2 * Implementation of the security services.
4 * Authors : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
5 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
7 * Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
9 * Support for enhanced MLS infrastructure.
10 * Support for context based audit filters.
12 * Updated: Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com> and Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
14 * Added conditional policy language extensions
16 * Updated: Hewlett-Packard <paul@paul-moore.com>
18 * Added support for NetLabel
19 * Added support for the policy capability bitmap
21 * Updated: Chad Sellers <csellers@tresys.com>
23 * Added validation of kernel classes and permissions
25 * Updated: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
27 * Added support for bounds domain and audit messaged on masked permissions
29 * Updated: Guido Trentalancia <guido@trentalancia.com>
31 * Added support for runtime switching of the policy type
33 * Copyright (C) 2008, 2009 NEC Corporation
34 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
35 * Copyright (C) 2004-2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
36 * Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004, 2006 Tresys Technology, LLC
37 * Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
38 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
39 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
40 * the Free Software Foundation, version 2.
42 #include <linux/kernel.h>
43 #include <linux/slab.h>
44 #include <linux/string.h>
45 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
46 #include <linux/rcupdate.h>
47 #include <linux/errno.h>
49 #include <linux/sched.h>
50 #include <linux/audit.h>
51 #include <linux/mutex.h>
52 #include <linux/selinux.h>
53 #include <linux/flex_array.h>
54 #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
55 #include <net/netlabel.h>
65 #include "conditional.h"
73 /* Policy capability names */
74 char *selinux_policycap_names[__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX] = {
75 "network_peer_controls",
77 "extended_socket_class",
78 "always_check_network",
80 "nnp_nosuid_transition"
83 int selinux_policycap_netpeer;
84 int selinux_policycap_openperm;
85 int selinux_policycap_extsockclass;
86 int selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork;
87 int selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel;
88 int selinux_policycap_nnp_nosuid_transition;
90 static DEFINE_RWLOCK(policy_rwlock);
92 static struct sidtab sidtab;
93 struct policydb policydb;
97 * The largest sequence number that has been used when
98 * providing an access decision to the access vector cache.
99 * The sequence number only changes when a policy change
102 static u32 latest_granting;
104 /* Forward declaration. */
105 static int context_struct_to_string(struct context *context, char **scontext,
108 static void context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
109 struct context *tcontext,
111 struct av_decision *avd,
112 struct extended_perms *xperms);
114 struct selinux_mapping {
115 u16 value; /* policy value */
117 u32 perms[sizeof(u32) * 8];
120 static struct selinux_mapping *current_mapping;
121 static u16 current_mapping_size;
123 static int selinux_set_mapping(struct policydb *pol,
124 struct security_class_mapping *map,
125 struct selinux_mapping **out_map_p,
128 struct selinux_mapping *out_map = NULL;
129 size_t size = sizeof(struct selinux_mapping);
132 bool print_unknown_handle = false;
134 /* Find number of classes in the input mapping */
141 /* Allocate space for the class records, plus one for class zero */
142 out_map = kcalloc(++i, size, GFP_ATOMIC);
146 /* Store the raw class and permission values */
148 while (map[j].name) {
149 struct security_class_mapping *p_in = map + (j++);
150 struct selinux_mapping *p_out = out_map + j;
152 /* An empty class string skips ahead */
153 if (!strcmp(p_in->name, "")) {
154 p_out->num_perms = 0;
158 p_out->value = string_to_security_class(pol, p_in->name);
161 "SELinux: Class %s not defined in policy.\n",
163 if (pol->reject_unknown)
165 p_out->num_perms = 0;
166 print_unknown_handle = true;
171 while (p_in->perms[k]) {
172 /* An empty permission string skips ahead */
173 if (!*p_in->perms[k]) {
177 p_out->perms[k] = string_to_av_perm(pol, p_out->value,
179 if (!p_out->perms[k]) {
181 "SELinux: Permission %s in class %s not defined in policy.\n",
182 p_in->perms[k], p_in->name);
183 if (pol->reject_unknown)
185 print_unknown_handle = true;
190 p_out->num_perms = k;
193 if (print_unknown_handle)
194 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: the above unknown classes and permissions will be %s\n",
195 pol->allow_unknown ? "allowed" : "denied");
197 *out_map_p = out_map;
206 * Get real, policy values from mapped values
209 static u16 unmap_class(u16 tclass)
211 if (tclass < current_mapping_size)
212 return current_mapping[tclass].value;
218 * Get kernel value for class from its policy value
220 static u16 map_class(u16 pol_value)
224 for (i = 1; i < current_mapping_size; i++) {
225 if (current_mapping[i].value == pol_value)
229 return SECCLASS_NULL;
232 static void map_decision(u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd,
235 if (tclass < current_mapping_size) {
236 unsigned i, n = current_mapping[tclass].num_perms;
239 for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++) {
240 if (avd->allowed & current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
242 if (allow_unknown && !current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
245 avd->allowed = result;
247 for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++)
248 if (avd->auditallow & current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
250 avd->auditallow = result;
252 for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++) {
253 if (avd->auditdeny & current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
255 if (!allow_unknown && !current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
259 * In case the kernel has a bug and requests a permission
260 * between num_perms and the maximum permission number, we
261 * should audit that denial
263 for (; i < (sizeof(u32)*8); i++)
265 avd->auditdeny = result;
269 int security_mls_enabled(void)
271 return policydb.mls_enabled;
275 * Return the boolean value of a constraint expression
276 * when it is applied to the specified source and target
279 * xcontext is a special beast... It is used by the validatetrans rules
280 * only. For these rules, scontext is the context before the transition,
281 * tcontext is the context after the transition, and xcontext is the context
282 * of the process performing the transition. All other callers of
283 * constraint_expr_eval should pass in NULL for xcontext.
285 static int constraint_expr_eval(struct context *scontext,
286 struct context *tcontext,
287 struct context *xcontext,
288 struct constraint_expr *cexpr)
292 struct role_datum *r1, *r2;
293 struct mls_level *l1, *l2;
294 struct constraint_expr *e;
295 int s[CEXPR_MAXDEPTH];
298 for (e = cexpr; e; e = e->next) {
299 switch (e->expr_type) {
315 if (sp == (CEXPR_MAXDEPTH - 1))
319 val1 = scontext->user;
320 val2 = tcontext->user;
323 val1 = scontext->type;
324 val2 = tcontext->type;
327 val1 = scontext->role;
328 val2 = tcontext->role;
329 r1 = policydb.role_val_to_struct[val1 - 1];
330 r2 = policydb.role_val_to_struct[val2 - 1];
333 s[++sp] = ebitmap_get_bit(&r1->dominates,
337 s[++sp] = ebitmap_get_bit(&r2->dominates,
341 s[++sp] = (!ebitmap_get_bit(&r1->dominates,
343 !ebitmap_get_bit(&r2->dominates,
351 l1 = &(scontext->range.level[0]);
352 l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[0]);
355 l1 = &(scontext->range.level[0]);
356 l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[1]);
359 l1 = &(scontext->range.level[1]);
360 l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[0]);
363 l1 = &(scontext->range.level[1]);
364 l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[1]);
367 l1 = &(scontext->range.level[0]);
368 l2 = &(scontext->range.level[1]);
371 l1 = &(tcontext->range.level[0]);
372 l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[1]);
377 s[++sp] = mls_level_eq(l1, l2);
380 s[++sp] = !mls_level_eq(l1, l2);
383 s[++sp] = mls_level_dom(l1, l2);
386 s[++sp] = mls_level_dom(l2, l1);
389 s[++sp] = mls_level_incomp(l2, l1);
403 s[++sp] = (val1 == val2);
406 s[++sp] = (val1 != val2);
414 if (sp == (CEXPR_MAXDEPTH-1))
417 if (e->attr & CEXPR_TARGET)
419 else if (e->attr & CEXPR_XTARGET) {
426 if (e->attr & CEXPR_USER)
428 else if (e->attr & CEXPR_ROLE)
430 else if (e->attr & CEXPR_TYPE)
439 s[++sp] = ebitmap_get_bit(&e->names, val1 - 1);
442 s[++sp] = !ebitmap_get_bit(&e->names, val1 - 1);
460 * security_dump_masked_av - dumps masked permissions during
461 * security_compute_av due to RBAC, MLS/Constraint and Type bounds.
