2 * Simplified MAC Kernel (smack) security module
4 * This file contains the smack hook function implementations.
7 * Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
8 * Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@intel.com>
10 * Copyright (C) 2007 Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
12 * Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
13 * Copyright (C) 2010 Nokia Corporation
14 * Copyright (C) 2011 Intel Corporation.
16 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
17 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
18 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
21 #include <linux/xattr.h>
22 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
23 #include <linux/mount.h>
24 #include <linux/stat.h>
26 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
28 #include <linux/tcp.h>
29 #include <linux/udp.h>
30 #include <linux/dccp.h>
31 #include <linux/slab.h>
32 #include <linux/mutex.h>
33 #include <linux/pipe_fs_i.h>
34 #include <net/cipso_ipv4.h>
37 #include <linux/audit.h>
38 #include <linux/magic.h>
39 #include <linux/dcache.h>
40 #include <linux/personality.h>
41 #include <linux/msg.h>
42 #include <linux/shm.h>
43 #include <linux/binfmts.h>
44 #include <linux/parser.h>
47 #define TRANS_TRUE "TRUE"
48 #define TRANS_TRUE_SIZE 4
50 #define SMK_CONNECTING 0
51 #define SMK_RECEIVING 1
54 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
55 static LIST_HEAD(smk_ipv6_port_list);
57 static struct kmem_cache *smack_inode_cache;
60 static const match_table_t smk_mount_tokens = {
61 {Opt_fsdefault, SMK_FSDEFAULT "%s"},
62 {Opt_fsfloor, SMK_FSFLOOR "%s"},
63 {Opt_fshat, SMK_FSHAT "%s"},
64 {Opt_fsroot, SMK_FSROOT "%s"},
65 {Opt_fstransmute, SMK_FSTRANS "%s"},
69 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
70 static char *smk_bu_mess[] = {
71 "Bringup Error", /* Unused */
72 "Bringup", /* SMACK_BRINGUP_ALLOW */
73 "Unconfined Subject", /* SMACK_UNCONFINED_SUBJECT */
74 "Unconfined Object", /* SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT */
77 static void smk_bu_mode(int mode, char *s)
87 if (mode & MAY_APPEND)
89 if (mode & MAY_TRANSMUTE)
99 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
100 static int smk_bu_note(char *note, struct smack_known *sskp,
101 struct smack_known *oskp, int mode, int rc)
103 char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
107 if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
110 smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
111 pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
112 sskp->smk_known, oskp->smk_known, acc, note);
116 #define smk_bu_note(note, sskp, oskp, mode, RC) (RC)
119 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
120 static int smk_bu_current(char *note, struct smack_known *oskp,
123 struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
124 char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
128 if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
131 smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
132 pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) %s %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
133 tsp->smk_task->smk_known, oskp->smk_known,
134 acc, current->comm, note);
138 #define smk_bu_current(note, oskp, mode, RC) (RC)
141 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
142 static int smk_bu_task(struct task_struct *otp, int mode, int rc)
144 struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
145 struct smack_known *smk_task = smk_of_task_struct(otp);
146 char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
150 if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
153 smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
154 pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) %s to %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
155 tsp->smk_task->smk_known, smk_task->smk_known, acc,
156 current->comm, otp->comm);
160 #define smk_bu_task(otp, mode, RC) (RC)
163 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
164 static int smk_bu_inode(struct inode *inode, int mode, int rc)
166 struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
167 struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
168 char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
170 if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_IMPURE)
171 pr_info("Smack Unconfined Corruption: inode=(%s %ld) %s\n",
172 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, current->comm);
176 if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
178 if (rc == SMACK_UNCONFINED_SUBJECT &&
179 (mode & (MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND)))
180 isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_IMPURE;
182 smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
184 pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) inode=(%s %ld) %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
185 tsp->smk_task->smk_known, isp->smk_inode->smk_known, acc,
186 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, current->comm);
190 #define smk_bu_inode(inode, mode, RC) (RC)
193 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
194 static int smk_bu_file(struct file *file, int mode, int rc)
196 struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
197 struct smack_known *sskp = tsp->smk_task;
198 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
199 struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
200 char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
202 if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_IMPURE)
203 pr_info("Smack Unconfined Corruption: inode=(%s %ld) %s\n",
204 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, current->comm);
208 if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
211 smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
212 pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) file=(%s %ld %pD) %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
213 sskp->smk_known, smk_of_inode(inode)->smk_known, acc,
214 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, file,
219 #define smk_bu_file(file, mode, RC) (RC)
222 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
223 static int smk_bu_credfile(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file,
226 struct task_smack *tsp = cred->security;
227 struct smack_known *sskp = tsp->smk_task;
228 struct inode *inode = file->f_inode;
229 struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
230 char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
232 if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_IMPURE)
233 pr_info("Smack Unconfined Corruption: inode=(%s %ld) %s\n",
234 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, current->comm);
238 if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
241 smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
242 pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) file=(%s %ld %pD) %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
243 sskp->smk_known, smk_of_inode(inode)->smk_known, acc,
244 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, file,
249 #define smk_bu_credfile(cred, file, mode, RC) (RC)
253 * smk_fetch - Fetch the smack label from a file.
254 * @name: type of the label (attribute)
255 * @ip: a pointer to the inode
256 * @dp: a pointer to the dentry
258 * Returns a pointer to the master list entry for the Smack label,
259 * NULL if there was no label to fetch, or an error code.
261 static struct smack_known *smk_fetch(const char *name, struct inode *ip,
266 struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
268 if (!(ip->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR))
269 return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);
271 buffer = kzalloc(SMK_LONGLABEL, GFP_NOFS);
273 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
275 rc = __vfs_getxattr(dp, ip, name, buffer, SMK_LONGLABEL);
281 skp = smk_import_entry(buffer, rc);
289 * new_inode_smack - allocate an inode security blob
290 * @skp: a pointer to the Smack label entry to use in the blob
292 * Returns the new blob or NULL if there's no memory available
294 static struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(struct smack_known *skp)
296 struct inode_smack *isp;
298 isp = kmem_cache_zalloc(smack_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
302 isp->smk_inode = skp;
304 mutex_init(&isp->smk_lock);
310 * new_task_smack - allocate a task security blob
311 * @task: a pointer to the Smack label for the running task
312 * @forked: a pointer to the Smack label for the forked task
313 * @gfp: type of the memory for the allocation
315 * Returns the new blob or NULL if there's no memory available
317 static struct task_smack *new_task_smack(struct smack_known *task,
318 struct smack_known *forked, gfp_t gfp)
320 struct task_smack *tsp;
322 tsp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_smack), gfp);
326 tsp->smk_task = task;
327 tsp->smk_forked = forked;
328 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tsp->smk_rules);
329 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tsp->smk_relabel);
330 mutex_init(&tsp->smk_rules_lock);
336 * smk_copy_rules - copy a rule set
337 * @nhead: new rules header pointer
338 * @ohead: old rules header pointer
339 * @gfp: type of the memory for the allocation
341 * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM on error
343 static int smk_copy_rules(struct list_head *nhead, struct list_head *ohead,
346 struct smack_rule *nrp;
347 struct smack_rule *orp;
350 INIT_LIST_HEAD(nhead);
352 list_for_each_entry_rcu(orp, ohead, list) {
353 nrp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct smack_rule), gfp);
359 list_add_rcu(&nrp->list, nhead);
365 * smk_copy_relabel - copy smk_relabel labels list
366 * @nhead: new rules header pointer
367 * @ohead: old rules header pointer
368 * @gfp: type of the memory for the allocation
370 * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM on error
372 static int smk_copy_relabel(struct list_head *nhead, struct list_head *ohead,
375 struct smack_known_list_elem *nklep;
376 struct smack_known_list_elem *oklep;
378 INIT_LIST_HEAD(nhead);
380 list_for_each_entry(oklep, ohead, list) {
381 nklep = kzalloc(sizeof(struct smack_known_list_elem), gfp);
383 smk_destroy_label_list(nhead);
386 nklep->smk_label = oklep->smk_label;
387 list_add(&nklep->list, nhead);
394 * smk_ptrace_mode - helper function for converting PTRACE_MODE_* into MAY_*
395 * @mode - input mode in form of PTRACE_MODE_*
397 * Returns a converted MAY_* mode usable by smack rules
399 static inline unsigned int smk_ptrace_mode(unsigned int mode)
401 if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH)
402 return MAY_READWRITE;
403 if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ)
410 * smk_ptrace_rule_check - helper for ptrace access
411 * @tracer: tracer process
412 * @tracee_known: label entry of the process that's about to be traced
413 * @mode: ptrace attachment mode (PTRACE_MODE_*)
414 * @func: name of the function that called us, used for audit
416 * Returns 0 on access granted, -error on error
418 static int smk_ptrace_rule_check(struct task_struct *tracer,
419 struct smack_known *tracee_known,
420 unsigned int mode, const char *func)
423 struct smk_audit_info ad, *saip = NULL;
424 struct task_smack *tsp;
425 struct smack_known *tracer_known;
427 if ((mode & PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT) == 0) {
428 smk_ad_init(&ad, func, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
429 smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, tracer);
434 tsp = __task_cred(tracer)->security;
435 tracer_known = smk_of_task(tsp);
437 if ((mode & PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH) &&
438 (smack_ptrace_rule == SMACK_PTRACE_EXACT ||
439 smack_ptrace_rule == SMACK_PTRACE_DRACONIAN)) {
440 if (tracer_known->smk_known == tracee_known->smk_known)
442 else if (smack_ptrace_rule == SMACK_PTRACE_DRACONIAN)
444 else if (capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
450 smack_log(tracer_known->smk_known,
451 tracee_known->smk_known,
458 /* In case of rule==SMACK_PTRACE_DEFAULT or mode==PTRACE_MODE_READ */
459 rc = smk_tskacc(tsp, tracee_known, smk_ptrace_mode(mode), saip);
467 * We he, that is fun!
471 * smack_ptrace_access_check - Smack approval on PTRACE_ATTACH
472 * @ctp: child task pointer
473 * @mode: ptrace attachment mode (PTRACE_MODE_*)
475 * Returns 0 if access is OK, an error code otherwise
477 * Do the capability checks.
479 static int smack_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode)
481 struct smack_known *skp;
483 skp = smk_of_task_struct(ctp);
485 return smk_ptrace_rule_check(current, skp, mode, __func__);
489 * smack_ptrace_traceme - Smack approval on PTRACE_TRACEME
490 * @ptp: parent task pointer
492 * Returns 0 if access is OK, an error code otherwise
494 * Do the capability checks, and require PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH.
496 static int smack_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *ptp)
499 struct smack_known *skp;
501 skp = smk_of_task(current_security());
503 rc = smk_ptrace_rule_check(ptp, skp, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH, __func__);
508 * smack_syslog - Smack approval on syslog
509 * @type: message type
511 * Returns 0 on success, error code otherwise.
513 static int smack_syslog(int typefrom_file)
516 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
518 if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
521 if (smack_syslog_label != NULL && smack_syslog_label != skp)
533 * smack_sb_alloc_security - allocate a superblock blob
534 * @sb: the superblock getting the blob
536 * Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error.
538 static int smack_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
540 struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
542 sbsp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_smack), GFP_KERNEL);
547 sbsp->smk_root = &smack_known_floor;
548 sbsp->smk_default = &smack_known_floor;
549 sbsp->smk_floor = &smack_known_floor;
550 sbsp->smk_hat = &smack_known_hat;
552 * SMK_SB_INITIALIZED will be zero from kzalloc.
