2 * Copyright (c) 2016-2017, Mellanox Technologies. All rights reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2016-2017, Dave Watson <davejwatson@fb.com>. All rights reserved.
4 * Copyright (c) 2016-2017, Lance Chao <lancerchao@fb.com>. All rights reserved.
5 * Copyright (c) 2016, Fridolin Pokorny <fridolin.pokorny@gmail.com>. All rights reserved.
6 * Copyright (c) 2016, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@gnutls.org>. All rights reserved.
7 * Copyright (c) 2018, Covalent IO, Inc. http://covalent.io
9 * This software is available to you under a choice of one of two
10 * licenses. You may choose to be licensed under the terms of the GNU
11 * General Public License (GPL) Version 2, available from the file
12 * COPYING in the main directory of this source tree, or the
13 * OpenIB.org BSD license below:
15 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
16 * without modification, are permitted provided that the following
19 * - Redistributions of source code must retain the above
20 * copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following
23 * - Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above
24 * copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following
25 * disclaimer in the documentation and/or other materials
26 * provided with the distribution.
28 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
29 * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
30 * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
31 * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
32 * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
33 * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
34 * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
38 #include <linux/bug.h>
39 #include <linux/sched/signal.h>
40 #include <linux/module.h>
41 #include <linux/splice.h>
42 #include <crypto/aead.h>
44 #include <net/strparser.h>
49 struct tls_decrypt_arg {
59 struct tls_decrypt_ctx {
61 u8 aad[TLS_MAX_AAD_SIZE];
63 struct scatterlist sg[];
66 noinline void tls_err_abort(struct sock *sk, int err)
68 WARN_ON_ONCE(err >= 0);
69 /* sk->sk_err should contain a positive error code. */
74 static int __skb_nsg(struct sk_buff *skb, int offset, int len,
75 unsigned int recursion_level)
77 int start = skb_headlen(skb);
78 int i, chunk = start - offset;
79 struct sk_buff *frag_iter;
82 if (unlikely(recursion_level >= 24))
95 for (i = 0; i < skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags; i++) {
98 WARN_ON(start > offset + len);
100 end = start + skb_frag_size(&skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[i]);
101 chunk = end - offset;
114 if (unlikely(skb_has_frag_list(skb))) {
115 skb_walk_frags(skb, frag_iter) {
118 WARN_ON(start > offset + len);
120 end = start + frag_iter->len;
121 chunk = end - offset;
125 ret = __skb_nsg(frag_iter, offset - start, chunk,
126 recursion_level + 1);
127 if (unlikely(ret < 0))
142 /* Return the number of scatterlist elements required to completely map the
143 * skb, or -EMSGSIZE if the recursion depth is exceeded.
145 static int skb_nsg(struct sk_buff *skb, int offset, int len)
147 return __skb_nsg(skb, offset, len, 0);
150 static int tls_padding_length(struct tls_prot_info *prot, struct sk_buff *skb,
151 struct tls_decrypt_arg *darg)
153 struct strp_msg *rxm = strp_msg(skb);
154 struct tls_msg *tlm = tls_msg(skb);
157 /* Determine zero-padding length */
158 if (prot->version == TLS_1_3_VERSION) {
159 int offset = rxm->full_len - TLS_TAG_SIZE - 1;
160 char content_type = darg->zc ? darg->tail : 0;
163 while (content_type == 0) {
164 if (offset < prot->prepend_size)
166 err = skb_copy_bits(skb, rxm->offset + offset,
175 tlm->control = content_type;
180 static void tls_decrypt_done(struct crypto_async_request *req, int err)
182 struct aead_request *aead_req = (struct aead_request *)req;
183 struct scatterlist *sgout = aead_req->dst;
184 struct scatterlist *sgin = aead_req->src;
185 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx;
186 struct tls_context *tls_ctx;
187 struct scatterlist *sg;
191 sk = (struct sock *)req->data;
192 tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
193 ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
195 /* Propagate if there was an err */
198 TLS_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TLSDECRYPTERROR);
199 ctx->async_wait.err = err;
200 tls_err_abort(sk, err);
203 /* Free the destination pages if skb was not decrypted inplace */
205 /* Skip the first S/G entry as it points to AAD */
206 for_each_sg(sg_next(sgout), sg, UINT_MAX, pages) {
209 put_page(sg_page(sg));
215 spin_lock_bh(&ctx->decrypt_compl_lock);
216 if (!atomic_dec_return(&ctx->decrypt_pending))
217 complete(&ctx->async_wait.completion);
218 spin_unlock_bh(&ctx->decrypt_compl_lock);
221 static int tls_do_decryption(struct sock *sk,
222 struct scatterlist *sgin,
223 struct scatterlist *sgout,
226 struct aead_request *aead_req,
227 struct tls_decrypt_arg *darg)
229 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
230 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
231 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
234 aead_request_set_tfm(aead_req, ctx->aead_recv);
235 aead_request_set_ad(aead_req, prot->aad_size);
236 aead_request_set_crypt(aead_req, sgin, sgout,
237 data_len + prot->tag_size,
241 aead_request_set_callback(aead_req,
242 CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
243 tls_decrypt_done, sk);
244 atomic_inc(&ctx->decrypt_pending);
246 aead_request_set_callback(aead_req,
247 CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
248 crypto_req_done, &ctx->async_wait);
251 ret = crypto_aead_decrypt(aead_req);
252 if (ret == -EINPROGRESS) {
256 ret = crypto_wait_req(ret, &ctx->async_wait);
263 static void tls_trim_both_msgs(struct sock *sk, int target_size)
265 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
266 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
267 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
268 struct tls_rec *rec = ctx->open_rec;
270 sk_msg_trim(sk, &rec->msg_plaintext, target_size);
272 target_size += prot->overhead_size;
273 sk_msg_trim(sk, &rec->msg_encrypted, target_size);
276 static int tls_alloc_encrypted_msg(struct sock *sk, int len)
278 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
279 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
280 struct tls_rec *rec = ctx->open_rec;
281 struct sk_msg *msg_en = &rec->msg_encrypted;
283 return sk_msg_alloc(sk, msg_en, len, 0);
286 static int tls_clone_plaintext_msg(struct sock *sk, int required)
288 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
289 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
290 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
291 struct tls_rec *rec = ctx->open_rec;
292 struct sk_msg *msg_pl = &rec->msg_plaintext;
293 struct sk_msg *msg_en = &rec->msg_encrypted;
296 /* We add page references worth len bytes from encrypted sg
297 * at the end of plaintext sg. It is guaranteed that msg_en
298 * has enough required room (ensured by caller).
300 len = required - msg_pl->sg.size;
302 /* Skip initial bytes in msg_en's data to be able to use
303 * same offset of both plain and encrypted data.
305 skip = prot->prepend_size + msg_pl->sg.size;
307 return sk_msg_clone(sk, msg_pl, msg_en, skip, len);
310 static struct tls_rec *tls_get_rec(struct sock *sk)
312 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
313 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
314 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
315 struct sk_msg *msg_pl, *msg_en;
319 mem_size = sizeof(struct tls_rec) + crypto_aead_reqsize(ctx->aead_send);
321 rec = kzalloc(mem_size, sk->sk_allocation);
325 msg_pl = &rec->msg_plaintext;
326 msg_en = &rec->msg_encrypted;
331 sg_init_table(rec->sg_aead_in, 2);
332 sg_set_buf(&rec->sg_aead_in[0], rec->aad_space, prot->aad_size);
333 sg_unmark_end(&rec->sg_aead_in[1]);
335 sg_init_table(rec->sg_aead_out, 2);
336 sg_set_buf(&rec->sg_aead_out[0], rec->aad_space, prot->aad_size);
337 sg_unmark_end(&rec->sg_aead_out[1]);
342 static void tls_free_rec(struct sock *sk, struct tls_rec *rec)
344 sk_msg_free(sk, &rec->msg_encrypted);
345 sk_msg_free(sk, &rec->msg_plaintext);
349 static void tls_free_open_rec(struct sock *sk)
351 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
352 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
353 struct tls_rec *rec = ctx->open_rec;
356 tls_free_rec(sk, rec);
357 ctx->open_rec = NULL;
361 int tls_tx_records(struct sock *sk, int flags)
363 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
364 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
365 struct tls_rec *rec, *tmp;
366 struct sk_msg *msg_en;
367 int tx_flags, rc = 0;
369 if (tls_is_partially_sent_record(tls_ctx)) {
370 rec = list_first_entry(&ctx->tx_list,
371 struct tls_rec, list);
374 tx_flags = rec->tx_flags;
378 rc = tls_push_partial_record(sk, tls_ctx, tx_flags);
382 /* Full record has been transmitted.