463 static int dump_masked_av_helper(void *k, void *d, void *args)
465 struct perm_datum *pdatum = d;
466 char **permission_names = args;
468 BUG_ON(pdatum->value < 1 || pdatum->value > 32);
470 permission_names[pdatum->value - 1] = (char *)k;
475 static void security_dump_masked_av(struct context *scontext,
476 struct context *tcontext,
481 struct common_datum *common_dat;
482 struct class_datum *tclass_dat;
483 struct audit_buffer *ab;
485 char *scontext_name = NULL;
486 char *tcontext_name = NULL;
487 char *permission_names[32];
490 bool need_comma = false;
495 tclass_name = sym_name(&policydb, SYM_CLASSES, tclass - 1);
496 tclass_dat = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
497 common_dat = tclass_dat->comdatum;
499 /* init permission_names */
501 hashtab_map(common_dat->permissions.table,
502 dump_masked_av_helper, permission_names) < 0)
505 if (hashtab_map(tclass_dat->permissions.table,
506 dump_masked_av_helper, permission_names) < 0)
509 /* get scontext/tcontext in text form */
510 if (context_struct_to_string(scontext,
511 &scontext_name, &length) < 0)
514 if (context_struct_to_string(tcontext,
515 &tcontext_name, &length) < 0)
518 /* audit a message */
519 ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context,
520 GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
524 audit_log_format(ab, "op=security_compute_av reason=%s "
525 "scontext=%s tcontext=%s tclass=%s perms=",
526 reason, scontext_name, tcontext_name, tclass_name);
528 for (index = 0; index < 32; index++) {
529 u32 mask = (1 << index);
531 if ((mask & permissions) == 0)
534 audit_log_format(ab, "%s%s",
535 need_comma ? "," : "",
536 permission_names[index]
537 ? permission_names[index] : "????");
542 /* release scontext/tcontext */
543 kfree(tcontext_name);
544 kfree(scontext_name);
550 * security_boundary_permission - drops violated permissions
551 * on boundary constraint.
553 static void type_attribute_bounds_av(struct context *scontext,
554 struct context *tcontext,
556 struct av_decision *avd)
558 struct context lo_scontext;
559 struct context lo_tcontext, *tcontextp = tcontext;
560 struct av_decision lo_avd;
561 struct type_datum *source;
562 struct type_datum *target;
565 source = flex_array_get_ptr(policydb.type_val_to_struct_array,
572 target = flex_array_get_ptr(policydb.type_val_to_struct_array,
576 memset(&lo_avd, 0, sizeof(lo_avd));
578 memcpy(&lo_scontext, scontext, sizeof(lo_scontext));
579 lo_scontext.type = source->bounds;
581 if (target->bounds) {
582 memcpy(&lo_tcontext, tcontext, sizeof(lo_tcontext));
583 lo_tcontext.type = target->bounds;
584 tcontextp = &lo_tcontext;
587 context_struct_compute_av(&lo_scontext,
593 masked = ~lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed;
596 return; /* no masked permission */
598 /* mask violated permissions */
599 avd->allowed &= ~masked;
601 /* audit masked permissions */
602 security_dump_masked_av(scontext, tcontext,
603 tclass, masked, "bounds");
607 * flag which drivers have permissions
608 * only looking for ioctl based extended permssions
610 void services_compute_xperms_drivers(
611 struct extended_perms *xperms,
612 struct avtab_node *node)
616 if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER) {
617 /* if one or more driver has all permissions allowed */
618 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xperms->drivers.p); i++)
619 xperms->drivers.p[i] |= node->datum.u.xperms->perms.p[i];
620 } else if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION) {
621 /* if allowing permissions within a driver */
622 security_xperm_set(xperms->drivers.p,
623 node->datum.u.xperms->driver);
626 /* If no ioctl commands are allowed, ignore auditallow and auditdeny */
627 if (node->key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS_ALLOWED)
632 * Compute access vectors and extended permissions based on a context
633 * structure pair for the permissions in a particular class.
635 static void context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
636 struct context *tcontext,
638 struct av_decision *avd,
639 struct extended_perms *xperms)
641 struct constraint_node *constraint;
642 struct role_allow *ra;
643 struct avtab_key avkey;
644 struct avtab_node *node;
645 struct class_datum *tclass_datum;
646 struct ebitmap *sattr, *tattr;
647 struct ebitmap_node *snode, *tnode;
652 avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff;
654 memset(&xperms->drivers, 0, sizeof(xperms->drivers));
658 if (unlikely(!tclass || tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim)) {
659 if (printk_ratelimit())
660 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Invalid class %hu\n", tclass);
664 tclass_datum = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
667 * If a specific type enforcement rule was defined for
668 * this permission check, then use it.
670 avkey.target_class = tclass;
671 avkey.specified = AVTAB_AV | AVTAB_XPERMS;
672 sattr = flex_array_get(policydb.type_attr_map_array, scontext->type - 1);
674 tattr = flex_array_get(policydb.type_attr_map_array, tcontext->type - 1);
676 ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(sattr, snode, i) {
677 ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(tattr, tnode, j) {
678 avkey.source_type = i + 1;
679 avkey.target_type = j + 1;
680 for (node = avtab_search_node(&policydb.te_avtab, &avkey);
682 node = avtab_search_node_next(node, avkey.specified)) {
683 if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_ALLOWED)
684 avd->allowed |= node->datum.u.data;
685 else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_AUDITALLOW)
686 avd->auditallow |= node->datum.u.data;
687 else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_AUDITDENY)
688 avd->auditdeny &= node->datum.u.data;
689 else if (xperms && (node->key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS))
690 services_compute_xperms_drivers(xperms, node);
693 /* Check conditional av table for additional permissions */
694 cond_compute_av(&policydb.te_cond_avtab, &avkey,
701 * Remove any permissions prohibited by a constraint (this includes
704 constraint = tclass_datum->constraints;
706 if ((constraint->permissions & (avd->allowed)) &&
707 !constraint_expr_eval(scontext, tcontext, NULL,
709 avd->allowed &= ~(constraint->permissions);
711 constraint = constraint->next;
715 * If checking process transition permission and the
716 * role is changing, then check the (current_role, new_role)
719 if (tclass == policydb.process_class &&
720 (avd->allowed & policydb.process_trans_perms) &&
721 scontext->role != tcontext->role) {
722 for (ra = policydb.role_allow; ra; ra = ra->next) {
723 if (scontext->role == ra->role &&
724 tcontext->role == ra->new_role)
728 avd->allowed &= ~policydb.process_trans_perms;
732 * If the given source and target types have boundary
733 * constraint, lazy checks have to mask any violated
734 * permission and notice it to userspace via audit.
736 type_attribute_bounds_av(scontext, tcontext,
740 static int security_validtrans_handle_fail(struct context *ocontext,
741 struct context *ncontext,
742 struct context *tcontext,
745 char *o = NULL, *n = NULL, *t = NULL;
746 u32 olen, nlen, tlen;
748 if (context_struct_to_string(ocontext, &o, &olen))
750 if (context_struct_to_string(ncontext, &n, &nlen))
752 if (context_struct_to_string(tcontext, &t, &tlen))
754 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
755 "op=security_validate_transition seresult=denied"
756 " oldcontext=%s newcontext=%s taskcontext=%s tclass=%s",
757 o, n, t, sym_name(&policydb, SYM_CLASSES, tclass-1));
763 if (!selinux_enforcing)
768 static int security_compute_validatetrans(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
769 u16 orig_tclass, bool user)
771 struct context *ocontext;
772 struct context *ncontext;
773 struct context *tcontext;
774 struct class_datum *tclass_datum;
775 struct constraint_node *constraint;
782 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
785 tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass);
787 tclass = orig_tclass;
789 if (!tclass || tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim) {
793 tclass_datum = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
795 ocontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, oldsid);
797 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
803 ncontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, newsid);
805 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
811 tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tasksid);
813 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
819 constraint = tclass_datum->validatetrans;
821 if (!constraint_expr_eval(ocontext, ncontext, tcontext,
826 rc = security_validtrans_handle_fail(ocontext,
832 constraint = constraint->next;
836 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
840 int security_validate_transition_user(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
843 return security_compute_validatetrans(oldsid, newsid, tasksid,
847 int security_validate_transition(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
850 return security_compute_validatetrans(oldsid, newsid, tasksid,
855 * security_bounded_transition - check whether the given
856 * transition is directed to bounded, or not.
857 * It returns 0, if @newsid is bounded by @oldsid.
858 * Otherwise, it returns error code.