554 sb->s_security = sbsp;
560 * smack_sb_free_security - free a superblock blob
561 * @sb: the superblock getting the blob
564 static void smack_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
566 kfree(sb->s_security);
567 sb->s_security = NULL;
571 * smack_sb_copy_data - copy mount options data for processing
572 * @orig: where to start
573 * @smackopts: mount options string
575 * Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error.
577 * Copy the Smack specific mount options out of the mount
580 static int smack_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *smackopts)
582 char *cp, *commap, *otheropts, *dp;
584 otheropts = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
585 if (otheropts == NULL)
588 for (cp = orig, commap = orig; commap != NULL; cp = commap + 1) {
589 if (strstr(cp, SMK_FSDEFAULT) == cp)
591 else if (strstr(cp, SMK_FSFLOOR) == cp)
593 else if (strstr(cp, SMK_FSHAT) == cp)
595 else if (strstr(cp, SMK_FSROOT) == cp)
597 else if (strstr(cp, SMK_FSTRANS) == cp)
602 commap = strchr(cp, ',');
611 strcpy(orig, otheropts);
612 free_page((unsigned long)otheropts);
618 * smack_parse_opts_str - parse Smack specific mount options
619 * @options: mount options string
620 * @opts: where to store converted mount opts
622 * Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error.
624 * converts Smack specific mount options to generic security option format
626 static int smack_parse_opts_str(char *options,
627 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
630 char *fsdefault = NULL;
631 char *fsfloor = NULL;
634 char *fstransmute = NULL;
636 int num_mnt_opts = 0;
639 opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
644 while ((p = strsep(&options, ",")) != NULL) {
645 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
650 token = match_token(p, smk_mount_tokens, args);
656 fsdefault = match_strdup(&args[0]);
663 fsfloor = match_strdup(&args[0]);
670 fshat = match_strdup(&args[0]);
677 fsroot = match_strdup(&args[0]);
681 case Opt_fstransmute:
684 fstransmute = match_strdup(&args[0]);
690 pr_warn("Smack: unknown mount option\n");
695 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SMK_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
699 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SMK_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int),
701 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
702 kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
707 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fsdefault;
708 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSDEFAULT_MNT;
711 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fsfloor;
712 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSFLOOR_MNT;
715 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fshat;
716 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSHAT_MNT;
719 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fsroot;
720 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSROOT_MNT;
723 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fstransmute;
724 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSTRANS_MNT;
727 opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
732 pr_warn("Smack: duplicate mount options\n");
744 * smack_set_mnt_opts - set Smack specific mount options
745 * @sb: the file system superblock
746 * @opts: Smack mount options
747 * @kern_flags: mount option from kernel space or user space
748 * @set_kern_flags: where to store converted mount opts
750 * Returns 0 on success, an error code on failure
752 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set Smack mount
755 static int smack_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
756 struct security_mnt_opts *opts,
757 unsigned long kern_flags,
758 unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
760 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
761 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(root);
762 struct superblock_smack *sp = sb->s_security;
763 struct inode_smack *isp;
764 struct smack_known *skp;
766 int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
769 if (sp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_INITIALIZED)
772 sp->smk_flags |= SMK_SB_INITIALIZED;
774 for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
775 switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
777 skp = smk_import_entry(opts->mnt_opts[i], 0);
780 sp->smk_default = skp;
783 skp = smk_import_entry(opts->mnt_opts[i], 0);
789 skp = smk_import_entry(opts->mnt_opts[i], 0);
795 skp = smk_import_entry(opts->mnt_opts[i], 0);
801 skp = smk_import_entry(opts->mnt_opts[i], 0);
812 if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
814 * Unprivileged mounts don't get to specify Smack values.
819 * Unprivileged mounts get root and default from the caller.
821 skp = smk_of_current();
823 sp->smk_default = skp;
825 * For a handful of fs types with no user-controlled
826 * backing store it's okay to trust security labels
827 * in the filesystem. The rest are untrusted.
829 if (sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns &&
830 sb->s_magic != SYSFS_MAGIC && sb->s_magic != TMPFS_MAGIC &&
831 sb->s_magic != RAMFS_MAGIC) {
833 sp->smk_flags |= SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED;
838 * Initialize the root inode.
840 isp = inode->i_security;
842 isp = new_inode_smack(sp->smk_root);
845 inode->i_security = isp;
847 isp->smk_inode = sp->smk_root;
850 isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
856 * smack_sb_kern_mount - Smack specific mount processing
857 * @sb: the file system superblock
858 * @flags: the mount flags
859 * @data: the smack mount options
861 * Returns 0 on success, an error code on failure
863 static int smack_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
866 char *options = data;
867 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
869 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
874 rc = smack_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
879 rc = smack_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts, 0, NULL);
882 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
887 * smack_sb_statfs - Smack check on statfs
888 * @dentry: identifies the file system in question
890 * Returns 0 if current can read the floor of the filesystem,
891 * and error code otherwise
893 static int smack_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
895 struct superblock_smack *sbp = dentry->d_sb->s_security;
897 struct smk_audit_info ad;
899 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
900 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
902 rc = smk_curacc(sbp->smk_floor, MAY_READ, &ad);
903 rc = smk_bu_current("statfs", sbp->smk_floor, MAY_READ, rc);
912 * smack_bprm_set_creds - set creds for exec
913 * @bprm: the exec information
915 * Returns 0 if it gets a blob, -EPERM if exec forbidden and -ENOMEM otherwise
917 static int smack_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
919 struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file);
920 struct task_smack *bsp = bprm->cred->security;
921 struct inode_smack *isp;
922 struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
925 if (bprm->cred_prepared)
928 isp = inode->i_security;
929 if (isp->smk_task == NULL || isp->smk_task == bsp->smk_task)
932 sbsp = inode->i_sb->s_security;
933 if ((sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED) &&
934 isp->smk_task != sbsp->smk_root)
937 if (bprm->unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
938 struct task_struct *tracer;
942 tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
943 if (likely(tracer != NULL))
944 rc = smk_ptrace_rule_check(tracer,
953 if (bprm->unsafe & ~LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE)
956 bsp->smk_task = isp->smk_task;
957 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
963 * smack_bprm_committing_creds - Prepare to install the new credentials
966 * @bprm: binprm for exec
968 static void smack_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
970 struct task_smack *bsp = bprm->cred->security;
972 if (bsp->smk_task != bsp->smk_forked)
973 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
977 * smack_bprm_secureexec - Return the decision to use secureexec.
978 * @bprm: binprm for exec
980 * Returns 0 on success.
982 static int smack_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
984 struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
986 if (tsp->smk_task != tsp->smk_forked)
997 * smack_inode_alloc_security - allocate an inode blob
998 * @inode: the inode in need of a blob
1000 * Returns 0 if it gets a blob, -ENOMEM otherwise
1002 static int smack_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
1004 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
1006 inode->i_security = new_inode_smack(skp);
1007 if (inode->i_security == NULL)
1013 * smack_inode_free_security - free an inode blob
1014 * @inode: the inode with a blob
1016 * Clears the blob pointer in inode
1018 static void smack_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
1020 kmem_cache_free(smack_inode_cache, inode->i_security);
1021 inode->i_security = NULL;
1025 * smack_inode_init_security - copy out the smack from an inode
1026 * @inode: the newly created inode
1027 * @dir: containing directory object
1029 * @name: where to put the attribute name
1030 * @value: where to put the attribute value
1031 * @len: where to put the length of the attribute
1033 * Returns 0 if it all works out, -ENOMEM if there's no memory
1035 static int smack_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
1036 const struct qstr *qstr, const char **name,
1037 void **value, size_t *len)
1039 struct inode_smack *issp = inode->i_security;
1040 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
1041 struct smack_known *isp = smk_of_inode(inode);
1042 struct smack_known *dsp = smk_of_inode(dir);
1046 *name = XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX;
1050 may = smk_access_entry(skp->smk_known, dsp->smk_known,
1055 * If the access rule allows transmutation and
1056 * the directory requests transmutation then
1057 * by all means transmute.
1058 * Mark the inode as changed.
1060 if (may > 0 && ((may & MAY_TRANSMUTE) != 0) &&
1061 smk_inode_transmutable(dir)) {
1063 issp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_CHANGED;
1066 *value = kstrdup(isp->smk_known, GFP_NOFS);
1070 *len = strlen(isp->smk_known);
1077 * smack_inode_link - Smack check on link
1078 * @old_dentry: the existing object
1080 * @new_dentry: the new object
1082 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1084 static int smack_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir,
1085 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1087 struct smack_known *isp;
1088 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1091 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1092 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, old_dentry);
1094 isp = smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(old_dentry));
1095 rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1096 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(old_dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
1098 if (rc == 0 && d_is_positive(new_dentry)) {
1099 isp = smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(new_dentry));
1100 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, new_dentry);
1101 rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1102 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(new_dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
1109 * smack_inode_unlink - Smack check on inode deletion
1110 * @dir: containing directory object
1111 * @dentry: file to unlink
1113 * Returns 0 if current can write the containing directory
1114 * and the object, error code otherwise
1116 static int smack_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
1118 struct inode *ip = d_backing_inode(dentry);
1119 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1122 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1123 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
1126 * You need write access to the thing you're unlinking
1128 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(ip), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1129 rc = smk_bu_inode(ip, MAY_WRITE, rc);
1132 * You also need write access to the containing directory
1134 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE);
1135 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, dir);
1136 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dir), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1137 rc = smk_bu_inode(dir, MAY_WRITE, rc);
1143 * smack_inode_rmdir - Smack check on directory deletion
1144 * @dir: containing directory object
1145 * @dentry: directory to unlink
1147 * Returns 0 if current can write the containing directory
1148 * and the directory, error code otherwise
1150 static int smack_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
1152 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1155 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1156 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
1159 * You need write access to the thing you're removing
1161 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1162 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
1165 * You also need write access to the containing directory
1167 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE);
1168 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, dir);
1169 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dir), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1170 rc = smk_bu_inode(dir, MAY_WRITE, rc);
1177 * smack_inode_rename - Smack check on rename
1178 * @old_inode: unused
1179 * @old_dentry: the old object
1180 * @new_inode: unused
1181 * @new_dentry: the new object
1183 * Read and write access is required on both the old and
1186 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1188 static int smack_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode,
1189 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1190 struct inode *new_inode,
1191 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1194 struct smack_known *isp;
1195 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1197 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1198 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, old_dentry);
1200 isp = smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(old_dentry));
1201 rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
1202 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(old_dentry), MAY_READWRITE, rc);
1204 if (rc == 0 && d_is_positive(new_dentry)) {
1205 isp = smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(new_dentry));
1206 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, new_dentry);
1207 rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
1208 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(new_dentry), MAY_READWRITE, rc);
1214 * smack_inode_permission - Smack version of permission()
1215 * @inode: the inode in question
1216 * @mask: the access requested
1218 * This is the important Smack hook.
1220 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, -EACCES otherwise
1222 static int smack_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
1224 struct superblock_smack *sbsp = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1225 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1226 int no_block = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
1229 mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND);
1231 * No permission to check. Existence test. Yup, it's there.
1236 if (sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED) {
1237 if (smk_of_inode(inode) != sbsp->smk_root)
1241 /* May be droppable after audit */
1244 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE);
1245 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, inode);
1246 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), mask, &ad);
1247 rc = smk_bu_inode(inode, mask, rc);
1252 * smack_inode_setattr - Smack check for setting attributes
1253 * @dentry: the object
1254 * @iattr: for the force flag
1256 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1258 static int smack_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
1260 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1264 * Need to allow for clearing the setuid bit.