383 * Remove the head of tx_list
385 list_del(&rec->list);
386 sk_msg_free(sk, &rec->msg_plaintext);
390 /* Tx all ready records */
391 list_for_each_entry_safe(rec, tmp, &ctx->tx_list, list) {
392 if (READ_ONCE(rec->tx_ready)) {
394 tx_flags = rec->tx_flags;
398 msg_en = &rec->msg_encrypted;
399 rc = tls_push_sg(sk, tls_ctx,
400 &msg_en->sg.data[msg_en->sg.curr],
405 list_del(&rec->list);
406 sk_msg_free(sk, &rec->msg_plaintext);
414 if (rc < 0 && rc != -EAGAIN)
415 tls_err_abort(sk, -EBADMSG);
420 static void tls_encrypt_done(struct crypto_async_request *req, int err)
422 struct aead_request *aead_req = (struct aead_request *)req;
423 struct sock *sk = req->data;
424 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
425 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
426 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
427 struct scatterlist *sge;
428 struct sk_msg *msg_en;
433 rec = container_of(aead_req, struct tls_rec, aead_req);
434 msg_en = &rec->msg_encrypted;
436 sge = sk_msg_elem(msg_en, msg_en->sg.curr);
437 sge->offset -= prot->prepend_size;
438 sge->length += prot->prepend_size;
440 /* Check if error is previously set on socket */
441 if (err || sk->sk_err) {
444 /* If err is already set on socket, return the same code */
446 ctx->async_wait.err = -sk->sk_err;
448 ctx->async_wait.err = err;
449 tls_err_abort(sk, err);
454 struct tls_rec *first_rec;
456 /* Mark the record as ready for transmission */
457 smp_store_mb(rec->tx_ready, true);
459 /* If received record is at head of tx_list, schedule tx */
460 first_rec = list_first_entry(&ctx->tx_list,
461 struct tls_rec, list);
462 if (rec == first_rec)
466 spin_lock_bh(&ctx->encrypt_compl_lock);
467 pending = atomic_dec_return(&ctx->encrypt_pending);
469 if (!pending && ctx->async_notify)
470 complete(&ctx->async_wait.completion);
471 spin_unlock_bh(&ctx->encrypt_compl_lock);
476 /* Schedule the transmission */
477 if (!test_and_set_bit(BIT_TX_SCHEDULED, &ctx->tx_bitmask))
478 schedule_delayed_work(&ctx->tx_work.work, 1);
481 static int tls_do_encryption(struct sock *sk,
482 struct tls_context *tls_ctx,
483 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx,
484 struct aead_request *aead_req,
485 size_t data_len, u32 start)
487 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
488 struct tls_rec *rec = ctx->open_rec;
489 struct sk_msg *msg_en = &rec->msg_encrypted;
490 struct scatterlist *sge = sk_msg_elem(msg_en, start);
491 int rc, iv_offset = 0;
493 /* For CCM based ciphers, first byte of IV is a constant */
494 switch (prot->cipher_type) {
495 case TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128:
496 rec->iv_data[0] = TLS_AES_CCM_IV_B0_BYTE;
499 case TLS_CIPHER_SM4_CCM:
500 rec->iv_data[0] = TLS_SM4_CCM_IV_B0_BYTE;
505 memcpy(&rec->iv_data[iv_offset], tls_ctx->tx.iv,
506 prot->iv_size + prot->salt_size);
508 tls_xor_iv_with_seq(prot, rec->iv_data + iv_offset,
509 tls_ctx->tx.rec_seq);
511 sge->offset += prot->prepend_size;
512 sge->length -= prot->prepend_size;
514 msg_en->sg.curr = start;
516 aead_request_set_tfm(aead_req, ctx->aead_send);
517 aead_request_set_ad(aead_req, prot->aad_size);
518 aead_request_set_crypt(aead_req, rec->sg_aead_in,
520 data_len, rec->iv_data);
522 aead_request_set_callback(aead_req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
523 tls_encrypt_done, sk);
525 /* Add the record in tx_list */
526 list_add_tail((struct list_head *)&rec->list, &ctx->tx_list);
527 atomic_inc(&ctx->encrypt_pending);
529 rc = crypto_aead_encrypt(aead_req);
530 if (!rc || rc != -EINPROGRESS) {
531 atomic_dec(&ctx->encrypt_pending);
532 sge->offset -= prot->prepend_size;
533 sge->length += prot->prepend_size;
537 WRITE_ONCE(rec->tx_ready, true);
538 } else if (rc != -EINPROGRESS) {
539 list_del(&rec->list);
543 /* Unhook the record from context if encryption is not failure */
544 ctx->open_rec = NULL;
545 tls_advance_record_sn(sk, prot, &tls_ctx->tx);
549 static int tls_split_open_record(struct sock *sk, struct tls_rec *from,
550 struct tls_rec **to, struct sk_msg *msg_opl,
551 struct sk_msg *msg_oen, u32 split_point,
552 u32 tx_overhead_size, u32 *orig_end)
554 u32 i, j, bytes = 0, apply = msg_opl->apply_bytes;
555 struct scatterlist *sge, *osge, *nsge;
556 u32 orig_size = msg_opl->sg.size;
557 struct scatterlist tmp = { };
558 struct sk_msg *msg_npl;
562 new = tls_get_rec(sk);
565 ret = sk_msg_alloc(sk, &new->msg_encrypted, msg_opl->sg.size +
566 tx_overhead_size, 0);
568 tls_free_rec(sk, new);
572 *orig_end = msg_opl->sg.end;
573 i = msg_opl->sg.start;
574 sge = sk_msg_elem(msg_opl, i);
575 while (apply && sge->length) {
576 if (sge->length > apply) {
577 u32 len = sge->length - apply;
579 get_page(sg_page(sge));
580 sg_set_page(&tmp, sg_page(sge), len,
581 sge->offset + apply);
586 apply -= sge->length;
587 bytes += sge->length;
590 sk_msg_iter_var_next(i);
591 if (i == msg_opl->sg.end)
593 sge = sk_msg_elem(msg_opl, i);
597 msg_opl->sg.curr = i;
598 msg_opl->sg.copybreak = 0;
599 msg_opl->apply_bytes = 0;
600 msg_opl->sg.size = bytes;
602 msg_npl = &new->msg_plaintext;
603 msg_npl->apply_bytes = apply;
604 msg_npl->sg.size = orig_size - bytes;
606 j = msg_npl->sg.start;
607 nsge = sk_msg_elem(msg_npl, j);
609 memcpy(nsge, &tmp, sizeof(*nsge));
610 sk_msg_iter_var_next(j);
611 nsge = sk_msg_elem(msg_npl, j);
614 osge = sk_msg_elem(msg_opl, i);
615 while (osge->length) {
616 memcpy(nsge, osge, sizeof(*nsge));
618 sk_msg_iter_var_next(i);
619 sk_msg_iter_var_next(j);
622 osge = sk_msg_elem(msg_opl, i);
623 nsge = sk_msg_elem(msg_npl, j);
627 msg_npl->sg.curr = j;
628 msg_npl->sg.copybreak = 0;
634 static void tls_merge_open_record(struct sock *sk, struct tls_rec *to,
635 struct tls_rec *from, u32 orig_end)
637 struct sk_msg *msg_npl = &from->msg_plaintext;
638 struct sk_msg *msg_opl = &to->msg_plaintext;
639 struct scatterlist *osge, *nsge;
643 sk_msg_iter_var_prev(i);
644 j = msg_npl->sg.start;
646 osge = sk_msg_elem(msg_opl, i);
647 nsge = sk_msg_elem(msg_npl, j);
649 if (sg_page(osge) == sg_page(nsge) &&
650 osge->offset + osge->length == nsge->offset) {
651 osge->length += nsge->length;
652 put_page(sg_page(nsge));
655 msg_opl->sg.end = orig_end;
656 msg_opl->sg.curr = orig_end;
657 msg_opl->sg.copybreak = 0;
658 msg_opl->apply_bytes = msg_opl->sg.size + msg_npl->sg.size;
659 msg_opl->sg.size += msg_npl->sg.size;
661 sk_msg_free(sk, &to->msg_encrypted);
662 sk_msg_xfer_full(&to->msg_encrypted, &from->msg_encrypted);
667 static int tls_push_record(struct sock *sk, int flags,
668 unsigned char record_type)
670 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
671 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
672 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
673 struct tls_rec *rec = ctx->open_rec, *tmp = NULL;
674 u32 i, split_point, orig_end;
675 struct sk_msg *msg_pl, *msg_en;
676 struct aead_request *req;
683 msg_pl = &rec->msg_plaintext;
684 msg_en = &rec->msg_encrypted;
686 split_point = msg_pl->apply_bytes;
687 split = split_point && split_point < msg_pl->sg.size;
688 if (unlikely((!split &&
690 prot->overhead_size > msg_en->sg.size) ||
693 prot->overhead_size > msg_en->sg.size))) {
695 split_point = msg_en->sg.size;
698 rc = tls_split_open_record(sk, rec, &tmp, msg_pl, msg_en,
699 split_point, prot->overhead_size,
703 /* This can happen if above tls_split_open_record allocates
704 * a single large encryption buffer instead of two smaller
