_TASK', 'y')]
if arch == 'X86_64':
- l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION', 'y')]
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'RANDOMIZE_MEMORY', 'y')]
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'X86_KERNEL_IBT', 'y')]
+ l += [OR(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION', 'y'),
+ KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION', 'y'))]
+ l += [OR(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'MITIGATION_SRSO', 'y'),
+ KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'CPU_SRSO', 'y'),
+ cpu_sup_amd_not_set)]
l += [AND(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'INTEL_IOMMU', 'y'),
iommu_support_is_set)]
l += [AND(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'AMD_IOMMU', 'y'),
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL', 'y')]
l += [OR(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS', 'y'),
AND(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'RANDOMIZE_BASE', 'y'),
- VersionCheck((5, 9))))] # HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS was included in RANDOMIZE_BASE in v5.9
+ VersionCheck((5, 9, 0))))] # HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS was included in RANDOMIZE_BASE in v5.9
l += [OR(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR', 'y'),
- VersionCheck((5, 10)))] # HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR is enabled by default since v5.10
+ VersionCheck((5, 10, 0)))] # HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR is enabled by default since v5.10
if arch == 'ARM':
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'CPU_SW_DOMAIN_PAN', 'y')]
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR', 'y')]
# 'self_protection', 'kspp'
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION', 'y')]
- l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'SCHED_STACK_END_CHECK', 'y')]
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED', 'y')]
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM', 'y')]
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'SHUFFLE_PAGE_ALLOCATOR', 'y')]
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'DEBUG_LIST', 'y')]
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'DEBUG_VIRTUAL', 'y')]
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'DEBUG_SG', 'y')]
- l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'DEBUG_CREDENTIALS', 'y')]
- l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'DEBUG_NOTIFIERS', 'y')]
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'INIT_ON_ALLOC_DEFAULT_ON', 'y')]
- l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'HW_RANDOM_TPM', 'y')]
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'STATIC_USERMODEHELPER', 'y')] # needs userspace support
+ l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'SCHED_CORE', 'y')]
+ l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM', 'y')]
+ l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM_EARLY', 'y')]
+ l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL_FORCE_CONFIDENTIALITY', 'y')]
+ cfi_clang_is_set = KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'CFI_CLANG', 'y')
+ cfi_clang_permissive_not_set = KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'CFI_PERMISSIVE', 'is not set')
+ l += [OR(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'DEBUG_CREDENTIALS', 'y'),
+ VersionCheck((6, 6, 8)))] # DEBUG_CREDENTIALS was dropped in v6.6.8
+ l += [OR(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'DEBUG_NOTIFIERS', 'y'),
+ AND(cfi_clang_is_set,
+ cfi_clang_permissive_not_set,
+ cc_is_clang))]
+ l += [OR(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'SCHED_STACK_END_CHECK', 'y'),
+ vmap_stack_is_set)]
kfence_is_set = KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'KFENCE', 'y')
l += [kfence_is_set]
- l += [AND(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'my', 'KFENCE_SAMPLE_INTERVAL', 'is not off'),
+ l += [AND(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'a13xp0p0v', 'KFENCE_SAMPLE_INTERVAL', 'is not off'),
kfence_is_set)]
randstruct_is_set = OR(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'RANDSTRUCT_FULL', 'y'),
KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT', 'y'))
l += [AND(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'HARDENED_USERCOPY_PAGESPAN', 'is not set'),
hardened_usercopy_is_set)] # this debugging for HARDENED_USERCOPY is not needed for security
l += [AND(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY', 'y'),
- gcc_plugins_support_is_set)]
+ cc_is_gcc)]
l += [OR(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'MODULE_SIG', 'y'),
modules_not_set)]
l += [OR(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'MODULE_SIG_ALL', 'y'),
modules_not_set)]
l += [OR(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'MODULE_SIG_SHA512', 'y'),
+ KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'a13xp0p0v', 'MODULE_SIG_SHA3_512', 'y'),
modules_not_set)]
l += [OR(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'MODULE_SIG_FORCE', 'y'),
modules_not_set)] # refers to LOCKDOWN
- l += [OR(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'INIT_STACK_ALL_ZERO', 'y'),
- KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL', 'y'))]
l += [OR(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'INIT_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON', 'y'),
KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'PAGE_POISONING_ZERO', 'y'))]