860 * @oldsid : current security identifier
861 * @newsid : destinated security identifier
863 int security_bounded_transition(u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
865 struct context *old_context, *new_context;
866 struct type_datum *type;
873 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
876 old_context = sidtab_search(&sidtab, old_sid);
878 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %u\n",
884 new_context = sidtab_search(&sidtab, new_sid);
886 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %u\n",
892 /* type/domain unchanged */
893 if (old_context->type == new_context->type)
896 index = new_context->type;
898 type = flex_array_get_ptr(policydb.type_val_to_struct_array,
902 /* not bounded anymore */
907 /* @newsid is bounded by @oldsid */
909 if (type->bounds == old_context->type)
912 index = type->bounds;
916 char *old_name = NULL;
917 char *new_name = NULL;
920 if (!context_struct_to_string(old_context,
921 &old_name, &length) &&
922 !context_struct_to_string(new_context,
923 &new_name, &length)) {
924 audit_log(current->audit_context,
925 GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
926 "op=security_bounded_transition "
928 "oldcontext=%s newcontext=%s",
935 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
940 static void avd_init(struct av_decision *avd)
944 avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff;
945 avd->seqno = latest_granting;
949 void services_compute_xperms_decision(struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd,
950 struct avtab_node *node)
954 if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION) {
955 if (xpermd->driver != node->datum.u.xperms->driver)
957 } else if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER) {
958 if (!security_xperm_test(node->datum.u.xperms->perms.p,
965 if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_ALLOWED) {
966 xpermd->used |= XPERMS_ALLOWED;
967 if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER) {
968 memset(xpermd->allowed->p, 0xff,
969 sizeof(xpermd->allowed->p));
971 if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION) {
972 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xpermd->allowed->p); i++)
973 xpermd->allowed->p[i] |=
974 node->datum.u.xperms->perms.p[i];
976 } else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_AUDITALLOW) {
977 xpermd->used |= XPERMS_AUDITALLOW;
978 if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER) {
979 memset(xpermd->auditallow->p, 0xff,
980 sizeof(xpermd->auditallow->p));
982 if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION) {
983 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xpermd->auditallow->p); i++)
984 xpermd->auditallow->p[i] |=
985 node->datum.u.xperms->perms.p[i];
987 } else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_DONTAUDIT) {
988 xpermd->used |= XPERMS_DONTAUDIT;
989 if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER) {
990 memset(xpermd->dontaudit->p, 0xff,
991 sizeof(xpermd->dontaudit->p));
993 if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION) {
994 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xpermd->dontaudit->p); i++)
995 xpermd->dontaudit->p[i] |=
996 node->datum.u.xperms->perms.p[i];
1003 void security_compute_xperms_decision(u32 ssid,
1007 struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd)
1010 struct context *scontext, *tcontext;
1011 struct avtab_key avkey;
1012 struct avtab_node *node;
1013 struct ebitmap *sattr, *tattr;
1014 struct ebitmap_node *snode, *tnode;
1017 xpermd->driver = driver;
1019 memset(xpermd->allowed->p, 0, sizeof(xpermd->allowed->p));
1020 memset(xpermd->auditallow->p, 0, sizeof(xpermd->auditallow->p));
1021 memset(xpermd->dontaudit->p, 0, sizeof(xpermd->dontaudit->p));
1023 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
1024 if (!ss_initialized)
1027 scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid);
1029 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
1034 tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tsid);
1036 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
1041 tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass);
1042 if (unlikely(orig_tclass && !tclass)) {
1043 if (policydb.allow_unknown)
1049 if (unlikely(!tclass || tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim)) {
1050 pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: Invalid class %hu\n", tclass);
1054 avkey.target_class = tclass;
1055 avkey.specified = AVTAB_XPERMS;
1056 sattr = flex_array_get(policydb.type_attr_map_array,
1057 scontext->type - 1);
1059 tattr = flex_array_get(policydb.type_attr_map_array,
1060 tcontext->type - 1);
1062 ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(sattr, snode, i) {
1063 ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(tattr, tnode, j) {
1064 avkey.source_type = i + 1;
1065 avkey.target_type = j + 1;
1066 for (node = avtab_search_node(&policydb.te_avtab, &avkey);
1068 node = avtab_search_node_next(node, avkey.specified))
1069 services_compute_xperms_decision(xpermd, node);
1071 cond_compute_xperms(&policydb.te_cond_avtab,
1076 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
1079 memset(xpermd->allowed->p, 0xff, sizeof(xpermd->allowed->p));
1084 * security_compute_av - Compute access vector decisions.
1085 * @ssid: source security identifier
1086 * @tsid: target security identifier
1087 * @tclass: target security class
1088 * @avd: access vector decisions
1089 * @xperms: extended permissions
1091 * Compute a set of access vector decisions based on the
1092 * SID pair (@ssid, @tsid) for the permissions in @tclass.
1094 void security_compute_av(u32 ssid,
1097 struct av_decision *avd,
1098 struct extended_perms *xperms)
1101 struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL;
1103 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
1106 if (!ss_initialized)
1109 scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid);
1111 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
1116 /* permissive domain? */
1117 if (ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.permissive_map, scontext->type))
1118 avd->flags |= AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE;
1120 tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tsid);
1122 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
1127 tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass);
1128 if (unlikely(orig_tclass && !tclass)) {
1129 if (policydb.allow_unknown)
1133 context_struct_compute_av(scontext, tcontext, tclass, avd, xperms);
1134 map_decision(orig_tclass, avd, policydb.allow_unknown);
1136 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
1139 avd->allowed = 0xffffffff;
1143 void security_compute_av_user(u32 ssid,
1146 struct av_decision *avd)
1148 struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL;
1150 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
1152 if (!ss_initialized)
1155 scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid);
1157 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
1162 /* permissive domain? */
1163 if (ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.permissive_map, scontext->type))
1164 avd->flags |= AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE;
1166 tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tsid);
1168 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
1173 if (unlikely(!tclass)) {
1174 if (policydb.allow_unknown)
1179 context_struct_compute_av(scontext, tcontext, tclass, avd, NULL);
1181 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
1184 avd->allowed = 0xffffffff;
1189 * Write the security context string representation of
1190 * the context structure `context' into a dynamically
1191 * allocated string of the correct size. Set `*scontext'
1192 * to point to this string and set `*scontext_len' to
1193 * the length of the string.
1195 static int context_struct_to_string(struct context *context, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
1204 *scontext_len = context->len;
1206 *scontext = kstrdup(context->str, GFP_ATOMIC);
1213 /* Compute the size of the context. */
1214 *scontext_len += strlen(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_USERS, context->user - 1)) + 1;
1215 *scontext_len += strlen(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_ROLES, context->role - 1)) + 1;
1216 *scontext_len += strlen(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_TYPES, context->type - 1)) + 1;
1217 *scontext_len += mls_compute_context_len(context);
1222 /* Allocate space for the context; caller must free this space. */
1223 scontextp = kmalloc(*scontext_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
1226 *scontext = scontextp;
1229 * Copy the user name, role name and type name into the context.
1231 scontextp += sprintf(scontextp, "%s:%s:%s",
1232 sym_name(&policydb, SYM_USERS, context->user - 1),
1233 sym_name(&policydb, SYM_ROLES, context->role - 1),
1234 sym_name(&policydb, SYM_TYPES, context->type - 1));
1236 mls_sid_to_context(context, &scontextp);
1243 #include "initial_sid_to_string.h"
1245 const char *security_get_initial_sid_context(u32 sid)
1247 if (unlikely(sid > SECINITSID_NUM))
1249 return initial_sid_to_string[sid];
1252 static int security_sid_to_context_core(u32 sid, char **scontext,
1253 u32 *scontext_len, int force)
1255 struct context *context;
1262 if (!ss_initialized) {
1263 if (sid <= SECINITSID_NUM) {
1266 *scontext_len = strlen(initial_sid_to_string[sid]) + 1;
1269 scontextp = kmemdup(initial_sid_to_string[sid],
1270 *scontext_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
1275 *scontext = scontextp;
1278 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: called before initial "
1279 "load_policy on unknown SID %d\n", __func__, sid);
1283 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
1285 context = sidtab_search_force(&sidtab, sid);
1287 context = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
1289 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
1294 rc = context_struct_to_string(context, scontext, scontext_len);
1296 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
1303 * security_sid_to_context - Obtain a context for a given SID.
1304 * @sid: security identifier, SID
1305 * @scontext: security context
1306 * @scontext_len: length in bytes
1308 * Write the string representation of the context associated with @sid
1309 * into a dynamically allocated string of the correct size. Set @scontext
1310 * to point to this string and set @scontext_len to the length of the string.
1312 int security_sid_to_context(u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
1314 return security_sid_to_context_core(sid, scontext, scontext_len, 0);
1317 int security_sid_to_context_force(u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
1319 return security_sid_to_context_core(sid, scontext, scontext_len, 1);
1323 * Caveat: Mutates scontext.