705 * ones. In this case adjust pointers and continue without
708 if (!msg_pl->sg.size) {
709 tls_merge_open_record(sk, rec, tmp, orig_end);
710 msg_pl = &rec->msg_plaintext;
711 msg_en = &rec->msg_encrypted;
714 sk_msg_trim(sk, msg_en, msg_pl->sg.size +
715 prot->overhead_size);
718 rec->tx_flags = flags;
719 req = &rec->aead_req;
722 sk_msg_iter_var_prev(i);
724 rec->content_type = record_type;
725 if (prot->version == TLS_1_3_VERSION) {
726 /* Add content type to end of message. No padding added */
727 sg_set_buf(&rec->sg_content_type, &rec->content_type, 1);
728 sg_mark_end(&rec->sg_content_type);
729 sg_chain(msg_pl->sg.data, msg_pl->sg.end + 1,
730 &rec->sg_content_type);
732 sg_mark_end(sk_msg_elem(msg_pl, i));
735 if (msg_pl->sg.end < msg_pl->sg.start) {
736 sg_chain(&msg_pl->sg.data[msg_pl->sg.start],
737 MAX_SKB_FRAGS - msg_pl->sg.start + 1,
741 i = msg_pl->sg.start;
742 sg_chain(rec->sg_aead_in, 2, &msg_pl->sg.data[i]);
745 sk_msg_iter_var_prev(i);
746 sg_mark_end(sk_msg_elem(msg_en, i));
748 i = msg_en->sg.start;
749 sg_chain(rec->sg_aead_out, 2, &msg_en->sg.data[i]);
751 tls_make_aad(rec->aad_space, msg_pl->sg.size + prot->tail_size,
752 tls_ctx->tx.rec_seq, record_type, prot);
754 tls_fill_prepend(tls_ctx,
755 page_address(sg_page(&msg_en->sg.data[i])) +
756 msg_en->sg.data[i].offset,
757 msg_pl->sg.size + prot->tail_size,
760 tls_ctx->pending_open_record_frags = false;
762 rc = tls_do_encryption(sk, tls_ctx, ctx, req,
763 msg_pl->sg.size + prot->tail_size, i);
765 if (rc != -EINPROGRESS) {
766 tls_err_abort(sk, -EBADMSG);
768 tls_ctx->pending_open_record_frags = true;
769 tls_merge_open_record(sk, rec, tmp, orig_end);
772 ctx->async_capable = 1;
775 msg_pl = &tmp->msg_plaintext;
776 msg_en = &tmp->msg_encrypted;
777 sk_msg_trim(sk, msg_en, msg_pl->sg.size + prot->overhead_size);
778 tls_ctx->pending_open_record_frags = true;
782 return tls_tx_records(sk, flags);
785 static int bpf_exec_tx_verdict(struct sk_msg *msg, struct sock *sk,
786 bool full_record, u8 record_type,
787 ssize_t *copied, int flags)
789 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
790 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
791 struct sk_msg msg_redir = { };
792 struct sk_psock *psock;
793 struct sock *sk_redir;
795 bool enospc, policy, redir_ingress;
799 policy = !(flags & MSG_SENDPAGE_NOPOLICY);
800 psock = sk_psock_get(sk);
801 if (!psock || !policy) {
802 err = tls_push_record(sk, flags, record_type);
803 if (err && sk->sk_err == EBADMSG) {
804 *copied -= sk_msg_free(sk, msg);
805 tls_free_open_rec(sk);
809 sk_psock_put(sk, psock);
813 enospc = sk_msg_full(msg);
814 if (psock->eval == __SK_NONE) {
815 delta = msg->sg.size;
816 psock->eval = sk_psock_msg_verdict(sk, psock, msg);
817 delta -= msg->sg.size;
819 if (msg->cork_bytes && msg->cork_bytes > msg->sg.size &&
820 !enospc && !full_record) {
826 if (msg->apply_bytes && msg->apply_bytes < send)
827 send = msg->apply_bytes;
829 switch (psock->eval) {
831 err = tls_push_record(sk, flags, record_type);
832 if (err && sk->sk_err == EBADMSG) {
833 *copied -= sk_msg_free(sk, msg);
834 tls_free_open_rec(sk);
840 redir_ingress = psock->redir_ingress;
841 sk_redir = psock->sk_redir;
842 memcpy(&msg_redir, msg, sizeof(*msg));
843 if (msg->apply_bytes < send)
844 msg->apply_bytes = 0;
846 msg->apply_bytes -= send;
847 sk_msg_return_zero(sk, msg, send);
848 msg->sg.size -= send;
850 err = tcp_bpf_sendmsg_redir(sk_redir, redir_ingress,
851 &msg_redir, send, flags);
854 *copied -= sk_msg_free_nocharge(sk, &msg_redir);
857 if (msg->sg.size == 0)
858 tls_free_open_rec(sk);
862 sk_msg_free_partial(sk, msg, send);
863 if (msg->apply_bytes < send)
864 msg->apply_bytes = 0;
866 msg->apply_bytes -= send;
867 if (msg->sg.size == 0)
868 tls_free_open_rec(sk);
869 *copied -= (send + delta);
874 bool reset_eval = !ctx->open_rec;
878 msg = &rec->msg_plaintext;
879 if (!msg->apply_bytes)
883 psock->eval = __SK_NONE;
884 if (psock->sk_redir) {
885 sock_put(psock->sk_redir);
886 psock->sk_redir = NULL;
893 sk_psock_put(sk, psock);
897 static int tls_sw_push_pending_record(struct sock *sk, int flags)
899 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
900 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
901 struct tls_rec *rec = ctx->open_rec;
902 struct sk_msg *msg_pl;
908 msg_pl = &rec->msg_plaintext;
909 copied = msg_pl->sg.size;
913 return bpf_exec_tx_verdict(msg_pl, sk, true, TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA,
917 int tls_sw_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size)
919 long timeo = sock_sndtimeo(sk, msg->msg_flags & MSG_DONTWAIT);
920 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
921 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
922 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
923 bool async_capable = ctx->async_capable;
924 unsigned char record_type = TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA;
925 bool is_kvec = iov_iter_is_kvec(&msg->msg_iter);
926 bool eor = !(msg->msg_flags & MSG_MORE);
929 struct sk_msg *msg_pl, *msg_en;
940 if (msg->msg_flags & ~(MSG_MORE | MSG_DONTWAIT | MSG_NOSIGNAL |
944 ret = mutex_lock_interruptible(&tls_ctx->tx_lock);
949 if (unlikely(msg->msg_controllen)) {
950 ret = tls_process_cmsg(sk, msg, &record_type);
952 if (ret == -EINPROGRESS)
954 else if (ret != -EAGAIN)
959 while (msg_data_left(msg)) {
968 rec = ctx->open_rec = tls_get_rec(sk);
974 msg_pl = &rec->msg_plaintext;
975 msg_en = &rec->msg_encrypted;
977 orig_size = msg_pl->sg.size;
979 try_to_copy = msg_data_left(msg);
980 record_room = TLS_MAX_PAYLOAD_SIZE - msg_pl->sg.size;
981 if (try_to_copy >= record_room) {
982 try_to_copy = record_room;
986 required_size = msg_pl->sg.size + try_to_copy +
989 if (!sk_stream_memory_free(sk))
990 goto wait_for_sndbuf;
993 ret = tls_alloc_encrypted_msg(sk, required_size);
996 goto wait_for_memory;
998 /* Adjust try_to_copy according to the amount that was
999 * actually allocated. The difference is due
1000 * to max sg elements limit
1002 try_to_copy -= required_size - msg_en->sg.size;
1006 if (!is_kvec && (full_record || eor) && !async_capable) {
1007 u32 first = msg_pl->sg.end;
1009 ret = sk_msg_zerocopy_from_iter(sk, &msg->msg_iter,
1010 msg_pl, try_to_copy);
1012 goto fallback_to_reg_send;
1015 copied += try_to_copy;
1017 sk_msg_sg_copy_set(msg_pl, first);
1018 ret = bpf_exec_tx_verdict(msg_pl, sk, full_record,
1019 record_type, &copied,
1022 if (ret == -EINPROGRESS)
1024 else if (ret == -ENOMEM)
1025 goto wait_for_memory;
1026 else if (ctx->open_rec && ret == -ENOSPC)
1028 else if (ret != -EAGAIN)
1033 copied -= try_to_copy;
1034 sk_msg_sg_copy_clear(msg_pl, first);
1035 iov_iter_revert(&msg->msg_iter,
1036 msg_pl->sg.size - orig_size);
1037 fallback_to_reg_send:
1038 sk_msg_trim(sk, msg_pl, orig_size);
1041 required_size = msg_pl->sg.size + try_to_copy;
1043 ret = tls_clone_plaintext_msg(sk, required_size);
1048 /* Adjust try_to_copy according to the amount that was
1049 * actually allocated. The difference is due
1050 * to max sg elements limit
1052 try_to_copy -= required_size - msg_pl->sg.size;
1054 sk_msg_trim(sk, msg_en,
1055 msg_pl->sg.size + prot->overhead_size);
1059 ret = sk_msg_memcopy_from_iter(sk, &msg->msg_iter,
1060 msg_pl, try_to_copy);
1065 /* Open records defined only if successfully copied, otherwise
1066 * we would trim the sg but not reset the open record frags.