# CONFIG_INIT_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON was added in v5.3.
KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'UBSAN_BOOL', 'is not set'),
KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'UBSAN_ENUM', 'is not set'),
KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'UBSAN_ALIGNMENT', 'is not set'))] # only array index bounds checking with traps
+ l += [AND(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'UBSAN_SANITIZE_ALL', 'y'),
+ ubsan_bounds_is_set)]
if arch in ('X86_64', 'ARM64', 'X86_32'):
- l += [AND(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'UBSAN_SANITIZE_ALL', 'y'),
- ubsan_bounds_is_set)] # ARCH_HAS_UBSAN_SANITIZE_ALL is not enabled for ARM
stackleak_is_set = KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK', 'y')
- l += [AND(stackleak_is_set, gcc_plugins_support_is_set)]
+ l += [AND(stackleak_is_set,
+ cc_is_gcc)]
l += [AND(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'STACKLEAK_METRICS', 'is not set'),
stackleak_is_set,
- gcc_plugins_support_is_set)]
+ cc_is_gcc)]
l += [AND(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE', 'is not set'),
stackleak_is_set,
- gcc_plugins_support_is_set)]
+ cc_is_gcc)]
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET_DEFAULT', 'y')]
if arch in ('X86_64', 'ARM64'):
- cfi_clang_is_set = KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'CFI_CLANG', 'y')
- l += [cfi_clang_is_set]
- l += [AND(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'CFI_PERMISSIVE', 'is not set'),
- cfi_clang_is_set)]
+ l += [AND(cfi_clang_is_set,
+ cc_is_clang)]
+ l += [AND(cfi_clang_permissive_not_set,
+ cfi_clang_is_set,
+ cc_is_clang)]
if arch in ('X86_64', 'X86_32'):
- l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'SCHED_CORE', 'y')]
+ l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'HW_RANDOM_TPM', 'y')]
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR', '65536')]
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'IOMMU_DEFAULT_DMA_STRICT', 'y')]
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'IOMMU_DEFAULT_PASSTHROUGH', 'is not set')] # true if IOMMU_DEFAULT_DMA_STRICT is set
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR', '32768')]
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'SYN_COOKIES', 'y')] # another reason?
if arch == 'X86_64':
- l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'SLS', 'y')] # vs CVE-2021-26341 in Straight-Line-Speculation
+ l += [OR(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'MITIGATION_SLS', 'y'),
+ KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'SLS', 'y'))] # vs CVE-2021-26341 in Straight-Line-Speculation
l += [AND(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'INTEL_IOMMU_SVM', 'y'),
iommu_support_is_set)]
l += [AND(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'AMD_IOMMU_V2', 'y'),
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'SHADOW_CALL_STACK', 'y')]
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'KASAN_HW_TAGS', 'y')] # see also: kasan=on, kasan.stacktrace=off, kasan.fault=panic
if arch == 'X86_32':
- l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION', 'y')]
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'HIGHMEM64G', 'y')]
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'X86_PAE', 'y')]
+ l += [OR(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION', 'y'),
+ KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION', 'y'))]
l += [AND(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'INTEL_IOMMU', 'y'),
iommu_support_is_set)]
# 'self_protection', 'clipos'
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'clipos', 'SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT', 'is not set')]
+ # 'self_protection', 'a13xp0p0v'
+ l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'a13xp0p0v', 'LIST_HARDENED', 'y')]
+ l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'a13xp0p0v', 'RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES', 'y')]
+
# 'security_policy'
if arch in ('X86_64', 'ARM64', 'X86_32'):
l += [KconfigCheck('security_policy', 'defconfig', 'SECURITY', 'y')]
l += [KconfigCheck('security_policy', 'kspp', 'SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE', 'is not set')]
l += [KconfigCheck('security_policy', 'kspp', 'SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM', 'is not set')]
l += [KconfigCheck('security_policy', 'kspp', 'SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP', 'is not set')]
- l += [KconfigCheck('security_policy', 'kspp', 'SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM', 'y')]
- l += [KconfigCheck('security_policy', 'kspp', 'SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM_EARLY', 'y')]
- l += [KconfigCheck('security_policy', 'kspp', 'LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL_FORCE_CONFIDENTIALITY', 'y')]
