#
#
# N.B Hardening command line parameters:
-# slub_debug=FZP
# slab_nomerge
# page_alloc.shuffle=1
# iommu=force (does it help against DMA attacks?)
-# page_poison=1 (if enabled)
-# init_on_alloc=1
-# init_on_free=1
+# slub_debug=FZ (slow)
+# init_on_alloc=1 (since v5.3)
+# init_on_free=1 (since v5.3, otherwise slub_debug=P and page_poison=1)
# loadpin.enforce=1
+# debugfs=no-mount (or off if possible)
#
# Mitigations of CPU vulnerabilities:
# Аrch-independent:
-# mitigations=auto,nosmt
+# mitigations=auto,nosmt (nosmt is slow)
# X86:
# spectre_v2=on
# pti=on
class ComplexOptCheck:
def __init__(self, *opts):
self.opts = opts
+ if not self.opts:
+ sys.exit('[!] ERROR: empty {} check'.format(self.__class__.__name__))
+ if not isinstance(opts[0], OptCheck):
+ sys.exit('[!] ERROR: invalid {} check: {}'.format(self.__class__.__name__, opts))
self.result = None
@property
for i, opt in enumerate(self.opts):
ret = opt.check()
if ret:
- if i == 0 or not hasattr(opt, 'expected'):
+ if opt.result != 'OK' or i == 0:
+ # Preserve additional explanation of this OK result.
+ # Simple OK is enough only for the main option that
+ # this OR-check is about.
self.result = opt.result
else:
+ # Simple OK is not enough for additional checks.
self.result = 'OK: CONFIG_{} "{}"'.format(opt.name, opt.expected)
return True
self.result = self.opts[0].result
self.result = opt.result
return ret
if not ret:
- if hasattr(opt, 'expected'):
+ # This FAIL is caused by additional checks,
+ # and not by the main option that this AND-check is about.
+ # Describe the reason of the FAIL.
+ if opt.result.startswith('FAIL: \"') or opt.result == 'FAIL: not found':
self.result = 'FAIL: CONFIG_{} not "{}"'.format(opt.name, opt.expected)
+ elif opt.result == 'FAIL: not present':
+ self.result = 'FAIL: CONFIG_{} not present'.format(opt.name)
else:
+ # This FAIL message is self-explaining.
self.result = opt.result
return False
if arch == 'ARM64':
l += [OptCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'ARM64_PAN', 'y')]
l += [OptCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0', 'y')]
- l += [OptCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS', 'y')]
+ l += [OR(OptCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS', 'y'),
+ AND(OptCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'RANDOMIZE_BASE', 'y'),
+ VerCheck((5, 9))))] # HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS was included in RANDOMIZE_BASE in v5.9
l += [OptCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'RODATA_FULL_DEFAULT_ENABLED', 'y')]
l += [OptCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'ARM64_PTR_AUTH', 'y')]
+ l += [OptCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'ARM64_BTI_KERNEL', 'y')]
if arch in ('X86_64', 'ARM64'):
l += [OptCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'VMAP_STACK', 'y')]
if arch in ('X86_64', 'ARM64', 'X86_32'):
if arch == 'ARM':
l += [OptCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'CPU_SW_DOMAIN_PAN', 'y')]
l += [OptCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'STACKPROTECTOR_PER_TASK', 'y')]
- if arch in ('ARM64', 'ARM'):
+ if arch == 'ARM64':
+ l += [OR(OptCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR', 'y'),
+ VerCheck((5, 10)))] # HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR is enabled by default since v5.10
+ if arch == 'ARM':
l += [OptCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR', 'y')]
# 'self_protection', 'kspp'
modules_not_set)]
l += [OR(OptCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'MODULE_SIG_FORCE', 'y'),
modules_not_set)] # refers to LOCKDOWN
- l += [OR(OptCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'INIT_STACK_ALL', 'y'),
+ l += [OR(OptCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'INIT_STACK_ALL_ZERO', 'y'),
OptCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL', 'y'))]
l += [OR(OptCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'INIT_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON', 'y'),
- OptCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'PAGE_POISONING', 'y'))] # before v5.3
+ OptCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'PAGE_POISONING_ZERO', 'y'))] # before v5.3
if arch in ('X86_64', 'ARM64', 'X86_32'):
stackleak_is_set = OptCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK', 'y')
l += [stackleak_is_set]