1068 tls_ctx->pending_open_record_frags = true;
1069 copied += try_to_copy;
1070 if (full_record || eor) {
1071 ret = bpf_exec_tx_verdict(msg_pl, sk, full_record,
1072 record_type, &copied,
1075 if (ret == -EINPROGRESS)
1077 else if (ret == -ENOMEM)
1078 goto wait_for_memory;
1079 else if (ret != -EAGAIN) {
1090 set_bit(SOCK_NOSPACE, &sk->sk_socket->flags);
1092 ret = sk_stream_wait_memory(sk, &timeo);
1096 tls_trim_both_msgs(sk, orig_size);
1100 if (ctx->open_rec && msg_en->sg.size < required_size)
1101 goto alloc_encrypted;
1106 } else if (num_zc) {
1107 /* Wait for pending encryptions to get completed */
1108 spin_lock_bh(&ctx->encrypt_compl_lock);
1109 ctx->async_notify = true;
1111 pending = atomic_read(&ctx->encrypt_pending);
1112 spin_unlock_bh(&ctx->encrypt_compl_lock);
1114 crypto_wait_req(-EINPROGRESS, &ctx->async_wait);
1116 reinit_completion(&ctx->async_wait.completion);
1118 /* There can be no concurrent accesses, since we have no
1119 * pending encrypt operations
1121 WRITE_ONCE(ctx->async_notify, false);
1123 if (ctx->async_wait.err) {
1124 ret = ctx->async_wait.err;
1129 /* Transmit if any encryptions have completed */
1130 if (test_and_clear_bit(BIT_TX_SCHEDULED, &ctx->tx_bitmask)) {
1131 cancel_delayed_work(&ctx->tx_work.work);
1132 tls_tx_records(sk, msg->msg_flags);
1136 ret = sk_stream_error(sk, msg->msg_flags, ret);
1139 mutex_unlock(&tls_ctx->tx_lock);
1140 return copied > 0 ? copied : ret;
1143 static int tls_sw_do_sendpage(struct sock *sk, struct page *page,
1144 int offset, size_t size, int flags)
1146 long timeo = sock_sndtimeo(sk, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT);
1147 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
1148 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
1149 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
1150 unsigned char record_type = TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA;
1151 struct sk_msg *msg_pl;
1152 struct tls_rec *rec;
1160 eor = !(flags & MSG_SENDPAGE_NOTLAST);
1161 sk_clear_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_NOSPACE, sk);
1163 /* Call the sk_stream functions to manage the sndbuf mem. */
1165 size_t copy, required_size;
1173 rec = ctx->open_rec;
1175 rec = ctx->open_rec = tls_get_rec(sk);
1181 msg_pl = &rec->msg_plaintext;
1183 full_record = false;
1184 record_room = TLS_MAX_PAYLOAD_SIZE - msg_pl->sg.size;
1186 if (copy >= record_room) {
1191 required_size = msg_pl->sg.size + copy + prot->overhead_size;
1193 if (!sk_stream_memory_free(sk))
1194 goto wait_for_sndbuf;
1196 ret = tls_alloc_encrypted_msg(sk, required_size);
1199 goto wait_for_memory;
1201 /* Adjust copy according to the amount that was
1202 * actually allocated. The difference is due
1203 * to max sg elements limit
1205 copy -= required_size - msg_pl->sg.size;
1209 sk_msg_page_add(msg_pl, page, copy, offset);
1210 sk_mem_charge(sk, copy);
1216 tls_ctx->pending_open_record_frags = true;
1217 if (full_record || eor || sk_msg_full(msg_pl)) {
1218 ret = bpf_exec_tx_verdict(msg_pl, sk, full_record,
1219 record_type, &copied, flags);
1221 if (ret == -EINPROGRESS)
1223 else if (ret == -ENOMEM)
1224 goto wait_for_memory;
1225 else if (ret != -EAGAIN) {
1234 set_bit(SOCK_NOSPACE, &sk->sk_socket->flags);
1236 ret = sk_stream_wait_memory(sk, &timeo);
1239 tls_trim_both_msgs(sk, msg_pl->sg.size);
1248 /* Transmit if any encryptions have completed */
1249 if (test_and_clear_bit(BIT_TX_SCHEDULED, &ctx->tx_bitmask)) {
1250 cancel_delayed_work(&ctx->tx_work.work);
1251 tls_tx_records(sk, flags);
1255 ret = sk_stream_error(sk, flags, ret);
1256 return copied > 0 ? copied : ret;
1259 int tls_sw_sendpage_locked(struct sock *sk, struct page *page,
1260 int offset, size_t size, int flags)
1262 if (flags & ~(MSG_MORE | MSG_DONTWAIT | MSG_NOSIGNAL |
1263 MSG_SENDPAGE_NOTLAST | MSG_SENDPAGE_NOPOLICY |
1264 MSG_NO_SHARED_FRAGS))
1267 return tls_sw_do_sendpage(sk, page, offset, size, flags);
1270 int tls_sw_sendpage(struct sock *sk, struct page *page,
1271 int offset, size_t size, int flags)
1273 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
1276 if (flags & ~(MSG_MORE | MSG_DONTWAIT | MSG_NOSIGNAL |
1277 MSG_SENDPAGE_NOTLAST | MSG_SENDPAGE_NOPOLICY))
1280 ret = mutex_lock_interruptible(&tls_ctx->tx_lock);
1284 ret = tls_sw_do_sendpage(sk, page, offset, size, flags);
1286 mutex_unlock(&tls_ctx->tx_lock);
1291 tls_rx_rec_wait(struct sock *sk, struct sk_psock *psock, bool nonblock,
1294 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
1295 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
1296 DEFINE_WAIT_FUNC(wait, woken_wake_function);
1299 timeo = sock_rcvtimeo(sk, nonblock);
1301 while (!tls_strp_msg_ready(ctx)) {
1302 if (!sk_psock_queue_empty(psock))
1306 return sock_error(sk);
1308 if (!skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_receive_queue)) {
1309 tls_strp_check_rcv(&ctx->strp);
1310 if (tls_strp_msg_ready(ctx))
1314 if (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN)
1317 if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DONE))
1324 add_wait_queue(sk_sleep(sk), &wait);
1325 sk_set_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_WAITDATA, sk);
1326 sk_wait_event(sk, &timeo,
1327 tls_strp_msg_ready(ctx) ||
1328 !sk_psock_queue_empty(psock),
1330 sk_clear_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_WAITDATA, sk);
1331 remove_wait_queue(sk_sleep(sk), &wait);
1333 /* Handle signals */
1334 if (signal_pending(current))
1335 return sock_intr_errno(timeo);
1338 tls_strp_msg_load(&ctx->strp, released);
1343 static int tls_setup_from_iter(struct iov_iter *from,
1344 int length, int *pages_used,
1345 struct scatterlist *to,
1348 int rc = 0, i = 0, num_elem = *pages_used, maxpages;
1349 struct page *pages[MAX_SKB_FRAGS];
1350 unsigned int size = 0;
1351 ssize_t copied, use;
1354 while (length > 0) {
1356 maxpages = to_max_pages - num_elem;
1357 if (maxpages == 0) {
1361 copied = iov_iter_get_pages2(from, pages,
1372 use = min_t(int, copied, PAGE_SIZE - offset);
1374 sg_set_page(&to[num_elem],
1375 pages[i], use, offset);
1376 sg_unmark_end(&to[num_elem]);
1377 /* We do not uncharge memory from this API */
1386 /* Mark the end in the last sg entry if newly added */
1387 if (num_elem > *pages_used)
1388 sg_mark_end(&to[num_elem - 1]);
1391 iov_iter_revert(from, size);
1392 *pages_used = num_elem;
1397 static struct sk_buff *
1398 tls_alloc_clrtxt_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
1399 unsigned int full_len)
1401 struct strp_msg *clr_rxm;
1402 struct sk_buff *clr_skb;
1405 clr_skb = alloc_skb_with_frags(0, full_len, TLS_PAGE_ORDER,
1406 &err, sk->sk_allocation);
1410 skb_copy_header(clr_skb, skb);
1411 clr_skb->len = full_len;
1412 clr_skb->data_len = full_len;
1414 clr_rxm = strp_msg(clr_skb);
1415 clr_rxm->offset = 0;
1422 * tls_decrypt_sw() and tls_decrypt_device() are decrypt handlers.
1423 * They must transform the darg in/out argument are as follows:
1425 * -------------------------------------------------------------------
1426 * zc | Zero-copy decrypt allowed | Zero-copy performed
1427 * async | Async decrypt allowed | Async crypto used / in progress
1428 * skb | * | Output skb
1430 * If ZC decryption was performed darg.skb will point to the input skb.
1433 /* This function decrypts the input skb into either out_iov or in out_sg
1434 * or in skb buffers itself. The input parameter 'darg->zc' indicates if
1435 * zero-copy mode needs to be tried or not. With zero-copy mode, either
1436 * out_iov or out_sg must be non-NULL. In case both out_iov and out_sg are
1437 * NULL, then the decryption happens inside skb buffers itself, i.e.
1438 * zero-copy gets disabled and 'darg->zc' is updated.
1440 static int tls_decrypt_sg(struct sock *sk, struct iov_iter *out_iov,
1441 struct scatterlist *out_sg,
1442 struct tls_decrypt_arg *darg)
1444 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
1445 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
1446 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
1447 int n_sgin, n_sgout, aead_size, err, pages = 0;
1448 struct sk_buff *skb = tls_strp_msg(ctx);
1449 const struct strp_msg *rxm = strp_msg(skb);
1450 const struct tls_msg *tlm = tls_msg(skb);
1451 struct aead_request *aead_req;
1452 struct scatterlist *sgin = NULL;
1453 struct scatterlist *sgout = NULL;
1454 const int data_len = rxm->full_len - prot->overhead_size;
1455 int tail_pages = !!prot->tail_size;
1456 struct tls_decrypt_ctx *dctx;
1457 struct sk_buff *clear_skb;
1461 n_sgin = skb_nsg(skb, rxm->offset + prot->prepend_size,
1462 rxm->full_len - prot->prepend_size);
1464 return n_sgin ?: -EBADMSG;
1466 if (darg->zc && (out_iov || out_sg)) {
1470 n_sgout = 1 + tail_pages +
1471 iov_iter_npages_cap(out_iov, INT_MAX, data_len);
1473 n_sgout = sg_nents(out_sg);
1477 clear_skb = tls_alloc_clrtxt_skb(sk, skb, rxm->full_len);
1481 n_sgout = 1 + skb_shinfo(clear_skb)->nr_frags;
1484 /* Increment to accommodate AAD */
1485 n_sgin = n_sgin + 1;
1487 /* Allocate a single block of memory which contains
1488 * aead_req || tls_decrypt_ctx.
