# N.B Hardening command line parameters:
# iommu=force (does it help against DMA attacks?)
#
-# Mitigations of CPU vulnerabilities:
-# Аrch-independent:
-# X86:
-# l1tf=full,force
-# l1d_flush=on (a part of the l1tf option)
-# mds=full,nosmt
-# tsx=off
-# ARM64:
-# kpti=on
-# ssbd=force-on
-#
-# Should NOT be set:
-# sysrq_always_enabled
-# arm64.nobti
-# arm64.nopauth
-# arm64.nomte
+# The list of disabled mitigations of CPU vulnerabilities:
+# mitigations=off
+# pti=off
+# spectre_v2=off
+# spectre_v2_user=off
+# spec_store_bypass_disable=off
+# l1tf=off
+# mds=off
+# tsx_async_abort=off
+# srbds=off
+# mmio_stale_data=off
+# retbleed=off
+# nopti
+# nokaslr
+# nospectre_v1
+# nospectre_v2
+# nospectre_bhb
+# nospec_store_bypass_disable
+# kpti=0
+# ssbd=force-off
+# nosmt (enabled)
#
# Hardware tag-based KASAN with arm64 Memory Tagging Extension (MTE):
# kasan=on
if self.expected == 'is not off':
if self.state == 'off':
self.result = 'FAIL: is off'
+ if self.state == '0':
+ self.result = 'FAIL: is off, "0"'
elif self.state is None:
self.result = 'FAIL: is off, not found'
else:
self.result = 'FAIL: {} is not "{}"'.format(opt.name, opt.expected)
elif opt.result == 'FAIL: is not present':
self.result = 'FAIL: {} is not present'.format(opt.name)
- elif opt.result == 'FAIL: is off':
+ elif opt.result == 'FAIL: is off' or opt.result == 'FAIL: is off, "0"':
self.result = 'FAIL: {} is off'.format(opt.name)
elif opt.result == 'FAIL: is off, not found':
self.result = 'FAIL: {} is off, not found'.format(opt.name)
# 'self_protection', 'defconfig'
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'BUG', 'y')]
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'SLUB_DEBUG', 'y')]
+ l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'THREAD_INFO_IN_TASK', 'y')]
gcc_plugins_support_is_set = KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'GCC_PLUGINS', 'y')
l += [gcc_plugins_support_is_set]
+ iommu_support_is_set = KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'IOMMU_SUPPORT', 'y')
+ l += [iommu_support_is_set] # is needed for mitigating DMA attacks
l += [OR(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'STACKPROTECTOR', 'y'),
KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'CC_STACKPROTECTOR', 'y'),
KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'CC_STACKPROTECTOR_REGULAR', 'y'),
modules_not_set)] # DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX was before v4.11
l += [OR(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'REFCOUNT_FULL', 'y'),
VersionCheck((5, 5)))] # REFCOUNT_FULL is enabled by default since v5.5
- l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'THREAD_INFO_IN_TASK', 'y')]
- iommu_support_is_set = KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'IOMMU_SUPPORT', 'y')
- l += [iommu_support_is_set] # is needed for mitigating DMA attacks
if arch in ('X86_64', 'ARM64', 'X86_32'):
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'RANDOMIZE_BASE', 'y')]
if arch in ('X86_64', 'ARM64'):
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'X86_MCE_AMD', 'y')]
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'MICROCODE', 'y')] # is needed for mitigating CPU bugs
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'RETPOLINE', 'y')]
+ l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'SYN_COOKIES', 'y')] # another reason?
l += [OR(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'X86_SMAP', 'y'),
VersionCheck((5, 19)))] # X86_SMAP is enabled by default since v5.19
- l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'SYN_COOKIES', 'y')] # another reason?
