2 * Implementation of the security services.
4 * Authors : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
5 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
7 * Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
9 * Support for enhanced MLS infrastructure.
10 * Support for context based audit filters.
12 * Updated: Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com> and Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
14 * Added conditional policy language extensions
16 * Updated: Hewlett-Packard <paul@paul-moore.com>
18 * Added support for NetLabel
19 * Added support for the policy capability bitmap
21 * Updated: Chad Sellers <csellers@tresys.com>
23 * Added validation of kernel classes and permissions
25 * Updated: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
27 * Added support for bounds domain and audit messaged on masked permissions
29 * Updated: Guido Trentalancia <guido@trentalancia.com>
31 * Added support for runtime switching of the policy type
33 * Copyright (C) 2008, 2009 NEC Corporation
34 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
35 * Copyright (C) 2004-2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
36 * Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004, 2006 Tresys Technology, LLC
37 * Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
38 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
39 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
40 * the Free Software Foundation, version 2.
42 #include <linux/kernel.h>
43 #include <linux/slab.h>
44 #include <linux/string.h>
45 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
46 #include <linux/rcupdate.h>
47 #include <linux/errno.h>
49 #include <linux/sched.h>
50 #include <linux/audit.h>
51 #include <linux/mutex.h>
52 #include <linux/selinux.h>
53 #include <linux/flex_array.h>
54 #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
55 #include <net/netlabel.h>
65 #include "conditional.h"
73 int selinux_policycap_netpeer;
74 int selinux_policycap_openperm;
75 int selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork;
77 static DEFINE_RWLOCK(policy_rwlock);
79 static struct sidtab sidtab;
80 struct policydb policydb;
84 * The largest sequence number that has been used when
85 * providing an access decision to the access vector cache.
86 * The sequence number only changes when a policy change
89 static u32 latest_granting;
91 /* Forward declaration. */
92 static int context_struct_to_string(struct context *context, char **scontext,
95 static void context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
96 struct context *tcontext,
98 struct av_decision *avd,
99 struct extended_perms *xperms);
101 struct selinux_mapping {
102 u16 value; /* policy value */
104 u32 perms[sizeof(u32) * 8];
107 static struct selinux_mapping *current_mapping;
108 static u16 current_mapping_size;
110 static int selinux_set_mapping(struct policydb *pol,
111 struct security_class_mapping *map,
112 struct selinux_mapping **out_map_p,
115 struct selinux_mapping *out_map = NULL;
116 size_t size = sizeof(struct selinux_mapping);
119 bool print_unknown_handle = false;
121 /* Find number of classes in the input mapping */
128 /* Allocate space for the class records, plus one for class zero */
129 out_map = kcalloc(++i, size, GFP_ATOMIC);
133 /* Store the raw class and permission values */
135 while (map[j].name) {
136 struct security_class_mapping *p_in = map + (j++);
137 struct selinux_mapping *p_out = out_map + j;
139 /* An empty class string skips ahead */
140 if (!strcmp(p_in->name, "")) {
141 p_out->num_perms = 0;
145 p_out->value = string_to_security_class(pol, p_in->name);
148 "SELinux: Class %s not defined in policy.\n",
150 if (pol->reject_unknown)
152 p_out->num_perms = 0;
153 print_unknown_handle = true;
158 while (p_in->perms[k]) {
159 /* An empty permission string skips ahead */
160 if (!*p_in->perms[k]) {
164 p_out->perms[k] = string_to_av_perm(pol, p_out->value,
166 if (!p_out->perms[k]) {
168 "SELinux: Permission %s in class %s not defined in policy.\n",
169 p_in->perms[k], p_in->name);
170 if (pol->reject_unknown)
172 print_unknown_handle = true;
177 p_out->num_perms = k;
180 if (print_unknown_handle)
181 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: the above unknown classes and permissions will be %s\n",
182 pol->allow_unknown ? "allowed" : "denied");
184 *out_map_p = out_map;
193 * Get real, policy values from mapped values
196 static u16 unmap_class(u16 tclass)
198 if (tclass < current_mapping_size)
199 return current_mapping[tclass].value;
205 * Get kernel value for class from its policy value
207 static u16 map_class(u16 pol_value)
211 for (i = 1; i < current_mapping_size; i++) {
212 if (current_mapping[i].value == pol_value)
216 return SECCLASS_NULL;
219 static void map_decision(u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd,
222 if (tclass < current_mapping_size) {
223 unsigned i, n = current_mapping[tclass].num_perms;
226 for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++) {
227 if (avd->allowed & current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
229 if (allow_unknown && !current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
232 avd->allowed = result;
234 for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++)
235 if (avd->auditallow & current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
237 avd->auditallow = result;
239 for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++) {
240 if (avd->auditdeny & current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
242 if (!allow_unknown && !current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
246 * In case the kernel has a bug and requests a permission
247 * between num_perms and the maximum permission number, we
248 * should audit that denial
250 for (; i < (sizeof(u32)*8); i++)
252 avd->auditdeny = result;
256 int security_mls_enabled(void)
258 return policydb.mls_enabled;
262 * Return the boolean value of a constraint expression
263 * when it is applied to the specified source and target
266 * xcontext is a special beast... It is used by the validatetrans rules
267 * only. For these rules, scontext is the context before the transition,
268 * tcontext is the context after the transition, and xcontext is the context
269 * of the process performing the transition. All other callers of
270 * constraint_expr_eval should pass in NULL for xcontext.
272 static int constraint_expr_eval(struct context *scontext,
273 struct context *tcontext,
274 struct context *xcontext,
275 struct constraint_expr *cexpr)
279 struct role_datum *r1, *r2;
280 struct mls_level *l1, *l2;
281 struct constraint_expr *e;
282 int s[CEXPR_MAXDEPTH];
285 for (e = cexpr; e; e = e->next) {
286 switch (e->expr_type) {
302 if (sp == (CEXPR_MAXDEPTH - 1))
306 val1 = scontext->user;
307 val2 = tcontext->user;
310 val1 = scontext->type;
311 val2 = tcontext->type;
314 val1 = scontext->role;
315 val2 = tcontext->role;
316 r1 = policydb.role_val_to_struct[val1 - 1];
317 r2 = policydb.role_val_to_struct[val2 - 1];
320 s[++sp] = ebitmap_get_bit(&r1->dominates,
324 s[++sp] = ebitmap_get_bit(&r2->dominates,
328 s[++sp] = (!ebitmap_get_bit(&r1->dominates,
330 !ebitmap_get_bit(&r2->dominates,
338 l1 = &(scontext->range.level[0]);
339 l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[0]);
342 l1 = &(scontext->range.level[0]);
343 l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[1]);
346 l1 = &(scontext->range.level[1]);
347 l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[0]);
350 l1 = &(scontext->range.level[1]);
351 l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[1]);
354 l1 = &(scontext->range.level[0]);
355 l2 = &(scontext->range.level[1]);
358 l1 = &(tcontext->range.level[0]);
359 l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[1]);
364 s[++sp] = mls_level_eq(l1, l2);
367 s[++sp] = !mls_level_eq(l1, l2);
370 s[++sp] = mls_level_dom(l1, l2);
373 s[++sp] = mls_level_dom(l2, l1);
376 s[++sp] = mls_level_incomp(l2, l1);
390 s[++sp] = (val1 == val2);
393 s[++sp] = (val1 != val2);
401 if (sp == (CEXPR_MAXDEPTH-1))
404 if (e->attr & CEXPR_TARGET)
406 else if (e->attr & CEXPR_XTARGET) {
413 if (e->attr & CEXPR_USER)
415 else if (e->attr & CEXPR_ROLE)
417 else if (e->attr & CEXPR_TYPE)
426 s[++sp] = ebitmap_get_bit(&e->names, val1 - 1);
429 s[++sp] = !ebitmap_get_bit(&e->names, val1 - 1);
447 * security_dump_masked_av - dumps masked permissions during
448 * security_compute_av due to RBAC, MLS/Constraint and Type bounds.