1489 * Both structs are variable length.
1491 aead_size = sizeof(*aead_req) + crypto_aead_reqsize(ctx->aead_recv);
1492 mem = kmalloc(aead_size + struct_size(dctx, sg, n_sgin + n_sgout),
1499 /* Segment the allocated memory */
1500 aead_req = (struct aead_request *)mem;
1501 dctx = (struct tls_decrypt_ctx *)(mem + aead_size);
1502 sgin = &dctx->sg[0];
1503 sgout = &dctx->sg[n_sgin];
1505 /* For CCM based ciphers, first byte of nonce+iv is a constant */
1506 switch (prot->cipher_type) {
1507 case TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128:
1508 dctx->iv[0] = TLS_AES_CCM_IV_B0_BYTE;
1511 case TLS_CIPHER_SM4_CCM:
1512 dctx->iv[0] = TLS_SM4_CCM_IV_B0_BYTE;
1518 if (prot->version == TLS_1_3_VERSION ||
1519 prot->cipher_type == TLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305) {
1520 memcpy(&dctx->iv[iv_offset], tls_ctx->rx.iv,
1521 prot->iv_size + prot->salt_size);
1523 err = skb_copy_bits(skb, rxm->offset + TLS_HEADER_SIZE,
1524 &dctx->iv[iv_offset] + prot->salt_size,
1528 memcpy(&dctx->iv[iv_offset], tls_ctx->rx.iv, prot->salt_size);
1530 tls_xor_iv_with_seq(prot, &dctx->iv[iv_offset], tls_ctx->rx.rec_seq);
1533 tls_make_aad(dctx->aad, rxm->full_len - prot->overhead_size +
1535 tls_ctx->rx.rec_seq, tlm->control, prot);
1538 sg_init_table(sgin, n_sgin);
1539 sg_set_buf(&sgin[0], dctx->aad, prot->aad_size);
1540 err = skb_to_sgvec(skb, &sgin[1],
1541 rxm->offset + prot->prepend_size,
1542 rxm->full_len - prot->prepend_size);
1547 sg_init_table(sgout, n_sgout);
1548 sg_set_buf(&sgout[0], dctx->aad, prot->aad_size);
1550 err = skb_to_sgvec(clear_skb, &sgout[1], prot->prepend_size,
1551 data_len + prot->tail_size);
1554 } else if (out_iov) {
1555 sg_init_table(sgout, n_sgout);
1556 sg_set_buf(&sgout[0], dctx->aad, prot->aad_size);
1558 err = tls_setup_from_iter(out_iov, data_len, &pages, &sgout[1],
1559 (n_sgout - 1 - tail_pages));
1561 goto exit_free_pages;
1563 if (prot->tail_size) {
1564 sg_unmark_end(&sgout[pages]);
1565 sg_set_buf(&sgout[pages + 1], &dctx->tail,
1567 sg_mark_end(&sgout[pages + 1]);
1569 } else if (out_sg) {
1570 memcpy(sgout, out_sg, n_sgout * sizeof(*sgout));
1573 /* Prepare and submit AEAD request */
1574 err = tls_do_decryption(sk, sgin, sgout, dctx->iv,
1575 data_len + prot->tail_size, aead_req, darg);
1577 goto exit_free_pages;
1579 darg->skb = clear_skb ?: tls_strp_msg(ctx);
1582 if (unlikely(darg->async)) {
1583 err = tls_strp_msg_hold(&ctx->strp, &ctx->async_hold);
1585 __skb_queue_tail(&ctx->async_hold, darg->skb);
1589 if (prot->tail_size)
1590 darg->tail = dctx->tail;
1593 /* Release the pages in case iov was mapped to pages */
1594 for (; pages > 0; pages--)
1595 put_page(sg_page(&sgout[pages]));
1599 consume_skb(clear_skb);
1604 tls_decrypt_sw(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *tls_ctx,
1605 struct msghdr *msg, struct tls_decrypt_arg *darg)
1607 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
1608 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
1609 struct strp_msg *rxm;
1612 err = tls_decrypt_sg(sk, &msg->msg_iter, NULL, darg);
1614 if (err == -EBADMSG)
1615 TLS_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TLSDECRYPTERROR);
1618 /* keep going even for ->async, the code below is TLS 1.3 */
1620 /* If opportunistic TLS 1.3 ZC failed retry without ZC */
1621 if (unlikely(darg->zc && prot->version == TLS_1_3_VERSION &&
1622 darg->tail != TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA)) {
1625 TLS_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TLSRXNOPADVIOL);
1626 TLS_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TLSDECRYPTRETRY);
1627 return tls_decrypt_sw(sk, tls_ctx, msg, darg);
1630 pad = tls_padding_length(prot, darg->skb, darg);
1632 if (darg->skb != tls_strp_msg(ctx))
1633 consume_skb(darg->skb);
1637 rxm = strp_msg(darg->skb);
1638 rxm->full_len -= pad;
1644 tls_decrypt_device(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg,
1645 struct tls_context *tls_ctx, struct tls_decrypt_arg *darg)
1647 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
1648 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
1649 struct strp_msg *rxm;
1652 if (tls_ctx->rx_conf != TLS_HW)
1655 err = tls_device_decrypted(sk, tls_ctx);
1659 pad = tls_padding_length(prot, tls_strp_msg(ctx), darg);
1663 darg->async = false;
1664 darg->skb = tls_strp_msg(ctx);
1665 /* ->zc downgrade check, in case TLS 1.3 gets here */
1666 darg->zc &= !(prot->version == TLS_1_3_VERSION &&
1667 tls_msg(darg->skb)->control != TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA);
1669 rxm = strp_msg(darg->skb);
1670 rxm->full_len -= pad;
1673 /* Non-ZC case needs a real skb */
1674 darg->skb = tls_strp_msg_detach(ctx);
1678 unsigned int off, len;
1680 /* In ZC case nobody cares about the output skb.
1681 * Just copy the data here. Note the skb is not fully trimmed.
1683 off = rxm->offset + prot->prepend_size;
1684 len = rxm->full_len - prot->overhead_size;
1686 err = skb_copy_datagram_msg(darg->skb, off, msg, len);
1693 static int tls_rx_one_record(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg,
1694 struct tls_decrypt_arg *darg)
1696 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
1697 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
1698 struct strp_msg *rxm;
1701 err = tls_decrypt_device(sk, msg, tls_ctx, darg);
1703 err = tls_decrypt_sw(sk, tls_ctx, msg, darg);
1707 rxm = strp_msg(darg->skb);
1708 rxm->offset += prot->prepend_size;
1709 rxm->full_len -= prot->overhead_size;
1710 tls_advance_record_sn(sk, prot, &tls_ctx->rx);
1715 int decrypt_skb(struct sock *sk, struct scatterlist *sgout)
1717 struct tls_decrypt_arg darg = { .zc = true, };
1719 return tls_decrypt_sg(sk, NULL, sgout, &darg);
1722 static int tls_record_content_type(struct msghdr *msg, struct tls_msg *tlm,
1728 *control = tlm->control;
1732 err = put_cmsg(msg, SOL_TLS, TLS_GET_RECORD_TYPE,
1733 sizeof(*control), control);
1734 if (*control != TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA) {
1735 if (err || msg->msg_flags & MSG_CTRUNC)
1738 } else if (*control != tlm->control) {
1745 static void tls_rx_rec_done(struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx)
1747 tls_strp_msg_done(&ctx->strp);
1750 /* This function traverses the rx_list in tls receive context to copies the
1751 * decrypted records into the buffer provided by caller zero copy is not
1752 * true. Further, the records are removed from the rx_list if it is not a peek
1753 * case and the record has been consumed completely.
1755 static int process_rx_list(struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx,
1762 struct sk_buff *skb = skb_peek(&ctx->rx_list);
1763 struct tls_msg *tlm;
1767 while (skip && skb) {
1768 struct strp_msg *rxm = strp_msg(skb);
1771 err = tls_record_content_type(msg, tlm, control);
1775 if (skip < rxm->full_len)
1778 skip = skip - rxm->full_len;
1779 skb = skb_peek_next(skb, &ctx->rx_list);
1782 while (len && skb) {
1783 struct sk_buff *next_skb;
1784 struct strp_msg *rxm = strp_msg(skb);
1785 int chunk = min_t(unsigned int, rxm->full_len - skip, len);
1789 err = tls_record_content_type(msg, tlm, control);
1793 err = skb_copy_datagram_msg(skb, rxm->offset + skip,
1799 copied = copied + chunk;
1801 /* Consume the data from record if it is non-peek case*/
1803 rxm->offset = rxm->offset + chunk;
1804 rxm->full_len = rxm->full_len - chunk;
1806 /* Return if there is unconsumed data in the record */
1807 if (rxm->full_len - skip)
1811 /* The remaining skip-bytes must lie in 1st record in rx_list.
1812 * So from the 2nd record, 'skip' should be 0.