1266 if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
1268 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1269 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
1271 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1272 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
1277 * smack_inode_getattr - Smack check for getting attributes
1278 * @mnt: vfsmount of the object
1279 * @dentry: the object
1281 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1283 static int smack_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
1285 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1286 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(path->dentry);
1289 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1290 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, *path);
1291 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_READ, &ad);
1292 rc = smk_bu_inode(inode, MAY_READ, rc);
1297 * smack_inode_setxattr - Smack check for setting xattrs
1298 * @dentry: the object
1299 * @name: name of the attribute
1300 * @value: value of the attribute
1301 * @size: size of the value
1304 * This protects the Smack attribute explicitly.
1306 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1308 static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
1309 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
1311 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1312 struct smack_known *skp;
1314 int check_import = 0;
1319 * Check label validity here so import won't fail in post_setxattr
1321 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 ||
1322 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN) == 0 ||
1323 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0) {
1326 } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 ||
1327 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) {
1331 } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0) {
1333 if (size != TRANS_TRUE_SIZE ||
1334 strncmp(value, TRANS_TRUE, TRANS_TRUE_SIZE) != 0)
1337 rc = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
1339 if (check_priv && !smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
1342 if (rc == 0 && check_import) {
1343 skp = size ? smk_import_entry(value, size) : NULL;
1346 else if (skp == NULL || (check_star &&
1347 (skp == &smack_known_star || skp == &smack_known_web)))
1351 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1352 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
1355 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1356 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
1363 * smack_inode_post_setxattr - Apply the Smack update approved above
1365 * @name: attribute name
1366 * @value: attribute value
1367 * @size: attribute size
1370 * Set the pointer in the inode blob to the entry found
1371 * in the master label list.
1373 static void smack_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
1374 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
1376 struct smack_known *skp;
1377 struct inode_smack *isp = d_backing_inode(dentry)->i_security;
1379 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0) {
1380 isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
1384 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0) {
1385 skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
1387 isp->smk_inode = skp;
1389 isp->smk_inode = &smack_known_invalid;
1390 } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0) {
1391 skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
1393 isp->smk_task = skp;
1395 isp->smk_task = &smack_known_invalid;
1396 } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) {
1397 skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
1399 isp->smk_mmap = skp;
1401 isp->smk_mmap = &smack_known_invalid;
1408 * smack_inode_getxattr - Smack check on getxattr
1409 * @dentry: the object
1412 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1414 static int smack_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
1416 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1419 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1420 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
1422 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_READ, &ad);
1423 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_READ, rc);
1428 * smack_inode_removexattr - Smack check on removexattr
1429 * @dentry: the object
1430 * @name: name of the attribute
1432 * Removing the Smack attribute requires CAP_MAC_ADMIN
1434 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1436 static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
1438 struct inode_smack *isp;
1439 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1442 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 ||
1443 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN) == 0 ||
1444 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0 ||
1445 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 ||
1446 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0 ||
1447 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) {
1448 if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
1451 rc = cap_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
1456 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1457 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
1459 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1460 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
1464 isp = d_backing_inode(dentry)->i_security;
1466 * Don't do anything special for these.
1467 * XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN
1468 * XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT
1470 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0) {
1471 struct super_block *sbp = dentry->d_sb;
1472 struct superblock_smack *sbsp = sbp->s_security;
1474 isp->smk_inode = sbsp->smk_default;
1475 } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0)
1476 isp->smk_task = NULL;
1477 else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0)
1478 isp->smk_mmap = NULL;
1479 else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0)
1480 isp->smk_flags &= ~SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
1486 * smack_inode_getsecurity - get smack xattrs
1487 * @inode: the object
1488 * @name: attribute name
1489 * @buffer: where to put the result
1490 * @alloc: duplicate memory
1492 * Returns the size of the attribute or an error code
1494 static int smack_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode,
1495 const char *name, void **buffer,
1498 struct socket_smack *ssp;
1499 struct socket *sock;
1500 struct super_block *sbp;
1501 struct inode *ip = (struct inode *)inode;
1502 struct smack_known *isp;
1504 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0)
1505 isp = smk_of_inode(inode);
1508 * The rest of the Smack xattrs are only on sockets.
1511 if (sbp->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC)
1514 sock = SOCKET_I(ip);
1515 if (sock == NULL || sock->sk == NULL)
1518 ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
1520 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
1522 else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT) == 0)
1529 *buffer = kstrdup(isp->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
1530 if (*buffer == NULL)
1534 return strlen(isp->smk_known);
1539 * smack_inode_listsecurity - list the Smack attributes
1540 * @inode: the object
1541 * @buffer: where they go
1542 * @buffer_size: size of buffer
1544 static int smack_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer,
1547 int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SMACK);
1549 if (buffer != NULL && len <= buffer_size)
1550 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SMACK, len);
1556 * smack_inode_getsecid - Extract inode's security id
1557 * @inode: inode to extract the info from
1558 * @secid: where result will be saved
1560 static void smack_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
1562 struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
1564 *secid = isp->smk_inode->smk_secid;
1572 * There is no smack_file_permission hook
1574 * Should access checks be done on each read or write?
1575 * UNICOS and SELinux say yes.
1576 * Trusted Solaris, Trusted Irix, and just about everyone else says no.
1578 * I'll say no for now. Smack does not do the frequent
1579 * label changing that SELinux does.
1583 * smack_file_alloc_security - assign a file security blob
1586 * The security blob for a file is a pointer to the master
1587 * label list, so no allocation is done.
1589 * f_security is the owner security information. It
1590 * isn't used on file access checks, it's for send_sigio.
1594 static int smack_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
1596 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
1598 file->f_security = skp;
1603 * smack_file_free_security - clear a file security blob
1606 * The security blob for a file is a pointer to the master
1607 * label list, so no memory is freed.
1609 static void smack_file_free_security(struct file *file)
1611 file->f_security = NULL;
1615 * smack_file_ioctl - Smack check on ioctls
1620 * Relies heavily on the correct use of the ioctl command conventions.
1622 * Returns 0 if allowed, error code otherwise
1624 static int smack_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
1628 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1629 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1631 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1632 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1634 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE) {
1635 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1636 rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_WRITE, rc);
1639 if (rc == 0 && (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ)) {
1640 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_READ, &ad);
1641 rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_READ, rc);
1648 * smack_file_lock - Smack check on file locking
1652 * Returns 0 if current has lock access, error code otherwise
1654 static int smack_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
1656 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1658 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1660 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1661 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1662 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_LOCK, &ad);
1663 rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_LOCK, rc);
1668 * smack_file_fcntl - Smack check on fcntl
1670 * @cmd: what action to check
1673 * Generally these operations are harmless.
1674 * File locking operations present an obvious mechanism
1675 * for passing information, so they require write access.
1677 * Returns 0 if current has access, error code otherwise
1679 static int smack_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
1682 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1684 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1691 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1692 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1693 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_LOCK, &ad);
1694 rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_LOCK, rc);
1698 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1699 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1700 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1701 rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_WRITE, rc);
1712 * Check permissions for a mmap operation. The @file may be NULL, e.g.
1713 * if mapping anonymous memory.
1714 * @file contains the file structure for file to map (may be NULL).
1715 * @reqprot contains the protection requested by the application.
1716 * @prot contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel.
1717 * @flags contains the operational flags.
1718 * Return 0 if permission is granted.
1720 static int smack_mmap_file(struct file *file,
1721 unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot,
1722 unsigned long flags)
1724 struct smack_known *skp;
1725 struct smack_known *mkp;
1726 struct smack_rule *srp;
1727 struct task_smack *tsp;
1728 struct smack_known *okp;
1729 struct inode_smack *isp;
1730 struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
1739 isp = file_inode(file)->i_security;
1740 if (isp->smk_mmap == NULL)
1742 sbsp = file_inode(file)->i_sb->s_security;
1743 if (sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED &&
1744 isp->smk_mmap != sbsp->smk_root)
1746 mkp = isp->smk_mmap;
1748 tsp = current_security();
1749 skp = smk_of_current();
1754 * For each Smack rule associated with the subject
1755 * label verify that the SMACK64MMAP also has access
1756 * to that rule's object label.
1758 list_for_each_entry_rcu(srp, &skp->smk_rules, list) {
1759 okp = srp->smk_object;
1761 * Matching labels always allows access.
1763 if (mkp->smk_known == okp->smk_known)
1766 * If there is a matching local rule take
1767 * that into account as well.
1769 may = smk_access_entry(srp->smk_subject->smk_known,
1773 may = srp->smk_access;
1775 may &= srp->smk_access;
1777 * If may is zero the SMACK64MMAP subject can't
1778 * possibly have less access.
1784 * Fetch the global list entry.
1785 * If there isn't one a SMACK64MMAP subject
1786 * can't have as much access as current.
1788 mmay = smk_access_entry(mkp->smk_known, okp->smk_known,
1790 if (mmay == -ENOENT) {
1795 * If there is a local entry it modifies the
1796 * potential access, too.
1798 tmay = smk_access_entry(mkp->smk_known, okp->smk_known,
1800 if (tmay != -ENOENT)
1804 * If there is any access available to current that is
1805 * not available to a SMACK64MMAP subject
1808 if ((may | mmay) != mmay) {
1820 * smack_file_set_fowner - set the file security blob value
1821 * @file: object in question
1824 static void smack_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
1826 file->f_security = smk_of_current();
1830 * smack_file_send_sigiotask - Smack on sigio
1831 * @tsk: The target task
1832 * @fown: the object the signal come from
1835 * Allow a privileged task to get signals even if it shouldn't
1837 * Returns 0 if a subject with the object's smack could
1838 * write to the task, an error code otherwise.
1840 static int smack_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
1841 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
1843 struct smack_known *skp;
1844 struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task(tsk->cred->security);
1847 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1850 * struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file
1852 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
1854 /* we don't log here as rc can be overriden */
1855 skp = file->f_security;
1856 rc = smk_access(skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, NULL);
1857 rc = smk_bu_note("sigiotask", skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, rc);
1858 if (rc != 0 && has_capability(tsk, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
1861 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
1862 smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, tsk);
1863 smack_log(skp->smk_known, tkp->smk_known, MAY_DELIVER, rc, &ad);
1868 * smack_file_receive - Smack file receive check
1871 * Returns 0 if current has access, error code otherwise
1873 static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file)
1877 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1878 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1879 struct socket *sock;
1880 struct task_smack *tsp;
1881 struct socket_smack *ssp;
1883 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1886 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1887 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1889 if (S_ISSOCK(inode->i_mode)) {
1890 sock = SOCKET_I(inode);
1891 ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
1892 tsp = current_security();
1894 * If the receiving process can't write to the
1895 * passed socket or if the passed socket can't
1896 * write to the receiving process don't accept
1897 * the passed socket.
1899 rc = smk_access(tsp->smk_task, ssp->smk_out, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1900 rc = smk_bu_file(file, may, rc);
1903 rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_in, tsp->smk_task, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1904 rc = smk_bu_file(file, may, rc);
1908 * This code relies on bitmasks.
1910 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1912 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)
1915 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), may, &ad);
1916 rc = smk_bu_file(file, may, rc);
1921 * smack_file_open - Smack dentry open processing
1923 * @cred: task credential
1925 * Set the security blob in the file structure.
1926 * Allow the open only if the task has read access. There are
1927 * many read operations (e.g. fstat) that you can do with an
1928 * fd even if you have the file open write-only.