l += [OR(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'X86_UMIP', 'y'),
KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'X86_INTEL_UMIP', 'y'))]
if arch in ('ARM64', 'ARM'):
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'ARM64_EPAN', 'y')]
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0', 'y')]
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'ARM64_E0PD', 'y')]
- l += [OR(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS', 'y'),
- AND(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'RANDOMIZE_BASE', 'y'),
- VersionCheck((5, 9))))] # HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS was included in RANDOMIZE_BASE in v5.9
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'RODATA_FULL_DEFAULT_ENABLED', 'y')]
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL', 'y')]
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'ARM64_BTI_KERNEL', 'y')]
- l += [OR(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR', 'y'),
- VersionCheck((5, 10)))] # HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR is enabled by default since v5.10
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY', 'y')]
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'ARM64_MTE', 'y')]
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL', 'y')]
+ l += [OR(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS', 'y'),
+ AND(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'RANDOMIZE_BASE', 'y'),
+ VersionCheck((5, 9))))] # HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS was included in RANDOMIZE_BASE in v5.9
+ l += [OR(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR', 'y'),
+ VersionCheck((5, 10)))] # HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR is enabled by default since v5.10
if arch == 'ARM':
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'CPU_SW_DOMAIN_PAN', 'y')]
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR', 'y')]
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'DEBUG_CREDENTIALS', 'y')]
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'DEBUG_NOTIFIERS', 'y')]
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'INIT_ON_ALLOC_DEFAULT_ON', 'y')]
- l += [AND(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY', 'y'),
- gcc_plugins_support_is_set)]
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'KFENCE', 'y')]
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'WERROR', 'y')]
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'IOMMU_DEFAULT_DMA_STRICT', 'y')]
hardened_usercopy_is_set)]
l += [AND(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'HARDENED_USERCOPY_PAGESPAN', 'is not set'),
hardened_usercopy_is_set)]
+ l += [AND(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY', 'y'),
+ gcc_plugins_support_is_set)]
l += [OR(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'MODULE_SIG', 'y'),
modules_not_set)]
l += [OR(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'MODULE_SIG_ALL', 'y'),
l += [KconfigCheck('security_policy', 'kspp', 'SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS', 'is not set')] # refers to SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
# 'cut_attack_surface', 'defconfig'
- l += [OR(KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'defconfig', 'BPF_UNPRIV_DEFAULT_OFF', 'y'),
- bpf_syscall_not_set)] # see unprivileged_bpf_disabled
l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'defconfig', 'SECCOMP', 'y')]
l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'defconfig', 'SECCOMP_FILTER', 'y')]
+ l += [OR(KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'defconfig', 'BPF_UNPRIV_DEFAULT_OFF', 'y'),
+ bpf_syscall_not_set)] # see unprivileged_bpf_disabled
if arch in ('X86_64', 'ARM64', 'X86_32'):
l += [OR(KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'defconfig', 'STRICT_DEVMEM', 'y'),
devmem_not_set)] # refers to LOCKDOWN
+ if arch in ('X86_64', 'X86_32'):
+ l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'defconfig', 'X86_INTEL_TSX_MODE_OFF', 'y')] # tsx=off
# 'cut_attack_surface', 'kspp'
l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT', 'y')]
devmem_not_set)] # refers to LOCKDOWN
l += [AND(KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'LDISC_AUTOLOAD', 'is not set'),
KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'LDISC_AUTOLOAD', 'is present'))]
+ if arch == 'X86_64':
+ l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'LEGACY_VSYSCALL_NONE', 'y')] # 'vsyscall=none'
if arch == 'ARM':
l += [OR(KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'STRICT_DEVMEM', 'y'),
devmem_not_set)] # refers to LOCKDOWN
- if arch == 'X86_64':
- l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'LEGACY_VSYSCALL_NONE', 'y')] # 'vsyscall=none'
# 'cut_attack_surface', 'grsec'
l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'grsec', 'ZSMALLOC_STAT', 'is not set')]
# 'cut_attack_surface', 'clipos'
l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'clipos', 'STAGING', 'is not set')]
l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'clipos', 'KSM', 'is not set')] # to prevent FLUSH+RELOAD attack
-# l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'clipos', 'IKCONFIG', 'is not set')] # no, IKCONFIG is needed for this check :)
l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'clipos', 'KALLSYMS', 'is not set')]
l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'clipos', 'X86_VSYSCALL_EMULATION', 'is not set')]
l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'clipos', 'MAGIC_SYSRQ', 'is not set')]
l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'clipos', 'ACPI_TABLE_UPGRADE', 'is not set')] # refers to LOCKDOWN
l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'clipos', 'EFI_CUSTOM_SSDT_OVERLAYS', 'is not set')]
l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'clipos', 'COREDUMP', 'is not set')] # cut userspace attack surface
- if arch in ('X86_64', 'X86_32'):
- l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'clipos', 'X86_INTEL_TSX_MODE_OFF', 'y')] # tsx=off
+# l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'clipos', 'IKCONFIG', 'is not set')] # no, IKCONFIG is needed for this check :)
# 'cut_attack_surface', 'lockdown'
- l += [bpf_syscall_not_set] # refers to LOCKDOWN
l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'lockdown', 'EFI_TEST', 'is not set')] # refers to LOCKDOWN
l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'lockdown', 'MMIOTRACE_TEST', 'is not set')] # refers to LOCKDOWN
l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'lockdown', 'KPROBES', 'is not set')] # refers to LOCKDOWN
+ l += [bpf_syscall_not_set] # refers to LOCKDOWN