1817 msg->msg_flags |= MSG_EOR;
1819 next_skb = skb_peek_next(skb, &ctx->rx_list);
1822 __skb_unlink(skb, &ctx->rx_list);
1831 return copied ? : err;
1835 tls_read_flush_backlog(struct sock *sk, struct tls_prot_info *prot,
1836 size_t len_left, size_t decrypted, ssize_t done,
1841 if (len_left <= decrypted)
1844 max_rec = prot->overhead_size - prot->tail_size + TLS_MAX_PAYLOAD_SIZE;
1845 if (done - *flushed_at < SZ_128K && tcp_inq(sk) > max_rec)
1849 return sk_flush_backlog(sk);
1852 static int tls_rx_reader_lock(struct sock *sk, struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx,
1860 timeo = sock_rcvtimeo(sk, nonblock);
1862 while (unlikely(ctx->reader_present)) {
1863 DEFINE_WAIT_FUNC(wait, woken_wake_function);
1865 ctx->reader_contended = 1;
1867 add_wait_queue(&ctx->wq, &wait);
1868 sk_wait_event(sk, &timeo,
1869 !READ_ONCE(ctx->reader_present), &wait);
1870 remove_wait_queue(&ctx->wq, &wait);
1876 if (signal_pending(current)) {
1877 err = sock_intr_errno(timeo);
1882 WRITE_ONCE(ctx->reader_present, 1);
1891 static void tls_rx_reader_unlock(struct sock *sk, struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx)
1893 if (unlikely(ctx->reader_contended)) {
1894 if (wq_has_sleeper(&ctx->wq))
1897 ctx->reader_contended = 0;
1899 WARN_ON_ONCE(!ctx->reader_present);
1902 WRITE_ONCE(ctx->reader_present, 0);
1906 int tls_sw_recvmsg(struct sock *sk,
1912 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
1913 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
1914 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
1915 ssize_t decrypted = 0, async_copy_bytes = 0;
1916 struct sk_psock *psock;
1917 unsigned char control = 0;
1918 size_t flushed_at = 0;
1919 struct strp_msg *rxm;
1920 struct tls_msg *tlm;
1924 bool is_kvec = iov_iter_is_kvec(&msg->msg_iter);
1925 bool is_peek = flags & MSG_PEEK;
1926 bool released = true;
1927 bool bpf_strp_enabled;
1930 if (unlikely(flags & MSG_ERRQUEUE))
1931 return sock_recv_errqueue(sk, msg, len, SOL_IP, IP_RECVERR);
1933 psock = sk_psock_get(sk);
1934 err = tls_rx_reader_lock(sk, ctx, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT);
1937 bpf_strp_enabled = sk_psock_strp_enabled(psock);
1939 /* If crypto failed the connection is broken */
1940 err = ctx->async_wait.err;
1944 /* Process pending decrypted records. It must be non-zero-copy */
1945 err = process_rx_list(ctx, msg, &control, 0, len, is_peek);
1953 target = sock_rcvlowat(sk, flags & MSG_WAITALL, len);
1956 zc_capable = !bpf_strp_enabled && !is_kvec && !is_peek &&
1959 while (len && (decrypted + copied < target || tls_strp_msg_ready(ctx))) {
1960 struct tls_decrypt_arg darg;
1961 int to_decrypt, chunk;
1963 err = tls_rx_rec_wait(sk, psock, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT,
1967 chunk = sk_msg_recvmsg(sk, psock, msg, len,
1978 memset(&darg.inargs, 0, sizeof(darg.inargs));
1980 rxm = strp_msg(tls_strp_msg(ctx));
1981 tlm = tls_msg(tls_strp_msg(ctx));
1983 to_decrypt = rxm->full_len - prot->overhead_size;
1985 if (zc_capable && to_decrypt <= len &&
1986 tlm->control == TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA)
1989 /* Do not use async mode if record is non-data */
1990 if (tlm->control == TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA && !bpf_strp_enabled)
1991 darg.async = ctx->async_capable;
1995 err = tls_rx_one_record(sk, msg, &darg);
1997 tls_err_abort(sk, -EBADMSG);
2001 async |= darg.async;
2003 /* If the type of records being processed is not known yet,
2004 * set it to record type just dequeued. If it is already known,
2005 * but does not match the record type just dequeued, go to end.
2006 * We always get record type here since for tls1.2, record type
2007 * is known just after record is dequeued from stream parser.
2008 * For tls1.3, we disable async.
2010 err = tls_record_content_type(msg, tls_msg(darg.skb), &control);
2012 DEBUG_NET_WARN_ON_ONCE(darg.zc);
2013 tls_rx_rec_done(ctx);
2015 __skb_queue_tail(&ctx->rx_list, darg.skb);
2019 /* periodically flush backlog, and feed strparser */
2020 released = tls_read_flush_backlog(sk, prot, len, to_decrypt,
2024 /* TLS 1.3 may have updated the length by more than overhead */
2025 rxm = strp_msg(darg.skb);
2026 chunk = rxm->full_len;
2027 tls_rx_rec_done(ctx);
2030 bool partially_consumed = chunk > len;
2031 struct sk_buff *skb = darg.skb;
2033 DEBUG_NET_WARN_ON_ONCE(darg.skb == ctx->strp.anchor);
2036 /* TLS 1.2-only, to_decrypt must be text len */
2037 chunk = min_t(int, to_decrypt, len);
2038 async_copy_bytes += chunk;
2042 __skb_queue_tail(&ctx->rx_list, skb);
2046 if (bpf_strp_enabled) {
2048 err = sk_psock_tls_strp_read(psock, skb);
2049 if (err != __SK_PASS) {
2050 rxm->offset = rxm->offset + rxm->full_len;
2052 if (err == __SK_DROP)
2058 if (partially_consumed)
2061 err = skb_copy_datagram_msg(skb, rxm->offset,
2064 goto put_on_rx_list_err;
2067 goto put_on_rx_list;
2069 if (partially_consumed) {
2070 rxm->offset += chunk;
2071 rxm->full_len -= chunk;
2072 goto put_on_rx_list;
2081 /* Return full control message to userspace before trying
2082 * to parse another message type
2084 msg->msg_flags |= MSG_EOR;
2085 if (control != TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA)
2093 /* Wait for all previously submitted records to be decrypted */
2094 spin_lock_bh(&ctx->decrypt_compl_lock);
2095 reinit_completion(&ctx->async_wait.completion);
2096 pending = atomic_read(&ctx->decrypt_pending);
2097 spin_unlock_bh(&ctx->decrypt_compl_lock);
2100 ret = crypto_wait_req(-EINPROGRESS, &ctx->async_wait);
2101 __skb_queue_purge(&ctx->async_hold);
2104 if (err >= 0 || err == -EINPROGRESS)
2110 /* Drain records from the rx_list & copy if required */
2111 if (is_peek || is_kvec)
2112 err = process_rx_list(ctx, msg, &control, copied,
2113 decrypted, is_peek);
2115 err = process_rx_list(ctx, msg, &control, 0,
2116 async_copy_bytes, is_peek);
2117 decrypted += max(err, 0);
2120 copied += decrypted;
2123 tls_rx_reader_unlock(sk, ctx);
2125 sk_psock_put(sk, psock);
2126 return copied ? : err;
2129 ssize_t tls_sw_splice_read(struct socket *sock, loff_t *ppos,
2130 struct pipe_inode_info *pipe,
2131 size_t len, unsigned int flags)
2133 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sock->sk);
2134 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
2135 struct strp_msg *rxm = NULL;
2136 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
2137 struct tls_msg *tlm;
2138 struct sk_buff *skb;
2143 err = tls_rx_reader_lock(sk, ctx, flags & SPLICE_F_NONBLOCK);
2147 if (!skb_queue_empty(&ctx->rx_list)) {
2148 skb = __skb_dequeue(&ctx->rx_list);
2150 struct tls_decrypt_arg darg;
2152 err = tls_rx_rec_wait(sk, NULL, flags & SPLICE_F_NONBLOCK,
2155 goto splice_read_end;
2157 memset(&darg.inargs, 0, sizeof(darg.inargs));
2159 err = tls_rx_one_record(sk, NULL, &darg);
2161 tls_err_abort(sk, -EBADMSG);
2162 goto splice_read_end;
2165 tls_rx_rec_done(ctx);
2169 rxm = strp_msg(skb);
2172 /* splice does not support reading control messages */
2173 if (tlm->control != TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA) {
2175 goto splice_requeue;
2178 chunk = min_t(unsigned int, rxm->full_len, len);
2179 copied = skb_splice_bits(skb, sk, rxm->offset, pipe, chunk, flags);
2181 goto splice_requeue;
2183 if (chunk < rxm->full_len) {
2185 rxm->full_len -= len;
2186 goto splice_requeue;
2192 tls_rx_reader_unlock(sk, ctx);
2193 return copied ? : err;
2196 __skb_queue_head(&ctx->rx_list, skb);
2197 goto splice_read_end;
2200 bool tls_sw_sock_is_readable(struct sock *sk)
2202 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
2203 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
2204 bool ingress_empty = true;
2205 struct sk_psock *psock;
2208 psock = sk_psock(sk);
2210 ingress_empty = list_empty(&psock->ingress_msg);
2213 return !ingress_empty || tls_strp_msg_ready(ctx) ||
2214 !skb_queue_empty(&ctx->rx_list);
2217 int tls_rx_msg_size(struct tls_strparser *strp, struct sk_buff *skb)
2219 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(strp->sk);
2220 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
2221 char header[TLS_HEADER_SIZE + MAX_IV_SIZE];
2222 size_t cipher_overhead;
2223 size_t data_len = 0;
2226 /* Verify that we have a full TLS header, or wait for more data */
2227 if (strp->stm.offset + prot->prepend_size > skb->len)
2230 /* Sanity-check size of on-stack buffer. */
2231 if (WARN_ON(prot->prepend_size > sizeof(header))) {
2236 /* Linearize header to local buffer */
2237 ret = skb_copy_bits(skb, strp->stm.offset, header, prot->prepend_size);
2241 strp->mark = header[0];
2243 data_len = ((header[4] & 0xFF) | (header[3] << 8));
2245 cipher_overhead = prot->tag_size;
2246 if (prot->version != TLS_1_3_VERSION &&
2247 prot->cipher_type != TLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305)
2248 cipher_overhead += prot->iv_size;
2250 if (data_len > TLS_MAX_PAYLOAD_SIZE + cipher_overhead +
2255 if (data_len < cipher_overhead) {
2260 /* Note that both TLS1.3 and TLS1.2 use TLS_1_2 version here */
2261 if (header[1] != TLS_1_2_VERSION_MINOR ||
2262 header[2] != TLS_1_2_VERSION_MAJOR) {
2267 tls_device_rx_resync_new_rec(strp->sk, data_len + TLS_HEADER_SIZE,
2268 TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq + strp->stm.offset);
2269 return data_len + TLS_HEADER_SIZE;
2272 tls_err_abort(strp->sk, ret);
2277 void tls_rx_msg_ready(struct tls_strparser *strp)
2279 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx;
2281 ctx = container_of(strp, struct tls_sw_context_rx, strp);
2282 ctx->saved_data_ready(strp->sk);
2285 static void tls_data_ready(struct sock *sk)
2287 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
2288 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
2289 struct sk_psock *psock;
2291 tls_strp_data_ready(&ctx->strp);
2293 psock = sk_psock_get(sk);
2295 if (!list_empty(&psock->ingress_msg))
2296 ctx->saved_data_ready(sk);
2297 sk_psock_put(sk, psock);
2301 void tls_sw_cancel_work_tx(struct tls_context *tls_ctx)
2303 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
2305 set_bit(BIT_TX_CLOSING, &ctx->tx_bitmask);
2306 set_bit(BIT_TX_SCHEDULED, &ctx->tx_bitmask);
2307 cancel_delayed_work_sync(&ctx->tx_work.work);
2310 void tls_sw_release_resources_tx(struct sock *sk)
2312 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
2313 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
2314 struct tls_rec *rec, *tmp;
2317 /* Wait for any pending async encryptions to complete */
2318 spin_lock_bh(&ctx->encrypt_compl_lock);
2319 ctx->async_notify = true;
2320 pending = atomic_read(&ctx->encrypt_pending);
2321 spin_unlock_bh(&ctx->encrypt_compl_lock);
2324 crypto_wait_req(-EINPROGRESS, &ctx->async_wait);
2326 tls_tx_records(sk, -1);
2328 /* Free up un-sent records in tx_list. First, free
2329 * the partially sent record if any at head of tx_list.
