2 * Copyright (C) 2008 IBM Corporation
3 * Author: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
5 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
6 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
7 * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
10 * - initialize default measure policy rules
13 #include <linux/module.h>
14 #include <linux/list.h>
16 #include <linux/security.h>
17 #include <linux/magic.h>
18 #include <linux/parser.h>
19 #include <linux/slab.h>
20 #include <linux/rculist.h>
21 #include <linux/genhd.h>
22 #include <linux/seq_file.h>
26 /* flags definitions */
27 #define IMA_FUNC 0x0001
28 #define IMA_MASK 0x0002
29 #define IMA_FSMAGIC 0x0004
30 #define IMA_UID 0x0008
31 #define IMA_FOWNER 0x0010
32 #define IMA_FSUUID 0x0020
33 #define IMA_INMASK 0x0040
34 #define IMA_EUID 0x0080
35 #define IMA_PCR 0x0100
38 #define MEASURE 0x0001 /* same as IMA_MEASURE */
39 #define DONT_MEASURE 0x0002
40 #define APPRAISE 0x0004 /* same as IMA_APPRAISE */
41 #define DONT_APPRAISE 0x0008
44 #define INVALID_PCR(a) (((a) < 0) || \
45 (a) >= (FIELD_SIZEOF(struct integrity_iint_cache, measured_pcrs) * 8))
48 static int temp_ima_appraise;
50 #define MAX_LSM_RULES 6
51 enum lsm_rule_types { LSM_OBJ_USER, LSM_OBJ_ROLE, LSM_OBJ_TYPE,
52 LSM_SUBJ_USER, LSM_SUBJ_ROLE, LSM_SUBJ_TYPE
55 enum policy_types { ORIGINAL_TCB = 1, DEFAULT_TCB };
57 struct ima_rule_entry {
58 struct list_head list;
63 unsigned long fsmagic;
69 void *rule; /* LSM file metadata specific */
70 void *args_p; /* audit value */
71 int type; /* audit type */
76 * Without LSM specific knowledge, the default policy can only be
77 * written in terms of .action, .func, .mask, .fsmagic, .uid, and .fowner
81 * The minimum rule set to allow for full TCB coverage. Measures all files
82 * opened or mmap for exec and everything read by root. Dangerous because
83 * normal users can easily run the machine out of memory simply building
84 * and running executables.
86 static struct ima_rule_entry dont_measure_rules[] = {
87 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
88 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
89 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
90 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
91 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
92 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
93 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
94 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
95 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC,
96 .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
97 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = NSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}
100 static struct ima_rule_entry original_measurement_rules[] = {
101 {.action = MEASURE, .func = MMAP_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC,
102 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
103 {.action = MEASURE, .func = BPRM_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC,
104 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
105 {.action = MEASURE, .func = FILE_CHECK, .mask = MAY_READ,
106 .uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_UID},
107 {.action = MEASURE, .func = MODULE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
108 {.action = MEASURE, .func = FIRMWARE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
111 static struct ima_rule_entry default_measurement_rules[] = {
112 {.action = MEASURE, .func = MMAP_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC,
113 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
114 {.action = MEASURE, .func = BPRM_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC,
115 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
116 {.action = MEASURE, .func = FILE_CHECK, .mask = MAY_READ,
117 .uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_INMASK | IMA_EUID},
118 {.action = MEASURE, .func = FILE_CHECK, .mask = MAY_READ,
119 .uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_INMASK | IMA_UID},
120 {.action = MEASURE, .func = MODULE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
121 {.action = MEASURE, .func = FIRMWARE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
122 {.action = MEASURE, .func = POLICY_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
125 static struct ima_rule_entry default_appraise_rules[] = {
126 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
127 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
128 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
129 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
130 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = RAMFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
131 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
132 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
133 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