1325 static int string_to_context_struct(struct policydb *pol,
1326 struct sidtab *sidtabp,
1329 struct context *ctx,
1332 struct role_datum *role;
1333 struct type_datum *typdatum;
1334 struct user_datum *usrdatum;
1335 char *scontextp, *p, oldc;
1340 /* Parse the security context. */
1343 scontextp = (char *) scontext;
1345 /* Extract the user. */
1347 while (*p && *p != ':')
1355 usrdatum = hashtab_search(pol->p_users.table, scontextp);
1359 ctx->user = usrdatum->value;
1363 while (*p && *p != ':')
1371 role = hashtab_search(pol->p_roles.table, scontextp);
1374 ctx->role = role->value;
1378 while (*p && *p != ':')
1383 typdatum = hashtab_search(pol->p_types.table, scontextp);
1384 if (!typdatum || typdatum->attribute)
1387 ctx->type = typdatum->value;
1389 rc = mls_context_to_sid(pol, oldc, &p, ctx, sidtabp, def_sid);
1394 if ((p - scontext) < scontext_len)
1397 /* Check the validity of the new context. */
1398 if (!policydb_context_isvalid(pol, ctx))
1403 context_destroy(ctx);
1407 static int security_context_to_sid_core(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
1408 u32 *sid, u32 def_sid, gfp_t gfp_flags,
1411 char *scontext2, *str = NULL;
1412 struct context context;
1415 /* An empty security context is never valid. */
1419 /* Copy the string to allow changes and ensure a NUL terminator */
1420 scontext2 = kmemdup_nul(scontext, scontext_len, gfp_flags);
1424 if (!ss_initialized) {
1427 for (i = 1; i < SECINITSID_NUM; i++) {
1428 if (!strcmp(initial_sid_to_string[i], scontext2)) {
1433 *sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
1439 /* Save another copy for storing in uninterpreted form */
1441 str = kstrdup(scontext2, gfp_flags);
1446 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
1447 rc = string_to_context_struct(&policydb, &sidtab, scontext2,
1448 scontext_len, &context, def_sid);
1449 if (rc == -EINVAL && force) {
1451 context.len = strlen(str) + 1;
1455 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &context, sid);
1456 context_destroy(&context);
1458 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
1466 * security_context_to_sid - Obtain a SID for a given security context.
1467 * @scontext: security context
1468 * @scontext_len: length in bytes
1469 * @sid: security identifier, SID
1470 * @gfp: context for the allocation
1472 * Obtains a SID associated with the security context that
1473 * has the string representation specified by @scontext.
1474 * Returns -%EINVAL if the context is invalid, -%ENOMEM if insufficient
1475 * memory is available, or 0 on success.
1477 int security_context_to_sid(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32 *sid,
1480 return security_context_to_sid_core(scontext, scontext_len,
1481 sid, SECSID_NULL, gfp, 0);
1484 int security_context_str_to_sid(const char *scontext, u32 *sid, gfp_t gfp)
1486 return security_context_to_sid(scontext, strlen(scontext), sid, gfp);
1490 * security_context_to_sid_default - Obtain a SID for a given security context,
1491 * falling back to specified default if needed.
1493 * @scontext: security context
1494 * @scontext_len: length in bytes
1495 * @sid: security identifier, SID
1496 * @def_sid: default SID to assign on error
1498 * Obtains a SID associated with the security context that
1499 * has the string representation specified by @scontext.
1500 * The default SID is passed to the MLS layer to be used to allow
1501 * kernel labeling of the MLS field if the MLS field is not present
1502 * (for upgrading to MLS without full relabel).
1503 * Implicitly forces adding of the context even if it cannot be mapped yet.
1504 * Returns -%EINVAL if the context is invalid, -%ENOMEM if insufficient
1505 * memory is available, or 0 on success.
1507 int security_context_to_sid_default(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
1508 u32 *sid, u32 def_sid, gfp_t gfp_flags)
1510 return security_context_to_sid_core(scontext, scontext_len,
1511 sid, def_sid, gfp_flags, 1);
1514 int security_context_to_sid_force(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
1517 return security_context_to_sid_core(scontext, scontext_len,
1518 sid, SECSID_NULL, GFP_KERNEL, 1);
1521 static int compute_sid_handle_invalid_context(
1522 struct context *scontext,
1523 struct context *tcontext,
1525 struct context *newcontext)
1527 char *s = NULL, *t = NULL, *n = NULL;
1528 u32 slen, tlen, nlen;
1530 if (context_struct_to_string(scontext, &s, &slen))
1532 if (context_struct_to_string(tcontext, &t, &tlen))
1534 if (context_struct_to_string(newcontext, &n, &nlen))
1536 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
1537 "op=security_compute_sid invalid_context=%s"
1541 n, s, t, sym_name(&policydb, SYM_CLASSES, tclass-1));
1546 if (!selinux_enforcing)
1551 static void filename_compute_type(struct policydb *p, struct context *newcontext,
1552 u32 stype, u32 ttype, u16 tclass,
1553 const char *objname)
1555 struct filename_trans ft;
1556 struct filename_trans_datum *otype;
1559 * Most filename trans rules are going to live in specific directories
1560 * like /dev or /var/run. This bitmap will quickly skip rule searches
1561 * if the ttype does not contain any rules.
1563 if (!ebitmap_get_bit(&p->filename_trans_ttypes, ttype))
1571 otype = hashtab_search(p->filename_trans, &ft);
1573 newcontext->type = otype->otype;
1576 static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
1580 const char *objname,
1584 struct class_datum *cladatum = NULL;
1585 struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL, newcontext;
1586 struct role_trans *roletr = NULL;
1587 struct avtab_key avkey;
1588 struct avtab_datum *avdatum;
1589 struct avtab_node *node;
1594 if (!ss_initialized) {
1595 switch (orig_tclass) {
1596 case SECCLASS_PROCESS: /* kernel value */
1606 context_init(&newcontext);
1608 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
1611 tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass);
1612 sock = security_is_socket_class(orig_tclass);
1614 tclass = orig_tclass;
1615 sock = security_is_socket_class(map_class(tclass));
1618 scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid);
1620 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
1625 tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tsid);
1627 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
1633 if (tclass && tclass <= policydb.p_classes.nprim)
1634 cladatum = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
1636 /* Set the user identity. */
1637 switch (specified) {
1638 case AVTAB_TRANSITION:
1640 if (cladatum && cladatum->default_user == DEFAULT_TARGET) {
1641 newcontext.user = tcontext->user;
1643 /* notice this gets both DEFAULT_SOURCE and unset */
1644 /* Use the process user identity. */
1645 newcontext.user = scontext->user;
1649 /* Use the related object owner. */
1650 newcontext.user = tcontext->user;
1654 /* Set the role to default values. */
1655 if (cladatum && cladatum->default_role == DEFAULT_SOURCE) {
1656 newcontext.role = scontext->role;
1657 } else if (cladatum && cladatum->default_role == DEFAULT_TARGET) {
1658 newcontext.role = tcontext->role;
1660 if ((tclass == policydb.process_class) || (sock == true))
1661 newcontext.role = scontext->role;
1663 newcontext.role = OBJECT_R_VAL;
1666 /* Set the type to default values. */
1667 if (cladatum && cladatum->default_type == DEFAULT_SOURCE) {
1668 newcontext.type = scontext->type;
1669 } else if (cladatum && cladatum->default_type == DEFAULT_TARGET) {
1670 newcontext.type = tcontext->type;
1672 if ((tclass == policydb.process_class) || (sock == true)) {
1673 /* Use the type of process. */
1674 newcontext.type = scontext->type;
1676 /* Use the type of the related object. */
1677 newcontext.type = tcontext->type;
1681 /* Look for a type transition/member/change rule. */
1682 avkey.source_type = scontext->type;
1683 avkey.target_type = tcontext->type;
1684 avkey.target_class = tclass;
1685 avkey.specified = specified;
1686 avdatum = avtab_search(&policydb.te_avtab, &avkey);
1688 /* If no permanent rule, also check for enabled conditional rules */
1690 node = avtab_search_node(&policydb.te_cond_avtab, &avkey);
1691 for (; node; node = avtab_search_node_next(node, specified)) {
1692 if (node->key.specified & AVTAB_ENABLED) {
1693 avdatum = &node->datum;
1700 /* Use the type from the type transition/member/change rule. */
1701 newcontext.type = avdatum->u.data;
1704 /* if we have a objname this is a file trans check so check those rules */
1706 filename_compute_type(&policydb, &newcontext, scontext->type,
1707 tcontext->type, tclass, objname);
1709 /* Check for class-specific changes. */
1710 if (specified & AVTAB_TRANSITION) {
1711 /* Look for a role transition rule. */
1712 for (roletr = policydb.role_tr; roletr; roletr = roletr->next) {
1713 if ((roletr->role == scontext->role) &&
1714 (roletr->type == tcontext->type) &&
1715 (roletr->tclass == tclass)) {
1716 /* Use the role transition rule. */
1717 newcontext.role = roletr->new_role;
1723 /* Set the MLS attributes.