450 static int dump_masked_av_helper(void *k, void *d, void *args)
452 struct perm_datum *pdatum = d;
453 char **permission_names = args;
455 BUG_ON(pdatum->value < 1 || pdatum->value > 32);
457 permission_names[pdatum->value - 1] = (char *)k;
462 static void security_dump_masked_av(struct context *scontext,
463 struct context *tcontext,
468 struct common_datum *common_dat;
469 struct class_datum *tclass_dat;
470 struct audit_buffer *ab;
472 char *scontext_name = NULL;
473 char *tcontext_name = NULL;
474 char *permission_names[32];
477 bool need_comma = false;
482 tclass_name = sym_name(&policydb, SYM_CLASSES, tclass - 1);
483 tclass_dat = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
484 common_dat = tclass_dat->comdatum;
486 /* init permission_names */
488 hashtab_map(common_dat->permissions.table,
489 dump_masked_av_helper, permission_names) < 0)
492 if (hashtab_map(tclass_dat->permissions.table,
493 dump_masked_av_helper, permission_names) < 0)
496 /* get scontext/tcontext in text form */
497 if (context_struct_to_string(scontext,
498 &scontext_name, &length) < 0)
501 if (context_struct_to_string(tcontext,
502 &tcontext_name, &length) < 0)
505 /* audit a message */
506 ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context,
507 GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
511 audit_log_format(ab, "op=security_compute_av reason=%s "
512 "scontext=%s tcontext=%s tclass=%s perms=",
513 reason, scontext_name, tcontext_name, tclass_name);
515 for (index = 0; index < 32; index++) {
516 u32 mask = (1 << index);
518 if ((mask & permissions) == 0)
521 audit_log_format(ab, "%s%s",
522 need_comma ? "," : "",
523 permission_names[index]
524 ? permission_names[index] : "????");
529 /* release scontext/tcontext */
530 kfree(tcontext_name);
531 kfree(scontext_name);
537 * security_boundary_permission - drops violated permissions
538 * on boundary constraint.
540 static void type_attribute_bounds_av(struct context *scontext,
541 struct context *tcontext,
543 struct av_decision *avd)
545 struct context lo_scontext;
546 struct context lo_tcontext;
547 struct av_decision lo_avd;
548 struct type_datum *source;
549 struct type_datum *target;
552 source = flex_array_get_ptr(policydb.type_val_to_struct_array,
556 target = flex_array_get_ptr(policydb.type_val_to_struct_array,
560 if (source->bounds) {
561 memset(&lo_avd, 0, sizeof(lo_avd));
563 memcpy(&lo_scontext, scontext, sizeof(lo_scontext));
564 lo_scontext.type = source->bounds;
566 context_struct_compute_av(&lo_scontext,
571 if ((lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed) == avd->allowed)
572 return; /* no masked permission */
573 masked = ~lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed;
576 if (target->bounds) {
577 memset(&lo_avd, 0, sizeof(lo_avd));
579 memcpy(&lo_tcontext, tcontext, sizeof(lo_tcontext));
580 lo_tcontext.type = target->bounds;
582 context_struct_compute_av(scontext,
587 if ((lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed) == avd->allowed)
588 return; /* no masked permission */
589 masked = ~lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed;
592 if (source->bounds && target->bounds) {
593 memset(&lo_avd, 0, sizeof(lo_avd));
595 * lo_scontext and lo_tcontext are already
599 context_struct_compute_av(&lo_scontext,
604 if ((lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed) == avd->allowed)
605 return; /* no masked permission */
606 masked = ~lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed;
610 /* mask violated permissions */
611 avd->allowed &= ~masked;
613 /* audit masked permissions */
614 security_dump_masked_av(scontext, tcontext,
615 tclass, masked, "bounds");
620 * flag which drivers have permissions
621 * only looking for ioctl based extended permssions
623 void services_compute_xperms_drivers(
624 struct extended_perms *xperms,
625 struct avtab_node *node)
629 if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER) {
630 /* if one or more driver has all permissions allowed */
631 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xperms->drivers.p); i++)
632 xperms->drivers.p[i] |= node->datum.u.xperms->perms.p[i];
633 } else if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION) {
634 /* if allowing permissions within a driver */
635 security_xperm_set(xperms->drivers.p,
636 node->datum.u.xperms->driver);
639 /* If no ioctl commands are allowed, ignore auditallow and auditdeny */
640 if (node->key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS_ALLOWED)
645 * Compute access vectors and extended permissions based on a context
646 * structure pair for the permissions in a particular class.
648 static void context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
649 struct context *tcontext,
651 struct av_decision *avd,
652 struct extended_perms *xperms)
654 struct constraint_node *constraint;
655 struct role_allow *ra;
656 struct avtab_key avkey;
657 struct avtab_node *node;
658 struct class_datum *tclass_datum;
659 struct ebitmap *sattr, *tattr;
660 struct ebitmap_node *snode, *tnode;
665 avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff;
667 memset(&xperms->drivers, 0, sizeof(xperms->drivers));
671 if (unlikely(!tclass || tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim)) {
672 if (printk_ratelimit())
673 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Invalid class %hu\n", tclass);
677 tclass_datum = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
680 * If a specific type enforcement rule was defined for
681 * this permission check, then use it.
683 avkey.target_class = tclass;
684 avkey.specified = AVTAB_AV | AVTAB_XPERMS;
685 sattr = flex_array_get(policydb.type_attr_map_array, scontext->type - 1);
687 tattr = flex_array_get(policydb.type_attr_map_array, tcontext->type - 1);
689 ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(sattr, snode, i) {
690 ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(tattr, tnode, j) {
691 avkey.source_type = i + 1;
692 avkey.target_type = j + 1;
693 for (node = avtab_search_node(&policydb.te_avtab, &avkey);
695 node = avtab_search_node_next(node, avkey.specified)) {
696 if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_ALLOWED)
697 avd->allowed |= node->datum.u.data;
698 else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_AUDITALLOW)
699 avd->auditallow |= node->datum.u.data;
700 else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_AUDITDENY)
701 avd->auditdeny &= node->datum.u.data;
702 else if (xperms && (node->key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS))
703 services_compute_xperms_drivers(xperms, node);
706 /* Check conditional av table for additional permissions */
707 cond_compute_av(&policydb.te_cond_avtab, &avkey,
714 * Remove any permissions prohibited by a constraint (this includes
717 constraint = tclass_datum->constraints;
719 if ((constraint->permissions & (avd->allowed)) &&
720 !constraint_expr_eval(scontext, tcontext, NULL,
722 avd->allowed &= ~(constraint->permissions);
724 constraint = constraint->next;
728 * If checking process transition permission and the
729 * role is changing, then check the (current_role, new_role)
732 if (tclass == policydb.process_class &&
733 (avd->allowed & policydb.process_trans_perms) &&
734 scontext->role != tcontext->role) {
735 for (ra = policydb.role_allow; ra; ra = ra->next) {
736 if (scontext->role == ra->role &&
737 tcontext->role == ra->new_role)
741 avd->allowed &= ~policydb.process_trans_perms;
745 * If the given source and target types have boundary
746 * constraint, lazy checks have to mask any violated
747 * permission and notice it to userspace via audit.
749 type_attribute_bounds_av(scontext, tcontext,
753 static int security_validtrans_handle_fail(struct context *ocontext,
754 struct context *ncontext,
755 struct context *tcontext,
758 char *o = NULL, *n = NULL, *t = NULL;
759 u32 olen, nlen, tlen;
761 if (context_struct_to_string(ocontext, &o, &olen))
763 if (context_struct_to_string(ncontext, &n, &nlen))
765 if (context_struct_to_string(tcontext, &t, &tlen))
767 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
768 "op=security_validate_transition seresult=denied"
769 " oldcontext=%s newcontext=%s taskcontext=%s tclass=%s",
770 o, n, t, sym_name(&policydb, SYM_CLASSES, tclass-1));
776 if (!selinux_enforcing)
781 int security_validate_transition(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
784 struct context *ocontext;
785 struct context *ncontext;
786 struct context *tcontext;
787 struct class_datum *tclass_datum;
788 struct constraint_node *constraint;
795 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
797 tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass);
799 if (!tclass || tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim) {
800 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized class %d\n",
805 tclass_datum = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
807 ocontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, oldsid);
809 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
815 ncontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, newsid);
817 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
823 tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tasksid);
825 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
831 constraint = tclass_datum->validatetrans;
833 if (!constraint_expr_eval(ocontext, ncontext, tcontext,
835 rc = security_validtrans_handle_fail(ocontext, ncontext,
839 constraint = constraint->next;
843 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
848 * security_bounded_transition - check whether the given
849 * transition is directed to bounded, or not.
850 * It returns 0, if @newsid is bounded by @oldsid.
851 * Otherwise, it returns error code.