2331 if (tls_ctx->partially_sent_record) {
2332 tls_free_partial_record(sk, tls_ctx);
2333 rec = list_first_entry(&ctx->tx_list,
2334 struct tls_rec, list);
2335 list_del(&rec->list);
2336 sk_msg_free(sk, &rec->msg_plaintext);
2340 list_for_each_entry_safe(rec, tmp, &ctx->tx_list, list) {
2341 list_del(&rec->list);
2342 sk_msg_free(sk, &rec->msg_encrypted);
2343 sk_msg_free(sk, &rec->msg_plaintext);
2347 crypto_free_aead(ctx->aead_send);
2348 tls_free_open_rec(sk);
2351 void tls_sw_free_ctx_tx(struct tls_context *tls_ctx)
2353 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
2358 void tls_sw_release_resources_rx(struct sock *sk)
2360 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
2361 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
2363 kfree(tls_ctx->rx.rec_seq);
2364 kfree(tls_ctx->rx.iv);
2366 if (ctx->aead_recv) {
2367 __skb_queue_purge(&ctx->rx_list);
2368 crypto_free_aead(ctx->aead_recv);
2369 tls_strp_stop(&ctx->strp);
2370 /* If tls_sw_strparser_arm() was not called (cleanup paths)
2371 * we still want to tls_strp_stop(), but sk->sk_data_ready was
2374 if (ctx->saved_data_ready) {
2375 write_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
2376 sk->sk_data_ready = ctx->saved_data_ready;
2377 write_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
2382 void tls_sw_strparser_done(struct tls_context *tls_ctx)
2384 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
2386 tls_strp_done(&ctx->strp);
2389 void tls_sw_free_ctx_rx(struct tls_context *tls_ctx)
2391 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
2396 void tls_sw_free_resources_rx(struct sock *sk)
2398 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
2400 tls_sw_release_resources_rx(sk);
2401 tls_sw_free_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
2404 /* The work handler to transmitt the encrypted records in tx_list */
2405 static void tx_work_handler(struct work_struct *work)
2407 struct delayed_work *delayed_work = to_delayed_work(work);
2408 struct tx_work *tx_work = container_of(delayed_work,
2409 struct tx_work, work);
2410 struct sock *sk = tx_work->sk;
2411 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
2412 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx;
2414 if (unlikely(!tls_ctx))
2417 ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
2418 if (test_bit(BIT_TX_CLOSING, &ctx->tx_bitmask))
2421 if (!test_and_clear_bit(BIT_TX_SCHEDULED, &ctx->tx_bitmask))
2424 if (mutex_trylock(&tls_ctx->tx_lock)) {
2426 tls_tx_records(sk, -1);
2428 mutex_unlock(&tls_ctx->tx_lock);
2429 } else if (!test_and_set_bit(BIT_TX_SCHEDULED, &ctx->tx_bitmask)) {
2430 /* Someone is holding the tx_lock, they will likely run Tx
2431 * and cancel the work on their way out of the lock section.
2432 * Schedule a long delay just in case.
2434 schedule_delayed_work(&ctx->tx_work.work, msecs_to_jiffies(10));
2438 static bool tls_is_tx_ready(struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx)
2440 struct tls_rec *rec;
2442 rec = list_first_entry_or_null(&ctx->tx_list, struct tls_rec, list);
2446 return READ_ONCE(rec->tx_ready);
2449 void tls_sw_write_space(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *ctx)
2451 struct tls_sw_context_tx *tx_ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(ctx);
2453 /* Schedule the transmission if tx list is ready */
2454 if (tls_is_tx_ready(tx_ctx) &&
2455 !test_and_set_bit(BIT_TX_SCHEDULED, &tx_ctx->tx_bitmask))
2456 schedule_delayed_work(&tx_ctx->tx_work.work, 0);
2459 void tls_sw_strparser_arm(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *tls_ctx)
2461 struct tls_sw_context_rx *rx_ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
2463 write_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
2464 rx_ctx->saved_data_ready = sk->sk_data_ready;
2465 sk->sk_data_ready = tls_data_ready;
2466 write_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
2469 void tls_update_rx_zc_capable(struct tls_context *tls_ctx)
2471 struct tls_sw_context_rx *rx_ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
2473 rx_ctx->zc_capable = tls_ctx->rx_no_pad ||
2474 tls_ctx->prot_info.version != TLS_1_3_VERSION;
2477 int tls_set_sw_offload(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *ctx, int tx)
2479 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
2480 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
2481 struct tls_crypto_info *crypto_info;
2482 struct tls_sw_context_tx *sw_ctx_tx = NULL;
2483 struct tls_sw_context_rx *sw_ctx_rx = NULL;
2484 struct cipher_context *cctx;
2485 struct crypto_aead **aead;
2486 u16 nonce_size, tag_size, iv_size, rec_seq_size, salt_size;
2487 struct crypto_tfm *tfm;
2488 char *iv, *rec_seq, *key, *salt, *cipher_name;
2498 if (!ctx->priv_ctx_tx) {
2499 sw_ctx_tx = kzalloc(sizeof(*sw_ctx_tx), GFP_KERNEL);
2504 ctx->priv_ctx_tx = sw_ctx_tx;
2507 (struct tls_sw_context_tx *)ctx->priv_ctx_tx;
2510 if (!ctx->priv_ctx_rx) {
2511 sw_ctx_rx = kzalloc(sizeof(*sw_ctx_rx), GFP_KERNEL);
2516 ctx->priv_ctx_rx = sw_ctx_rx;
2519 (struct tls_sw_context_rx *)ctx->priv_ctx_rx;
2524 crypto_init_wait(&sw_ctx_tx->async_wait);
2525 spin_lock_init(&sw_ctx_tx->encrypt_compl_lock);
2526 crypto_info = &ctx->crypto_send.info;
2528 aead = &sw_ctx_tx->aead_send;
2529 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sw_ctx_tx->tx_list);
2530 INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&sw_ctx_tx->tx_work.work, tx_work_handler);
2531 sw_ctx_tx->tx_work.sk = sk;
2533 crypto_init_wait(&sw_ctx_rx->async_wait);
2534 spin_lock_init(&sw_ctx_rx->decrypt_compl_lock);
2535 init_waitqueue_head(&sw_ctx_rx->wq);
2536 crypto_info = &ctx->crypto_recv.info;
2538 skb_queue_head_init(&sw_ctx_rx->rx_list);
2539 skb_queue_head_init(&sw_ctx_rx->async_hold);
2540 aead = &sw_ctx_rx->aead_recv;
2543 switch (crypto_info->cipher_type) {
2544 case TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128: {
2545 struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_gcm_128 *gcm_128_info;
2547 gcm_128_info = (void *)crypto_info;
2548 nonce_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_IV_SIZE;
2549 tag_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_TAG_SIZE;
2550 iv_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_IV_SIZE;
2551 iv = gcm_128_info->iv;
2552 rec_seq_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_REC_SEQ_SIZE;
2553 rec_seq = gcm_128_info->rec_seq;
2554 keysize = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_KEY_SIZE;
2555 key = gcm_128_info->key;
2556 salt = gcm_128_info->salt;
2557 salt_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_SALT_SIZE;
2558 cipher_name = "gcm(aes)";
2561 case TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_256: {
