if arch == 'ARM64':
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN', 'y')]
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'SHADOW_CALL_STACK', 'y')]
+ l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'UNWIND_PATCH_PAC_INTO_SCS', 'y')]
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'KASAN_HW_TAGS', 'y')] # see also: kasan=on, kasan.stacktrace=off, kasan.fault=panic
if arch == 'X86_32':
l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION', 'y')]
# SysctlCheck(reason, decision, name, expected)
# Use an omnipresent kconfig symbol to see if we have a kconfig file for checking
- have_config_file = KconfigCheck('-', '-', 'LOCALVERSION', 'is present')
+ have_kconfig = KconfigCheck('-', '-', 'LOCALVERSION', 'is present')
l += [OR(SysctlCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'net.core.bpf_jit_harden', '2'),
AND(KconfigCheck('-', '-', 'BPF_JIT', 'is not set'),
- have_config_file))]
+ have_kconfig))]
l += [SysctlCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'kernel.dmesg_restrict', '1')]
l += [SysctlCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'kernel.perf_event_paranoid', '3')] # with a custom patch, see https://lwn.net/Articles/696216/
- l += [OR(SysctlCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'kernel.kexec_load_disabled', '1'),
- AND(KconfigCheck('-', '-', 'KEXEC_CORE', 'is not set'),
- have_config_file))]
l += [SysctlCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'user.max_user_namespaces', '0')] # may break the upower daemon in Ubuntu
l += [SysctlCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'dev.tty.ldisc_autoload', '0')]
- l += [OR(SysctlCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled', '1'),
- AND(KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'lockdown', 'BPF_SYSCALL', 'is not set'),
- have_config_file))]
l += [SysctlCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'kernel.kptr_restrict', '2')]
l += [SysctlCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'dev.tty.legacy_tiocsti', '0')]
+ l += [OR(SysctlCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'kernel.kexec_load_disabled', '1'),
+ AND(KconfigCheck('-', '-', 'KEXEC_CORE', 'is not set'),
+ have_kconfig))]
+ l += [OR(SysctlCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled', '1'),
+ AND(KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'lockdown', 'BPF_SYSCALL', 'is not set'),
+ have_kconfig))]
l += [OR(SysctlCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'vm.unprivileged_userfaultfd', '0'),
AND(KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'grsec', 'USERFAULTFD', 'is not set'),
- have_config_file))]
+ have_kconfig))]
# At first, it disabled unprivileged userfaultfd,
# and since v5.11 it enables unprivileged userfaultfd for user-mode only.
- l += [OR(SysctlCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'clipos', 'kernel.modules_disabled', '1'), # radical, but may be useful in some cases
+ l += [OR(SysctlCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'clipos', 'kernel.modules_disabled', '1'),
AND(KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'MODULES', 'is not set'),
- have_config_file))]
+ have_kconfig))] # radical, but may be useful in some cases
l += [SysctlCheck('harden_userspace', 'kspp', 'fs.protected_symlinks', '1')]
l += [SysctlCheck('harden_userspace', 'kspp', 'fs.protected_hardlinks', '1')]