853 * @oldsid : current security identifier
854 * @newsid : destinated security identifier
856 int security_bounded_transition(u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
858 struct context *old_context, *new_context;
859 struct type_datum *type;
866 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
869 old_context = sidtab_search(&sidtab, old_sid);
871 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %u\n",
877 new_context = sidtab_search(&sidtab, new_sid);
879 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %u\n",
885 /* type/domain unchanged */
886 if (old_context->type == new_context->type)
889 index = new_context->type;
891 type = flex_array_get_ptr(policydb.type_val_to_struct_array,
895 /* not bounded anymore */
900 /* @newsid is bounded by @oldsid */
902 if (type->bounds == old_context->type)
905 index = type->bounds;
909 char *old_name = NULL;
910 char *new_name = NULL;
913 if (!context_struct_to_string(old_context,
914 &old_name, &length) &&
915 !context_struct_to_string(new_context,
916 &new_name, &length)) {
917 audit_log(current->audit_context,
918 GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
919 "op=security_bounded_transition "
921 "oldcontext=%s newcontext=%s",
928 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
933 static void avd_init(struct av_decision *avd)
937 avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff;
938 avd->seqno = latest_granting;
942 void services_compute_xperms_decision(struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd,
943 struct avtab_node *node)
947 if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION) {
948 if (xpermd->driver != node->datum.u.xperms->driver)
950 } else if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER) {
951 if (!security_xperm_test(node->datum.u.xperms->perms.p,
958 if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_ALLOWED) {
959 xpermd->used |= XPERMS_ALLOWED;
960 if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER) {
961 memset(xpermd->allowed->p, 0xff,
962 sizeof(xpermd->allowed->p));
964 if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION) {
965 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xpermd->allowed->p); i++)
966 xpermd->allowed->p[i] |=
967 node->datum.u.xperms->perms.p[i];
969 } else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_AUDITALLOW) {
970 xpermd->used |= XPERMS_AUDITALLOW;
971 if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER) {
972 memset(xpermd->auditallow->p, 0xff,
973 sizeof(xpermd->auditallow->p));
975 if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION) {
976 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xpermd->auditallow->p); i++)
977 xpermd->auditallow->p[i] |=
978 node->datum.u.xperms->perms.p[i];
980 } else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_DONTAUDIT) {
981 xpermd->used |= XPERMS_DONTAUDIT;
982 if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER) {
983 memset(xpermd->dontaudit->p, 0xff,
984 sizeof(xpermd->dontaudit->p));
986 if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION) {
987 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xpermd->dontaudit->p); i++)
988 xpermd->dontaudit->p[i] |=
989 node->datum.u.xperms->perms.p[i];
996 void security_compute_xperms_decision(u32 ssid,
1000 struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd)
1003 struct context *scontext, *tcontext;
1004 struct avtab_key avkey;
1005 struct avtab_node *node;
1006 struct ebitmap *sattr, *tattr;
1007 struct ebitmap_node *snode, *tnode;
1010 xpermd->driver = driver;
1012 memset(xpermd->allowed->p, 0, sizeof(xpermd->allowed->p));
1013 memset(xpermd->auditallow->p, 0, sizeof(xpermd->auditallow->p));
1014 memset(xpermd->dontaudit->p, 0, sizeof(xpermd->dontaudit->p));
1016 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
1017 if (!ss_initialized)
1020 scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid);
1022 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
1027 tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tsid);
1029 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
1034 tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass);
1035 if (unlikely(orig_tclass && !tclass)) {
1036 if (policydb.allow_unknown)
1042 if (unlikely(!tclass || tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim)) {
1043 pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: Invalid class %hu\n", tclass);
1047 avkey.target_class = tclass;
1048 avkey.specified = AVTAB_XPERMS;
1049 sattr = flex_array_get(policydb.type_attr_map_array,
1050 scontext->type - 1);
1052 tattr = flex_array_get(policydb.type_attr_map_array,
1053 tcontext->type - 1);
1055 ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(sattr, snode, i) {
1056 ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(tattr, tnode, j) {
1057 avkey.source_type = i + 1;
1058 avkey.target_type = j + 1;
1059 for (node = avtab_search_node(&policydb.te_avtab, &avkey);
1061 node = avtab_search_node_next(node, avkey.specified))
1062 services_compute_xperms_decision(xpermd, node);
1064 cond_compute_xperms(&policydb.te_cond_avtab,
1069 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
1072 memset(xpermd->allowed->p, 0xff, sizeof(xpermd->allowed->p));
1077 * security_compute_av - Compute access vector decisions.
1078 * @ssid: source security identifier
1079 * @tsid: target security identifier
1080 * @tclass: target security class
1081 * @avd: access vector decisions
1082 * @xperms: extended permissions
1084 * Compute a set of access vector decisions based on the
1085 * SID pair (@ssid, @tsid) for the permissions in @tclass.
1087 void security_compute_av(u32 ssid,
1090 struct av_decision *avd,
1091 struct extended_perms *xperms)
1094 struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL;
1096 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
1099 if (!ss_initialized)
1102 scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid);
1104 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
1109 /* permissive domain? */
1110 if (ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.permissive_map, scontext->type))
1111 avd->flags |= AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE;
1113 tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tsid);
1115 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
1120 tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass);
1121 if (unlikely(orig_tclass && !tclass)) {
1122 if (policydb.allow_unknown)
1126 context_struct_compute_av(scontext, tcontext, tclass, avd, xperms);
1127 map_decision(orig_tclass, avd, policydb.allow_unknown);
1129 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
1132 avd->allowed = 0xffffffff;
1136 void security_compute_av_user(u32 ssid,
1139 struct av_decision *avd)
1141 struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL;
1143 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
1145 if (!ss_initialized)
1148 scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid);
1150 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
1155 /* permissive domain? */
1156 if (ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.permissive_map, scontext->type))
1157 avd->flags |= AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE;
1159 tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tsid);
1161 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
1166 if (unlikely(!tclass)) {
1167 if (policydb.allow_unknown)
1172 context_struct_compute_av(scontext, tcontext, tclass, avd, NULL);
1174 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
1177 avd->allowed = 0xffffffff;
1182 * Write the security context string representation of
1183 * the context structure `context' into a dynamically
1184 * allocated string of the correct size. Set `*scontext'
1185 * to point to this string and set `*scontext_len' to
1186 * the length of the string.
1188 static int context_struct_to_string(struct context *context, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
1197 *scontext_len = context->len;
1199 *scontext = kstrdup(context->str, GFP_ATOMIC);
1206 /* Compute the size of the context. */
1207 *scontext_len += strlen(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_USERS, context->user - 1)) + 1;
1208 *scontext_len += strlen(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_ROLES, context->role - 1)) + 1;
1209 *scontext_len += strlen(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_TYPES, context->type - 1)) + 1;
1210 *scontext_len += mls_compute_context_len(context);
1215 /* Allocate space for the context; caller must free this space. */
1216 scontextp = kmalloc(*scontext_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
1219 *scontext = scontextp;
1222 * Copy the user name, role name and type name into the context.
1224 scontextp += sprintf(scontextp, "%s:%s:%s",
1225 sym_name(&policydb, SYM_USERS, context->user - 1),
1226 sym_name(&policydb, SYM_ROLES, context->role - 1),
1227 sym_name(&policydb, SYM_TYPES, context->type - 1));
1229 mls_sid_to_context(context, &scontextp);
1236 #include "initial_sid_to_string.h"
1238 const char *security_get_initial_sid_context(u32 sid)
1240 if (unlikely(sid > SECINITSID_NUM))
1242 return initial_sid_to_string[sid];
1245 static int security_sid_to_context_core(u32 sid, char **scontext,
1246 u32 *scontext_len, int force)
1248 struct context *context;
1255 if (!ss_initialized) {
1256 if (sid <= SECINITSID_NUM) {
1259 *scontext_len = strlen(initial_sid_to_string[sid]) + 1;
1262 scontextp = kmemdup(initial_sid_to_string[sid],
1263 *scontext_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
1268 *scontext = scontextp;
1271 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: called before initial "
1272 "load_policy on unknown SID %d\n", __func__, sid);
1276 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
1278 context = sidtab_search_force(&sidtab, sid);
1280 context = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
1282 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
1287 rc = context_struct_to_string(context, scontext, scontext_len);
1289 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
1296 * security_sid_to_context - Obtain a context for a given SID.