2562 struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_gcm_256 *gcm_256_info;
2564 gcm_256_info = (void *)crypto_info;
2565 nonce_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_256_IV_SIZE;
2566 tag_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_256_TAG_SIZE;
2567 iv_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_256_IV_SIZE;
2568 iv = gcm_256_info->iv;
2569 rec_seq_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_256_REC_SEQ_SIZE;
2570 rec_seq = gcm_256_info->rec_seq;
2571 keysize = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_256_KEY_SIZE;
2572 key = gcm_256_info->key;
2573 salt = gcm_256_info->salt;
2574 salt_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_256_SALT_SIZE;
2575 cipher_name = "gcm(aes)";
2578 case TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128: {
2579 struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_ccm_128 *ccm_128_info;
2581 ccm_128_info = (void *)crypto_info;
2582 nonce_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128_IV_SIZE;
2583 tag_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128_TAG_SIZE;
2584 iv_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128_IV_SIZE;
2585 iv = ccm_128_info->iv;
2586 rec_seq_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128_REC_SEQ_SIZE;
2587 rec_seq = ccm_128_info->rec_seq;
2588 keysize = TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128_KEY_SIZE;
2589 key = ccm_128_info->key;
2590 salt = ccm_128_info->salt;
2591 salt_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128_SALT_SIZE;
2592 cipher_name = "ccm(aes)";
2595 case TLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305: {
2596 struct tls12_crypto_info_chacha20_poly1305 *chacha20_poly1305_info;
2598 chacha20_poly1305_info = (void *)crypto_info;
2600 tag_size = TLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305_TAG_SIZE;
2601 iv_size = TLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305_IV_SIZE;
2602 iv = chacha20_poly1305_info->iv;
2603 rec_seq_size = TLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305_REC_SEQ_SIZE;
2604 rec_seq = chacha20_poly1305_info->rec_seq;
2605 keysize = TLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305_KEY_SIZE;
2606 key = chacha20_poly1305_info->key;
2607 salt = chacha20_poly1305_info->salt;
2608 salt_size = TLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SALT_SIZE;
2609 cipher_name = "rfc7539(chacha20,poly1305)";
2612 case TLS_CIPHER_SM4_GCM: {
2613 struct tls12_crypto_info_sm4_gcm *sm4_gcm_info;
2615 sm4_gcm_info = (void *)crypto_info;
2616 nonce_size = TLS_CIPHER_SM4_GCM_IV_SIZE;
2617 tag_size = TLS_CIPHER_SM4_GCM_TAG_SIZE;
2618 iv_size = TLS_CIPHER_SM4_GCM_IV_SIZE;
2619 iv = sm4_gcm_info->iv;
2620 rec_seq_size = TLS_CIPHER_SM4_GCM_REC_SEQ_SIZE;
2621 rec_seq = sm4_gcm_info->rec_seq;
2622 keysize = TLS_CIPHER_SM4_GCM_KEY_SIZE;
2623 key = sm4_gcm_info->key;
2624 salt = sm4_gcm_info->salt;
2625 salt_size = TLS_CIPHER_SM4_GCM_SALT_SIZE;
2626 cipher_name = "gcm(sm4)";
2629 case TLS_CIPHER_SM4_CCM: {
2630 struct tls12_crypto_info_sm4_ccm *sm4_ccm_info;
2632 sm4_ccm_info = (void *)crypto_info;
2633 nonce_size = TLS_CIPHER_SM4_CCM_IV_SIZE;
2634 tag_size = TLS_CIPHER_SM4_CCM_TAG_SIZE;
2635 iv_size = TLS_CIPHER_SM4_CCM_IV_SIZE;
2636 iv = sm4_ccm_info->iv;
2637 rec_seq_size = TLS_CIPHER_SM4_CCM_REC_SEQ_SIZE;
2638 rec_seq = sm4_ccm_info->rec_seq;
2639 keysize = TLS_CIPHER_SM4_CCM_KEY_SIZE;
2640 key = sm4_ccm_info->key;
2641 salt = sm4_ccm_info->salt;
2642 salt_size = TLS_CIPHER_SM4_CCM_SALT_SIZE;
2643 cipher_name = "ccm(sm4)";
2646 case TLS_CIPHER_ARIA_GCM_128: {
2647 struct tls12_crypto_info_aria_gcm_128 *aria_gcm_128_info;
2649 aria_gcm_128_info = (void *)crypto_info;
2650 nonce_size = TLS_CIPHER_ARIA_GCM_128_IV_SIZE;
2651 tag_size = TLS_CIPHER_ARIA_GCM_128_TAG_SIZE;
2652 iv_size = TLS_CIPHER_ARIA_GCM_128_IV_SIZE;
2653 iv = aria_gcm_128_info->iv;
2654 rec_seq_size = TLS_CIPHER_ARIA_GCM_128_REC_SEQ_SIZE;
2655 rec_seq = aria_gcm_128_info->rec_seq;
2656 keysize = TLS_CIPHER_ARIA_GCM_128_KEY_SIZE;
2657 key = aria_gcm_128_info->key;
2658 salt = aria_gcm_128_info->salt;
2659 salt_size = TLS_CIPHER_ARIA_GCM_128_SALT_SIZE;
2660 cipher_name = "gcm(aria)";
2663 case TLS_CIPHER_ARIA_GCM_256: {
2664 struct tls12_crypto_info_aria_gcm_256 *gcm_256_info;
2666 gcm_256_info = (void *)crypto_info;
2667 nonce_size = TLS_CIPHER_ARIA_GCM_256_IV_SIZE;
2668 tag_size = TLS_CIPHER_ARIA_GCM_256_TAG_SIZE;
2669 iv_size = TLS_CIPHER_ARIA_GCM_256_IV_SIZE;
2670 iv = gcm_256_info->iv;
2671 rec_seq_size = TLS_CIPHER_ARIA_GCM_256_REC_SEQ_SIZE;
2672 rec_seq = gcm_256_info->rec_seq;
2673 keysize = TLS_CIPHER_ARIA_GCM_256_KEY_SIZE;
2674 key = gcm_256_info->key;
2675 salt = gcm_256_info->salt;
2676 salt_size = TLS_CIPHER_ARIA_GCM_256_SALT_SIZE;
2677 cipher_name = "gcm(aria)";
2685 if (crypto_info->version == TLS_1_3_VERSION) {
2687 prot->aad_size = TLS_HEADER_SIZE;
2688 prot->tail_size = 1;
2690 prot->aad_size = TLS_AAD_SPACE_SIZE;
2691 prot->tail_size = 0;
2694 /* Sanity-check the sizes for stack allocations. */
2695 if (iv_size > MAX_IV_SIZE || nonce_size > MAX_IV_SIZE ||
2696 rec_seq_size > TLS_MAX_REC_SEQ_SIZE || tag_size != TLS_TAG_SIZE ||
2697 prot->aad_size > TLS_MAX_AAD_SIZE) {
2702 prot->version = crypto_info->version;
2703 prot->cipher_type = crypto_info->cipher_type;
2704 prot->prepend_size = TLS_HEADER_SIZE + nonce_size;
2705 prot->tag_size = tag_size;
2706 prot->overhead_size = prot->prepend_size +
2707 prot->tag_size + prot->tail_size;
2708 prot->iv_size = iv_size;
2709 prot->salt_size = salt_size;
2710 cctx->iv = kmalloc(iv_size + salt_size, GFP_KERNEL);
2715 /* Note: 128 & 256 bit salt are the same size */
2716 prot->rec_seq_size = rec_seq_size;
2717 memcpy(cctx->iv, salt, salt_size);
2718 memcpy(cctx->iv + salt_size, iv, iv_size);
2719 cctx->rec_seq = kmemdup(rec_seq, rec_seq_size, GFP_KERNEL);
2720 if (!cctx->rec_seq) {
2726 *aead = crypto_alloc_aead(cipher_name, 0, 0);
2727 if (IS_ERR(*aead)) {
2728 rc = PTR_ERR(*aead);
2734 ctx->push_pending_record = tls_sw_push_pending_record;
2736 rc = crypto_aead_setkey(*aead, key, keysize);
2741 rc = crypto_aead_setauthsize(*aead, prot->tag_size);
2746 tfm = crypto_aead_tfm(sw_ctx_rx->aead_recv);
2748 tls_update_rx_zc_capable(ctx);
2749 sw_ctx_rx->async_capable =
2750 crypto_info->version != TLS_1_3_VERSION &&
2751 !!(tfm->__crt_alg->cra_flags & CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
2753 rc = tls_strp_init(&sw_ctx_rx->strp, sk);
2761 crypto_free_aead(*aead);
2764 kfree(cctx->rec_seq);
2765 cctx->rec_seq = NULL;
2771 kfree(ctx->priv_ctx_tx);
2772 ctx->priv_ctx_tx = NULL;
2774 kfree(ctx->priv_ctx_rx);
2775 ctx->priv_ctx_rx = NULL;