134 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
135 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = NSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
136 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
137 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY
138 {.action = APPRAISE, .func = POLICY_CHECK,
139 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED},
141 #ifndef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_SIGNED_INIT
142 {.action = APPRAISE, .fowner = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .flags = IMA_FOWNER},
144 /* force signature */
145 {.action = APPRAISE, .fowner = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
146 .flags = IMA_FOWNER | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED},
150 static LIST_HEAD(ima_default_rules);
151 static LIST_HEAD(ima_policy_rules);
152 static LIST_HEAD(ima_temp_rules);
153 static struct list_head *ima_rules = &ima_default_rules;
155 static int ima_policy __initdata;
157 static int __init default_measure_policy_setup(char *str)
162 ima_policy = ORIGINAL_TCB;
165 __setup("ima_tcb", default_measure_policy_setup);
167 static int __init policy_setup(char *str)
172 if (strcmp(str, "tcb") == 0)
173 ima_policy = DEFAULT_TCB;
177 __setup("ima_policy=", policy_setup);
179 static bool ima_use_appraise_tcb __initdata;
180 static int __init default_appraise_policy_setup(char *str)
182 ima_use_appraise_tcb = 1;
185 __setup("ima_appraise_tcb", default_appraise_policy_setup);
188 * The LSM policy can be reloaded, leaving the IMA LSM based rules referring
189 * to the old, stale LSM policy. Update the IMA LSM based rules to reflect
190 * the reloaded LSM policy. We assume the rules still exist; and BUG_ON() if
193 static void ima_lsm_update_rules(void)
195 struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
199 list_for_each_entry(entry, &ima_policy_rules, list) {
200 for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
201 if (!entry->lsm[i].rule)
203 result = security_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[i].type,
205 entry->lsm[i].args_p,
206 &entry->lsm[i].rule);
207 BUG_ON(!entry->lsm[i].rule);
213 * ima_match_rules - determine whether an inode matches the measure rule.
214 * @rule: a pointer to a rule
215 * @inode: a pointer to an inode
216 * @func: LIM hook identifier
217 * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
219 * Returns true on rule match, false on failure.
221 static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
222 enum ima_hooks func, int mask)
224 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
225 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
228 if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) &&
229 (rule->func != func && func != POST_SETATTR))
231 if ((rule->flags & IMA_MASK) &&
232 (rule->mask != mask && func != POST_SETATTR))
234 if ((rule->flags & IMA_INMASK) &&
235 (!(rule->mask & mask) && func != POST_SETATTR))
237 if ((rule->flags & IMA_FSMAGIC)
238 && rule->fsmagic != inode->i_sb->s_magic)
240 if ((rule->flags & IMA_FSUUID) &&
241 memcmp(rule->fsuuid, inode->i_sb->s_uuid, sizeof(rule->fsuuid)))
243 if ((rule->flags & IMA_UID) && !uid_eq(rule->uid, cred->uid))
245 if (rule->flags & IMA_EUID) {
246 if (has_capability_noaudit(current, CAP_SETUID)) {
247 if (!uid_eq(rule->uid, cred->euid)
248 && !uid_eq(rule->uid, cred->suid)
249 && !uid_eq(rule->uid, cred->uid))
251 } else if (!uid_eq(rule->uid, cred->euid))
255 if ((rule->flags & IMA_FOWNER) && !uid_eq(rule->fowner, inode->i_uid))
257 for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
262 if (!rule->lsm[i].rule)
269 security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid);
270 rc = security_filter_rule_match(osid,
279 security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
280 rc = security_filter_rule_match(sid,
288 if ((rc < 0) && (!retried)) {
290 ima_lsm_update_rules();
300 * In addition to knowing that we need to appraise the file in general,
301 * we need to differentiate between calling hooks, for hook specific rules.
303 static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)
305 if (!(rule->flags & IMA_FUNC))
306 return IMA_FILE_APPRAISE;
310 return IMA_MMAP_APPRAISE;
312 return IMA_BPRM_APPRAISE;
315 return IMA_FILE_APPRAISE;
316 case MODULE_CHECK ... MAX_CHECK - 1:
318 return IMA_READ_APPRAISE;
323 * ima_match_policy - decision based on LSM and other conditions
324 * @inode: pointer to an inode for which the policy decision is being made
325 * @func: IMA hook identifier
326 * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
327 * @pcr: set the pcr to extend
329 * Measure decision based on func/mask/fsmagic and LSM(subj/obj/type)
332 * Since the IMA policy may be updated multiple times we need to lock the
333 * list when walking it. Reads are many orders of magnitude more numerous
334 * than writes so ima_match_policy() is classical RCU candidate.