l += [KconfigCheck('security_policy', 'kspp', 'SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS', 'is not set')] # refers to SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
- l += [OR(KconfigCheck('security_policy', 'my', 'SECURITY_SELINUX', 'y'),
- KconfigCheck('security_policy', 'my', 'SECURITY_APPARMOR', 'y'),
- KconfigCheck('security_policy', 'my', 'SECURITY_SMACK', 'y'),
- KconfigCheck('security_policy', 'my', 'SECURITY_TOMOYO', 'y'))] # one of major LSMs implementing MAC
+ l += [KconfigCheck('security_policy', 'a13xp0p0v', 'SECURITY_SELINUX_DEBUG', 'is not set')]
+ l += [OR(KconfigCheck('security_policy', 'a13xp0p0v', 'SECURITY_SELINUX', 'y'),
+ KconfigCheck('security_policy', 'a13xp0p0v', 'SECURITY_APPARMOR', 'y'),
+ KconfigCheck('security_policy', 'a13xp0p0v', 'SECURITY_SMACK', 'y'),
+ KconfigCheck('security_policy', 'a13xp0p0v', 'SECURITY_TOMOYO', 'y'))] # one of major LSMs implementing MAC
# 'cut_attack_surface', 'defconfig'
l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'defconfig', 'SECCOMP', 'y')]
l += [OR(KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'defconfig', 'STRICT_DEVMEM', 'y'),
devmem_not_set)] # refers to LOCKDOWN
if arch in ('X86_64', 'X86_32'):
- l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'defconfig', 'X86_INTEL_TSX_MODE_OFF', 'y')] # tsx=off
+ l += [OR(KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'defconfig', 'X86_INTEL_TSX_MODE_OFF', 'y'),
+ cpu_sup_intel_not_set)] # tsx=off
# 'cut_attack_surface', 'kspp'
l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT', 'y')]
l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL', 'is not set')]
l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'OABI_COMPAT', 'is not set')]
l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'X86_MSR', 'is not set')] # refers to LOCKDOWN
+ l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'LEGACY_TIOCSTI', 'is not set')]
l += [modules_not_set]
l += [devmem_not_set]
l += [OR(KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'IO_STRICT_DEVMEM', 'y'),
l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'clipos', 'X86_IOPL_IOPERM', 'is not set')] # refers to LOCKDOWN
l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'clipos', 'ACPI_TABLE_UPGRADE', 'is not set')] # refers to LOCKDOWN
l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'clipos', 'EFI_CUSTOM_SSDT_OVERLAYS', 'is not set')]
+ l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'clipos', 'AIO', 'is not set')]
# l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'clipos', 'IKCONFIG', 'is not set')] # no, IKCONFIG is needed for this check :)
# 'cut_attack_surface', 'lockdown'
l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'lockdown', 'KPROBES', 'is not set')] # refers to LOCKDOWN
l += [bpf_syscall_not_set] # refers to LOCKDOWN
- # 'cut_attack_surface', 'my'
- l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'my', 'LEGACY_TIOCSTI', 'is not set')]
- l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'my', 'MMIOTRACE', 'is not set')] # refers to LOCKDOWN (permissive)
- l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'my', 'LIVEPATCH', 'is not set')]
- l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'my', 'IP_DCCP', 'is not set')]
- l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'my', 'IP_SCTP', 'is not set')]
- l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'my', 'FTRACE', 'is not set')] # refers to LOCKDOWN
- l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'my', 'VIDEO_VIVID', 'is not set')]
- l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'my', 'INPUT_EVBUG', 'is not set')] # Can be used as a keylogger
- l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'my', 'KGDB', 'is not set')]
- l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'my', 'AIO', 'is not set')]
- l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'my', 'CORESIGHT', 'is not set')]
- l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'my', 'XFS_SUPPORT_V4', 'is not set')]
- l += [OR(KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'my', 'TRIM_UNUSED_KSYMS', 'y'),
+ # 'cut_attack_surface', 'a13xp0p0v'
+ l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'a13xp0p0v', 'MMIOTRACE', 'is not set')] # refers to LOCKDOWN (permissive)
+ l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'a13xp0p0v', 'LIVEPATCH', 'is not set')]
+ l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'a13xp0p0v', 'IP_DCCP', 'is not set')]
+ l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'a13xp0p0v', 'IP_SCTP', 'is not set')]
+ l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'a13xp0p0v', 'FTRACE', 'is not set')] # refers to LOCKDOWN
+ l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'a13xp0p0v', 'VIDEO_VIVID', 'is not set')]
+ l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'a13xp0p0v', 'INPUT_EVBUG', 'is not set')] # Can be used as a keylogger