1297 * @sid: security identifier, SID
1298 * @scontext: security context
1299 * @scontext_len: length in bytes
1301 * Write the string representation of the context associated with @sid
1302 * into a dynamically allocated string of the correct size. Set @scontext
1303 * to point to this string and set @scontext_len to the length of the string.
1305 int security_sid_to_context(u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
1307 return security_sid_to_context_core(sid, scontext, scontext_len, 0);
1310 int security_sid_to_context_force(u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
1312 return security_sid_to_context_core(sid, scontext, scontext_len, 1);
1316 * Caveat: Mutates scontext.
1318 static int string_to_context_struct(struct policydb *pol,
1319 struct sidtab *sidtabp,
1322 struct context *ctx,
1325 struct role_datum *role;
1326 struct type_datum *typdatum;
1327 struct user_datum *usrdatum;
1328 char *scontextp, *p, oldc;
1333 /* Parse the security context. */
1336 scontextp = (char *) scontext;
1338 /* Extract the user. */
1340 while (*p && *p != ':')
1348 usrdatum = hashtab_search(pol->p_users.table, scontextp);
1352 ctx->user = usrdatum->value;
1356 while (*p && *p != ':')
1364 role = hashtab_search(pol->p_roles.table, scontextp);
1367 ctx->role = role->value;
1371 while (*p && *p != ':')
1376 typdatum = hashtab_search(pol->p_types.table, scontextp);
1377 if (!typdatum || typdatum->attribute)
1380 ctx->type = typdatum->value;
1382 rc = mls_context_to_sid(pol, oldc, &p, ctx, sidtabp, def_sid);
1387 if ((p - scontext) < scontext_len)
1390 /* Check the validity of the new context. */
1391 if (!policydb_context_isvalid(pol, ctx))
1396 context_destroy(ctx);
1400 static int security_context_to_sid_core(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
1401 u32 *sid, u32 def_sid, gfp_t gfp_flags,
1404 char *scontext2, *str = NULL;
1405 struct context context;
1408 /* An empty security context is never valid. */
1412 /* Copy the string to allow changes and ensure a NUL terminator */
1413 scontext2 = kmemdup_nul(scontext, scontext_len, gfp_flags);
1417 if (!ss_initialized) {
1420 for (i = 1; i < SECINITSID_NUM; i++) {
1421 if (!strcmp(initial_sid_to_string[i], scontext2)) {
1426 *sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
1432 /* Save another copy for storing in uninterpreted form */
1434 str = kstrdup(scontext2, gfp_flags);
1439 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
1440 rc = string_to_context_struct(&policydb, &sidtab, scontext2,
1441 scontext_len, &context, def_sid);
1442 if (rc == -EINVAL && force) {
1444 context.len = strlen(str) + 1;
1448 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &context, sid);
1449 context_destroy(&context);
1451 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
1459 * security_context_to_sid - Obtain a SID for a given security context.
1460 * @scontext: security context
1461 * @scontext_len: length in bytes
1462 * @sid: security identifier, SID
1463 * @gfp: context for the allocation
1465 * Obtains a SID associated with the security context that
1466 * has the string representation specified by @scontext.
1467 * Returns -%EINVAL if the context is invalid, -%ENOMEM if insufficient
1468 * memory is available, or 0 on success.
1470 int security_context_to_sid(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32 *sid,
1473 return security_context_to_sid_core(scontext, scontext_len,
1474 sid, SECSID_NULL, gfp, 0);
1477 int security_context_str_to_sid(const char *scontext, u32 *sid, gfp_t gfp)
1479 return security_context_to_sid(scontext, strlen(scontext), sid, gfp);
1483 * security_context_to_sid_default - Obtain a SID for a given security context,
1484 * falling back to specified default if needed.
1486 * @scontext: security context
1487 * @scontext_len: length in bytes
1488 * @sid: security identifier, SID
1489 * @def_sid: default SID to assign on error
1491 * Obtains a SID associated with the security context that
1492 * has the string representation specified by @scontext.
1493 * The default SID is passed to the MLS layer to be used to allow
1494 * kernel labeling of the MLS field if the MLS field is not present
1495 * (for upgrading to MLS without full relabel).
1496 * Implicitly forces adding of the context even if it cannot be mapped yet.
1497 * Returns -%EINVAL if the context is invalid, -%ENOMEM if insufficient
1498 * memory is available, or 0 on success.
1500 int security_context_to_sid_default(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
1501 u32 *sid, u32 def_sid, gfp_t gfp_flags)
1503 return security_context_to_sid_core(scontext, scontext_len,
1504 sid, def_sid, gfp_flags, 1);
1507 int security_context_to_sid_force(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
1510 return security_context_to_sid_core(scontext, scontext_len,
1511 sid, SECSID_NULL, GFP_KERNEL, 1);
1514 static int compute_sid_handle_invalid_context(
1515 struct context *scontext,
1516 struct context *tcontext,
1518 struct context *newcontext)
1520 char *s = NULL, *t = NULL, *n = NULL;
1521 u32 slen, tlen, nlen;
1523 if (context_struct_to_string(scontext, &s, &slen))
1525 if (context_struct_to_string(tcontext, &t, &tlen))
1527 if (context_struct_to_string(newcontext, &n, &nlen))
1529 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
1530 "op=security_compute_sid invalid_context=%s"
1534 n, s, t, sym_name(&policydb, SYM_CLASSES, tclass-1));
1539 if (!selinux_enforcing)
1544 static void filename_compute_type(struct policydb *p, struct context *newcontext,
1545 u32 stype, u32 ttype, u16 tclass,
1546 const char *objname)
1548 struct filename_trans ft;
1549 struct filename_trans_datum *otype;
1552 * Most filename trans rules are going to live in specific directories
1553 * like /dev or /var/run. This bitmap will quickly skip rule searches
1554 * if the ttype does not contain any rules.
1556 if (!ebitmap_get_bit(&p->filename_trans_ttypes, ttype))
1564 otype = hashtab_search(p->filename_trans, &ft);
1566 newcontext->type = otype->otype;
1569 static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
1573 const char *objname,
1577 struct class_datum *cladatum = NULL;
1578 struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL, newcontext;
1579 struct role_trans *roletr = NULL;
1580 struct avtab_key avkey;
1581 struct avtab_datum *avdatum;
1582 struct avtab_node *node;
1587 if (!ss_initialized) {
1588 switch (orig_tclass) {
1589 case SECCLASS_PROCESS: /* kernel value */
1599 context_init(&newcontext);
1601 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
1604 tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass);
1605 sock = security_is_socket_class(orig_tclass);
1607 tclass = orig_tclass;
1608 sock = security_is_socket_class(map_class(tclass));
1611 scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid);
1613 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
1618 tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tsid);
1620 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
1626 if (tclass && tclass <= policydb.p_classes.nprim)
1627 cladatum = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
1629 /* Set the user identity. */
1630 switch (specified) {
1631 case AVTAB_TRANSITION:
1633 if (cladatum && cladatum->default_user == DEFAULT_TARGET) {
1634 newcontext.user = tcontext->user;
1636 /* notice this gets both DEFAULT_SOURCE and unset */
1637 /* Use the process user identity. */
1638 newcontext.user = scontext->user;
1642 /* Use the related object owner. */
1643 newcontext.user = tcontext->user;
1647 /* Set the role to default values. */
1648 if (cladatum && cladatum->default_role == DEFAULT_SOURCE) {
1649 newcontext.role = scontext->role;
1650 } else if (cladatum && cladatum->default_role == DEFAULT_TARGET) {
1651 newcontext.role = tcontext->role;
1653 if ((tclass == policydb.process_class) || (sock == true))
1654 newcontext.role = scontext->role;
1656 newcontext.role = OBJECT_R_VAL;
1659 /* Set the type to default values. */
1660 if (cladatum && cladatum->default_type == DEFAULT_SOURCE) {
1661 newcontext.type = scontext->type;
1662 } else if (cladatum && cladatum->default_type == DEFAULT_TARGET) {
1663 newcontext.type = tcontext->type;
1665 if ((tclass == policydb.process_class) || (sock == true)) {
1666 /* Use the type of process. */
1667 newcontext.type = scontext->type;
1669 /* Use the type of the related object. */
1670 newcontext.type = tcontext->type;
1674 /* Look for a type transition/member/change rule. */
1675 avkey.source_type = scontext->type;
1676 avkey.target_type = tcontext->type;
1677 avkey.target_class = tclass;
1678 avkey.specified = specified;
1679 avdatum = avtab_search(&policydb.te_avtab, &avkey);
1681 /* If no permanent rule, also check for enabled conditional rules */
1683 node = avtab_search_node(&policydb.te_cond_avtab, &avkey);
1684 for (; node; node = avtab_search_node_next(node, specified)) {
1685 if (node->key.specified & AVTAB_ENABLED) {
1686 avdatum = &node->datum;
1693 /* Use the type from the type transition/member/change rule. */
1694 newcontext.type = avdatum->u.data;
1697 /* if we have a objname this is a file trans check so check those rules */
1699 filename_compute_type(&policydb, &newcontext, scontext->type,
1700 tcontext->type, tclass, objname);
1702 /* Check for class-specific changes. */
1703 if (specified & AVTAB_TRANSITION) {
1704 /* Look for a role transition rule. */
1705 for (roletr = policydb.role_tr; roletr; roletr = roletr->next) {
1706 if ((roletr->role == scontext->role) &&
1707 (roletr->type == tcontext->type) &&
1708 (roletr->tclass == tclass)) {
1709 /* Use the role transition rule. */
1710 newcontext.role = roletr->new_role;
1716 /* Set the MLS attributes.