336 int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
339 struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
340 int action = 0, actmask = flags | (flags << 1);
343 list_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, ima_rules, list) {
345 if (!(entry->action & actmask))
348 if (!ima_match_rules(entry, inode, func, mask))
351 action |= entry->flags & IMA_ACTION_FLAGS;
353 action |= entry->action & IMA_DO_MASK;
354 if (entry->action & IMA_APPRAISE)
355 action |= get_subaction(entry, func);
357 if (entry->action & IMA_DO_MASK)
358 actmask &= ~(entry->action | entry->action << 1);
360 actmask &= ~(entry->action | entry->action >> 1);
362 if ((pcr) && (entry->flags & IMA_PCR))
374 * Initialize the ima_policy_flag variable based on the currently
375 * loaded policy. Based on this flag, the decision to short circuit
376 * out of a function or not call the function in the first place
377 * can be made earlier.
379 void ima_update_policy_flag(void)
381 struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
383 list_for_each_entry(entry, ima_rules, list) {
384 if (entry->action & IMA_DO_MASK)
385 ima_policy_flag |= entry->action;
388 ima_appraise |= temp_ima_appraise;
390 ima_policy_flag &= ~IMA_APPRAISE;
394 * ima_init_policy - initialize the default measure rules.
396 * ima_rules points to either the ima_default_rules or the
397 * the new ima_policy_rules.
399 void __init ima_init_policy(void)
401 int i, measure_entries, appraise_entries;
403 /* if !ima_policy set entries = 0 so we load NO default rules */
404 measure_entries = ima_policy ? ARRAY_SIZE(dont_measure_rules) : 0;
405 appraise_entries = ima_use_appraise_tcb ?
406 ARRAY_SIZE(default_appraise_rules) : 0;
408 for (i = 0; i < measure_entries; i++)
409 list_add_tail(&dont_measure_rules[i].list, &ima_default_rules);
411 switch (ima_policy) {
413 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(original_measurement_rules); i++)
414 list_add_tail(&original_measurement_rules[i].list,
418 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(default_measurement_rules); i++)
419 list_add_tail(&default_measurement_rules[i].list,
425 for (i = 0; i < appraise_entries; i++) {
426 list_add_tail(&default_appraise_rules[i].list,
428 if (default_appraise_rules[i].func == POLICY_CHECK)
429 temp_ima_appraise |= IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY;
432 ima_update_policy_flag();
435 /* Make sure we have a valid policy, at least containing some rules. */
436 int ima_check_policy(void)
438 if (list_empty(&ima_temp_rules))
444 * ima_update_policy - update default_rules with new measure rules
446 * Called on file .release to update the default rules with a complete new
447 * policy. What we do here is to splice ima_policy_rules and ima_temp_rules so
448 * they make a queue. The policy may be updated multiple times and this is the
451 * Policy rules are never deleted so ima_policy_flag gets zeroed only once when
452 * we switch from the default policy to user defined.