1724 This is done last because it may allocate memory. */
1725 rc = mls_compute_sid(scontext, tcontext, tclass, specified,
1730 /* Check the validity of the context. */
1731 if (!policydb_context_isvalid(&policydb, &newcontext)) {
1732 rc = compute_sid_handle_invalid_context(scontext,
1739 /* Obtain the sid for the context. */
1740 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &newcontext, out_sid);
1742 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
1743 context_destroy(&newcontext);
1749 * security_transition_sid - Compute the SID for a new subject/object.
1750 * @ssid: source security identifier
1751 * @tsid: target security identifier
1752 * @tclass: target security class
1753 * @out_sid: security identifier for new subject/object
1755 * Compute a SID to use for labeling a new subject or object in the
1756 * class @tclass based on a SID pair (@ssid, @tsid).
1757 * Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid, -%ENOMEM
1758 * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the new SID was
1759 * computed successfully.
1761 int security_transition_sid(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
1762 const struct qstr *qstr, u32 *out_sid)
1764 return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_TRANSITION,
1765 qstr ? qstr->name : NULL, out_sid, true);
1768 int security_transition_sid_user(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
1769 const char *objname, u32 *out_sid)
1771 return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_TRANSITION,
1772 objname, out_sid, false);
1776 * security_member_sid - Compute the SID for member selection.
1777 * @ssid: source security identifier
1778 * @tsid: target security identifier
1779 * @tclass: target security class
1780 * @out_sid: security identifier for selected member
1782 * Compute a SID to use when selecting a member of a polyinstantiated
1783 * object of class @tclass based on a SID pair (@ssid, @tsid).
1784 * Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid, -%ENOMEM
1785 * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the SID was
1786 * computed successfully.
1788 int security_member_sid(u32 ssid,
1793 return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_MEMBER, NULL,
1798 * security_change_sid - Compute the SID for object relabeling.
1799 * @ssid: source security identifier
1800 * @tsid: target security identifier
1801 * @tclass: target security class
1802 * @out_sid: security identifier for selected member
1804 * Compute a SID to use for relabeling an object of class @tclass
1805 * based on a SID pair (@ssid, @tsid).
1806 * Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid, -%ENOMEM
1807 * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the SID was
1808 * computed successfully.
1810 int security_change_sid(u32 ssid,
1815 return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_CHANGE, NULL,
1819 /* Clone the SID into the new SID table. */
1820 static int clone_sid(u32 sid,
1821 struct context *context,
1824 struct sidtab *s = arg;
1826 if (sid > SECINITSID_NUM)
1827 return sidtab_insert(s, sid, context);
1832 static inline int convert_context_handle_invalid_context(struct context *context)
1837 if (selinux_enforcing)
1840 if (!context_struct_to_string(context, &s, &len)) {
1841 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Context %s would be invalid if enforcing\n", s);
1847 struct convert_context_args {
1848 struct policydb *oldp;
1849 struct policydb *newp;
1853 * Convert the values in the security context
1854 * structure `c' from the values specified
1855 * in the policy `p->oldp' to the values specified
1856 * in the policy `p->newp'. Verify that the
1857 * context is valid under the new policy.
1859 static int convert_context(u32 key,
1863 struct convert_context_args *args;
1864 struct context oldc;
1865 struct ocontext *oc;
1866 struct mls_range *range;
1867 struct role_datum *role;
1868 struct type_datum *typdatum;
1869 struct user_datum *usrdatum;
1874 if (key <= SECINITSID_NUM)
1883 s = kstrdup(c->str, GFP_KERNEL);
1887 rc = string_to_context_struct(args->newp, NULL, s,
1888 c->len, &ctx, SECSID_NULL);
1891 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Context %s became valid (mapped).\n",
1893 /* Replace string with mapped representation. */
1895 memcpy(c, &ctx, sizeof(*c));
1897 } else if (rc == -EINVAL) {
1898 /* Retain string representation for later mapping. */
1902 /* Other error condition, e.g. ENOMEM. */
1903 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: Unable to map context %s, rc = %d.\n",
1909 rc = context_cpy(&oldc, c);
1913 /* Convert the user. */
1915 usrdatum = hashtab_search(args->newp->p_users.table,
1916 sym_name(args->oldp, SYM_USERS, c->user - 1));
1919 c->user = usrdatum->value;
1921 /* Convert the role. */
1923 role = hashtab_search(args->newp->p_roles.table,
1924 sym_name(args->oldp, SYM_ROLES, c->role - 1));
1927 c->role = role->value;
1929 /* Convert the type. */
1931 typdatum = hashtab_search(args->newp->p_types.table,
1932 sym_name(args->oldp, SYM_TYPES, c->type - 1));
1935 c->type = typdatum->value;
1937 /* Convert the MLS fields if dealing with MLS policies */
1938 if (args->oldp->mls_enabled && args->newp->mls_enabled) {
1939 rc = mls_convert_context(args->oldp, args->newp, c);
1942 } else if (args->oldp->mls_enabled && !args->newp->mls_enabled) {
1944 * Switching between MLS and non-MLS policy:
1945 * free any storage used by the MLS fields in the
1946 * context for all existing entries in the sidtab.
1948 mls_context_destroy(c);
1949 } else if (!args->oldp->mls_enabled && args->newp->mls_enabled) {
1951 * Switching between non-MLS and MLS policy:
1952 * ensure that the MLS fields of the context for all
1953 * existing entries in the sidtab are filled in with a
1954 * suitable default value, likely taken from one of the
1957 oc = args->newp->ocontexts[OCON_ISID];
1958 while (oc && oc->sid[0] != SECINITSID_UNLABELED)
1962 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to look up"
1963 " the initial SIDs list\n");
1966 range = &oc->context[0].range;
1967 rc = mls_range_set(c, range);
1972 /* Check the validity of the new context. */
1973 if (!policydb_context_isvalid(args->newp, c)) {
1974 rc = convert_context_handle_invalid_context(&oldc);
1979 context_destroy(&oldc);
1985 /* Map old representation to string and save it. */
1986 rc = context_struct_to_string(&oldc, &s, &len);
1989 context_destroy(&oldc);
1993 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Context %s became invalid (unmapped).\n",
1999 static void security_load_policycaps(void)
2002 struct ebitmap_node *node;
2004 selinux_policycap_netpeer = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
2005 POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NETPEER);
2006 selinux_policycap_openperm = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
2007 POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_OPENPERM);
2008 selinux_policycap_extsockclass = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
2009 POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_EXTSOCKCLASS);
2010 selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
2011 POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_ALWAYSNETWORK);
2012 selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel =
2013 ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
2014 POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_CGROUPSECLABEL);
2015 selinux_policycap_nnp_nosuid_transition =
2016 ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
2017 POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NNP_NOSUID_TRANSITION);
2019 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_policycap_names); i++)
2020 pr_info("SELinux: policy capability %s=%d\n",
2021 selinux_policycap_names[i],
2022 ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps, i));
2024 ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&policydb.policycaps, node, i) {
2025 if (i >= ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_policycap_names))
2026 pr_info("SELinux: unknown policy capability %u\n",
2031 static int security_preserve_bools(struct policydb *p);
2034 * security_load_policy - Load a security policy configuration.
2035 * @data: binary policy data
2036 * @len: length of data in bytes
2038 * Load a new set of security policy configuration data,
2039 * validate it and convert the SID table as necessary.
2040 * This function will flush the access vector cache after
2041 * loading the new policy.