+ l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'a13xp0p0v', 'KGDB', 'is not set')]
+ l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'a13xp0p0v', 'CORESIGHT', 'is not set')]
+ l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'a13xp0p0v', 'XFS_SUPPORT_V4', 'is not set')]
+ l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'a13xp0p0v', 'MODULE_FORCE_LOAD', 'is not set')]
+ l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'a13xp0p0v', 'BLK_DEV_WRITE_MOUNTED', 'is not set')]
+ l += [OR(KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'a13xp0p0v', 'TRIM_UNUSED_KSYMS', 'y'),
modules_not_set)]
- l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'my', 'MODULE_FORCE_LOAD', 'is not set')]
+
# 'harden_userspace'
if arch == 'ARM64':
if arch in ('ARM', 'X86_32'):
l += [KconfigCheck('harden_userspace', 'defconfig', 'VMSPLIT_3G', 'y')]
l += [KconfigCheck('harden_userspace', 'clipos', 'COREDUMP', 'is not set')]
- l += [KconfigCheck('harden_userspace', 'my', 'ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS', 'MAX')] # 'MAX' value is refined using ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MAX
+ l += [KconfigCheck('harden_userspace', 'a13xp0p0v', 'ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS', 'MAX')] # 'MAX' value is refined using ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MAX
+ if arch == 'X86_64':
+ l += [KconfigCheck('harden_userspace', 'a13xp0p0v', 'X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK', 'y')]
-def add_cmdline_checks(l, arch):
+def add_cmdline_checks(l: List[ChecklistObjType], arch: str) -> None:
assert(arch), 'empty arch'
# Calling the CmdlineCheck class constructor:
l += [OR(CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'spectre_v2_user', 'is not off'),
AND(CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'mitigations', 'auto,nosmt'),
CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'spectre_v2_user', 'is not set')))]
+ l += [OR(CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'spectre_bhi', 'is not off'),
+ AND(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'MITIGATION_SPECTRE_BHI', 'y'),
+ CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'mitigations', 'auto,nosmt'),
+ CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'spectre_bhi', 'is not set')))]
l += [OR(CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'spec_store_bypass_disable', 'is not off'),
AND(CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'mitigations', 'auto,nosmt'),
CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'spec_store_bypass_disable', 'is not set')))]
l += [OR(CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'spec_rstack_overflow', 'is not off'),
AND(CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'mitigations', 'auto,nosmt'),
CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'spec_rstack_overflow', 'is not set')))]
+ l += [OR(CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'gather_data_sampling', 'is not off'),
+ AND(CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'mitigations', 'auto,nosmt'),
+ CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'gather_data_sampling', 'is not set')))]
+ l += [OR(CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'reg_file_data_sampling', 'is not off'),
+ AND(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'MITIGATION_RFDS', 'y'),
+ CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'mitigations', 'auto,nosmt'),
+ CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'reg_file_data_sampling', 'is not set')))]
if arch == 'ARM64':
l += [OR(CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'kpti', 'is not off'),
AND(CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'mitigations', 'auto,nosmt'),
CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'kpti', 'is not set')))]
l += [OR(CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'ssbd', 'kernel'),
- CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'my', 'ssbd', 'force-on'),
+ CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'a13xp0p0v', 'ssbd', 'force-on'),
AND(CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'mitigations', 'auto,nosmt'),
CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'ssbd', 'is not set')))]
l += [OR(CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'rodata', 'full'),
CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'hardened_usercopy', 'is not set')))]
l += [AND(CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'slab_common.usercopy_fallback', 'is not set'),
KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'HARDENED_USERCOPY_FALLBACK', 'is not set'))]
- # don't require slab_common.usercopy_fallback=0,
- # since HARDENED_USERCOPY_FALLBACK was removed in Linux v5.16
+ # Consequence of the HARDENED_USERCOPY_FALLBACK check by kspp.