454 void ima_update_policy(void)
456 struct list_head *first, *last, *policy;
458 /* append current policy with the new rules */
459 first = (&ima_temp_rules)->next;
460 last = (&ima_temp_rules)->prev;
461 policy = &ima_policy_rules;
466 rcu_assign_pointer(list_next_rcu(policy->prev), first);
467 first->prev = policy->prev;
470 /* prepare for the next policy rules addition */
471 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ima_temp_rules);
473 if (ima_rules != policy) {
477 ima_update_policy_flag();
482 Opt_measure = 1, Opt_dont_measure,
483 Opt_appraise, Opt_dont_appraise,
485 Opt_obj_user, Opt_obj_role, Opt_obj_type,
486 Opt_subj_user, Opt_subj_role, Opt_subj_type,
487 Opt_func, Opt_mask, Opt_fsmagic,
488 Opt_fsuuid, Opt_uid, Opt_euid, Opt_fowner,
489 Opt_appraise_type, Opt_permit_directio,
493 static match_table_t policy_tokens = {
494 {Opt_measure, "measure"},
495 {Opt_dont_measure, "dont_measure"},
496 {Opt_appraise, "appraise"},
497 {Opt_dont_appraise, "dont_appraise"},
498 {Opt_audit, "audit"},
499 {Opt_obj_user, "obj_user=%s"},
500 {Opt_obj_role, "obj_role=%s"},
501 {Opt_obj_type, "obj_type=%s"},
502 {Opt_subj_user, "subj_user=%s"},
503 {Opt_subj_role, "subj_role=%s"},
504 {Opt_subj_type, "subj_type=%s"},
505 {Opt_func, "func=%s"},
506 {Opt_mask, "mask=%s"},
507 {Opt_fsmagic, "fsmagic=%s"},
508 {Opt_fsuuid, "fsuuid=%s"},
510 {Opt_euid, "euid=%s"},
511 {Opt_fowner, "fowner=%s"},
512 {Opt_appraise_type, "appraise_type=%s"},
513 {Opt_permit_directio, "permit_directio"},
518 static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry,
519 substring_t *args, int lsm_rule, int audit_type)
523 if (entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule)
526 entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p = match_strdup(args);
527 if (!entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p)
530 entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type = audit_type;
531 result = security_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type,
533 entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p,
534 &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule);
535 if (!entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule) {
536 kfree(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p);
543 static void ima_log_string(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key, char *value)
545 audit_log_format(ab, "%s=", key);
546 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, value);
547 audit_log_format(ab, " ");
550 static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
552 struct audit_buffer *ab;
557 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE);
559 entry->uid = INVALID_UID;
560 entry->fowner = INVALID_UID;
561 entry->action = UNKNOWN;
562 while ((p = strsep(&rule, " \t")) != NULL) {
563 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
569 if ((*p == '\0') || (*p == ' ') || (*p == '\t'))
571 token = match_token(p, policy_tokens, args);
574 ima_log_string(ab, "action", "measure");
576 if (entry->action != UNKNOWN)
579 entry->action = MEASURE;
581 case Opt_dont_measure:
582 ima_log_string(ab, "action", "dont_measure");
584 if (entry->action != UNKNOWN)
587 entry->action = DONT_MEASURE;
590 ima_log_string(ab, "action", "appraise");
592 if (entry->action != UNKNOWN)
595 entry->action = APPRAISE;
597 case Opt_dont_appraise:
598 ima_log_string(ab, "action", "dont_appraise");
600 if (entry->action != UNKNOWN)
603 entry->action = DONT_APPRAISE;
606 ima_log_string(ab, "action", "audit");
608 if (entry->action != UNKNOWN)
611 entry->action = AUDIT;
614 ima_log_string(ab, "func", args[0].from);
619 if (strcmp(args[0].from, "FILE_CHECK") == 0)
620 entry->func = FILE_CHECK;
621 /* PATH_CHECK is for backwards compat */
622 else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "PATH_CHECK") == 0)
623 entry->func = FILE_CHECK;
624 else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "MODULE_CHECK") == 0)
625 entry->func = MODULE_CHECK;
626 else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "FIRMWARE_CHECK") == 0)
627 entry->func = FIRMWARE_CHECK;
628 else if ((strcmp(args[0].from, "FILE_MMAP") == 0)
629 || (strcmp(args[0].from, "MMAP_CHECK") == 0))
630 entry->func = MMAP_CHECK;
631 else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "BPRM_CHECK") == 0)
632 entry->func = BPRM_CHECK;
633 else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK") ==
635 entry->func = KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK;
636 else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK")
638 entry->func = KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK;
