2 * Copyright (c) 2016-2017, Mellanox Technologies. All rights reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2016-2017, Dave Watson <davejwatson@fb.com>. All rights reserved.
4 * Copyright (c) 2016-2017, Lance Chao <lancerchao@fb.com>. All rights reserved.
5 * Copyright (c) 2016, Fridolin Pokorny <fridolin.pokorny@gmail.com>. All rights reserved.
6 * Copyright (c) 2016, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@gnutls.org>. All rights reserved.
7 * Copyright (c) 2018, Covalent IO, Inc. http://covalent.io
9 * This software is available to you under a choice of one of two
10 * licenses. You may choose to be licensed under the terms of the GNU
11 * General Public License (GPL) Version 2, available from the file
12 * COPYING in the main directory of this source tree, or the
13 * OpenIB.org BSD license below:
15 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
16 * without modification, are permitted provided that the following
19 * - Redistributions of source code must retain the above
20 * copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following
23 * - Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above
24 * copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following
25 * disclaimer in the documentation and/or other materials
26 * provided with the distribution.
28 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
29 * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
30 * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
31 * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
32 * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
33 * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
34 * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
38 #include <linux/bug.h>
39 #include <linux/sched/signal.h>
40 #include <linux/module.h>
41 #include <linux/splice.h>
42 #include <crypto/aead.h>
44 #include <net/strparser.h>
47 noinline void tls_err_abort(struct sock *sk, int err)
49 WARN_ON_ONCE(err >= 0);
50 /* sk->sk_err should contain a positive error code. */
52 sk->sk_error_report(sk);
55 static int __skb_nsg(struct sk_buff *skb, int offset, int len,
56 unsigned int recursion_level)
58 int start = skb_headlen(skb);
59 int i, chunk = start - offset;
60 struct sk_buff *frag_iter;
63 if (unlikely(recursion_level >= 24))
76 for (i = 0; i < skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags; i++) {
79 WARN_ON(start > offset + len);
81 end = start + skb_frag_size(&skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[i]);
95 if (unlikely(skb_has_frag_list(skb))) {
96 skb_walk_frags(skb, frag_iter) {
99 WARN_ON(start > offset + len);
101 end = start + frag_iter->len;
102 chunk = end - offset;
106 ret = __skb_nsg(frag_iter, offset - start, chunk,
107 recursion_level + 1);
108 if (unlikely(ret < 0))
123 /* Return the number of scatterlist elements required to completely map the
124 * skb, or -EMSGSIZE if the recursion depth is exceeded.
126 static int skb_nsg(struct sk_buff *skb, int offset, int len)
128 return __skb_nsg(skb, offset, len, 0);
131 static int padding_length(struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx,
132 struct tls_prot_info *prot, struct sk_buff *skb)
134 struct strp_msg *rxm = strp_msg(skb);
137 /* Determine zero-padding length */
138 if (prot->version == TLS_1_3_VERSION) {
139 char content_type = 0;
143 while (content_type == 0) {
144 if (back > rxm->full_len - prot->prepend_size)
146 err = skb_copy_bits(skb,
147 rxm->offset + rxm->full_len - back,
156 ctx->control = content_type;
161 static void tls_decrypt_done(struct crypto_async_request *req, int err)
163 struct aead_request *aead_req = (struct aead_request *)req;
164 struct scatterlist *sgout = aead_req->dst;
165 struct scatterlist *sgin = aead_req->src;
166 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx;
167 struct tls_context *tls_ctx;
168 struct tls_prot_info *prot;
169 struct scatterlist *sg;
174 skb = (struct sk_buff *)req->data;
175 tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(skb->sk);
176 ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
177 prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
179 /* Propagate if there was an err */
182 TLS_INC_STATS(sock_net(skb->sk),
183 LINUX_MIB_TLSDECRYPTERROR);
184 ctx->async_wait.err = err;
185 tls_err_abort(skb->sk, err);
187 struct strp_msg *rxm = strp_msg(skb);
190 pad = padding_length(ctx, prot, skb);
192 ctx->async_wait.err = pad;
193 tls_err_abort(skb->sk, pad);
195 rxm->full_len -= pad;
196 rxm->offset += prot->prepend_size;
197 rxm->full_len -= prot->overhead_size;
201 /* After using skb->sk to propagate sk through crypto async callback
202 * we need to NULL it again.