1932 static int smack_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
1934 struct task_smack *tsp = cred->security;
1935 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1936 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1939 if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
1942 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1943 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1944 rc = smk_access(tsp->smk_task, smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_READ, &ad);
1945 rc = smk_bu_credfile(cred, file, MAY_READ, rc);
1955 * smack_cred_alloc_blank - "allocate" blank task-level security credentials
1956 * @new: the new credentials
1957 * @gfp: the atomicity of any memory allocations
1959 * Prepare a blank set of credentials for modification. This must allocate all
1960 * the memory the LSM module might require such that cred_transfer() can
1961 * complete without error.
1963 static int smack_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
1965 struct task_smack *tsp;
1967 tsp = new_task_smack(NULL, NULL, gfp);
1971 cred->security = tsp;
1978 * smack_cred_free - "free" task-level security credentials
1979 * @cred: the credentials in question
1982 static void smack_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
1984 struct task_smack *tsp = cred->security;
1985 struct smack_rule *rp;
1986 struct list_head *l;
1987 struct list_head *n;
1991 cred->security = NULL;
1993 smk_destroy_label_list(&tsp->smk_relabel);
1995 list_for_each_safe(l, n, &tsp->smk_rules) {
1996 rp = list_entry(l, struct smack_rule, list);
1997 list_del(&rp->list);
2004 * smack_cred_prepare - prepare new set of credentials for modification
2005 * @new: the new credentials
2006 * @old: the original credentials
2007 * @gfp: the atomicity of any memory allocations
2009 * Prepare a new set of credentials for modification.
2011 static int smack_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
2014 struct task_smack *old_tsp = old->security;
2015 struct task_smack *new_tsp;
2018 new_tsp = new_task_smack(old_tsp->smk_task, old_tsp->smk_task, gfp);
2019 if (new_tsp == NULL)
2022 rc = smk_copy_rules(&new_tsp->smk_rules, &old_tsp->smk_rules, gfp);
2026 rc = smk_copy_relabel(&new_tsp->smk_relabel, &old_tsp->smk_relabel,
2031 new->security = new_tsp;
2036 * smack_cred_transfer - Transfer the old credentials to the new credentials
2037 * @new: the new credentials
2038 * @old: the original credentials
2040 * Fill in a set of blank credentials from another set of credentials.
2042 static void smack_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
2044 struct task_smack *old_tsp = old->security;
2045 struct task_smack *new_tsp = new->security;
2047 new_tsp->smk_task = old_tsp->smk_task;
2048 new_tsp->smk_forked = old_tsp->smk_task;
2049 mutex_init(&new_tsp->smk_rules_lock);
2050 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&new_tsp->smk_rules);
2053 /* cbs copy rule list */
2057 * smack_kernel_act_as - Set the subjective context in a set of credentials
2058 * @new: points to the set of credentials to be modified.
2059 * @secid: specifies the security ID to be set
2061 * Set the security data for a kernel service.
2063 static int smack_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
2065 struct task_smack *new_tsp = new->security;
2066 struct smack_known *skp = smack_from_secid(secid);
2071 new_tsp->smk_task = skp;
2076 * smack_kernel_create_files_as - Set the file creation label in a set of creds
2077 * @new: points to the set of credentials to be modified
2078 * @inode: points to the inode to use as a reference
2080 * Set the file creation context in a set of credentials to the same
2081 * as the objective context of the specified inode
2083 static int smack_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new,
2084 struct inode *inode)
2086 struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
2087 struct task_smack *tsp = new->security;
2089 tsp->smk_forked = isp->smk_inode;
2090 tsp->smk_task = tsp->smk_forked;
2095 * smk_curacc_on_task - helper to log task related access
2096 * @p: the task object
2097 * @access: the access requested
2098 * @caller: name of the calling function for audit
2100 * Return 0 if access is permitted
2102 static int smk_curacc_on_task(struct task_struct *p, int access,
2105 struct smk_audit_info ad;
2106 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct(p);
2109 smk_ad_init(&ad, caller, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
2110 smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, p);
2111 rc = smk_curacc(skp, access, &ad);
2112 rc = smk_bu_task(p, access, rc);
2117 * smack_task_setpgid - Smack check on setting pgid
2118 * @p: the task object
2121 * Return 0 if write access is permitted
2123 static int smack_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
2125 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
2129 * smack_task_getpgid - Smack access check for getpgid
2130 * @p: the object task
2132 * Returns 0 if current can read the object task, error code otherwise
2134 static int smack_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
2136 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ, __func__);
2140 * smack_task_getsid - Smack access check for getsid
2141 * @p: the object task
2143 * Returns 0 if current can read the object task, error code otherwise
2145 static int smack_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
2147 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ, __func__);
2151 * smack_task_getsecid - get the secid of the task
2152 * @p: the object task
2153 * @secid: where to put the result
2155 * Sets the secid to contain a u32 version of the smack label.
2157 static void smack_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
2159 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct(p);
2161 *secid = skp->smk_secid;
2165 * smack_task_setnice - Smack check on setting nice
2166 * @p: the task object
2169 * Return 0 if write access is permitted
2171 static int smack_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
2173 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
2177 * smack_task_setioprio - Smack check on setting ioprio
2178 * @p: the task object
2181 * Return 0 if write access is permitted
2183 static int smack_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
2185 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
2189 * smack_task_getioprio - Smack check on reading ioprio
2190 * @p: the task object
2192 * Return 0 if read access is permitted
2194 static int smack_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
2196 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ, __func__);
2200 * smack_task_setscheduler - Smack check on setting scheduler
2201 * @p: the task object
2205 * Return 0 if read access is permitted
2207 static int smack_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
2209 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
2213 * smack_task_getscheduler - Smack check on reading scheduler
2214 * @p: the task object
2216 * Return 0 if read access is permitted
2218 static int smack_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
2220 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ, __func__);
2224 * smack_task_movememory - Smack check on moving memory
2225 * @p: the task object
2227 * Return 0 if write access is permitted
2229 static int smack_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
2231 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
2235 * smack_task_kill - Smack check on signal delivery
2236 * @p: the task object
2239 * @secid: identifies the smack to use in lieu of current's
2241 * Return 0 if write access is permitted
2243 * The secid behavior is an artifact of an SELinux hack
2244 * in the USB code. Someday it may go away.
2246 static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
2249 struct smk_audit_info ad;
2250 struct smack_known *skp;
2251 struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task_struct(p);
2255 return 0; /* null signal; existence test */
2257 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
2258 smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, p);
2260 * Sending a signal requires that the sender
2261 * can write the receiver.
2264 rc = smk_curacc(tkp, MAY_DELIVER, &ad);
2265 rc = smk_bu_task(p, MAY_DELIVER, rc);
2269 * If the secid isn't 0 we're dealing with some USB IO
2270 * specific behavior. This is not clean. For one thing
2271 * we can't take privilege into account.
2273 skp = smack_from_secid(secid);
2274 rc = smk_access(skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, &ad);
2275 rc = smk_bu_note("USB signal", skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, rc);
2280 * smack_task_to_inode - copy task smack into the inode blob
2281 * @p: task to copy from
2282 * @inode: inode to copy to
2284 * Sets the smack pointer in the inode security blob
2286 static void smack_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode)
2288 struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
2289 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct(p);
2291 isp->smk_inode = skp;
2292 isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_INSTANT;
2300 * smack_sk_alloc_security - Allocate a socket blob
2303 * @gfp_flags: memory allocation flags
2305 * Assign Smack pointers to current
2307 * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM is there's no memory
2309 static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags)
2311 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
2312 struct socket_smack *ssp;
2314 ssp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct socket_smack), gfp_flags);
2320 ssp->smk_packet = NULL;
2322 sk->sk_security = ssp;
2328 * smack_sk_free_security - Free a socket blob
2331 * Clears the blob pointer
2333 static void smack_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
2335 kfree(sk->sk_security);
2339 * smack_ipv4host_label - check host based restrictions
2340 * @sip: the object end
2342 * looks for host based access restrictions
2344 * This version will only be appropriate for really small sets of single label
2345 * hosts. The caller is responsible for ensuring that the RCU read lock is
2346 * taken before calling this function.
2348 * Returns the label of the far end or NULL if it's not special.
2350 static struct smack_known *smack_ipv4host_label(struct sockaddr_in *sip)
2352 struct smk_net4addr *snp;
2353 struct in_addr *siap = &sip->sin_addr;
2355 if (siap->s_addr == 0)
2358 list_for_each_entry_rcu(snp, &smk_net4addr_list, list)
2360 * we break after finding the first match because
2361 * the list is sorted from longest to shortest mask
2362 * so we have found the most specific match
2364 if (snp->smk_host.s_addr ==
2365 (siap->s_addr & snp->smk_mask.s_addr))
2366 return snp->smk_label;
2371 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
2373 * smk_ipv6_localhost - Check for local ipv6 host address
2376 * Returns boolean true if this is the localhost address
2378 static bool smk_ipv6_localhost(struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)
2380 __be16 *be16p = (__be16 *)&sip->sin6_addr;
2381 __be32 *be32p = (__be32 *)&sip->sin6_addr;
2383 if (be32p[0] == 0 && be32p[1] == 0 && be32p[2] == 0 && be16p[6] == 0 &&
2384 ntohs(be16p[7]) == 1)
2390 * smack_ipv6host_label - check host based restrictions
2391 * @sip: the object end
2393 * looks for host based access restrictions
2395 * This version will only be appropriate for really small sets of single label
2396 * hosts. The caller is responsible for ensuring that the RCU read lock is
2397 * taken before calling this function.
2399 * Returns the label of the far end or NULL if it's not special.
2401 static struct smack_known *smack_ipv6host_label(struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)
2403 struct smk_net6addr *snp;
2404 struct in6_addr *sap = &sip->sin6_addr;
2409 * It's local. Don't look for a host label.
2411 if (smk_ipv6_localhost(sip))
2414 list_for_each_entry_rcu(snp, &smk_net6addr_list, list) {
2416 * we break after finding the first match because
2417 * the list is sorted from longest to shortest mask
2418 * so we have found the most specific match
2420 for (found = 1, i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
2422 * If the label is NULL the entry has
2423 * been renounced. Ignore it.
2425 if (snp->smk_label == NULL)
2427 if ((sap->s6_addr16[i] & snp->smk_mask.s6_addr16[i]) !=
2428 snp->smk_host.s6_addr16[i]) {
2434 return snp->smk_label;
2439 #endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
2442 * smack_netlabel - Set the secattr on a socket
2444 * @labeled: socket label scheme
2446 * Convert the outbound smack value (smk_out) to a
2447 * secattr and attach it to the socket.
2449 * Returns 0 on success or an error code
2451 static int smack_netlabel(struct sock *sk, int labeled)
2453 struct smack_known *skp;
2454 struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
2458 * Usually the netlabel code will handle changing the
2459 * packet labeling based on the label.
2460 * The case of a single label host is different, because
2461 * a single label host should never get a labeled packet
2462 * even though the label is usually associated with a packet
2466 bh_lock_sock_nested(sk);
2468 if (ssp->smk_out == smack_net_ambient ||
2469 labeled == SMACK_UNLABELED_SOCKET)
2470 netlbl_sock_delattr(sk);
2473 rc = netlbl_sock_setattr(sk, sk->sk_family, &skp->smk_netlabel);
2483 * smack_netlbel_send - Set the secattr on a socket and perform access checks
2485 * @sap: the destination address
2487 * Set the correct secattr for the given socket based on the destination
2488 * address and perform any outbound access checks needed.
2490 * Returns 0 on success or an error code.
2493 static int smack_netlabel_send(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in *sap)
2495 struct smack_known *skp;
2498 struct smack_known *hkp;
2499 struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
2500 struct smk_audit_info ad;
2503 hkp = smack_ipv4host_label(sap);
2506 struct lsm_network_audit net;
2508 smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
2509 ad.a.u.net->family = sap->sin_family;
2510 ad.a.u.net->dport = sap->sin_port;
2511 ad.a.u.net->v4info.daddr = sap->sin_addr.s_addr;
2513 sk_lbl = SMACK_UNLABELED_SOCKET;
2515 rc = smk_access(skp, hkp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
2516 rc = smk_bu_note("IPv4 host check", skp, hkp, MAY_WRITE, rc);
2518 sk_lbl = SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET;
2525 return smack_netlabel(sk, sk_lbl);
2528 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
2530 * smk_ipv6_check - check Smack access
2531 * @subject: subject Smack label
2532 * @object: object Smack label
2534 * @act: the action being taken
2536 * Check an IPv6 access
2538 static int smk_ipv6_check(struct smack_known *subject,
2539 struct smack_known *object,
2540 struct sockaddr_in6 *address, int act)
2543 struct lsm_network_audit net;
2545 struct smk_audit_info ad;
2549 smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
2550 ad.a.u.net->family = PF_INET6;
2551 ad.a.u.net->dport = address->sin6_port;
2552 if (act == SMK_RECEIVING)
2553 ad.a.u.net->v6info.saddr = address->sin6_addr;
2555 ad.a.u.net->v6info.daddr = address->sin6_addr;
2557 rc = smk_access(subject, object, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
2558 rc = smk_bu_note("IPv6 check", subject, object, MAY_WRITE, rc);
2561 #endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
2563 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
2565 * smk_ipv6_port_label - Smack port access table management
2569 * Create or update the port list entry
2571 static void smk_ipv6_port_label(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address)
2573 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
2574 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6;
2575 struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
2576 struct smk_port_label *spp;
2577 unsigned short port = 0;
2579 if (address == NULL) {
2581 * This operation is changing the Smack information
2582 * on the bound socket. Take the changes to the port
2585 list_for_each_entry(spp, &smk_ipv6_port_list, list) {
2586 if (sk != spp->smk_sock)
2588 spp->smk_in = ssp->smk_in;
2589 spp->smk_out = ssp->smk_out;
2593 * A NULL address is only used for updating existing
2594 * bound entries. If there isn't one, it's OK.
2599 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
2600 port = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
2602 * This is a special case that is safely ignored.
2608 * Look for an existing port list entry.
2609 * This is an indication that a port is getting reused.
2611 list_for_each_entry(spp, &smk_ipv6_port_list, list) {
2612 if (spp->smk_port != port)
2614 spp->smk_port = port;
2616 spp->smk_in = ssp->smk_in;
2617 spp->smk_out = ssp->smk_out;
2622 * A new port entry is required.
2624 spp = kzalloc(sizeof(*spp), GFP_KERNEL);
2628 spp->smk_port = port;
2630 spp->smk_in = ssp->smk_in;
2631 spp->smk_out = ssp->smk_out;
2633 list_add(&spp->list, &smk_ipv6_port_list);
2638 * smk_ipv6_port_check - check Smack port access
2642 * Create or update the port list entry
2644 static int smk_ipv6_port_check(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in6 *address,
2647 struct smk_port_label *spp;
2648 struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
2649 struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
2650 unsigned short port;
2651 struct smack_known *object;
2653 if (act == SMK_RECEIVING) {
2654 skp = smack_ipv6host_label(address);
2655 object = ssp->smk_in;
2658 object = smack_ipv6host_label(address);
2662 * The other end is a single label host.
2664 if (skp != NULL && object != NULL)
2665 return smk_ipv6_check(skp, object, address, act);
2667 skp = smack_net_ambient;
2669 object = smack_net_ambient;
2672 * It's remote, so port lookup does no good.
2674 if (!smk_ipv6_localhost(address))
2675 return smk_ipv6_check(skp, object, address, act);
2678 * It's local so the send check has to have passed.
2680 if (act == SMK_RECEIVING)
2683 port = ntohs(address->sin6_port);
2684 list_for_each_entry(spp, &smk_ipv6_port_list, list) {
2685 if (spp->smk_port != port)
2687 object = spp->smk_in;
2688 if (act == SMK_CONNECTING)
2689 ssp->smk_packet = spp->smk_out;
2693 return smk_ipv6_check(skp, object, address, act);
2695 #endif /* SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING */
2698 * smack_inode_setsecurity - set smack xattrs
2699 * @inode: the object
2700 * @name: attribute name
2701 * @value: attribute value
2702 * @size: size of the attribute
2705 * Sets the named attribute in the appropriate blob
2707 * Returns 0 on success, or an error code
2709 static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2710 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2712 struct smack_known *skp;
2713 struct inode_smack *nsp = inode->i_security;
2714 struct socket_smack *ssp;
2715 struct socket *sock;
2718 if (value == NULL || size > SMK_LONGLABEL || size == 0)
2721 skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
2723 return PTR_ERR(skp);
2725 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0) {
2726 nsp->smk_inode = skp;
2727 nsp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_INSTANT;
2731 * The rest of the Smack xattrs are only on sockets.
2733 if (inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC)
2736 sock = SOCKET_I(inode);
2737 if (sock == NULL || sock->sk == NULL)
2740 ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
2742 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
2744 else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT) == 0) {
2746 if (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
2747 rc = smack_netlabel(sock->sk, SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET);
2750 "Smack: \"%s\" netlbl error %d.\n",
2756 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
2757 if (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_INET6)
2758 smk_ipv6_port_label(sock, NULL);
2765 * smack_socket_post_create - finish socket setup
2767 * @family: protocol family
2772 * Sets the netlabel information on the socket
2774 * Returns 0 on success, and error code otherwise
2776 static int smack_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
2777 int type, int protocol, int kern)
2779 struct socket_smack *ssp;
2781 if (sock->sk == NULL)
2785 * Sockets created by kernel threads receive web label.
2787 if (unlikely(current->flags & PF_KTHREAD)) {
2788 ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
2789 ssp->smk_in = &smack_known_web;
2790 ssp->smk_out = &smack_known_web;
2793 if (family != PF_INET)
2796 * Set the outbound netlbl.
2798 return smack_netlabel(sock->sk, SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET);
2801 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
2803 * smack_socket_bind - record port binding information.
2805 * @address: the port address
2806 * @addrlen: size of the address
2808 * Records the label bound to a port.
2812 static int smack_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
2815 if (sock->sk != NULL && sock->sk->sk_family == PF_INET6)
2816 smk_ipv6_port_label(sock, address);
2819 #endif /* SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING */
2822 * smack_socket_connect - connect access check
2824 * @sap: the other end
2825 * @addrlen: size of sap
2827 * Verifies that a connection may be possible
2829 * Returns 0 on success, and error code otherwise
2831 static int smack_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *sap,
2835 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
2836 struct sockaddr_in6 *sip = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sap;
2838 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
2839 struct smack_known *rsp;
2840 struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
2843 if (sock->sk == NULL)
2846 switch (sock->sk->sk_family) {
2848 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
2850 rc = smack_netlabel_send(sock->sk, (struct sockaddr_in *)sap);
2853 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6))
2855 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
2856 rsp = smack_ipv6host_label(sip);
2858 rc = smk_ipv6_check(ssp->smk_out, rsp, sip,
2861 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
2862 rc = smk_ipv6_port_check(sock->sk, sip, SMK_CONNECTING);
2870 * smack_flags_to_may - convert S_ to MAY_ values
2871 * @flags: the S_ value
2873 * Returns the equivalent MAY_ value
2875 static int smack_flags_to_may(int flags)
2879 if (flags & S_IRUGO)
2881 if (flags & S_IWUGO)
2883 if (flags & S_IXUGO)
2890 * smack_msg_msg_alloc_security - Set the security blob for msg_msg
2895 static int smack_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
2897 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
2899 msg->security = skp;
2904 * smack_msg_msg_free_security - Clear the security blob for msg_msg
2907 * Clears the blob pointer
2909 static void smack_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
2911 msg->security = NULL;
2915 * smack_of_shm - the smack pointer for the shm
2918 * Returns a pointer to the smack value
2920 static struct smack_known *smack_of_shm(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
2922 return (struct smack_known *)shp->shm_perm.security;
2926 * smack_shm_alloc_security - Set the security blob for shm
2931 static int smack_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
2933 struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &shp->shm_perm;
2934 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
2936 isp->security = skp;
2941 * smack_shm_free_security - Clear the security blob for shm
2944 * Clears the blob pointer
2946 static void smack_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
2948 struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &shp->shm_perm;
2950 isp->security = NULL;
2954 * smk_curacc_shm : check if current has access on shm
2956 * @access : access requested
2958 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
2960 static int smk_curacc_shm(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int access)
2962 struct smack_known *ssp = smack_of_shm(shp);
2963 struct smk_audit_info ad;
2967 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
2968 ad.a.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.id;
2970 rc = smk_curacc(ssp, access, &ad);
2971 rc = smk_bu_current("shm", ssp, access, rc);
2976 * smack_shm_associate - Smack access check for shm
2978 * @shmflg: access requested
2980 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
2982 static int smack_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
2986 may = smack_flags_to_may(shmflg);
2987 return smk_curacc_shm(shp, may);
2991 * smack_shm_shmctl - Smack access check for shm
2993 * @cmd: what it wants to do
2995 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
2997 static int smack_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
3010 may = MAY_READWRITE;
3015 * System level information.
3021 return smk_curacc_shm(shp, may);
3025 * smack_shm_shmat - Smack access for shmat
3028 * @shmflg: access requested
3030 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3032 static int smack_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp, char __user *shmaddr,
3037 may = smack_flags_to_may(shmflg);
3038 return smk_curacc_shm(shp, may);
3042 * smack_of_sem - the smack pointer for the sem
3045 * Returns a pointer to the smack value
3047 static struct smack_known *smack_of_sem(struct sem_array *sma)
3049 return (struct smack_known *)sma->sem_perm.security;
3053 * smack_sem_alloc_security - Set the security blob for sem
3058 static int smack_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
3060 struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &sma->sem_perm;
3061 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
3063 isp->security = skp;
3068 * smack_sem_free_security - Clear the security blob for sem
3071 * Clears the blob pointer
3073 static void smack_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
3075 struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &sma->sem_perm;
3077 isp->security = NULL;
3081 * smk_curacc_sem : check if current has access on sem
3083 * @access : access requested
3085 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3087 static int smk_curacc_sem(struct sem_array *sma, int access)
3089 struct smack_known *ssp = smack_of_sem(sma);
3090 struct smk_audit_info ad;
3094 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
3095 ad.a.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.id;
3097 rc = smk_curacc(ssp, access, &ad);
3098 rc = smk_bu_current("sem", ssp, access, rc);
3103 * smack_sem_associate - Smack access check for sem
3105 * @semflg: access requested
3107 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3109 static int smack_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
3113 may = smack_flags_to_may(semflg);
3114 return smk_curacc_sem(sma, may);
3118 * smack_sem_shmctl - Smack access check for sem
3120 * @cmd: what it wants to do
3122 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3124 static int smack_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
3142 may = MAY_READWRITE;
3147 * System level information
3154 return smk_curacc_sem(sma, may);
3158 * smack_sem_semop - Smack checks of semaphore operations
3164 * Treated as read and write in all cases.
