#
# N.B Hardening command line parameters:
# iommu=force (does it help against DMA attacks?)
-# loadpin.enforce=1
#
# Mitigations of CPU vulnerabilities:
# Аrch-independent:
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'SHUFFLE_PAGE_ALLOCATOR', 'y')]
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'FORTIFY_SOURCE', 'y')]
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'DEBUG_LIST', 'y')]
+ l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'DEBUG_VIRTUAL', 'y')]
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'DEBUG_SG', 'y')]
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'DEBUG_CREDENTIALS', 'y')]
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'DEBUG_NOTIFIERS', 'y')]
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'IOMMU_DEFAULT_DMA_STRICT', 'y')]
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'IOMMU_DEFAULT_PASSTHROUGH', 'is not set')] # true if IOMMU_DEFAULT_DMA_STRICT is set
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'ZERO_CALL_USED_REGS', 'y')]
+ l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'HW_RANDOM_TPM', 'y')]
+ l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'STATIC_USERMODEHELPER', 'y')] # needs userspace support
randstruct_is_set = OR(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'RANDSTRUCT_FULL', 'y'),
KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT', 'y'))
l += [randstruct_is_set]
+ l += [AND(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'RANDSTRUCT_PERFORMANCE', 'is not set'),
+ KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT_PERFORMANCE', 'is not set'),
+ randstruct_is_set)]
hardened_usercopy_is_set = KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'HARDENED_USERCOPY', 'y')
l += [hardened_usercopy_is_set]
l += [AND(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'HARDENED_USERCOPY_FALLBACK', 'is not set'),
# Starting from v5.11 CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING unconditionally checks
# the 0xAA poison pattern on allocation.
# That brings higher performance penalty.
+ l += [OR(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'EFI_DISABLE_PCI_DMA', 'y'),
+ efi_not_set)]
+ l += [OR(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'RESET_ATTACK_MITIGATION', 'y'),
+ efi_not_set)] # needs userspace support (systemd)
+ ubsan_bounds_is_set = KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'UBSAN_BOUNDS', 'y')
+ l += [ubsan_bounds_is_set]
+ l += [OR(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'UBSAN_LOCAL_BOUNDS', 'y'),
+ AND(ubsan_bounds_is_set,
+ cc_is_gcc))]
+ l += [AND(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'UBSAN_TRAP', 'y'),
+ ubsan_bounds_is_set,
+ KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'UBSAN_SHIFT', 'is not set'),
+ KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'UBSAN_DIV_ZERO', 'is not set'),
+ KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'UBSAN_UNREACHABLE', 'is not set'),
+ KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'UBSAN_BOOL', 'is not set'),
+ KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'UBSAN_ENUM', 'is not set'),
+ KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'UBSAN_ALIGNMENT', 'is not set'))] # only array index bounds checking with traps
if arch in ('X86_64', 'ARM64', 'X86_32'):
+ l += [AND(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'UBSAN_SANITIZE_ALL', 'y'),
+ ubsan_bounds_is_set)] # ARCH_HAS_UBSAN_SANITIZE_ALL is not enabled for ARM
stackleak_is_set = KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK', 'y')
l += [AND(stackleak_is_set, gcc_plugins_support_is_set)]
+ l += [AND(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'STACKLEAK_METRICS', 'is not set'),
+ stackleak_is_set,
+ gcc_plugins_support_is_set)]
+ l += [AND(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE', 'is not set'),
+ stackleak_is_set,
+ gcc_plugins_support_is_set)]
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET_DEFAULT', 'y')]
if arch in ('X86_64', 'X86_32'):
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'SCHED_CORE', 'y')]
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'HIGHMEM64G', 'y')]
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'X86_PAE', 'y')]
- # 'self_protection', 'maintainer'
- ubsan_bounds_is_set = KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'maintainer', 'UBSAN_BOUNDS', 'y') # only array index bounds checking
- l += [ubsan_bounds_is_set] # recommended by Kees Cook in /issues/53
- if arch in ('X86_64', 'ARM64', 'X86_32'): # ARCH_HAS_UBSAN_SANITIZE_ALL is not enabled for ARM
- l += [AND(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'maintainer', 'UBSAN_SANITIZE_ALL', 'y'),