639 else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "POLICY_CHECK") == 0)
640 entry->func = POLICY_CHECK;
644 entry->flags |= IMA_FUNC;
647 ima_log_string(ab, "mask", args[0].from);
656 if ((strcmp(from, "MAY_EXEC")) == 0)
657 entry->mask = MAY_EXEC;
658 else if (strcmp(from, "MAY_WRITE") == 0)
659 entry->mask = MAY_WRITE;
660 else if (strcmp(from, "MAY_READ") == 0)
661 entry->mask = MAY_READ;
662 else if (strcmp(from, "MAY_APPEND") == 0)
663 entry->mask = MAY_APPEND;
667 entry->flags |= (*args[0].from == '^')
668 ? IMA_INMASK : IMA_MASK;
671 ima_log_string(ab, "fsmagic", args[0].from);
673 if (entry->fsmagic) {
678 result = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 16, &entry->fsmagic);
680 entry->flags |= IMA_FSMAGIC;
683 ima_log_string(ab, "fsuuid", args[0].from);
685 if (memchr_inv(entry->fsuuid, 0x00,
686 sizeof(entry->fsuuid))) {
691 result = blk_part_pack_uuid(args[0].from,
694 entry->flags |= IMA_FSUUID;
697 ima_log_string(ab, "uid", args[0].from);
699 if (token == Opt_euid)
700 ima_log_string(ab, "euid", args[0].from);
702 if (uid_valid(entry->uid)) {
707 result = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum);
709 entry->uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(),
711 if (!uid_valid(entry->uid) ||
715 entry->flags |= (token == Opt_uid)
716 ? IMA_UID : IMA_EUID;
720 ima_log_string(ab, "fowner", args[0].from);
722 if (uid_valid(entry->fowner)) {
727 result = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum);
729 entry->fowner = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), (uid_t)lnum);
730 if (!uid_valid(entry->fowner) || (((uid_t)lnum) != lnum))
733 entry->flags |= IMA_FOWNER;
737 ima_log_string(ab, "obj_user", args[0].from);
738 result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args,
743 ima_log_string(ab, "obj_role", args[0].from);
744 result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args,
749 ima_log_string(ab, "obj_type", args[0].from);
750 result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args,
755 ima_log_string(ab, "subj_user", args[0].from);
756 result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args,
761 ima_log_string(ab, "subj_role", args[0].from);
762 result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args,
767 ima_log_string(ab, "subj_type", args[0].from);
768 result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args,
772 case Opt_appraise_type:
773 if (entry->action != APPRAISE) {
778 ima_log_string(ab, "appraise_type", args[0].from);
779 if ((strcmp(args[0].from, "imasig")) == 0)
780 entry->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED;
784 case Opt_permit_directio:
785 entry->flags |= IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO;
788 if (entry->action != MEASURE) {
792 ima_log_string(ab, "pcr", args[0].from);
794 result = kstrtoint(args[0].from, 10, &entry->pcr);
795 if (result || INVALID_PCR(entry->pcr))
798 entry->flags |= IMA_PCR;
802 ima_log_string(ab, "UNKNOWN", p);
807 if (!result && (entry->action == UNKNOWN))
809 else if (entry->func == MODULE_CHECK)
810 temp_ima_appraise |= IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES;
811 else if (entry->func == FIRMWARE_CHECK)
812 temp_ima_appraise |= IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE;
813 else if (entry->func == POLICY_CHECK)
814 temp_ima_appraise |= IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY;
815 audit_log_format(ab, "res=%d", !result);
821 * ima_parse_add_rule - add a rule to ima_policy_rules
822 * @rule - ima measurement policy rule
824 * Avoid locking by allowing just one writer at a time in ima_write_policy()
825 * Returns the length of the rule parsed, an error code on failure
827 ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
829 static const char op[] = "update_policy";
831 struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
835 p = strsep(&rule, "\n");
837 p += strspn(p, " \t");
839 if (*p == '#' || *p == '\0')
842 entry = kzalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
844 integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL,
845 NULL, op, "-ENOMEM", -ENOMEM, audit_info);
849 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&entry->list);
851 result = ima_parse_rule(p, entry);
854 integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL,
855 NULL, op, "invalid-policy", result,
860 list_add_tail(&entry->list, &ima_temp_rules);
866 * ima_delete_rules() called to cleanup invalid in-flight policy.
867 * We don't need locking as we operate on the temp list, which is
868 * different from the active one. There is also only one user of
869 * ima_delete_rules() at a time.