3166 * Returns 0 if access is allowed, error code otherwise
3168 static int smack_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma, struct sembuf *sops,
3169 unsigned nsops, int alter)
3171 return smk_curacc_sem(sma, MAY_READWRITE);
3175 * smack_msg_alloc_security - Set the security blob for msg
3180 static int smack_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
3182 struct kern_ipc_perm *kisp = &msq->q_perm;
3183 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
3185 kisp->security = skp;
3190 * smack_msg_free_security - Clear the security blob for msg
3193 * Clears the blob pointer
3195 static void smack_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
3197 struct kern_ipc_perm *kisp = &msq->q_perm;
3199 kisp->security = NULL;
3203 * smack_of_msq - the smack pointer for the msq
3206 * Returns a pointer to the smack label entry
3208 static struct smack_known *smack_of_msq(struct msg_queue *msq)
3210 return (struct smack_known *)msq->q_perm.security;
3214 * smk_curacc_msq : helper to check if current has access on msq
3216 * @access : access requested
3218 * return 0 if current has access, error otherwise
3220 static int smk_curacc_msq(struct msg_queue *msq, int access)
3222 struct smack_known *msp = smack_of_msq(msq);
3223 struct smk_audit_info ad;
3227 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
3228 ad.a.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.id;
3230 rc = smk_curacc(msp, access, &ad);
3231 rc = smk_bu_current("msq", msp, access, rc);
3236 * smack_msg_queue_associate - Smack access check for msg_queue
3238 * @msqflg: access requested
3240 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3242 static int smack_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
3246 may = smack_flags_to_may(msqflg);
3247 return smk_curacc_msq(msq, may);
3251 * smack_msg_queue_msgctl - Smack access check for msg_queue
3253 * @cmd: what it wants to do
3255 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3257 static int smack_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
3268 may = MAY_READWRITE;
3273 * System level information
3280 return smk_curacc_msq(msq, may);
3284 * smack_msg_queue_msgsnd - Smack access check for msg_queue
3287 * @msqflg: access requested
3289 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3291 static int smack_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
3296 may = smack_flags_to_may(msqflg);
3297 return smk_curacc_msq(msq, may);
3301 * smack_msg_queue_msgsnd - Smack access check for msg_queue
3308 * Returns 0 if current has read and write access, error code otherwise
3310 static int smack_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
3311 struct task_struct *target, long type, int mode)
3313 return smk_curacc_msq(msq, MAY_READWRITE);
3317 * smack_ipc_permission - Smack access for ipc_permission()
3318 * @ipp: the object permissions
3319 * @flag: access requested
3321 * Returns 0 if current has read and write access, error code otherwise
3323 static int smack_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, short flag)
3325 struct smack_known *iskp = ipp->security;
3326 int may = smack_flags_to_may(flag);
3327 struct smk_audit_info ad;
3331 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
3332 ad.a.u.ipc_id = ipp->id;
3334 rc = smk_curacc(iskp, may, &ad);
3335 rc = smk_bu_current("svipc", iskp, may, rc);
3340 * smack_ipc_getsecid - Extract smack security id
3341 * @ipp: the object permissions
3342 * @secid: where result will be saved
3344 static void smack_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, u32 *secid)
3346 struct smack_known *iskp = ipp->security;
3348 *secid = iskp->smk_secid;
3352 * smack_d_instantiate - Make sure the blob is correct on an inode
3353 * @opt_dentry: dentry where inode will be attached
3354 * @inode: the object
3356 * Set the inode's security blob if it hasn't been done already.
3358 static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
3360 struct super_block *sbp;
3361 struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
3362 struct inode_smack *isp;
3363 struct smack_known *skp;
3364 struct smack_known *ckp = smk_of_current();
3365 struct smack_known *final;
3366 char trattr[TRANS_TRUE_SIZE];
3374 isp = inode->i_security;
3376 mutex_lock(&isp->smk_lock);
3378 * If the inode is already instantiated
3379 * take the quick way out
3381 if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_INSTANT)
3385 sbsp = sbp->s_security;
3387 * We're going to use the superblock default label
3388 * if there's no label on the file.
3390 final = sbsp->smk_default;
3393 * If this is the root inode the superblock
3394 * may be in the process of initialization.
3395 * If that is the case use the root value out
3396 * of the superblock.
3398 if (opt_dentry->d_parent == opt_dentry) {
3399 switch (sbp->s_magic) {
3400 case CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC:
3402 * The cgroup filesystem is never mounted,
3403 * so there's no opportunity to set the mount
3406 sbsp->smk_root = &smack_known_star;
3407 sbsp->smk_default = &smack_known_star;
3408 isp->smk_inode = sbsp->smk_root;
3412 * What about shmem/tmpfs anonymous files with dentry
3413 * obtained from d_alloc_pseudo()?
3415 isp->smk_inode = smk_of_current();
3418 isp->smk_inode = smk_of_current();
3421 isp->smk_inode = sbsp->smk_root;
3424 isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_INSTANT;
3429 * This is pretty hackish.
3430 * Casey says that we shouldn't have to do
3431 * file system specific code, but it does help
3432 * with keeping it simple.
3434 switch (sbp->s_magic) {
3438 case CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC:
3440 * Casey says that it's a little embarrassing
3441 * that the smack file system doesn't do
3442 * extended attributes.
3444 * Casey says pipes are easy (?)
3446 * Socket access is controlled by the socket
3447 * structures associated with the task involved.
3449 * Cgroupfs is special
3451 final = &smack_known_star;
3453 case DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC:
3455 * devpts seems content with the label of the task.
3456 * Programs that change smack have to treat the
3461 case PROC_SUPER_MAGIC:
3463 * Casey says procfs appears not to care.
3464 * The superblock default suffices.
3469 * Device labels should come from the filesystem,
3470 * but watch out, because they're volitile,
3471 * getting recreated on every reboot.
3473 final = &smack_known_star;
3477 * If a smack value has been set we want to use it,
3478 * but since tmpfs isn't giving us the opportunity
3479 * to set mount options simulate setting the
3480 * superblock default.
3484 * This isn't an understood special case.
3485 * Get the value from the xattr.
3489 * UNIX domain sockets use lower level socket data.
3491 if (S_ISSOCK(inode->i_mode)) {
3492 final = &smack_known_star;
3496 * No xattr support means, alas, no SMACK label.
3497 * Use the aforeapplied default.
3498 * It would be curious if the label of the task
3499 * does not match that assigned.
3501 if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR))
3504 * Get the dentry for xattr.
3506 dp = dget(opt_dentry);
3507 skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACK, inode, dp);
3508 if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(skp))
3512 * Transmuting directory
3514 if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) {
3516 * If this is a new directory and the label was
3517 * transmuted when the inode was initialized
3518 * set the transmute attribute on the directory
3519 * and mark the inode.
3521 * If there is a transmute attribute on the
3522 * directory mark the inode.
3524 if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_CHANGED) {
3525 isp->smk_flags &= ~SMK_INODE_CHANGED;
3526 rc = __vfs_setxattr(dp, inode,
3527 XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE,
3528 TRANS_TRUE, TRANS_TRUE_SIZE,
3531 rc = __vfs_getxattr(dp, inode,
3532 XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE, trattr,
3534 if (rc >= 0 && strncmp(trattr, TRANS_TRUE,
3535 TRANS_TRUE_SIZE) != 0)
3539 transflag = SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
3542 * Don't let the exec or mmap label be "*" or "@".
3544 skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC, inode, dp);
3545 if (IS_ERR(skp) || skp == &smack_known_star ||
3546 skp == &smack_known_web)
3548 isp->smk_task = skp;
3550 skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP, inode, dp);
3551 if (IS_ERR(skp) || skp == &smack_known_star ||
3552 skp == &smack_known_web)
3554 isp->smk_mmap = skp;
3561 isp->smk_inode = ckp;
3563 isp->smk_inode = final;
3565 isp->smk_flags |= (SMK_INODE_INSTANT | transflag);
3568 mutex_unlock(&isp->smk_lock);
3573 * smack_getprocattr - Smack process attribute access
3574 * @p: the object task
3575 * @name: the name of the attribute in /proc/.../attr
3576 * @value: where to put the result
3578 * Places a copy of the task Smack into value
3580 * Returns the length of the smack label or an error code
3582 static int smack_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value)
3584 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct(p);
3588 if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0)
3591 cp = kstrdup(skp->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
3601 * smack_setprocattr - Smack process attribute setting
3602 * @p: the object task
3603 * @name: the name of the attribute in /proc/.../attr
3604 * @value: the value to set
3605 * @size: the size of the value
3607 * Sets the Smack value of the task. Only setting self
3608 * is permitted and only with privilege
3610 * Returns the length of the smack label or an error code
3612 static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name,
3613 void *value, size_t size)
3615 struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
3617 struct smack_known *skp;
3618 struct smack_known_list_elem *sklep;
3622 * Changing another process' Smack value is too dangerous
3623 * and supports no sane use case.
3628 if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN) && list_empty(&tsp->smk_relabel))
3631 if (value == NULL || size == 0 || size >= SMK_LONGLABEL)
3634 if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0)
3637 skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
3639 return PTR_ERR(skp);
3642 * No process is ever allowed the web ("@") label.
3644 if (skp == &smack_known_web)
3647 if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
3649 list_for_each_entry(sklep, &tsp->smk_relabel, list)
3650 if (sklep->smk_label == skp) {
3658 new = prepare_creds();
3662 tsp = new->security;
3663 tsp->smk_task = skp;
3665 * process can change its label only once
3667 smk_destroy_label_list(&tsp->smk_relabel);
3674 * smack_unix_stream_connect - Smack access on UDS
3676 * @other: the other sock
3679 * Return 0 if a subject with the smack of sock could access
3680 * an object with the smack of other, otherwise an error code
3682 static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
3683 struct sock *other, struct sock *newsk)
3685 struct smack_known *skp;
3686 struct smack_known *okp;
3687 struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk_security;
3688 struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk_security;
3689 struct socket_smack *nsp = newsk->sk_security;
3690 struct smk_audit_info ad;
3693 struct lsm_network_audit net;
3696 if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) {
3700 smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
3701 smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other);
3703 rc = smk_access(skp, okp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
3704 rc = smk_bu_note("UDS connect", skp, okp, MAY_WRITE, rc);
3708 rc = smk_access(okp, skp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
3709 rc = smk_bu_note("UDS connect", okp, skp,
3715 * Cross reference the peer labels for SO_PEERSEC.
3718 nsp->smk_packet = ssp->smk_out;
3719 ssp->smk_packet = osp->smk_out;
3726 * smack_unix_may_send - Smack access on UDS
3728 * @other: the other socket
3730 * Return 0 if a subject with the smack of sock could access
3731 * an object with the smack of other, otherwise an error code
3733 static int smack_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other)
3735 struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
3736 struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk->sk_security;
3737 struct smk_audit_info ad;
3741 struct lsm_network_audit net;
3743 smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
3744 smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other->sk);
3747 if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
3750 rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_out, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
3751 rc = smk_bu_note("UDS send", ssp->smk_out, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, rc);
3756 * smack_socket_sendmsg - Smack check based on destination host
3759 * @size: the size of the message
3761 * Return 0 if the current subject can write to the destination host.
3762 * For IPv4 this is only a question if the destination is a single label host.
3763 * For IPv6 this is a check against the label of the port.
