Merge pull request #54 from evdenis/master

[kconfig-hardened-check.git] / kconfig_hardened_check / __init__.py

diff --git a/kconfig_hardened_check/__init__.py b/kconfig_hardened_check/__init__.py
index e0f2e010750026204ad512852ccffcbe848e3792..9c709694c84910809b434865ed6d0a46f9f53477 100644 (file)
--- a/kconfig_hardened_check/__init__.py
+++ b/kconfig_hardened_check/__init__.py
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
 #    init_on_free=1 (since v5.3, otherwise slub_debug=P and page_poison=1)
 #    loadpin.enforce=1
 #    debugfs=no-mount (or off if possible)
+#    randomize_kstack_offset=1
 #
 #    Mitigations of CPU vulnerabilities:
 #       Аrch-independent:
@@ -39,6 +40,11 @@
 #           arm64.nobti
 #           arm64.nopauth
 #
+#    Hardware tag-based KASAN with arm64 Memory Tagging Extension (MTE):
+#           kasan=on
+#           kasan.stacktrace=off
+#           kasan.fault=panic
+#
 # N.B. Hardening sysctls:
 #    kernel.kptr_restrict=2 (or 1?)
 #    kernel.dmesg_restrict=1 (also see the kconfig option)
@@ -320,6 +326,7 @@ def construct_checklist(l, arch):
                   iommu_support_is_set)]
     if arch == 'ARM64':
         l += [OptCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'ARM64_PAN', 'y')]
+        l += [OptCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'ARM64_EPAN', 'y')]
         l += [OptCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0', 'y')]
         l += [OR(OptCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS', 'y'),
                  AND(OptCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'RANDOMIZE_BASE', 'y'),
@@ -329,6 +336,7 @@ def construct_checklist(l, arch):
         l += [OptCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'ARM64_BTI_KERNEL', 'y')]
         l += [OR(OptCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR', 'y'),
                  VerCheck((5, 10)))] # HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR is enabled by default since v5.10
+        l += [OptCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'ARM64_MTE', 'y')]
     if arch == 'ARM':
         l += [OptCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'CPU_SW_DOMAIN_PAN', 'y')]
         l += [OptCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR', 'y')]
@@ -415,11 +423,18 @@ def construct_checklist(l, arch):
               OptCheck('self_protection', 'my', 'UBSAN_MISC', 'is not set'),
               OptCheck('self_protection', 'my', 'UBSAN_TRAP', 'y'))]
     l += [OptCheck('self_protection', 'my', 'RESET_ATTACK_MITIGATION', 'y')] # needs userspace support (systemd)
+    if arch in ('X86_64', 'ARM64', 'X86_32'):
+        l += [OptCheck('self_protection', 'my', 'RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET_DEFAULT', 'y')]
     if arch == 'X86_64':
         l += [AND(OptCheck('self_protection', 'my', 'AMD_IOMMU_V2', 'y'),
                   iommu_support_is_set)]
     if arch == 'ARM64':
         l += [OptCheck('self_protection', 'my', 'SHADOW_CALL_STACK', 'y')] # depends on clang, maybe it's alternative to STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG
+        l += [OptCheck('self_protection', 'my', 'KASAN_HW_TAGS', 'y')]
+        cfi_clang_is_set = OptCheck('self_protection', 'my', 'CFI_CLANG', 'y')
+        l += [cfi_clang_is_set]
+        l += [AND(OptCheck('self_protection', 'my', 'CFI_PERMISSIVE', 'is not set'),
+                  cfi_clang_is_set)]
 
     # 'security_policy'
     if arch in ('X86_64', 'ARM64', 'X86_32'):
@@ -495,6 +510,7 @@ def construct_checklist(l, arch):
     l += [OptCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'maintainer', 'DRM_LEGACY', 'is not set')]
     l += [OptCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'maintainer', 'FB', 'is not set')]
     l += [OptCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'maintainer', 'VT', 'is not set')]
+    l += [OptCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'maintainer', 'BLK_DEV_FD', 'is not set')]
 
     # 'cut_attack_surface', 'grapheneos'
     l += [OptCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'grapheneos', 'AIO', 'is not set')]