2043 int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
2045 struct policydb *oldpolicydb, *newpolicydb;
2046 struct sidtab oldsidtab, newsidtab;
2047 struct selinux_mapping *oldmap, *map = NULL;
2048 struct convert_context_args args;
2052 struct policy_file file = { data, len }, *fp = &file;
2054 oldpolicydb = kzalloc(2 * sizeof(*oldpolicydb), GFP_KERNEL);
2059 newpolicydb = oldpolicydb + 1;
2061 if (!ss_initialized) {
2063 ebitmap_cache_init();
2064 rc = policydb_read(&policydb, fp);
2066 avtab_cache_destroy();
2067 ebitmap_cache_destroy();
2072 rc = selinux_set_mapping(&policydb, secclass_map,
2074 ¤t_mapping_size);
2076 policydb_destroy(&policydb);
2077 avtab_cache_destroy();
2078 ebitmap_cache_destroy();
2082 rc = policydb_load_isids(&policydb, &sidtab);
2084 policydb_destroy(&policydb);
2085 avtab_cache_destroy();
2086 ebitmap_cache_destroy();
2090 security_load_policycaps();
2092 seqno = ++latest_granting;
2093 selinux_complete_init();
2094 avc_ss_reset(seqno);
2095 selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
2096 selinux_status_update_policyload(seqno);
2097 selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate();
2098 selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload();
2103 sidtab_hash_eval(&sidtab, "sids");
2106 rc = policydb_read(newpolicydb, fp);
2110 newpolicydb->len = len;
2111 /* If switching between different policy types, log MLS status */
2112 if (policydb.mls_enabled && !newpolicydb->mls_enabled)
2113 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabling MLS support...\n");
2114 else if (!policydb.mls_enabled && newpolicydb->mls_enabled)
2115 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Enabling MLS support...\n");
2117 rc = policydb_load_isids(newpolicydb, &newsidtab);
2119 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to load the initial SIDs\n");
2120 policydb_destroy(newpolicydb);
2124 rc = selinux_set_mapping(newpolicydb, secclass_map, &map, &map_size);
2128 rc = security_preserve_bools(newpolicydb);
2130 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to preserve booleans\n");
2134 /* Clone the SID table. */
2135 sidtab_shutdown(&sidtab);
2137 rc = sidtab_map(&sidtab, clone_sid, &newsidtab);
2142 * Convert the internal representations of contexts
2143 * in the new SID table.
2145 args.oldp = &policydb;
2146 args.newp = newpolicydb;
2147 rc = sidtab_map(&newsidtab, convert_context, &args);
2149 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to convert the internal"
2150 " representation of contexts in the new SID"
2155 /* Save the old policydb and SID table to free later. */
2156 memcpy(oldpolicydb, &policydb, sizeof(policydb));
2157 sidtab_set(&oldsidtab, &sidtab);
2159 /* Install the new policydb and SID table. */
2160 write_lock_irq(&policy_rwlock);
2161 memcpy(&policydb, newpolicydb, sizeof(policydb));
2162 sidtab_set(&sidtab, &newsidtab);
2163 security_load_policycaps();
2164 oldmap = current_mapping;
2165 current_mapping = map;
2166 current_mapping_size = map_size;
2167 seqno = ++latest_granting;
2168 write_unlock_irq(&policy_rwlock);
2170 /* Free the old policydb and SID table. */
2171 policydb_destroy(oldpolicydb);
2172 sidtab_destroy(&oldsidtab);
2175 avc_ss_reset(seqno);
2176 selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
2177 selinux_status_update_policyload(seqno);
2178 selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate();
2179 selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload();
2186 sidtab_destroy(&newsidtab);
2187 policydb_destroy(newpolicydb);
2194 size_t security_policydb_len(void)
2198 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2200 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2206 * security_port_sid - Obtain the SID for a port.
2207 * @protocol: protocol number
2208 * @port: port number
2209 * @out_sid: security identifier
2211 int security_port_sid(u8 protocol, u16 port, u32 *out_sid)
2216 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2218 c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_PORT];
2220 if (c->u.port.protocol == protocol &&
2221 c->u.port.low_port <= port &&
2222 c->u.port.high_port >= port)
2229 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
2235 *out_sid = c->sid[0];
2237 *out_sid = SECINITSID_PORT;
2241 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2246 * security_pkey_sid - Obtain the SID for a pkey.
2247 * @subnet_prefix: Subnet Prefix
2248 * @pkey_num: pkey number
2249 * @out_sid: security identifier
2251 int security_ib_pkey_sid(u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_num, u32 *out_sid)
2256 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2258 c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_IBPKEY];
2260 if (c->u.ibpkey.low_pkey <= pkey_num &&
2261 c->u.ibpkey.high_pkey >= pkey_num &&
2262 c->u.ibpkey.subnet_prefix == subnet_prefix)
2270 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
2276 *out_sid = c->sid[0];
2278 *out_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
2281 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2286 * security_ib_endport_sid - Obtain the SID for a subnet management interface.
2287 * @dev_name: device name
2288 * @port: port number
2289 * @out_sid: security identifier
2291 int security_ib_endport_sid(const char *dev_name, u8 port_num, u32 *out_sid)
2296 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2298 c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_IBENDPORT];
2300 if (c->u.ibendport.port == port_num &&
2301 !strncmp(c->u.ibendport.dev_name,
2303 IB_DEVICE_NAME_MAX))
2311 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
2317 *out_sid = c->sid[0];
2319 *out_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
2322 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2327 * security_netif_sid - Obtain the SID for a network interface.
2328 * @name: interface name
2329 * @if_sid: interface SID
2331 int security_netif_sid(char *name, u32 *if_sid)
2336 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2338 c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_NETIF];
2340 if (strcmp(name, c->u.name) == 0)
2346 if (!c->sid[0] || !c->sid[1]) {
2347 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
2352 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
2358 *if_sid = c->sid[0];
2360 *if_sid = SECINITSID_NETIF;
2363 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2367 static int match_ipv6_addrmask(u32 *input, u32 *addr, u32 *mask)
2371 for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
2372 if (addr[i] != (input[i] & mask[i])) {
2381 * security_node_sid - Obtain the SID for a node (host).
2382 * @domain: communication domain aka address family
2384 * @addrlen: address length in bytes
2385 * @out_sid: security identifier
2387 int security_node_sid(u16 domain,
2395 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2402 if (addrlen != sizeof(u32))
2405 addr = *((u32 *)addrp);
2407 c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_NODE];
2409 if (c->u.node.addr == (addr & c->u.node.mask))
2418 if (addrlen != sizeof(u64) * 2)
2420 c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_NODE6];
2422 if (match_ipv6_addrmask(addrp, c->u.node6.addr,
2431 *out_sid = SECINITSID_NODE;
2437 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
2443 *out_sid = c->sid[0];
2445 *out_sid = SECINITSID_NODE;
2450 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2457 * security_get_user_sids - Obtain reachable SIDs for a user.
2458 * @fromsid: starting SID
2459 * @username: username
2460 * @sids: array of reachable SIDs for user
2461 * @nel: number of elements in @sids
2463 * Generate the set of SIDs for legal security contexts
2464 * for a given user that can be reached by @fromsid.
2465 * Set *@sids to point to a dynamically allocated
2466 * array containing the set of SIDs. Set *@nel to the
2467 * number of elements in the array.
2470 int security_get_user_sids(u32 fromsid,
2475 struct context *fromcon, usercon;
2476 u32 *mysids = NULL, *mysids2, sid;
2477 u32 mynel = 0, maxnel = SIDS_NEL;
2478 struct user_datum *user;
2479 struct role_datum *role;
2480 struct ebitmap_node *rnode, *tnode;
2486 if (!ss_initialized)
2489 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2491 context_init(&usercon);
2494 fromcon = sidtab_search(&sidtab, fromsid);
2499 user = hashtab_search(policydb.p_users.table, username);
2503 usercon.user = user->value;
2506 mysids = kcalloc(maxnel, sizeof(*mysids), GFP_ATOMIC);
2510 ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&user->roles, rnode, i) {
2511 role = policydb.role_val_to_struct[i];
2512 usercon.role = i + 1;
2513 ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&role->types, tnode, j) {
2514 usercon.type = j + 1;
2516 if (mls_setup_user_range(fromcon, user, &usercon))
2519 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &usercon, &sid);
2522 if (mynel < maxnel) {
2523 mysids[mynel++] = sid;
2527 mysids2 = kcalloc(maxnel, sizeof(*mysids2), GFP_ATOMIC);
2530 memcpy(mysids2, mysids, mynel * sizeof(*mysids2));
2533 mysids[mynel++] = sid;
2539 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2546 mysids2 = kcalloc(mynel, sizeof(*mysids2), GFP_KERNEL);
2551 for (i = 0, j = 0; i < mynel; i++) {
2552 struct av_decision dummy_avd;
2553 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(fromsid, mysids[i],
2554 SECCLASS_PROCESS, /* kernel value */
2555 PROCESS__TRANSITION, AVC_STRICT,
2558 mysids2[j++] = mysids[i];
2570 * __security_genfs_sid - Helper to obtain a SID for a file in a filesystem
2571 * @fstype: filesystem type
2572 * @path: path from root of mount
2573 * @sclass: file security class
2574 * @sid: SID for path
2576 * Obtain a SID to use for a file in a filesystem that
2577 * cannot support xattr or use a fixed labeling behavior like
2578 * transition SIDs or task SIDs.
2580 * The caller must acquire the policy_rwlock before calling this function.
2582 static inline int __security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype,
2589 struct genfs *genfs;
2593 while (path[0] == '/' && path[1] == '/')
2596 sclass = unmap_class(orig_sclass);
2597 *sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
2599 for (genfs = policydb.genfs; genfs; genfs = genfs->next) {
2600 cmp = strcmp(fstype, genfs->fstype);
2609 for (c = genfs->head; c; c = c->next) {
2610 len = strlen(c->u.name);
2611 if ((!c->v.sclass || sclass == c->v.sclass) &&
2612 (strncmp(c->u.name, path, len) == 0))
2621 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &c->context[0], &c->sid[0]);
2633 * security_genfs_sid - Obtain a SID for a file in a filesystem
2634 * @fstype: filesystem type
2635 * @path: path from root of mount
2636 * @sclass: file security class
2637 * @sid: SID for path
2639 * Acquire policy_rwlock before calling __security_genfs_sid() and release
2642 int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype,
2649 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2650 retval = __security_genfs_sid(fstype, path, orig_sclass, sid);
2651 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2656 * security_fs_use - Determine how to handle labeling for a filesystem.
2657 * @sb: superblock in question
2659 int security_fs_use(struct super_block *sb)
2663 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
2664 const char *fstype = sb->s_type->name;
2666 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2668 c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_FSUSE];
2670 if (strcmp(fstype, c->u.name) == 0)
2676 sbsec->behavior = c->v.behavior;
2678 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &c->context[0],
2683 sbsec->sid = c->sid[0];
2685 rc = __security_genfs_sid(fstype, "/", SECCLASS_DIR,
2688 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE;
2691 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS;
2696 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2700 int security_get_bools(int *len, char ***names, int **values)
2704 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2709 *len = policydb.p_bools.nprim;
2714 *names = kcalloc(*len, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
2719 *values = kcalloc(*len, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
2723 for (i = 0; i < *len; i++) {
2724 (*values)[i] = policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state;
2727 (*names)[i] = kstrdup(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_BOOLS, i), GFP_ATOMIC);
2733 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2737 for (i = 0; i < *len; i++)
2749 int security_set_bools(int len, int *values)
2752 int lenp, seqno = 0;
2753 struct cond_node *cur;
2755 write_lock_irq(&policy_rwlock);
2758 lenp = policydb.p_bools.nprim;
2762 for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
2763 if (!!values[i] != policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state) {
2764 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC,
2765 AUDIT_MAC_CONFIG_CHANGE,
2766 "bool=%s val=%d old_val=%d auid=%u ses=%u",
2767 sym_name(&policydb, SYM_BOOLS, i),
2769 policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state,
2770 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)),
2771 audit_get_sessionid(current));
2774 policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state = 1;
2776 policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state = 0;
2779 for (cur = policydb.cond_list; cur; cur = cur->next) {
2780 rc = evaluate_cond_node(&policydb, cur);
2785 seqno = ++latest_granting;
2788 write_unlock_irq(&policy_rwlock);
2790 avc_ss_reset(seqno);
2791 selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
2792 selinux_status_update_policyload(seqno);
2793 selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload();
2798 int security_get_bool_value(int index)
2803 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2806 len = policydb.p_bools.nprim;
2810 rc = policydb.bool_val_to_struct[index]->state;
2812 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2816 static int security_preserve_bools(struct policydb *p)
2818 int rc, nbools = 0, *bvalues = NULL, i;
2819 char **bnames = NULL;
2820 struct cond_bool_datum *booldatum;
2821 struct cond_node *cur;
2823 rc = security_get_bools(&nbools, &bnames, &bvalues);
2826 for (i = 0; i < nbools; i++) {
2827 booldatum = hashtab_search(p->p_bools.table, bnames[i]);
2829 booldatum->state = bvalues[i];
2831 for (cur = p->cond_list; cur; cur = cur->next) {
2832 rc = evaluate_cond_node(p, cur);
2839 for (i = 0; i < nbools; i++)
2848 * security_sid_mls_copy() - computes a new sid based on the given
2849 * sid and the mls portion of mls_sid.
2851 int security_sid_mls_copy(u32 sid, u32 mls_sid, u32 *new_sid)
2853 struct context *context1;
2854 struct context *context2;
2855 struct context newcon;
2861 if (!ss_initialized || !policydb.mls_enabled) {
2866 context_init(&newcon);
2868 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2871 context1 = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
2873 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
2879 context2 = sidtab_search(&sidtab, mls_sid);
2881 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
2886 newcon.user = context1->user;
2887 newcon.role = context1->role;
2888 newcon.type = context1->type;
2889 rc = mls_context_cpy(&newcon, context2);
2893 /* Check the validity of the new context. */
2894 if (!policydb_context_isvalid(&policydb, &newcon)) {
2895 rc = convert_context_handle_invalid_context(&newcon);
2897 if (!context_struct_to_string(&newcon, &s, &len)) {
2898 audit_log(current->audit_context,
2899 GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
2900 "op=security_sid_mls_copy "
2901 "invalid_context=%s", s);
2908 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &newcon, new_sid);
2910 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2911 context_destroy(&newcon);
2917 * security_net_peersid_resolve - Compare and resolve two network peer SIDs
2918 * @nlbl_sid: NetLabel SID
2919 * @nlbl_type: NetLabel labeling protocol type
2920 * @xfrm_sid: XFRM SID
2923 * Compare the @nlbl_sid and @xfrm_sid values and if the two SIDs can be
2924 * resolved into a single SID it is returned via @peer_sid and the function
2925 * returns zero. Otherwise @peer_sid is set to SECSID_NULL and the function
2926 * returns a negative value. A table summarizing the behavior is below:
2928 * | function return | @sid
2929 * ------------------------------+-----------------+-----------------
2930 * no peer labels | 0 | SECSID_NULL
2931 * single peer label | 0 | <peer_label>
2932 * multiple, consistent labels | 0 | <peer_label>
2933 * multiple, inconsistent labels | -<errno> | SECSID_NULL
2936 int security_net_peersid_resolve(u32 nlbl_sid, u32 nlbl_type,
2941 struct context *nlbl_ctx;
2942 struct context *xfrm_ctx;
2944 *peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
2946 /* handle the common (which also happens to be the set of easy) cases
2947 * right away, these two if statements catch everything involving a
2948 * single or absent peer SID/label */
2949 if (xfrm_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
2950 *peer_sid = nlbl_sid;
2953 /* NOTE: an nlbl_type == NETLBL_NLTYPE_UNLABELED is a "fallback" label
2954 * and is treated as if nlbl_sid == SECSID_NULL when a XFRM SID/label
2956 if (nlbl_sid == SECSID_NULL || nlbl_type == NETLBL_NLTYPE_UNLABELED) {
2957 *peer_sid = xfrm_sid;
2961 /* we don't need to check ss_initialized here since the only way both
2962 * nlbl_sid and xfrm_sid are not equal to SECSID_NULL would be if the
2963 * security server was initialized and ss_initialized was true */
2964 if (!policydb.mls_enabled)
2967 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2970 nlbl_ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, nlbl_sid);
2972 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
2973 __func__, nlbl_sid);
2977 xfrm_ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, xfrm_sid);
2979 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
2980 __func__, xfrm_sid);
2983 rc = (mls_context_cmp(nlbl_ctx, xfrm_ctx) ? 0 : -EACCES);
2987 /* at present NetLabel SIDs/labels really only carry MLS
2988 * information so if the MLS portion of the NetLabel SID
2989 * matches the MLS portion of the labeled XFRM SID/label
2990 * then pass along the XFRM SID as it is the most
2992 *peer_sid = xfrm_sid;
2994 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2998 static int get_classes_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args)
3000 struct class_datum *datum = d;
3001 char *name = k, **classes = args;
3002 int value = datum->value - 1;
3004 classes[value] = kstrdup(name, GFP_ATOMIC);
3005 if (!classes[value])
3011 int security_get_classes(char ***classes, int *nclasses)
3015 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
3018 *nclasses = policydb.p_classes.nprim;
3019 *classes = kcalloc(*nclasses, sizeof(**classes), GFP_ATOMIC);
3023 rc = hashtab_map(policydb.p_classes.table, get_classes_callback,
3027 for (i = 0; i < *nclasses; i++)
3028 kfree((*classes)[i]);
3033 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
3037 static int get_permissions_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args)
3039 struct perm_datum *datum = d;
3040 char *name = k, **perms = args;
3041 int value = datum->value - 1;
3043 perms[value] = kstrdup(name, GFP_ATOMIC);
3050 int security_get_permissions(char *class, char ***perms, int *nperms)
3053 struct class_datum *match;
3055 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
3058 match = hashtab_search(policydb.p_classes.table, class);
3060 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized class %s\n",
3066 *nperms = match->permissions.nprim;
3067 *perms = kcalloc(*nperms, sizeof(**perms), GFP_ATOMIC);
3071 if (match->comdatum) {
3072 rc = hashtab_map(match->comdatum->permissions.table,
3073 get_permissions_callback, *perms);
3078 rc = hashtab_map(match->permissions.table, get_permissions_callback,
3084 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
3088 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
3089 for (i = 0; i < *nperms; i++)
3095 int security_get_reject_unknown(void)
3097 return policydb.reject_unknown;
3100 int security_get_allow_unknown(void)
3102 return policydb.allow_unknown;
3106 * security_policycap_supported - Check for a specific policy capability
3107 * @req_cap: capability
3110 * This function queries the currently loaded policy to see if it supports the
3111 * capability specified by @req_cap. Returns true (1) if the capability is
3112 * supported, false (0) if it isn't supported.
3115 int security_policycap_supported(unsigned int req_cap)
3119 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
3120 rc = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps, req_cap);
3121 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
3126 struct selinux_audit_rule {
3128 struct context au_ctxt;
3131 void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *vrule)
3133 struct selinux_audit_rule *rule = vrule;
3136 context_destroy(&rule->au_ctxt);
3141 int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
3143 struct selinux_audit_rule *tmprule;
3144 struct role_datum *roledatum;
3145 struct type_datum *typedatum;
3146 struct user_datum *userdatum;
3147 struct selinux_audit_rule **rule = (struct selinux_audit_rule **)vrule;
3152 if (!ss_initialized)
3156 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
3157 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
3158 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
3159 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
3160 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
3161 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
3162 /* only 'equals' and 'not equals' fit user, role, and type */
3163 if (op != Audit_equal && op != Audit_not_equal)
3166 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
3167 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
3168 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
3169 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
3170 /* we do not allow a range, indicated by the presence of '-' */
3171 if (strchr(rulestr, '-'))
3175 /* only the above fields are valid */
3179 tmprule = kzalloc(sizeof(struct selinux_audit_rule), GFP_KERNEL);
3183 context_init(&tmprule->au_ctxt);
3185 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
3187 tmprule->au_seqno = latest_granting;
3190 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
3191 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
3193 userdatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_users.table, rulestr);
3196 tmprule->au_ctxt.user = userdatum->value;
3198 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
3199 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
3201 roledatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_roles.table, rulestr);
3204 tmprule->au_ctxt.role = roledatum->value;
3206 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
3207 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
3209 typedatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_types.table, rulestr);
3212 tmprule->au_ctxt.type = typedatum->value;
3214 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
3215 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
3216 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
3217 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
3218 rc = mls_from_string(rulestr, &tmprule->au_ctxt, GFP_ATOMIC);
3225 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
3228 selinux_audit_rule_free(tmprule);
3237 /* Check to see if the rule contains any selinux fields */
3238 int selinux_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule)
3242 for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
3243 struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
3245 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
3246 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
3247 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
3248 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
3249 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
3250 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
3251 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
3252 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
3253 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
3254 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
3262 int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
3263 struct audit_context *actx)
3265 struct context *ctxt;
3266 struct mls_level *level;
3267 struct selinux_audit_rule *rule = vrule;
3270 if (unlikely(!rule)) {
3271 WARN_ONCE(1, "selinux_audit_rule_match: missing rule\n");
3275 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
3277 if (rule->au_seqno < latest_granting) {
3282 ctxt = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
3283 if (unlikely(!ctxt)) {
3284 WARN_ONCE(1, "selinux_audit_rule_match: unrecognized SID %d\n",
3290 /* a field/op pair that is not caught here will simply fall through
3293 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
3294 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
3297 match = (ctxt->user == rule->au_ctxt.user);
3299 case Audit_not_equal:
3300 match = (ctxt->user != rule->au_ctxt.user);
3304 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
3305 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
3308 match = (ctxt->role == rule->au_ctxt.role);
3310 case Audit_not_equal:
3311 match = (ctxt->role != rule->au_ctxt.role);
3315 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
3316 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
3319 match = (ctxt->type == rule->au_ctxt.type);
3321 case Audit_not_equal:
3322 match = (ctxt->type != rule->au_ctxt.type);
3326 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
3327 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
3328 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
3329 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
3330 level = ((field == AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN ||
3331 field == AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW) ?
3332 &ctxt->range.level[0] : &ctxt->range.level[1]);
3335 match = mls_level_eq(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
3338 case Audit_not_equal:
3339 match = !mls_level_eq(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
3343 match = (mls_level_dom(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
3345 !mls_level_eq(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
3349 match = mls_level_dom(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
3353 match = (mls_level_dom(level,
3354 &rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0]) &&
3355 !mls_level_eq(level,
3356 &rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0]));
3359 match = mls_level_dom(level,
3360 &rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0]);
3366 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
3370 static int (*aurule_callback)(void) = audit_update_lsm_rules;
3372 static int aurule_avc_callback(u32 event)
3376 if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET && aurule_callback)
3377 err = aurule_callback();
3381 static int __init aurule_init(void)
3385 err = avc_add_callback(aurule_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET);
3387 panic("avc_add_callback() failed, error %d\n", err);
3391 __initcall(aurule_init);
3393 #ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
3395 * security_netlbl_cache_add - Add an entry to the NetLabel cache
3396 * @secattr: the NetLabel packet security attributes
3397 * @sid: the SELinux SID
3400 * Attempt to cache the context in @ctx, which was derived from the packet in
3401 * @skb, in the NetLabel subsystem cache. This function assumes @secattr has
3402 * already been initialized.
3405 static void security_netlbl_cache_add(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
3410 sid_cache = kmalloc(sizeof(*sid_cache), GFP_ATOMIC);
3411 if (sid_cache == NULL)
3413 secattr->cache = netlbl_secattr_cache_alloc(GFP_ATOMIC);
3414 if (secattr->cache == NULL) {
3420 secattr->cache->free = kfree;
3421 secattr->cache->data = sid_cache;
3422 secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE;
3426 * security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid - Convert a NetLabel secattr to a SELinux SID
3427 * @secattr: the NetLabel packet security attributes
3428 * @sid: the SELinux SID
3431 * Convert the given NetLabel security attributes in @secattr into a
3432 * SELinux SID. If the @secattr field does not contain a full SELinux
3433 * SID/context then use SECINITSID_NETMSG as the foundation. If possible the
3434 * 'cache' field of @secattr is set and the CACHE flag is set; this is to
3435 * allow the @secattr to be used by NetLabel to cache the secattr to SID
3436 * conversion for future lookups. Returns zero on success, negative values on
3440 int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
3444 struct context *ctx;
3445 struct context ctx_new;
3447 if (!ss_initialized) {
3452 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
3454 if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE)
3455 *sid = *(u32 *)secattr->cache->data;
3456 else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID)
3457 *sid = secattr->attr.secid;
3458 else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) {
3460 ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, SECINITSID_NETMSG);
3464 context_init(&ctx_new);
3465 ctx_new.user = ctx->user;
3466 ctx_new.role = ctx->role;
3467 ctx_new.type = ctx->type;
3468 mls_import_netlbl_lvl(&ctx_new, secattr);
3469 if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) {
3470 rc = mls_import_netlbl_cat(&ctx_new, secattr);
3475 if (!mls_context_isvalid(&policydb, &ctx_new))
3478 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &ctx_new, sid);
3482 security_netlbl_cache_add(secattr, *sid);
3484 ebitmap_destroy(&ctx_new.range.level[0].cat);
3488 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
3491 ebitmap_destroy(&ctx_new.range.level[0].cat);
3493 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
3498 * security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr - Convert a SELinux SID to a NetLabel secattr
3499 * @sid: the SELinux SID
3500 * @secattr: the NetLabel packet security attributes
3503 * Convert the given SELinux SID in @sid into a NetLabel security attribute.
3504 * Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
3507 int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(u32 sid, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
3510 struct context *ctx;
3512 if (!ss_initialized)
3515 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
3518 ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
3523 secattr->domain = kstrdup(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_TYPES, ctx->type - 1),
3525 if (secattr->domain == NULL)
3528 secattr->attr.secid = sid;
3529 secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN_CPY | NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID;
3530 mls_export_netlbl_lvl(ctx, secattr);
3531 rc = mls_export_netlbl_cat(ctx, secattr);
3533 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
3536 #endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */
3539 * security_read_policy - read the policy.
3540 * @data: binary policy data
3541 * @len: length of data in bytes
3544 int security_read_policy(void **data, size_t *len)
3547 struct policy_file fp;
3549 if (!ss_initialized)
3552 *len = security_policydb_len();
3554 *data = vmalloc_user(*len);
3561 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
3562 rc = policydb_write(&policydb, &fp);
3563 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
3568 *len = (unsigned long)fp.data - (unsigned long)*data;