3765 static int smack_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3768 struct sockaddr_in *sip = (struct sockaddr_in *) msg->msg_name;
3769 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
3770 struct sockaddr_in6 *sap = (struct sockaddr_in6 *) msg->msg_name;
3772 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
3773 struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
3774 struct smack_known *rsp;
3779 * Perfectly reasonable for this to be NULL
3784 switch (sock->sk->sk_family) {
3786 rc = smack_netlabel_send(sock->sk, sip);
3789 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
3790 rsp = smack_ipv6host_label(sap);
3792 rc = smk_ipv6_check(ssp->smk_out, rsp, sap,
3795 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
3796 rc = smk_ipv6_port_check(sock->sk, sap, SMK_SENDING);
3804 * smack_from_secattr - Convert a netlabel attr.mls.lvl/attr.mls.cat pair to smack
3805 * @sap: netlabel secattr
3806 * @ssp: socket security information
3808 * Returns a pointer to a Smack label entry found on the label list.
3810 static struct smack_known *smack_from_secattr(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap,
3811 struct socket_smack *ssp)
3813 struct smack_known *skp;
3818 if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) != 0) {
3820 * Looks like a CIPSO packet.
3821 * If there are flags but no level netlabel isn't
3822 * behaving the way we expect it to.
3824 * Look it up in the label table
3825 * Without guidance regarding the smack value
3826 * for the packet fall back on the network
3830 list_for_each_entry(skp, &smack_known_list, list) {
3831 if (sap->attr.mls.lvl != skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.lvl)
3834 * Compare the catsets. Use the netlbl APIs.
3836 if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) == 0) {
3837 if ((skp->smk_netlabel.flags &
3838 NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) == 0)
3842 for (acat = -1, kcat = -1; acat == kcat; ) {
3843 acat = netlbl_catmap_walk(sap->attr.mls.cat,
3845 kcat = netlbl_catmap_walk(
3846 skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.cat,
3848 if (acat < 0 || kcat < 0)
3861 if (ssp != NULL && ssp->smk_in == &smack_known_star)
3862 return &smack_known_web;
3863 return &smack_known_star;
3865 if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID) != 0) {
3867 * Looks like a fallback, which gives us a secid.
3869 skp = smack_from_secid(sap->attr.secid);
3871 * This has got to be a bug because it is
3872 * impossible to specify a fallback without
3873 * specifying the label, which will ensure
3874 * it has a secid, and the only way to get a
3875 * secid is from a fallback.
3877 BUG_ON(skp == NULL);
3881 * Without guidance regarding the smack value
3882 * for the packet fall back on the network
3885 return smack_net_ambient;
3888 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
3889 static int smk_skb_to_addr_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)
3893 int proto = -EINVAL;
3894 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h;
3895 struct ipv6hdr *ip6;
3897 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3898 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3899 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3903 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3904 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3907 sip->sin6_addr = ip6->saddr;
3909 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3910 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3911 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr, &frag_off);
3918 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3920 sip->sin6_port = th->source;
3923 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3925 sip->sin6_port = uh->source;
3928 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3930 sip->sin6_port = dh->dccph_sport;
3935 #endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
3938 * smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb - Smack packet delivery access check
3942 * Returns 0 if the packet should be delivered, an error code otherwise
3944 static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
3946 struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
3947 struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
3948 struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
3950 struct smk_audit_info ad;
3951 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
3953 struct lsm_network_audit net;
3955 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
3956 struct sockaddr_in6 sadd;
3959 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
3961 #endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
3965 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
3967 * If there is a secmark use it rather than the CIPSO label.
3968 * If there is no secmark fall back to CIPSO.
3969 * The secmark is assumed to reflect policy better.
3971 if (skb && skb->secmark != 0) {
3972 skp = smack_from_secid(skb->secmark);
3975 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER */
3977 * Translate what netlabel gave us.
3979 netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
3981 rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr);
3983 skp = smack_from_secattr(&secattr, ssp);
3985 skp = smack_net_ambient;
3987 netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
3989 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
3993 smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
3994 ad.a.u.net->family = family;
3995 ad.a.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
3996 ipv4_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL);
3999 * Receiving a packet requires that the other end
4000 * be able to write here. Read access is not required.
4001 * This is the simplist possible security model
4004 rc = smk_access(skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
4005 rc = smk_bu_note("IPv4 delivery", skp, ssp->smk_in,
4008 netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, family, rc, 0);
4010 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4012 proto = smk_skb_to_addr_ipv6(skb, &sadd);
4013 if (proto != IPPROTO_UDP && proto != IPPROTO_TCP)
4015 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
4016 if (skb && skb->secmark != 0)
4017 skp = smack_from_secid(skb->secmark);
4019 skp = smack_ipv6host_label(&sadd);
4021 skp = smack_net_ambient;
4025 smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
4026 ad.a.u.net->family = family;
4027 ad.a.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
4028 ipv6_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL);
4029 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
4030 rc = smk_access(skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
4031 rc = smk_bu_note("IPv6 delivery", skp, ssp->smk_in,
4033 #endif /* SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING */
4034 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
4035 rc = smk_ipv6_port_check(sk, &sadd, SMK_RECEIVING);
4036 #endif /* SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING */
4038 #endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
4045 * smack_socket_getpeersec_stream - pull in packet label
4047 * @optval: user's destination
4048 * @optlen: size thereof
4051 * returns zero on success, an error code otherwise
4053 static int smack_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
4054 char __user *optval,
4055 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4057 struct socket_smack *ssp;
4062 ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
4063 if (ssp->smk_packet != NULL) {
4064 rcp = ssp->smk_packet->smk_known;
4065 slen = strlen(rcp) + 1;
4070 else if (copy_to_user(optval, rcp, slen) != 0)
4073 if (put_user(slen, optlen) != 0)
4081 * smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram - pull in packet label
4082 * @sock: the peer socket
4084 * @secid: pointer to where to put the secid of the packet
4086 * Sets the netlabel socket state on sk from parent
4088 static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
4089 struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4092 struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
4093 struct socket_smack *ssp = NULL;
4094 struct smack_known *skp;
4095 int family = PF_UNSPEC;
4096 u32 s = 0; /* 0 is the invalid secid */
4100 if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4102 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4103 else if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
4105 #endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
4107 if (family == PF_UNSPEC && sock != NULL)
4108 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4112 ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
4113 s = ssp->smk_out->smk_secid;
4116 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
4122 * Translate what netlabel gave us.
4124 if (sock != NULL && sock->sk != NULL)
4125 ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
4126 netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
4127 rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr);
4129 skp = smack_from_secattr(&secattr, ssp);
4132 netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
4135 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
4147 * smack_sock_graft - Initialize a newly created socket with an existing sock
4149 * @parent: parent socket
4151 * Set the smk_{in,out} state of an existing sock based on the process that
4152 * is creating the new socket.
4154 static void smack_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4156 struct socket_smack *ssp;
4157 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
4160 (sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6))
4163 ssp = sk->sk_security;
4166 /* cssp->smk_packet is already set in smack_inet_csk_clone() */
4170 * smack_inet_conn_request - Smack access check on connect
4171 * @sk: socket involved
4175 * Returns 0 if a task with the packet label could write to
4176 * the socket, otherwise an error code
4178 static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4179 struct request_sock *req)
4181 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4182 struct smack_known *skp;
4183 struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
4184 struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
4185 struct sockaddr_in addr;
4187 struct smack_known *hskp;
4189 struct smk_audit_info ad;
4191 struct lsm_network_audit net;
4194 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4195 if (family == PF_INET6) {
4197 * Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving
4198 * via IPv6 sockets. Don't set up netlabel
4199 * processing on IPv6.
4201 if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4206 #endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
4208 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
4210 * If there is a secmark use it rather than the CIPSO label.
4211 * If there is no secmark fall back to CIPSO.
4212 * The secmark is assumed to reflect policy better.
4214 if (skb && skb->secmark != 0) {
4215 skp = smack_from_secid(skb->secmark);
4218 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER */
4220 netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
4221 rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr);
4223 skp = smack_from_secattr(&secattr, ssp);
4225 skp = &smack_known_huh;
4226 netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
4228 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
4233 smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
4234 ad.a.u.net->family = family;
4235 ad.a.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
4236 ipv4_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL);
4239 * Receiving a packet requires that the other end be able to write
4240 * here. Read access is not required.
4242 rc = smk_access(skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
4243 rc = smk_bu_note("IPv4 connect", skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, rc);
4248 * Save the peer's label in the request_sock so we can later setup
4249 * smk_packet in the child socket so that SO_PEERCRED can report it.
4251 req->peer_secid = skp->smk_secid;
4254 * We need to decide if we want to label the incoming connection here
4255 * if we do we only need to label the request_sock and the stack will
4256 * propagate the wire-label to the sock when it is created.
4259 addr.sin_addr.s_addr = hdr->saddr;
4261 hskp = smack_ipv4host_label(&addr);
4265 rc = netlbl_req_setattr(req, &skp->smk_netlabel);
4267 netlbl_req_delattr(req);
4273 * smack_inet_csk_clone - Copy the connection information to the new socket
4274 * @sk: the new socket
4275 * @req: the connection's request_sock
4277 * Transfer the connection's peer label to the newly created socket.
4279 static void smack_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk,
4280 const struct request_sock *req)
4282 struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
4283 struct smack_known *skp;
4285 if (req->peer_secid != 0) {
4286 skp = smack_from_secid(req->peer_secid);
4287 ssp->smk_packet = skp;
4289 ssp->smk_packet = NULL;
4293 * Key management security hooks
4295 * Casey has not tested key support very heavily.
4296 * The permission check is most likely too restrictive.
4297 * If you care about keys please have a look.
4302 * smack_key_alloc - Set the key security blob
4304 * @cred: the credentials to use
4307 * No allocation required
4311 static int smack_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred,
4312 unsigned long flags)
4314 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(cred->security);
4316 key->security = skp;
4321 * smack_key_free - Clear the key security blob
4324 * Clear the blob pointer
4326 static void smack_key_free(struct key *key)
4328 key->security = NULL;
4332 * smack_key_permission - Smack access on a key
4333 * @key_ref: gets to the object
4334 * @cred: the credentials to use
4335 * @perm: requested key permissions
4337 * Return 0 if the task has read and write to the object,
4338 * an error code otherwise
4340 static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
4341 const struct cred *cred, unsigned perm)
4344 struct smk_audit_info ad;
4345 struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task(cred->security);
4350 * Validate requested permissions
4352 if (perm & ~KEY_NEED_ALL)
4355 keyp = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
4359 * If the key hasn't been initialized give it access so that
4362 if (keyp->security == NULL)
4365 * This should not occur
4370 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KEY);
4371 ad.a.u.key_struct.key = keyp->serial;
4372 ad.a.u.key_struct.key_desc = keyp->description;
4374 if (perm & (KEY_NEED_READ | KEY_NEED_SEARCH | KEY_NEED_VIEW))
4375 request |= MAY_READ;
4376 if (perm & (KEY_NEED_WRITE | KEY_NEED_LINK | KEY_NEED_SETATTR))
4377 request |= MAY_WRITE;
4378 rc = smk_access(tkp, keyp->security, request, &ad);
4379 rc = smk_bu_note("key access", tkp, keyp->security, request, rc);
4384 * smack_key_getsecurity - Smack label tagging the key
4385 * @key points to the key to be queried
4386 * @_buffer points to a pointer that should be set to point to the
4387 * resulting string (if no label or an error occurs).
4388 * Return the length of the string (including terminating NUL) or -ve if
4390 * May also return 0 (and a NULL buffer pointer) if there is no label.