# 'cut_attack_surface', 'my'
- l += [OR(KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'my', 'TRIM_UNUSED_KSYMS', 'y'),
- modules_not_set)]
l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'my', 'MMIOTRACE', 'is not set')] # refers to LOCKDOWN (permissive)
l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'my', 'LIVEPATCH', 'is not set')]
l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'my', 'IP_DCCP', 'is not set')]
l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'my', 'VIDEO_VIVID', 'is not set')]
l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'my', 'INPUT_EVBUG', 'is not set')] # Can be used as a keylogger
l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'my', 'KGDB', 'is not set')]
+ l += [OR(KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'my', 'TRIM_UNUSED_KSYMS', 'y'),
+ modules_not_set)]
# 'harden_userspace'
if arch in ('X86_64', 'ARM64', 'X86_32'):
l += [CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'nopti', 'is not set')]
l += [CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'nospectre_v1', 'is not set')]
l += [CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'nospectre_v2', 'is not set')]
+ l += [CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'nospectre_bhb', 'is not set')]
l += [CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'nospec_store_bypass_disable', 'is not set')]
+ l += [CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'arm64.nobti', 'is not set')]
+ l += [CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'arm64.nopauth', 'is not set')]
+ l += [CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'arm64.nomte', 'is not set')]
l += [OR(CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'mitigations', 'is not off'),
CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'mitigations', 'is not set'))]
l += [OR(CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'spectre_v2', 'is not off'),
CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'spectre_v2', 'is not set'))]
+ l += [OR(CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'spectre_v2_user', 'is not off'),
+ CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'spectre_v2_user', 'is not set'))]
l += [OR(CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'spec_store_bypass_disable', 'is not off'),
CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'spec_store_bypass_disable', 'is not set'))]
+ l += [OR(CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'l1tf', 'is not off'),
+ CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'l1tf', 'is not set'))]
+ l += [OR(CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'mds', 'is not off'),
+ CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'mds', 'is not set'))]
+ l += [OR(CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'tsx_async_abort', 'is not off'),
+ CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'tsx_async_abort', 'is not set'))]
+ l += [OR(CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'srbds', 'is not off'),
+ CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'srbds', 'is not set'))]
+ l += [OR(CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'mmio_stale_data', 'is not off'),
+ CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'mmio_stale_data', 'is not set'))]
+ l += [OR(CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'retbleed', 'is not off'),
+ CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'retbleed', 'is not set'))]
+ l += [OR(CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'kpti', 'is not off'),
+ CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'kpti', 'is not set'))]
if arch == 'ARM64':
+ l += [OR(CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'ssbd', 'kernel'),
+ CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'my', 'ssbd', 'force-on'),
+ CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'ssbd', 'is not set'))]
l += [OR(CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'rodata', 'full'),
AND(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'RODATA_FULL_DEFAULT_ENABLED', 'y'),
CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'rodata', 'is not set')))]
# 'self_protection', 'clipos'
l += [CmdlineCheck('self_protection', 'clipos', 'page_alloc.shuffle', '1')]
+ # 'cut_attack_surface', 'defconfig'
+ if arch in ('X86_64', 'X86_32'):
+ l += [OR(CmdlineCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'defconfig', 'tsx', 'off'),
+ AND(KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'defconfig', 'X86_INTEL_TSX_MODE_OFF', 'y'),
+ CmdlineCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'defconfig', 'tsx', 'is not set')))]
+
# 'cut_attack_surface', 'kspp'
if arch == 'X86_64':
l += [OR(CmdlineCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'vsyscall', 'none'),
l += [OR(CmdlineCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'grsec', 'debugfs', 'off'),
KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'grsec', 'DEBUG_FS', 'is not set'))] # ... the end
+ # 'cut_attack_surface', 'my'
+ l += [CmdlineCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'my', 'sysrq_always_enabled', 'is not set')]
def print_unknown_options(checklist, parsed_options):
known_options = []
if option == 'spectre_v2':
# See spectre_v2_parse_cmdline() in arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
return value
+ if option == 'spectre_v2_user':
+ # See spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline() in arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+ return value
if option == 'spec_store_bypass_disable':
# See ssb_parse_cmdline() in arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
return value
+ if option == 'l1tf':
+ # See l1tf_cmdline() in arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+ return value
+ if option == 'mds':
+ # See mds_cmdline() in arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+ return value
+ if option == 'tsx_async_abort':
+ # See tsx_async_abort_parse_cmdline() in arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+ return value
+ if option == 'srbds':
+ # See srbds_parse_cmdline() in arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+ return value
+ if option == 'mmio_stale_data':
+ # See mmio_stale_data_parse_cmdline() in arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+ return value
+ if option == 'retbleed':
+ # See retbleed_parse_cmdline() in arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+ return value
+ if option == 'tsx':
+ # See tsx_init() in arch/x86/kernel/cpu/tsx.c
+ return value
# Implement a limited part of the kstrtobool() logic
if value in ('1', 'on', 'On', 'ON', 'y', 'Y', 'yes', 'Yes', 'YES'):
projects / kconfig-hardened-check.git / blobdiff