+ # Don't require slab_common.usercopy_fallback=0,
+ # since HARDENED_USERCOPY_FALLBACK was removed in Linux v5.16.
if arch in ('X86_64', 'ARM64', 'X86_32'):
l += [OR(CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'iommu.strict', '1'),
AND(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'IOMMU_DEFAULT_DMA_STRICT', 'y'),
if arch in ('X86_64', 'X86_32'):
l += [CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'clipos', 'iommu', 'force')]
- # 'self_protection', 'my'
- l += [OR(CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'my', 'kfence.sample_interval', 'is not off'),
- AND(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'my', 'KFENCE_SAMPLE_INTERVAL', 'is not off'),
- CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'my', 'kfence.sample_interval', 'is not set')))]
+ # 'self_protection', 'a13xp0p0v'
+ l += [OR(CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'a13xp0p0v', 'kfence.sample_interval', 'is not off'),
+ AND(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'a13xp0p0v', 'KFENCE_SAMPLE_INTERVAL', 'is not off'),
+ CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'a13xp0p0v', 'kfence.sample_interval', 'is not set')))]
# 'cut_attack_surface', 'defconfig'
if arch in ('X86_64', 'X86_32'):
+ tsx_not_set = CmdlineCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'defconfig', 'tsx', 'is not set')
l += [OR(CmdlineCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'defconfig', 'tsx', 'off'),
AND(KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'defconfig', 'X86_INTEL_TSX_MODE_OFF', 'y'),
- CmdlineCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'defconfig', 'tsx', 'is not set')))]
+ tsx_not_set),
+ AND(KconfigCheck('-', '-', 'CPU_SUP_INTEL', 'is not set'),
+ tsx_not_set))]
# 'cut_attack_surface', 'kspp'
l += [CmdlineCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'nosmt', 'is present')] # slow (high performance penalty)
KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'X86_VSYSCALL_EMULATION', 'is not set'),
AND(KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'LEGACY_VSYSCALL_NONE', 'y'),
CmdlineCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'vsyscall', 'is not set')))]
- l += [OR(CmdlineCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'my', 'vdso32', '1'),
- CmdlineCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'my', 'vdso32', '0'),
+ l += [OR(CmdlineCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'vdso32', '0'),
+ CmdlineCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'a13xp0p0v', 'vdso32', '1'),
AND(KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'COMPAT_VDSO', 'is not set'),
- CmdlineCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'my', 'vdso32', 'is not set')))] # the vdso32 parameter must not be 2
+ CmdlineCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'a13xp0p0v', 'vdso32', 'is not set')))] # the vdso32 parameter must not be 2
if arch == 'X86_32':
- l += [OR(CmdlineCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'my', 'vdso32', '1'),
- CmdlineCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'my', 'vdso', '1'),
- CmdlineCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'my', 'vdso32', '0'),
- CmdlineCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'my', 'vdso', '0'),
+ l += [OR(CmdlineCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'vdso32', '0'),
+ CmdlineCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'a13xp0p0v', 'vdso', '0'),
+ CmdlineCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'a13xp0p0v', 'vdso32', '1'),
+ CmdlineCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'a13xp0p0v', 'vdso', '1'),
AND(KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'COMPAT_VDSO', 'is not set'),
- CmdlineCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'my', 'vdso32', 'is not set'),
- CmdlineCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'my', 'vdso', 'is not set')))] # the vdso and vdso32 parameters must not be 2
+ CmdlineCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'a13xp0p0v', 'vdso32', 'is not set'),
+ CmdlineCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'a13xp0p0v', 'vdso', 'is not set')))] # the vdso and vdso32 parameters must not be 2
# 'cut_attack_surface', 'grsec'
# The cmdline checks compatible with the kconfig options disabled by grsecurity...
l += [OR(CmdlineCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'grsec', 'debugfs', 'off'),
KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'grsec', 'DEBUG_FS', 'is not set'))] # ... the end
- # 'cut_attack_surface', 'my'
- l += [CmdlineCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'my', 'sysrq_always_enabled', 'is not set')]
+ # 'cut_attack_surface', 'a13xp0p0v'
+ l += [CmdlineCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'a13xp0p0v', 'sysrq_always_enabled', 'is not set')]
+ l += [OR(CmdlineCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'a13xp0p0v', 'bdev_allow_write_mounted', '0'),
+ AND(KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'a13xp0p0v', 'BLK_DEV_WRITE_MOUNTED', 'is not set'),
+ CmdlineCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'a13xp0p0v', 'bdev_allow_write_mounted', 'is not set')))]
+ if arch == 'X86_64':
+ l += [OR(CmdlineCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'a13xp0p0v', 'ia32_emulation', '0'),
+ KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'IA32_EMULATION', 'is not set'),