iommu_support_is_set)]
# 'self_protection', 'my'
- l += [OptCheck('self_protection', 'my', 'SLUB_DEBUG_ON', 'y')]
+ l += [AND(OptCheck('self_protection', 'my', 'UBSAN_BOUNDS', 'y'),
+ OptCheck('self_protection', 'my', 'UBSAN_MISC', 'is not set'),
+ OptCheck('self_protection', 'my', 'UBSAN_TRAP', 'y'))]
l += [OptCheck('self_protection', 'my', 'RESET_ATTACK_MITIGATION', 'y')] # needs userspace support (systemd)
if arch == 'X86_64':
l += [AND(OptCheck('self_protection', 'my', 'AMD_IOMMU_V2', 'y'),
iommu_support_is_set)]
+ if arch == 'ARM64':
+ l += [OptCheck('self_protection', 'my', 'SHADOW_CALL_STACK', 'y')] # maybe it should be alternative to STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG
# 'security_policy'
if arch in ('X86_64', 'ARM64', 'X86_32'):
l += [OptCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'clipos', 'X86_CPUID', 'is not set')]
l += [OptCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'clipos', 'IO_URING', 'is not set')]
l += [OptCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'clipos', 'X86_IOPL_IOPERM', 'is not set')] # refers to LOCKDOWN
+ l += [OptCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'clipos', 'ACPI_TABLE_UPGRADE', 'is not set')] # refers to LOCKDOWN
+ l += [OptCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'clipos', 'EFI_CUSTOM_SSDT_OVERLAYS', 'is not set')]
l += [AND(OptCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'clipos', 'LDISC_AUTOLOAD', 'is not set'),
PresenceCheck('LDISC_AUTOLOAD'))]
if arch in ('X86_64', 'X86_32'):
l += [OptCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'clipos', 'X86_INTEL_TSX_MODE_OFF', 'y')] # tsx=off
# 'cut_attack_surface', 'lockdown'
- l += [OptCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'lockdown', 'ACPI_TABLE_UPGRADE', 'is not set')] # refers to LOCKDOWN
l += [OptCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'lockdown', 'EFI_TEST', 'is not set')] # refers to LOCKDOWN
l += [OptCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'lockdown', 'BPF_SYSCALL', 'is not set')] # refers to LOCKDOWN
l += [OptCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'lockdown', 'MMIOTRACE_TEST', 'is not set')] # refers to LOCKDOWN
# 'cut_attack_surface', 'my'
+ l += [OptCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'my', 'TRIM_UNUSED_KSYMS', 'y')]
l += [OptCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'my', 'MMIOTRACE', 'is not set')] # refers to LOCKDOWN (permissive)
l += [OptCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'my', 'LIVEPATCH', 'is not set')]
l += [OptCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'my', 'IP_DCCP', 'is not set')]
l += [OptCheck('userspace_hardening', 'defconfig', 'INTEGRITY', 'y')]
if arch == 'ARM':
l += [OptCheck('userspace_hardening', 'my', 'INTEGRITY', 'y')]
+ if arch == 'ARM64':
+ l += [OptCheck('userspace_hardening', 'defconfig', 'ARM64_MTE', 'y')]
if arch in ('ARM', 'X86_32'):
l += [OptCheck('userspace_hardening', 'defconfig', 'VMSPLIT_3G', 'y')]
if arch in ('X86_64', 'ARM64'):
print('[+] Config check is finished: \'OK\' - {}{} / \'FAIL\' - {}{}'.format(ok_count, ok_suppressed, fail_count, fail_suppressed))
+def perform_check(opt, parsed_options, kernel_version):
+ if hasattr(opt, 'opts'):
+ # prepare ComplexOptCheck
+ for o in opt.opts:
+ if hasattr(o, 'opts'):
+ # Recursion for nested ComplexOptChecks
+ perform_check(o, parsed_options, kernel_version)
+ if hasattr(o, 'state'):
+ o.state = parsed_options.get(o.name, None)
+ if hasattr(o, 'ver'):
+ o.ver = kernel_version
+ else:
+ # prepare simple check, opt.state is mandatory
+ if not hasattr(opt, 'state'):
+ sys.exit('[!] ERROR: bad simple check {}'.format(vars(opt)))
+ opt.state = parsed_options.get(opt.name, None)
+ opt.check()
+
+
def perform_checks(checklist, parsed_options, kernel_version):
for opt in checklist:
- if hasattr(opt, 'opts'):
- # prepare ComplexOptCheck
- for o in opt.opts:
- if hasattr(o, 'state'):
- o.state = parsed_options.get(o.name, None)
- if hasattr(o, 'ver'):
- o.ver = kernel_version
- else:
- # prepare simple check
- if not hasattr(opt, 'state'):
- sys.exit('[!] ERROR: bad simple check {}'.format(vars(opt)))
- opt.state = parsed_options.get(opt.name, None)
- opt.check()
+ perform_check(opt, parsed_options, kernel_version)
def parse_config_file(parsed_options, fname):
projects / kconfig-hardened-check.git / blobdiff