4392 static int smack_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
4394 struct smack_known *skp = key->security;
4398 if (key->security == NULL) {
4403 copy = kstrdup(skp->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
4406 length = strlen(copy) + 1;
4412 #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
4417 * Audit requires a unique representation of each Smack specific
4418 * rule. This unique representation is used to distinguish the
4419 * object to be audited from remaining kernel objects and also
4420 * works as a glue between the audit hooks.
4422 * Since repository entries are added but never deleted, we'll use
4423 * the smack_known label address related to the given audit rule as
4424 * the needed unique representation. This also better fits the smack
4425 * model where nearly everything is a label.
4430 * smack_audit_rule_init - Initialize a smack audit rule
4431 * @field: audit rule fields given from user-space (audit.h)
4432 * @op: required testing operator (=, !=, >, <, ...)
4433 * @rulestr: smack label to be audited
4434 * @vrule: pointer to save our own audit rule representation
4436 * Prepare to audit cases where (@field @op @rulestr) is true.
4437 * The label to be audited is created if necessay.
4439 static int smack_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
4441 struct smack_known *skp;
4442 char **rule = (char **)vrule;
4445 if (field != AUDIT_SUBJ_USER && field != AUDIT_OBJ_USER)
4448 if (op != Audit_equal && op != Audit_not_equal)
4451 skp = smk_import_entry(rulestr, 0);
4453 return PTR_ERR(skp);
4455 *rule = skp->smk_known;
4461 * smack_audit_rule_known - Distinguish Smack audit rules
4462 * @krule: rule of interest, in Audit kernel representation format
4464 * This is used to filter Smack rules from remaining Audit ones.
4465 * If it's proved that this rule belongs to us, the
4466 * audit_rule_match hook will be called to do the final judgement.
4468 static int smack_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
4470 struct audit_field *f;
4473 for (i = 0; i < krule->field_count; i++) {
4474 f = &krule->fields[i];
4476 if (f->type == AUDIT_SUBJ_USER || f->type == AUDIT_OBJ_USER)
4484 * smack_audit_rule_match - Audit given object ?
4485 * @secid: security id for identifying the object to test
4486 * @field: audit rule flags given from user-space
4487 * @op: required testing operator
4488 * @vrule: smack internal rule presentation
4489 * @actx: audit context associated with the check
4491 * The core Audit hook. It's used to take the decision of
4492 * whether to audit or not to audit a given object.
4494 static int smack_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
4495 struct audit_context *actx)
4497 struct smack_known *skp;
4500 if (unlikely(!rule)) {
4501 WARN_ONCE(1, "Smack: missing rule\n");
4505 if (field != AUDIT_SUBJ_USER && field != AUDIT_OBJ_USER)
4508 skp = smack_from_secid(secid);
4511 * No need to do string comparisons. If a match occurs,
4512 * both pointers will point to the same smack_known
4515 if (op == Audit_equal)
4516 return (rule == skp->smk_known);
4517 if (op == Audit_not_equal)
4518 return (rule != skp->smk_known);
4524 * There is no need for a smack_audit_rule_free hook.
4525 * No memory was allocated.
4528 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
4531 * smack_ismaclabel - check if xattr @name references a smack MAC label
4532 * @name: Full xattr name to check.
4534 static int smack_ismaclabel(const char *name)
4536 return (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0);
4541 * smack_secid_to_secctx - return the smack label for a secid
4542 * @secid: incoming integer
4543 * @secdata: destination
4544 * @seclen: how long it is
4546 * Exists for networking code.
4548 static int smack_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
4550 struct smack_known *skp = smack_from_secid(secid);
4553 *secdata = skp->smk_known;
4554 *seclen = strlen(skp->smk_known);
4559 * smack_secctx_to_secid - return the secid for a smack label
4560 * @secdata: smack label
4561 * @seclen: how long result is
4562 * @secid: outgoing integer
4564 * Exists for audit and networking code.
4566 static int smack_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
4568 struct smack_known *skp = smk_find_entry(secdata);
4571 *secid = skp->smk_secid;
4578 * There used to be a smack_release_secctx hook
4579 * that did nothing back when hooks were in a vector.
4580 * Now that there's a list such a hook adds cost.
4583 static int smack_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
4585 return smack_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
4588 static int smack_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
4590 return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SMACK, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
4593 static int smack_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
4596 len = smack_inode_getsecurity(inode, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX, ctx, true);
4604 static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] = {
4605 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, smack_ptrace_access_check),
4606 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, smack_ptrace_traceme),
4607 LSM_HOOK_INIT(syslog, smack_syslog),
4609 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security, smack_sb_alloc_security),
4610 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, smack_sb_free_security),
4611 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_copy_data, smack_sb_copy_data),
4612 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_kern_mount, smack_sb_kern_mount),
4613 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_statfs, smack_sb_statfs),
4614 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_set_mnt_opts, smack_set_mnt_opts),
4615 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_parse_opts_str, smack_parse_opts_str),
4617 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds, smack_bprm_set_creds),
4618 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, smack_bprm_committing_creds),
4619 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_secureexec, smack_bprm_secureexec),
4621 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_alloc_security, smack_inode_alloc_security),
4622 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, smack_inode_free_security),
4623 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security, smack_inode_init_security),
4624 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_link, smack_inode_link),
4625 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_unlink, smack_inode_unlink),
4626 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rmdir, smack_inode_rmdir),
4627 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rename, smack_inode_rename),
4628 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_permission, smack_inode_permission),
4629 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr, smack_inode_setattr),
4630 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, smack_inode_getattr),
4631 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, smack_inode_setxattr),
4632 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr, smack_inode_post_setxattr),
4633 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getxattr, smack_inode_getxattr),
4634 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr, smack_inode_removexattr),
4635 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity, smack_inode_getsecurity),
4636 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecurity, smack_inode_setsecurity),
4637 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listsecurity, smack_inode_listsecurity),
4638 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecid, smack_inode_getsecid),
4640 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, smack_file_alloc_security),
4641 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_free_security, smack_file_free_security),
4642 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl, smack_file_ioctl),
4643 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, smack_file_lock),
4644 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_fcntl, smack_file_fcntl),
4645 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, smack_mmap_file),
4646 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, cap_mmap_addr),
4647 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_set_fowner, smack_file_set_fowner),
4648 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_send_sigiotask, smack_file_send_sigiotask),
4649 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive, smack_file_receive),
4651 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, smack_file_open),
4653 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, smack_cred_alloc_blank),
4654 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, smack_cred_free),
4655 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, smack_cred_prepare),
4656 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, smack_cred_transfer),
4657 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, smack_kernel_act_as),
4658 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, smack_kernel_create_files_as),
4659 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, smack_task_setpgid),
4660 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, smack_task_getpgid),
4661 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, smack_task_getsid),
4662 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid, smack_task_getsecid),
4663 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, smack_task_setnice),
4664 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, smack_task_setioprio),
4665 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, smack_task_getioprio),
4666 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setscheduler, smack_task_setscheduler),
4667 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getscheduler, smack_task_getscheduler),
4668 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory, smack_task_movememory),
4669 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, smack_task_kill),
4670 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode, smack_task_to_inode),
4672 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, smack_ipc_permission),
4673 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getsecid, smack_ipc_getsecid),
4675 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_alloc_security, smack_msg_msg_alloc_security),
4676 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_free_security, smack_msg_msg_free_security),
4678 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_alloc_security, smack_msg_queue_alloc_security),
4679 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_free_security, smack_msg_queue_free_security),
4680 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_associate, smack_msg_queue_associate),
4681 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgctl, smack_msg_queue_msgctl),
4682 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgsnd, smack_msg_queue_msgsnd),
4683 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgrcv, smack_msg_queue_msgrcv),
4685 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_alloc_security, smack_shm_alloc_security),
4686 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_free_security, smack_shm_free_security),
4687 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_associate, smack_shm_associate),
4688 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmctl, smack_shm_shmctl),
4689 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmat, smack_shm_shmat),
4691 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_alloc_security, smack_sem_alloc_security),
4692 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_free_security, smack_sem_free_security),
4693 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_associate, smack_sem_associate),
4694 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semctl, smack_sem_semctl),
4695 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semop, smack_sem_semop),
4697 LSM_HOOK_INIT(d_instantiate, smack_d_instantiate),
4699 LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, smack_getprocattr),
4700 LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, smack_setprocattr),
4702 LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_stream_connect, smack_unix_stream_connect),
4703 LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_may_send, smack_unix_may_send),
4705 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, smack_socket_post_create),
4706 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
4707 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, smack_socket_bind),
4709 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, smack_socket_connect),
4710 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, smack_socket_sendmsg),
4711 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb),
4712 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream, smack_socket_getpeersec_stream),
4713 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram, smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
4714 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, smack_sk_alloc_security),
4715 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, smack_sk_free_security),
4716 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, smack_sock_graft),
4717 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, smack_inet_conn_request),
4718 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, smack_inet_csk_clone),
4720 /* key management security hooks */
4722 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_alloc, smack_key_alloc),
4723 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_free, smack_key_free),
4724 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_permission, smack_key_permission),
4725 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_getsecurity, smack_key_getsecurity),
4726 #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
4730 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_init, smack_audit_rule_init),
4731 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_known, smack_audit_rule_known),
4732 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match, smack_audit_rule_match),
4733 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
4735 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ismaclabel, smack_ismaclabel),
4736 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, smack_secid_to_secctx),
4737 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, smack_secctx_to_secid),
4738 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_notifysecctx, smack_inode_notifysecctx),
4739 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecctx, smack_inode_setsecctx),
4740 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecctx, smack_inode_getsecctx),
4744 static __init void init_smack_known_list(void)
4747 * Initialize rule list locks
4749 mutex_init(&smack_known_huh.smk_rules_lock);
4750 mutex_init(&smack_known_hat.smk_rules_lock);
4751 mutex_init(&smack_known_floor.smk_rules_lock);
4752 mutex_init(&smack_known_star.smk_rules_lock);
4753 mutex_init(&smack_known_invalid.smk_rules_lock);
4754 mutex_init(&smack_known_web.smk_rules_lock);
4756 * Initialize rule lists
4758 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_huh.smk_rules);
4759 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_hat.smk_rules);
4760 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_star.smk_rules);
4761 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_floor.smk_rules);
4762 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_invalid.smk_rules);
4763 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_web.smk_rules);
4765 * Create the known labels list
4767 smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_huh);
4768 smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_hat);
4769 smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_star);
4770 smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_floor);
4771 smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_invalid);
4772 smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_web);
4776 * smack_init - initialize the smack system
4780 static __init int smack_init(void)
4783 struct task_smack *tsp;
4785 if (!security_module_enable("smack"))
4788 smack_inode_cache = KMEM_CACHE(inode_smack, 0);
4789 if (!smack_inode_cache)
4792 tsp = new_task_smack(&smack_known_floor, &smack_known_floor,
4795 kmem_cache_destroy(smack_inode_cache);
4801 pr_info("Smack: Initializing.\n");
4802 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
4803 pr_info("Smack: Netfilter enabled.\n");
4805 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
4806 pr_info("Smack: IPv6 port labeling enabled.\n");
4808 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
4809 pr_info("Smack: IPv6 Netfilter enabled.\n");
4813 * Set the security state for the initial task.
4815 cred = (struct cred *) current->cred;
4816 cred->security = tsp;
4818 /* initialize the smack_known_list */
4819 init_smack_known_list();
4824 security_add_hooks(smack_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(smack_hooks));
4830 * Smack requires early initialization in order to label
4831 * all processes and objects when they are created.
4833 security_initcall(smack_init);