1717 This is done last because it may allocate memory. */
1718 rc = mls_compute_sid(scontext, tcontext, tclass, specified,
1723 /* Check the validity of the context. */
1724 if (!policydb_context_isvalid(&policydb, &newcontext)) {
1725 rc = compute_sid_handle_invalid_context(scontext,
1732 /* Obtain the sid for the context. */
1733 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &newcontext, out_sid);
1735 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
1736 context_destroy(&newcontext);
1742 * security_transition_sid - Compute the SID for a new subject/object.
1743 * @ssid: source security identifier
1744 * @tsid: target security identifier
1745 * @tclass: target security class
1746 * @out_sid: security identifier for new subject/object
1748 * Compute a SID to use for labeling a new subject or object in the
1749 * class @tclass based on a SID pair (@ssid, @tsid).
1750 * Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid, -%ENOMEM
1751 * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the new SID was
1752 * computed successfully.
1754 int security_transition_sid(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
1755 const struct qstr *qstr, u32 *out_sid)
1757 return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_TRANSITION,
1758 qstr ? qstr->name : NULL, out_sid, true);
1761 int security_transition_sid_user(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
1762 const char *objname, u32 *out_sid)
1764 return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_TRANSITION,
1765 objname, out_sid, false);
1769 * security_member_sid - Compute the SID for member selection.
1770 * @ssid: source security identifier
1771 * @tsid: target security identifier
1772 * @tclass: target security class
1773 * @out_sid: security identifier for selected member
1775 * Compute a SID to use when selecting a member of a polyinstantiated
1776 * object of class @tclass based on a SID pair (@ssid, @tsid).
1777 * Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid, -%ENOMEM
1778 * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the SID was
1779 * computed successfully.
1781 int security_member_sid(u32 ssid,
1786 return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_MEMBER, NULL,
1791 * security_change_sid - Compute the SID for object relabeling.
1792 * @ssid: source security identifier
1793 * @tsid: target security identifier
1794 * @tclass: target security class
1795 * @out_sid: security identifier for selected member
1797 * Compute a SID to use for relabeling an object of class @tclass
1798 * based on a SID pair (@ssid, @tsid).
1799 * Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid, -%ENOMEM
1800 * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the SID was
1801 * computed successfully.
1803 int security_change_sid(u32 ssid,
1808 return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_CHANGE, NULL,
1812 /* Clone the SID into the new SID table. */
1813 static int clone_sid(u32 sid,
1814 struct context *context,
1817 struct sidtab *s = arg;
1819 if (sid > SECINITSID_NUM)
1820 return sidtab_insert(s, sid, context);
1825 static inline int convert_context_handle_invalid_context(struct context *context)
1830 if (selinux_enforcing)
1833 if (!context_struct_to_string(context, &s, &len)) {
1834 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Context %s would be invalid if enforcing\n", s);
1840 struct convert_context_args {
1841 struct policydb *oldp;
1842 struct policydb *newp;
1846 * Convert the values in the security context
1847 * structure `c' from the values specified
1848 * in the policy `p->oldp' to the values specified
1849 * in the policy `p->newp'. Verify that the
1850 * context is valid under the new policy.
1852 static int convert_context(u32 key,
1856 struct convert_context_args *args;
1857 struct context oldc;
1858 struct ocontext *oc;
1859 struct mls_range *range;
1860 struct role_datum *role;
1861 struct type_datum *typdatum;
1862 struct user_datum *usrdatum;
1867 if (key <= SECINITSID_NUM)
1876 s = kstrdup(c->str, GFP_KERNEL);
1880 rc = string_to_context_struct(args->newp, NULL, s,
1881 c->len, &ctx, SECSID_NULL);
1884 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Context %s became valid (mapped).\n",
1886 /* Replace string with mapped representation. */
1888 memcpy(c, &ctx, sizeof(*c));
1890 } else if (rc == -EINVAL) {
1891 /* Retain string representation for later mapping. */
1895 /* Other error condition, e.g. ENOMEM. */
1896 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: Unable to map context %s, rc = %d.\n",
1902 rc = context_cpy(&oldc, c);
1906 /* Convert the user. */
1908 usrdatum = hashtab_search(args->newp->p_users.table,
1909 sym_name(args->oldp, SYM_USERS, c->user - 1));
1912 c->user = usrdatum->value;
1914 /* Convert the role. */
1916 role = hashtab_search(args->newp->p_roles.table,
1917 sym_name(args->oldp, SYM_ROLES, c->role - 1));
1920 c->role = role->value;
1922 /* Convert the type. */
1924 typdatum = hashtab_search(args->newp->p_types.table,
1925 sym_name(args->oldp, SYM_TYPES, c->type - 1));
1928 c->type = typdatum->value;
1930 /* Convert the MLS fields if dealing with MLS policies */
1931 if (args->oldp->mls_enabled && args->newp->mls_enabled) {
1932 rc = mls_convert_context(args->oldp, args->newp, c);
1935 } else if (args->oldp->mls_enabled && !args->newp->mls_enabled) {
1937 * Switching between MLS and non-MLS policy:
1938 * free any storage used by the MLS fields in the
1939 * context for all existing entries in the sidtab.
1941 mls_context_destroy(c);
1942 } else if (!args->oldp->mls_enabled && args->newp->mls_enabled) {
1944 * Switching between non-MLS and MLS policy:
1945 * ensure that the MLS fields of the context for all
1946 * existing entries in the sidtab are filled in with a
1947 * suitable default value, likely taken from one of the
1950 oc = args->newp->ocontexts[OCON_ISID];
1951 while (oc && oc->sid[0] != SECINITSID_UNLABELED)
1955 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to look up"
1956 " the initial SIDs list\n");
1959 range = &oc->context[0].range;
1960 rc = mls_range_set(c, range);
1965 /* Check the validity of the new context. */
1966 if (!policydb_context_isvalid(args->newp, c)) {
1967 rc = convert_context_handle_invalid_context(&oldc);
1972 context_destroy(&oldc);
1978 /* Map old representation to string and save it. */
1979 rc = context_struct_to_string(&oldc, &s, &len);
1982 context_destroy(&oldc);
1986 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Context %s became invalid (unmapped).\n",
1992 static void security_load_policycaps(void)
1994 selinux_policycap_netpeer = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
1995 POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NETPEER);
1996 selinux_policycap_openperm = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
1997 POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_OPENPERM);
1998 selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
1999 POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_ALWAYSNETWORK);
2002 static int security_preserve_bools(struct policydb *p);
2005 * security_load_policy - Load a security policy configuration.
2006 * @data: binary policy data
2007 * @len: length of data in bytes
2009 * Load a new set of security policy configuration data,
2010 * validate it and convert the SID table as necessary.
2011 * This function will flush the access vector cache after
2012 * loading the new policy.
