Update the KSPP recommendations in the config_files

[kconfig-hardened-check.git] / kconfig_hardened_check / config_files / kspp-recommendations / kspp-recommendations-x86-32.config

diff --git a/kconfig_hardened_check/config_files/kspp-recommendations/kspp-recommendations-x86-32.config b/kconfig_hardened_check/config_files/kspp-recommendations/kspp-recommendations-x86-32.config
index 477d75c1dd1608cdc313bb723986657518df10fd..ca929985614d977170f30880034db00ca61fe7e5 100644 (file)
--- a/kconfig_hardened_check/config_files/kspp-recommendations/kspp-recommendations-x86-32.config
+++ b/kconfig_hardened_check/config_files/kspp-recommendations/kspp-recommendations-x86-32.config
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 # CONFIGs
-# Linux/i386 5.4.0 Kernel Configuration
+# Linux/i386 5.14.0 Kernel Configuration
 
 # Report BUG() conditions and kill the offending process.
 CONFIG_BUG=y
@@ -68,8 +68,8 @@ CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING_ZERO=y
 CONFIG_INIT_ON_ALLOC_DEFAULT_ON=y
 CONFIG_INIT_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON=y
 
-# Initialize all stack variables on function entry. (Clang builds only. For GCC, see CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL=y below)
-CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL=y
+# Initialize all stack variables on function entry. (Clang and GCC 12+ builds only. For earlier GCC, see CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL=y below)
+CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL_ZERO=y
 
 # Adds guard pages to kernel stacks (not all architectures support this yet).
 CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y
@@ -80,6 +80,27 @@ CONFIG_REFCOUNT_FULL=y
 # Check for memory copies that might overflow a structure in str*() and mem*() functions both at build-time and run-time.
 CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE=y
 
+# Avoid kernel memory address exposures via dmesg (sets sysctl kernel.dmesg_restrict initial value to 1)
+CONFIG_SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT=y
+
+# Randomize kernel stack offset on syscall entry (since v5.13).
+CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET_DEFAULT=y
+
+# Enable sampling-based overflow detection. This is similar to KASAN coverage, but with almost zero runtime overhead.
+CONFIG_KFENCE=y
+
+# Do not ignore compile-time warnings (since v5.15)
+CONFIG_WERROR=y
+
+# Force IOMMU TLB invalidation so devices will never be able to access stale data contents (or set "iommu.passthrough=0 iommu.strict=1" at boot)
+CONFIG_IOMMU_DEFAULT_DMA_STRICT=y
+
+# Make scheduler aware of SMT Cores. Program needs to opt-in to using this feature with prctl(PR_SCHED_CORE).
+CONFIG_SCHED_CORE=y
+
+# Wipe all caller-used registers on exit from the function (reduces available ROP gadgets and minimizes stale data in registers)
+CONFIG_ZERO_CALL_USED_REGS=y
+
 # Dangerous; enabling this allows direct physical memory writing.
 # CONFIG_ACPI_CUSTOM_METHOD is not set
 
@@ -162,6 +183,9 @@ CONFIG_X86_PAE=y
 # Disallow allocating the first 64k of memory.
 CONFIG_DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR=65536
 
+# Disable Model-Specific Register writes.
+# CONFIG_X86_MSR is not set
+
 # Randomize position of kernel.
 CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE=y