871 void ima_delete_rules(void)
873 struct ima_rule_entry *entry, *tmp;
876 temp_ima_appraise = 0;
877 list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &ima_temp_rules, list) {
878 for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++)
879 kfree(entry->lsm[i].args_p);
881 list_del(&entry->list);
886 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY
888 mask_exec = 0, mask_write, mask_read, mask_append
891 static char *mask_tokens[] = {
899 func_file = 0, func_mmap, func_bprm,
900 func_module, func_firmware, func_post,
901 func_kexec_kernel, func_kexec_initramfs,
905 static char *func_tokens[] = {
912 "KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK",
913 "KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK",
917 void *ima_policy_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos)
920 struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
923 list_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, ima_rules, list) {
933 void *ima_policy_next(struct seq_file *m, void *v, loff_t *pos)
935 struct ima_rule_entry *entry = v;
938 entry = list_entry_rcu(entry->list.next, struct ima_rule_entry, list);
942 return (&entry->list == ima_rules) ? NULL : entry;
945 void ima_policy_stop(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
949 #define pt(token) policy_tokens[token + Opt_err].pattern
950 #define mt(token) mask_tokens[token]
951 #define ft(token) func_tokens[token]
954 * policy_func_show - display the ima_hooks policy rule
956 static void policy_func_show(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_hooks func)
958 char tbuf[64] = {0,};
962 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_file));
965 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_mmap));
968 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_bprm));
971 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_module));
974 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_firmware));
977 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_post));
979 case KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK:
980 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_kexec_kernel));
982 case KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK:
983 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_kexec_initramfs));
986 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_policy));
989 snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d", func);
990 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), tbuf);
996 int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
998 struct ima_rule_entry *entry = v;
1000 char tbuf[64] = {0,};
1004 if (entry->action & MEASURE)
1005 seq_puts(m, pt(Opt_measure));
1006 if (entry->action & DONT_MEASURE)
1007 seq_puts(m, pt(Opt_dont_measure));
1008 if (entry->action & APPRAISE)
1009 seq_puts(m, pt(Opt_appraise));
1010 if (entry->action & DONT_APPRAISE)
1011 seq_puts(m, pt(Opt_dont_appraise));
1012 if (entry->action & AUDIT)
1013 seq_puts(m, pt(Opt_audit));
1017 if (entry->flags & IMA_FUNC)
1018 policy_func_show(m, entry->func);
1020 if (entry->flags & IMA_MASK) {
1021 if (entry->mask & MAY_EXEC)
1022 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_mask), mt(mask_exec));
1023 if (entry->mask & MAY_WRITE)
1024 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_mask), mt(mask_write));
1025 if (entry->mask & MAY_READ)
1026 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_mask), mt(mask_read));
1027 if (entry->mask & MAY_APPEND)
1028 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_mask), mt(mask_append));
1032 if (entry->flags & IMA_FSMAGIC) {
1033 snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "0x%lx", entry->fsmagic);
1034 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_fsmagic), tbuf);
1038 if (entry->flags & IMA_PCR) {
1039 snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d", entry->pcr);
1040 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_pcr), tbuf);
1044 if (entry->flags & IMA_FSUUID) {
1045 seq_printf(m, "fsuuid=%pU", entry->fsuuid);
1049 if (entry->flags & IMA_UID) {
1050 snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d", __kuid_val(entry->uid));
1051 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_uid), tbuf);
1055 if (entry->flags & IMA_EUID) {
1056 snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d", __kuid_val(entry->uid));
1057 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_euid), tbuf);
1061 if (entry->flags & IMA_FOWNER) {
1062 snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d", __kuid_val(entry->fowner));
1063 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_fowner), tbuf);
1067 for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
1068 if (entry->lsm[i].rule) {
1071 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_obj_user),
1072 (char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p);
1075 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_obj_role),
1076 (char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p);
1079 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_obj_type),
1080 (char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p);
1083 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_subj_user),
1084 (char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p);
1087 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_subj_role),
1088 (char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p);
1091 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_subj_type),
1092 (char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p);
1097 if (entry->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED)
1098 seq_puts(m, "appraise_type=imasig ");
1099 if (entry->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO)
1100 seq_puts(m, "permit_directio ");
1105 #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY */