GNU Linux-libre 6.8.7-gnu
[releases.git] / security / landlock / net.c
1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
2 /*
3  * Landlock LSM - Network management and hooks
4  *
5  * Copyright © 2022-2023 Huawei Tech. Co., Ltd.
6  * Copyright © 2022-2023 Microsoft Corporation
7  */
8
9 #include <linux/in.h>
10 #include <linux/net.h>
11 #include <linux/socket.h>
12 #include <net/ipv6.h>
13
14 #include "common.h"
15 #include "cred.h"
16 #include "limits.h"
17 #include "net.h"
18 #include "ruleset.h"
19
20 int landlock_append_net_rule(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
21                              const u16 port, access_mask_t access_rights)
22 {
23         int err;
24         const struct landlock_id id = {
25                 .key.data = (__force uintptr_t)htons(port),
26                 .type = LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT,
27         };
28
29         BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(port) > sizeof(id.key.data));
30
31         /* Transforms relative access rights to absolute ones. */
32         access_rights |= LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_NET &
33                          ~landlock_get_net_access_mask(ruleset, 0);
34
35         mutex_lock(&ruleset->lock);
36         err = landlock_insert_rule(ruleset, id, access_rights);
37         mutex_unlock(&ruleset->lock);
38
39         return err;
40 }
41
42 static access_mask_t
43 get_raw_handled_net_accesses(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain)
44 {
45         access_mask_t access_dom = 0;
46         size_t layer_level;
47
48         for (layer_level = 0; layer_level < domain->num_layers; layer_level++)
49                 access_dom |= landlock_get_net_access_mask(domain, layer_level);
50         return access_dom;
51 }
52
53 static const struct landlock_ruleset *get_current_net_domain(void)
54 {
55         const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom =
56                 landlock_get_current_domain();
57
58         if (!dom || !get_raw_handled_net_accesses(dom))
59                 return NULL;
60
61         return dom;
62 }
63
64 static int current_check_access_socket(struct socket *const sock,
65                                        struct sockaddr *const address,
66                                        const int addrlen,
67                                        const access_mask_t access_request)
68 {
69         __be16 port;
70         layer_mask_t layer_masks[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET] = {};
71         const struct landlock_rule *rule;
72         access_mask_t handled_access;
73         struct landlock_id id = {
74                 .type = LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT,
75         };
76         const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom = get_current_net_domain();
77
78         if (!dom)
79                 return 0;
80         if (WARN_ON_ONCE(dom->num_layers < 1))
81                 return -EACCES;
82
83         /* Checks if it's a (potential) TCP socket. */
84         if (sock->type != SOCK_STREAM)
85                 return 0;
86
87         /* Checks for minimal header length to safely read sa_family. */
88         if (addrlen < offsetofend(typeof(*address), sa_family))
89                 return -EINVAL;
90
91         switch (address->sa_family) {
92         case AF_UNSPEC:
93         case AF_INET:
94                 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
95                         return -EINVAL;
96                 port = ((struct sockaddr_in *)address)->sin_port;
97                 break;
98
99 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
100         case AF_INET6:
101                 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
102                         return -EINVAL;
103                 port = ((struct sockaddr_in6 *)address)->sin6_port;
104                 break;
105 #endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) */
106
107         default:
108                 return 0;
109         }
110
111         /* Specific AF_UNSPEC handling. */
112         if (address->sa_family == AF_UNSPEC) {
113                 /*
114                  * Connecting to an address with AF_UNSPEC dissolves the TCP
115                  * association, which have the same effect as closing the
116                  * connection while retaining the socket object (i.e., the file
117                  * descriptor).  As for dropping privileges, closing
118                  * connections is always allowed.
119                  *
120                  * For a TCP access control system, this request is legitimate.
121                  * Let the network stack handle potential inconsistencies and
122                  * return -EINVAL if needed.
123                  */
124                 if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP)
125                         return 0;
126
127                 /*
128                  * For compatibility reason, accept AF_UNSPEC for bind
129                  * accesses (mapped to AF_INET) only if the address is
130                  * INADDR_ANY (cf. __inet_bind).  Checking the address is
131                  * required to not wrongfully return -EACCES instead of
132                  * -EAFNOSUPPORT.
133                  *
134                  * We could return 0 and let the network stack handle these
135                  * checks, but it is safer to return a proper error and test
136                  * consistency thanks to kselftest.
137                  */
138                 if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP) {
139                         /* addrlen has already been checked for AF_UNSPEC. */
140                         const struct sockaddr_in *const sockaddr =
141                                 (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
142
143                         if (sock->sk->__sk_common.skc_family != AF_INET)
144                                 return -EINVAL;
145
146                         if (sockaddr->sin_addr.s_addr != htonl(INADDR_ANY))
147                                 return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
148                 }
149         } else {
150                 /*
151                  * Checks sa_family consistency to not wrongfully return
152                  * -EACCES instead of -EINVAL.  Valid sa_family changes are
153                  * only (from AF_INET or AF_INET6) to AF_UNSPEC.
154                  *
155                  * We could return 0 and let the network stack handle this
156                  * check, but it is safer to return a proper error and test
157                  * consistency thanks to kselftest.
158                  */
159                 if (address->sa_family != sock->sk->__sk_common.skc_family)
160                         return -EINVAL;
161         }
162
163         id.key.data = (__force uintptr_t)port;
164         BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(port) > sizeof(id.key.data));
165
166         rule = landlock_find_rule(dom, id);
167         handled_access = landlock_init_layer_masks(
168                 dom, access_request, &layer_masks, LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT);
169         if (landlock_unmask_layers(rule, handled_access, &layer_masks,
170                                    ARRAY_SIZE(layer_masks)))
171                 return 0;
172
173         return -EACCES;
174 }
175
176 static int hook_socket_bind(struct socket *const sock,
177                             struct sockaddr *const address, const int addrlen)
178 {
179         return current_check_access_socket(sock, address, addrlen,
180                                            LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP);
181 }
182
183 static int hook_socket_connect(struct socket *const sock,
184                                struct sockaddr *const address,
185                                const int addrlen)
186 {
187         return current_check_access_socket(sock, address, addrlen,
188                                            LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP);
189 }
190
191 static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
192         LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, hook_socket_bind),
193         LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, hook_socket_connect),
194 };
195
196 __init void landlock_add_net_hooks(void)
197 {
198         security_add_hooks(landlock_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(landlock_hooks),
199                            &landlock_lsmid);
200 }