- ubsan_bounds_is_set)] # recommended by Kees Cook in /issues/53
- l += [AND(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'maintainer', 'UBSAN_TRAP', 'y'),
- ubsan_bounds_is_set)] # recommended by Kees Cook in /issues/53
-
# 'self_protection', 'clipos'
- l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'clipos', 'DEBUG_VIRTUAL', 'y')]
- l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'clipos', 'STATIC_USERMODEHELPER', 'y')] # needs userspace support
- l += [OR(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'clipos', 'EFI_DISABLE_PCI_DMA', 'y'),
- efi_not_set)]
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'clipos', 'SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT', 'is not set')]
- l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'clipos', 'RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER', 'is not set')]
- l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'clipos', 'RANDOM_TRUST_CPU', 'is not set')]
- l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'clipos', 'CONFIG_HW_RANDOM_TPM', 'y')]
- l += [AND(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'clipos', 'RANDSTRUCT_PERFORMANCE', 'is not set'),
- KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'clipos', 'GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT_PERFORMANCE', 'is not set'),
- randstruct_is_set)]
- if arch in ('X86_64', 'ARM64', 'X86_32'):
- l += [AND(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'clipos', 'STACKLEAK_METRICS', 'is not set'),
- stackleak_is_set,
- gcc_plugins_support_is_set)]
- l += [AND(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'clipos', 'STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE', 'is not set'),
- stackleak_is_set,
- gcc_plugins_support_is_set)]
if arch in ('X86_64', 'X86_32'):
l += [AND(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'clipos', 'INTEL_IOMMU_DEFAULT_ON', 'y'),
iommu_support_is_set)]
iommu_support_is_set)]
# 'self_protection', 'my'
- l += [OR(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'my', 'RESET_ATTACK_MITIGATION', 'y'),
- efi_not_set)] # needs userspace support (systemd)
- l += [OR(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'my', 'UBSAN_LOCAL_BOUNDS', 'y'),
- AND(ubsan_bounds_is_set,
- cc_is_gcc))]
if arch == 'X86_64':
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'my', 'SLS', 'y')] # vs CVE-2021-26341 in Straight-Line-Speculation
l += [AND(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'my', 'AMD_IOMMU_V2', 'y'),
l += [KconfigCheck('security_policy', 'kspp', 'SECURITY_YAMA', 'y')]
l += [KconfigCheck('security_policy', 'kspp', 'SECURITY_LANDLOCK', 'y')]
l += [KconfigCheck('security_policy', 'kspp', 'SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE', 'is not set')]
- l += [KconfigCheck('security_policy', 'clipos', 'SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM', 'y')]
- l += [KconfigCheck('security_policy', 'clipos', 'SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM_EARLY', 'y')]
- l += [KconfigCheck('security_policy', 'clipos', 'LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL_FORCE_CONFIDENTIALITY', 'y')]
- l += [KconfigCheck('security_policy', 'my', 'SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS', 'is not set')] # refers to SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
- l += [KconfigCheck('security_policy', 'my', 'SECURITY_SAFESETID', 'y')]
- loadpin_is_set = KconfigCheck('security_policy', 'my', 'SECURITY_LOADPIN', 'y')
- l += [loadpin_is_set] # needs userspace support
- l += [AND(KconfigCheck('security_policy', 'my', 'SECURITY_LOADPIN_ENFORCE', 'y'),
- loadpin_is_set)]
+ l += [KconfigCheck('security_policy', 'kspp', 'SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM', 'is not set')]
+ l += [KconfigCheck('security_policy', 'kspp', 'SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP', 'is not set')]
+ l += [KconfigCheck('security_policy', 'kspp', 'SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM', 'y')]
+ l += [KconfigCheck('security_policy', 'kspp', 'SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM_EARLY', 'y')]
+ l += [KconfigCheck('security_policy', 'kspp', 'LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL_FORCE_CONFIDENTIALITY', 'y')]
+ l += [KconfigCheck('security_policy', 'kspp', 'SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS', 'is not set')] # refers to SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
# 'cut_attack_surface', 'defconfig'
l += [OR(KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'defconfig', 'BPF_UNPRIV_DEFAULT_OFF', 'y'),
projects / kconfig-hardened-check.git / blobdiff