+ AND(KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'a13xp0p0v', 'IA32_EMULATION_DEFAULT_DISABLED', 'y'),
+ CmdlineCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'a13xp0p0v', 'ia32_emulation', 'is not set')))]
# 'harden_userspace'
l += [CmdlineCheck('harden_userspace', 'defconfig', 'norandmaps', 'is not set')]
'pti', # See pti_check_boottime_disable() in arch/x86/mm/pti.c
'spectre_v2', # See spectre_v2_parse_cmdline() in arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
'spectre_v2_user', # See spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline() in arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+ 'spectre_bhi', # See spectre_bhi_parse_cmdline() in arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
'spec_store_bypass_disable', # See ssb_parse_cmdline() in arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
'l1tf', # See l1tf_cmdline() in arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
'mds', # See mds_cmdline() in arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
'rodata', # See set_debug_rodata() in init/main.c
'ssbd', # See parse_spectre_v4_param() in arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c
'spec_rstack_overflow', # See srso_parse_cmdline() in arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+ 'gather_data_sampling', # See gds_parse_cmdline() in arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+ 'reg_file_data_sampling', # See rfds_parse_cmdline() in arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
'slub_debug', # See setup_slub_debug() in mm/slub.c
'iommu', # See iommu_setup() in arch/x86/kernel/pci-dma.c
'vsyscall', # See vsyscall_setup() in arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c
]
-def normalize_cmdline_options(option, value):
+def normalize_cmdline_options(option: str, value: str) -> str:
# Don't normalize the cmdline option values if
# the Linux kernel doesn't use kstrtobool() for them
if option in no_kstrtobool_options:
return value
-# TODO: draft of security hardening sysctls:
+# Ideas of security hardening sysctls:
# what about bpf_jit_enable?
# vm.mmap_min_addr has a good value
# nosmt sysfs control file
# kernel.warn_limit (think about a proper value)
# net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies=1 (?)
-def add_sysctl_checks(l, arch):
+def add_sysctl_checks(l: List[ChecklistObjType], _arch: StrOrNone) -> None:
# This function may be called with arch=None
# Calling the SysctlCheck class constructor:
# SysctlCheck(reason, decision, name, expected)
- l += [SysctlCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'net.core.bpf_jit_harden', '2')]
+ # Use an omnipresent kconfig symbol to see if we have a kconfig file for checking
+ have_kconfig = KconfigCheck('-', '-', 'LOCALVERSION', 'is present')
+
+ l += [OR(SysctlCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'net.core.bpf_jit_harden', '2'),
+ AND(KconfigCheck('-', '-', 'BPF_JIT', 'is not set'),
+ have_kconfig))]
l += [SysctlCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'kernel.dmesg_restrict', '1')]
l += [SysctlCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'kernel.perf_event_paranoid', '3')] # with a custom patch, see https://lwn.net/Articles/696216/
- l += [SysctlCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'kernel.kexec_load_disabled', '1')]
- l += [SysctlCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'user.max_user_namespaces', '0')]
+ l += [SysctlCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'user.max_user_namespaces', '0')] # may break the upower daemon in Ubuntu
l += [SysctlCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'dev.tty.ldisc_autoload', '0')]
- l += [SysctlCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled', '1')]
l += [SysctlCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'kernel.kptr_restrict', '2')]
l += [SysctlCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'dev.tty.legacy_tiocsti', '0')]
- l += [SysctlCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'vm.unprivileged_userfaultfd', '0')]
+ l += [OR(SysctlCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'kernel.kexec_load_disabled', '1'),
+ AND(KconfigCheck('-', '-', 'KEXEC_CORE', 'is not set'),
+ have_kconfig))]
+ l += [OR(SysctlCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled', '1'),
+ AND(KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'lockdown', 'BPF_SYSCALL', 'is not set'),
+ have_kconfig))]
+ l += [OR(SysctlCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'vm.unprivileged_userfaultfd', '0'),
+ AND(KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'grsec', 'USERFAULTFD', 'is not set'),
+ have_kconfig))]
# At first, it disabled unprivileged userfaultfd,
# and since v5.11 it enables unprivileged userfaultfd for user-mode only.
- l += [SysctlCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'clipos', 'kernel.modules_disabled', '1')] # radical, but may be useful in some cases
+ l += [OR(SysctlCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'clipos', 'kernel.modules_disabled', '1'),
+ AND(KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'MODULES', 'is not set'),
+ have_kconfig))] # radical, but may be useful in some cases
l += [SysctlCheck('harden_userspace', 'kspp', 'fs.protected_symlinks', '1')]
l += [SysctlCheck('harden_userspace', 'kspp', 'fs.protected_hardlinks', '1')]
projects / kconfig-hardened-check.git / blobdiff