2014 int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
2016 struct policydb *oldpolicydb, *newpolicydb;
2017 struct sidtab oldsidtab, newsidtab;
2018 struct selinux_mapping *oldmap, *map = NULL;
2019 struct convert_context_args args;
2023 struct policy_file file = { data, len }, *fp = &file;
2025 oldpolicydb = kzalloc(2 * sizeof(*oldpolicydb), GFP_KERNEL);
2030 newpolicydb = oldpolicydb + 1;
2032 if (!ss_initialized) {
2034 rc = policydb_read(&policydb, fp);
2036 avtab_cache_destroy();
2041 rc = selinux_set_mapping(&policydb, secclass_map,
2043 ¤t_mapping_size);
2045 policydb_destroy(&policydb);
2046 avtab_cache_destroy();
2050 rc = policydb_load_isids(&policydb, &sidtab);
2052 policydb_destroy(&policydb);
2053 avtab_cache_destroy();
2057 security_load_policycaps();
2059 seqno = ++latest_granting;
2060 selinux_complete_init();
2061 avc_ss_reset(seqno);
2062 selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
2063 selinux_status_update_policyload(seqno);
2064 selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate();
2065 selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload();
2070 sidtab_hash_eval(&sidtab, "sids");
2073 rc = policydb_read(newpolicydb, fp);
2077 newpolicydb->len = len;
2078 /* If switching between different policy types, log MLS status */
2079 if (policydb.mls_enabled && !newpolicydb->mls_enabled)
2080 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabling MLS support...\n");
2081 else if (!policydb.mls_enabled && newpolicydb->mls_enabled)
2082 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Enabling MLS support...\n");
2084 rc = policydb_load_isids(newpolicydb, &newsidtab);
2086 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to load the initial SIDs\n");
2087 policydb_destroy(newpolicydb);
2091 rc = selinux_set_mapping(newpolicydb, secclass_map, &map, &map_size);
2095 rc = security_preserve_bools(newpolicydb);
2097 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to preserve booleans\n");
2101 /* Clone the SID table. */
2102 sidtab_shutdown(&sidtab);
2104 rc = sidtab_map(&sidtab, clone_sid, &newsidtab);
2109 * Convert the internal representations of contexts
2110 * in the new SID table.
2112 args.oldp = &policydb;
2113 args.newp = newpolicydb;
2114 rc = sidtab_map(&newsidtab, convert_context, &args);
2116 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to convert the internal"
2117 " representation of contexts in the new SID"
2122 /* Save the old policydb and SID table to free later. */
2123 memcpy(oldpolicydb, &policydb, sizeof(policydb));
2124 sidtab_set(&oldsidtab, &sidtab);
2126 /* Install the new policydb and SID table. */
2127 write_lock_irq(&policy_rwlock);
2128 memcpy(&policydb, newpolicydb, sizeof(policydb));
2129 sidtab_set(&sidtab, &newsidtab);
2130 security_load_policycaps();
2131 oldmap = current_mapping;
2132 current_mapping = map;
2133 current_mapping_size = map_size;
2134 seqno = ++latest_granting;
2135 write_unlock_irq(&policy_rwlock);
2137 /* Free the old policydb and SID table. */
2138 policydb_destroy(oldpolicydb);
2139 sidtab_destroy(&oldsidtab);
2142 avc_ss_reset(seqno);
2143 selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
2144 selinux_status_update_policyload(seqno);
2145 selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate();
2146 selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload();
2153 sidtab_destroy(&newsidtab);
2154 policydb_destroy(newpolicydb);
2161 size_t security_policydb_len(void)
2165 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2167 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2173 * security_port_sid - Obtain the SID for a port.
2174 * @protocol: protocol number
2175 * @port: port number
2176 * @out_sid: security identifier
2178 int security_port_sid(u8 protocol, u16 port, u32 *out_sid)
2183 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2185 c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_PORT];
2187 if (c->u.port.protocol == protocol &&
2188 c->u.port.low_port <= port &&
2189 c->u.port.high_port >= port)
2196 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
2202 *out_sid = c->sid[0];
2204 *out_sid = SECINITSID_PORT;
2208 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2213 * security_netif_sid - Obtain the SID for a network interface.
2214 * @name: interface name
2215 * @if_sid: interface SID
2217 int security_netif_sid(char *name, u32 *if_sid)
2222 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2224 c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_NETIF];
2226 if (strcmp(name, c->u.name) == 0)
2232 if (!c->sid[0] || !c->sid[1]) {
2233 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
2238 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
2244 *if_sid = c->sid[0];
2246 *if_sid = SECINITSID_NETIF;
2249 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2253 static int match_ipv6_addrmask(u32 *input, u32 *addr, u32 *mask)
2257 for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
2258 if (addr[i] != (input[i] & mask[i])) {
2267 * security_node_sid - Obtain the SID for a node (host).
2268 * @domain: communication domain aka address family
2270 * @addrlen: address length in bytes
2271 * @out_sid: security identifier
2273 int security_node_sid(u16 domain,
2281 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2288 if (addrlen != sizeof(u32))
2291 addr = *((u32 *)addrp);
2293 c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_NODE];
2295 if (c->u.node.addr == (addr & c->u.node.mask))
2304 if (addrlen != sizeof(u64) * 2)
2306 c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_NODE6];
2308 if (match_ipv6_addrmask(addrp, c->u.node6.addr,
2317 *out_sid = SECINITSID_NODE;
2323 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
2329 *out_sid = c->sid[0];
2331 *out_sid = SECINITSID_NODE;
2336 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2343 * security_get_user_sids - Obtain reachable SIDs for a user.
2344 * @fromsid: starting SID
2345 * @username: username
2346 * @sids: array of reachable SIDs for user
2347 * @nel: number of elements in @sids
2349 * Generate the set of SIDs for legal security contexts
2350 * for a given user that can be reached by @fromsid.
2351 * Set *@sids to point to a dynamically allocated
2352 * array containing the set of SIDs. Set *@nel to the
2353 * number of elements in the array.
2356 int security_get_user_sids(u32 fromsid,
2361 struct context *fromcon, usercon;
2362 u32 *mysids = NULL, *mysids2, sid;
2363 u32 mynel = 0, maxnel = SIDS_NEL;
2364 struct user_datum *user;
2365 struct role_datum *role;
2366 struct ebitmap_node *rnode, *tnode;
2372 if (!ss_initialized)
2375 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2377 context_init(&usercon);
2380 fromcon = sidtab_search(&sidtab, fromsid);
2385 user = hashtab_search(policydb.p_users.table, username);
2389 usercon.user = user->value;
2392 mysids = kcalloc(maxnel, sizeof(*mysids), GFP_ATOMIC);
2396 ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&user->roles, rnode, i) {
2397 role = policydb.role_val_to_struct[i];
2398 usercon.role = i + 1;
2399 ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&role->types, tnode, j) {
2400 usercon.type = j + 1;
2402 if (mls_setup_user_range(fromcon, user, &usercon))
2405 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &usercon, &sid);
2408 if (mynel < maxnel) {
2409 mysids[mynel++] = sid;
2413 mysids2 = kcalloc(maxnel, sizeof(*mysids2), GFP_ATOMIC);
2416 memcpy(mysids2, mysids, mynel * sizeof(*mysids2));
2419 mysids[mynel++] = sid;
2425 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2432 mysids2 = kcalloc(mynel, sizeof(*mysids2), GFP_KERNEL);
2437 for (i = 0, j = 0; i < mynel; i++) {
2438 struct av_decision dummy_avd;
2439 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(fromsid, mysids[i],
2440 SECCLASS_PROCESS, /* kernel value */
2441 PROCESS__TRANSITION, AVC_STRICT,
2444 mysids2[j++] = mysids[i];
2456 * __security_genfs_sid - Helper to obtain a SID for a file in a filesystem
2457 * @fstype: filesystem type
2458 * @path: path from root of mount
2459 * @sclass: file security class
2460 * @sid: SID for path
2462 * Obtain a SID to use for a file in a filesystem that
2463 * cannot support xattr or use a fixed labeling behavior like
2464 * transition SIDs or task SIDs.
2466 * The caller must acquire the policy_rwlock before calling this function.
2468 static inline int __security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype,
2475 struct genfs *genfs;
2479 while (path[0] == '/' && path[1] == '/')
2482 sclass = unmap_class(orig_sclass);
2483 *sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
2485 for (genfs = policydb.genfs; genfs; genfs = genfs->next) {
2486 cmp = strcmp(fstype, genfs->fstype);
2495 for (c = genfs->head; c; c = c->next) {
2496 len = strlen(c->u.name);
2497 if ((!c->v.sclass || sclass == c->v.sclass) &&
2498 (strncmp(c->u.name, path, len) == 0))
2507 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &c->context[0], &c->sid[0]);
2519 * security_genfs_sid - Obtain a SID for a file in a filesystem
2520 * @fstype: filesystem type
2521 * @path: path from root of mount
2522 * @sclass: file security class
2523 * @sid: SID for path
2525 * Acquire policy_rwlock before calling __security_genfs_sid() and release
2528 int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype,
2535 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2536 retval = __security_genfs_sid(fstype, path, orig_sclass, sid);
2537 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2542 * security_fs_use - Determine how to handle labeling for a filesystem.
2543 * @sb: superblock in question
2545 int security_fs_use(struct super_block *sb)
2549 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
2550 const char *fstype = sb->s_type->name;
2552 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2554 c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_FSUSE];
2556 if (strcmp(fstype, c->u.name) == 0)
2562 sbsec->behavior = c->v.behavior;
2564 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &c->context[0],
2569 sbsec->sid = c->sid[0];
2571 rc = __security_genfs_sid(fstype, "/", SECCLASS_DIR,
2574 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE;
2577 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS;
2582 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2586 int security_get_bools(int *len, char ***names, int **values)
2590 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2595 *len = policydb.p_bools.nprim;
2600 *names = kcalloc(*len, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
2605 *values = kcalloc(*len, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
2609 for (i = 0; i < *len; i++) {
2610 (*values)[i] = policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state;
2613 (*names)[i] = kstrdup(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_BOOLS, i), GFP_ATOMIC);
2619 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2623 for (i = 0; i < *len; i++)
2635 int security_set_bools(int len, int *values)
2638 int lenp, seqno = 0;
2639 struct cond_node *cur;
2641 write_lock_irq(&policy_rwlock);
2644 lenp = policydb.p_bools.nprim;
2648 for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
2649 if (!!values[i] != policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state) {
2650 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC,
2651 AUDIT_MAC_CONFIG_CHANGE,
2652 "bool=%s val=%d old_val=%d auid=%u ses=%u",
2653 sym_name(&policydb, SYM_BOOLS, i),
2655 policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state,
2656 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)),
2657 audit_get_sessionid(current));
2660 policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state = 1;
2662 policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state = 0;
2665 for (cur = policydb.cond_list; cur; cur = cur->next) {
2666 rc = evaluate_cond_node(&policydb, cur);
2671 seqno = ++latest_granting;
2674 write_unlock_irq(&policy_rwlock);
2676 avc_ss_reset(seqno);
2677 selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
2678 selinux_status_update_policyload(seqno);
2679 selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload();
2684 int security_get_bool_value(int bool)
2689 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2692 len = policydb.p_bools.nprim;
2696 rc = policydb.bool_val_to_struct[bool]->state;
2698 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2702 static int security_preserve_bools(struct policydb *p)
2704 int rc, nbools = 0, *bvalues = NULL, i;
2705 char **bnames = NULL;
2706 struct cond_bool_datum *booldatum;
2707 struct cond_node *cur;
2709 rc = security_get_bools(&nbools, &bnames, &bvalues);
2712 for (i = 0; i < nbools; i++) {
2713 booldatum = hashtab_search(p->p_bools.table, bnames[i]);
2715 booldatum->state = bvalues[i];
2717 for (cur = p->cond_list; cur; cur = cur->next) {
2718 rc = evaluate_cond_node(p, cur);
2725 for (i = 0; i < nbools; i++)
2734 * security_sid_mls_copy() - computes a new sid based on the given
2735 * sid and the mls portion of mls_sid.
2737 int security_sid_mls_copy(u32 sid, u32 mls_sid, u32 *new_sid)
2739 struct context *context1;
2740 struct context *context2;
2741 struct context newcon;
2747 if (!ss_initialized || !policydb.mls_enabled) {
2752 context_init(&newcon);
2754 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2757 context1 = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
2759 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
2765 context2 = sidtab_search(&sidtab, mls_sid);
2767 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
2772 newcon.user = context1->user;
2773 newcon.role = context1->role;
2774 newcon.type = context1->type;
2775 rc = mls_context_cpy(&newcon, context2);
2779 /* Check the validity of the new context. */
2780 if (!policydb_context_isvalid(&policydb, &newcon)) {
2781 rc = convert_context_handle_invalid_context(&newcon);
2783 if (!context_struct_to_string(&newcon, &s, &len)) {
2784 audit_log(current->audit_context,
2785 GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
2786 "op=security_sid_mls_copy "
2787 "invalid_context=%s", s);
2794 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &newcon, new_sid);
2796 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2797 context_destroy(&newcon);
2803 * security_net_peersid_resolve - Compare and resolve two network peer SIDs
2804 * @nlbl_sid: NetLabel SID
2805 * @nlbl_type: NetLabel labeling protocol type
2806 * @xfrm_sid: XFRM SID
2809 * Compare the @nlbl_sid and @xfrm_sid values and if the two SIDs can be
2810 * resolved into a single SID it is returned via @peer_sid and the function
2811 * returns zero. Otherwise @peer_sid is set to SECSID_NULL and the function
2812 * returns a negative value. A table summarizing the behavior is below:
2814 * | function return | @sid
2815 * ------------------------------+-----------------+-----------------
2816 * no peer labels | 0 | SECSID_NULL
2817 * single peer label | 0 | <peer_label>
2818 * multiple, consistent labels | 0 | <peer_label>
2819 * multiple, inconsistent labels | -<errno> | SECSID_NULL
2822 int security_net_peersid_resolve(u32 nlbl_sid, u32 nlbl_type,
2827 struct context *nlbl_ctx;
2828 struct context *xfrm_ctx;
2830 *peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
2832 /* handle the common (which also happens to be the set of easy) cases
2833 * right away, these two if statements catch everything involving a
2834 * single or absent peer SID/label */
2835 if (xfrm_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
2836 *peer_sid = nlbl_sid;
2839 /* NOTE: an nlbl_type == NETLBL_NLTYPE_UNLABELED is a "fallback" label
2840 * and is treated as if nlbl_sid == SECSID_NULL when a XFRM SID/label
2842 if (nlbl_sid == SECSID_NULL || nlbl_type == NETLBL_NLTYPE_UNLABELED) {
2843 *peer_sid = xfrm_sid;
2847 /* we don't need to check ss_initialized here since the only way both
2848 * nlbl_sid and xfrm_sid are not equal to SECSID_NULL would be if the
2849 * security server was initialized and ss_initialized was true */
2850 if (!policydb.mls_enabled)
2853 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2856 nlbl_ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, nlbl_sid);
2858 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
2859 __func__, nlbl_sid);
2863 xfrm_ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, xfrm_sid);
2865 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
2866 __func__, xfrm_sid);
2869 rc = (mls_context_cmp(nlbl_ctx, xfrm_ctx) ? 0 : -EACCES);
2873 /* at present NetLabel SIDs/labels really only carry MLS
2874 * information so if the MLS portion of the NetLabel SID
2875 * matches the MLS portion of the labeled XFRM SID/label
2876 * then pass along the XFRM SID as it is the most
2878 *peer_sid = xfrm_sid;
2880 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2884 static int get_classes_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args)
2886 struct class_datum *datum = d;
2887 char *name = k, **classes = args;
2888 int value = datum->value - 1;
2890 classes[value] = kstrdup(name, GFP_ATOMIC);
2891 if (!classes[value])
2897 int security_get_classes(char ***classes, int *nclasses)
2901 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2904 *nclasses = policydb.p_classes.nprim;
2905 *classes = kcalloc(*nclasses, sizeof(**classes), GFP_ATOMIC);
2909 rc = hashtab_map(policydb.p_classes.table, get_classes_callback,
2913 for (i = 0; i < *nclasses; i++)
2914 kfree((*classes)[i]);
2919 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2923 static int get_permissions_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args)
2925 struct perm_datum *datum = d;
2926 char *name = k, **perms = args;
2927 int value = datum->value - 1;
2929 perms[value] = kstrdup(name, GFP_ATOMIC);
2936 int security_get_permissions(char *class, char ***perms, int *nperms)
2939 struct class_datum *match;
2941 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2944 match = hashtab_search(policydb.p_classes.table, class);
2946 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized class %s\n",
2952 *nperms = match->permissions.nprim;
2953 *perms = kcalloc(*nperms, sizeof(**perms), GFP_ATOMIC);
2957 if (match->comdatum) {
2958 rc = hashtab_map(match->comdatum->permissions.table,
2959 get_permissions_callback, *perms);
2964 rc = hashtab_map(match->permissions.table, get_permissions_callback,
2970 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2974 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2975 for (i = 0; i < *nperms; i++)
2981 int security_get_reject_unknown(void)
2983 return policydb.reject_unknown;
2986 int security_get_allow_unknown(void)
2988 return policydb.allow_unknown;
2992 * security_policycap_supported - Check for a specific policy capability
2993 * @req_cap: capability
2996 * This function queries the currently loaded policy to see if it supports the
2997 * capability specified by @req_cap. Returns true (1) if the capability is
2998 * supported, false (0) if it isn't supported.
3001 int security_policycap_supported(unsigned int req_cap)
3005 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
3006 rc = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps, req_cap);
3007 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
3012 struct selinux_audit_rule {
3014 struct context au_ctxt;
3017 void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *vrule)
3019 struct selinux_audit_rule *rule = vrule;
3022 context_destroy(&rule->au_ctxt);
3027 int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
3029 struct selinux_audit_rule *tmprule;
3030 struct role_datum *roledatum;
3031 struct type_datum *typedatum;
3032 struct user_datum *userdatum;
3033 struct selinux_audit_rule **rule = (struct selinux_audit_rule **)vrule;
3038 if (!ss_initialized)
3042 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
3043 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
3044 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
3045 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
3046 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
3047 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
3048 /* only 'equals' and 'not equals' fit user, role, and type */
3049 if (op != Audit_equal && op != Audit_not_equal)
3052 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
3053 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
3054 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
3055 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
3056 /* we do not allow a range, indicated by the presence of '-' */
3057 if (strchr(rulestr, '-'))
3061 /* only the above fields are valid */
3065 tmprule = kzalloc(sizeof(struct selinux_audit_rule), GFP_KERNEL);
3069 context_init(&tmprule->au_ctxt);
3071 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
3073 tmprule->au_seqno = latest_granting;
3076 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
3077 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
3079 userdatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_users.table, rulestr);
3082 tmprule->au_ctxt.user = userdatum->value;
3084 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
3085 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
3087 roledatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_roles.table, rulestr);
3090 tmprule->au_ctxt.role = roledatum->value;
3092 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
3093 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
3095 typedatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_types.table, rulestr);
3098 tmprule->au_ctxt.type = typedatum->value;
3100 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
3101 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
3102 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
3103 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
3104 rc = mls_from_string(rulestr, &tmprule->au_ctxt, GFP_ATOMIC);
3111 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
3114 selinux_audit_rule_free(tmprule);
3123 /* Check to see if the rule contains any selinux fields */
3124 int selinux_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule)
3128 for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
3129 struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
3131 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
3132 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
3133 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
3134 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
3135 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
3136 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
3137 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
3138 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
3139 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
3140 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
3148 int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
3149 struct audit_context *actx)
3151 struct context *ctxt;
3152 struct mls_level *level;
3153 struct selinux_audit_rule *rule = vrule;
3156 if (unlikely(!rule)) {
3157 WARN_ONCE(1, "selinux_audit_rule_match: missing rule\n");
3161 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
3163 if (rule->au_seqno < latest_granting) {
3168 ctxt = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
3169 if (unlikely(!ctxt)) {
3170 WARN_ONCE(1, "selinux_audit_rule_match: unrecognized SID %d\n",
3176 /* a field/op pair that is not caught here will simply fall through
3179 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
3180 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
3183 match = (ctxt->user == rule->au_ctxt.user);
3185 case Audit_not_equal:
3186 match = (ctxt->user != rule->au_ctxt.user);
3190 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
3191 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
3194 match = (ctxt->role == rule->au_ctxt.role);
3196 case Audit_not_equal:
3197 match = (ctxt->role != rule->au_ctxt.role);
3201 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
3202 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
3205 match = (ctxt->type == rule->au_ctxt.type);
3207 case Audit_not_equal:
3208 match = (ctxt->type != rule->au_ctxt.type);
3212 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
3213 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
3214 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
3215 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
3216 level = ((field == AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN ||
3217 field == AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW) ?
3218 &ctxt->range.level[0] : &ctxt->range.level[1]);
3221 match = mls_level_eq(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
3224 case Audit_not_equal:
3225 match = !mls_level_eq(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
3229 match = (mls_level_dom(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
3231 !mls_level_eq(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
3235 match = mls_level_dom(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
3239 match = (mls_level_dom(level,
3240 &rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0]) &&
3241 !mls_level_eq(level,
3242 &rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0]));
3245 match = mls_level_dom(level,
3246 &rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0]);
3252 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
3256 static int (*aurule_callback)(void) = audit_update_lsm_rules;
3258 static int aurule_avc_callback(u32 event)
3262 if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET && aurule_callback)
3263 err = aurule_callback();
3267 static int __init aurule_init(void)
3271 err = avc_add_callback(aurule_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET);
3273 panic("avc_add_callback() failed, error %d\n", err);
3277 __initcall(aurule_init);
3279 #ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
3281 * security_netlbl_cache_add - Add an entry to the NetLabel cache
3282 * @secattr: the NetLabel packet security attributes
3283 * @sid: the SELinux SID
3286 * Attempt to cache the context in @ctx, which was derived from the packet in
3287 * @skb, in the NetLabel subsystem cache. This function assumes @secattr has
3288 * already been initialized.
3291 static void security_netlbl_cache_add(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
3296 sid_cache = kmalloc(sizeof(*sid_cache), GFP_ATOMIC);
3297 if (sid_cache == NULL)
3299 secattr->cache = netlbl_secattr_cache_alloc(GFP_ATOMIC);
3300 if (secattr->cache == NULL) {
3306 secattr->cache->free = kfree;
3307 secattr->cache->data = sid_cache;
3308 secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE;
3312 * security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid - Convert a NetLabel secattr to a SELinux SID
3313 * @secattr: the NetLabel packet security attributes
3314 * @sid: the SELinux SID
3317 * Convert the given NetLabel security attributes in @secattr into a
3318 * SELinux SID. If the @secattr field does not contain a full SELinux
3319 * SID/context then use SECINITSID_NETMSG as the foundation. If possible the
3320 * 'cache' field of @secattr is set and the CACHE flag is set; this is to
3321 * allow the @secattr to be used by NetLabel to cache the secattr to SID
3322 * conversion for future lookups. Returns zero on success, negative values on
3326 int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
3330 struct context *ctx;
3331 struct context ctx_new;
3333 if (!ss_initialized) {
3338 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
3340 if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE)
3341 *sid = *(u32 *)secattr->cache->data;
3342 else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID)
3343 *sid = secattr->attr.secid;
3344 else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) {
3346 ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, SECINITSID_NETMSG);
3350 context_init(&ctx_new);
3351 ctx_new.user = ctx->user;
3352 ctx_new.role = ctx->role;
3353 ctx_new.type = ctx->type;
3354 mls_import_netlbl_lvl(&ctx_new, secattr);
3355 if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) {
3356 rc = mls_import_netlbl_cat(&ctx_new, secattr);
3361 if (!mls_context_isvalid(&policydb, &ctx_new))
3364 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &ctx_new, sid);
3368 security_netlbl_cache_add(secattr, *sid);
3370 ebitmap_destroy(&ctx_new.range.level[0].cat);
3374 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
3377 ebitmap_destroy(&ctx_new.range.level[0].cat);
3379 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
3384 * security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr - Convert a SELinux SID to a NetLabel secattr
3385 * @sid: the SELinux SID
3386 * @secattr: the NetLabel packet security attributes
3389 * Convert the given SELinux SID in @sid into a NetLabel security attribute.
3390 * Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
3393 int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(u32 sid, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
3396 struct context *ctx;
3398 if (!ss_initialized)
3401 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
3404 ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
3409 secattr->domain = kstrdup(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_TYPES, ctx->type - 1),
3411 if (secattr->domain == NULL)
3414 secattr->attr.secid = sid;
3415 secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN_CPY | NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID;
3416 mls_export_netlbl_lvl(ctx, secattr);
3417 rc = mls_export_netlbl_cat(ctx, secattr);
3419 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
3422 #endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */
3425 * security_read_policy - read the policy.
3426 * @data: binary policy data
3427 * @len: length of data in bytes
3430 int security_read_policy(void **data, size_t *len)
3433 struct policy_file fp;
3435 if (!ss_initialized)
3438 *len = security_policydb_len();
3440 *data = vmalloc_user(*len);
3447 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
3448 rc = policydb_write(&policydb, &fp);
3449 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
3454 *len = (unsigned long)fp.data - (unsigned long)*data;