207 /* Free the destination pages if skb was not decrypted inplace */
209 /* Skip the first S/G entry as it points to AAD */
210 for_each_sg(sg_next(sgout), sg, UINT_MAX, pages) {
213 put_page(sg_page(sg));
219 spin_lock_bh(&ctx->decrypt_compl_lock);
220 pending = atomic_dec_return(&ctx->decrypt_pending);
222 if (!pending && ctx->async_notify)
223 complete(&ctx->async_wait.completion);
224 spin_unlock_bh(&ctx->decrypt_compl_lock);
227 static int tls_do_decryption(struct sock *sk,
229 struct scatterlist *sgin,
230 struct scatterlist *sgout,
233 struct aead_request *aead_req,
236 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
237 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
238 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
241 aead_request_set_tfm(aead_req, ctx->aead_recv);
242 aead_request_set_ad(aead_req, prot->aad_size);
243 aead_request_set_crypt(aead_req, sgin, sgout,
244 data_len + prot->tag_size,
248 /* Using skb->sk to push sk through to crypto async callback
249 * handler. This allows propagating errors up to the socket
250 * if needed. It _must_ be cleared in the async handler
251 * before consume_skb is called. We _know_ skb->sk is NULL
252 * because it is a clone from strparser.
255 aead_request_set_callback(aead_req,
256 CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
257 tls_decrypt_done, skb);
258 atomic_inc(&ctx->decrypt_pending);
260 aead_request_set_callback(aead_req,
261 CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
262 crypto_req_done, &ctx->async_wait);
265 ret = crypto_aead_decrypt(aead_req);
266 if (ret == -EINPROGRESS) {
270 ret = crypto_wait_req(ret, &ctx->async_wait);
274 atomic_dec(&ctx->decrypt_pending);
279 static void tls_trim_both_msgs(struct sock *sk, int target_size)
281 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
282 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
283 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
284 struct tls_rec *rec = ctx->open_rec;
286 sk_msg_trim(sk, &rec->msg_plaintext, target_size);
288 target_size += prot->overhead_size;
289 sk_msg_trim(sk, &rec->msg_encrypted, target_size);
292 static int tls_alloc_encrypted_msg(struct sock *sk, int len)
294 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
295 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
296 struct tls_rec *rec = ctx->open_rec;
297 struct sk_msg *msg_en = &rec->msg_encrypted;
299 return sk_msg_alloc(sk, msg_en, len, 0);
302 static int tls_clone_plaintext_msg(struct sock *sk, int required)
304 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
305 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
306 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
307 struct tls_rec *rec = ctx->open_rec;
308 struct sk_msg *msg_pl = &rec->msg_plaintext;
309 struct sk_msg *msg_en = &rec->msg_encrypted;
312 /* We add page references worth len bytes from encrypted sg
313 * at the end of plaintext sg. It is guaranteed that msg_en
314 * has enough required room (ensured by caller).
316 len = required - msg_pl->sg.size;
318 /* Skip initial bytes in msg_en's data to be able to use
319 * same offset of both plain and encrypted data.
321 skip = prot->prepend_size + msg_pl->sg.size;
323 return sk_msg_clone(sk, msg_pl, msg_en, skip, len);
326 static struct tls_rec *tls_get_rec(struct sock *sk)
328 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
329 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
330 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
331 struct sk_msg *msg_pl, *msg_en;
335 mem_size = sizeof(struct tls_rec) + crypto_aead_reqsize(ctx->aead_send);
337 rec = kzalloc(mem_size, sk->sk_allocation);
341 msg_pl = &rec->msg_plaintext;
342 msg_en = &rec->msg_encrypted;
347 sg_init_table(rec->sg_aead_in, 2);
348 sg_set_buf(&rec->sg_aead_in[0], rec->aad_space, prot->aad_size);
349 sg_unmark_end(&rec->sg_aead_in[1]);
351 sg_init_table(rec->sg_aead_out, 2);
352 sg_set_buf(&rec->sg_aead_out[0], rec->aad_space, prot->aad_size);
353 sg_unmark_end(&rec->sg_aead_out[1]);
358 static void tls_free_rec(struct sock *sk, struct tls_rec *rec)
360 sk_msg_free(sk, &rec->msg_encrypted);
361 sk_msg_free(sk, &rec->msg_plaintext);
365 static void tls_free_open_rec(struct sock *sk)
367 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
368 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
369 struct tls_rec *rec = ctx->open_rec;
372 tls_free_rec(sk, rec);
373 ctx->open_rec = NULL;
377 int tls_tx_records(struct sock *sk, int flags)
379 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
380 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
381 struct tls_rec *rec, *tmp;
382 struct sk_msg *msg_en;
383 int tx_flags, rc = 0;
385 if (tls_is_partially_sent_record(tls_ctx)) {
386 rec = list_first_entry(&ctx->tx_list,
387 struct tls_rec, list);
390 tx_flags = rec->tx_flags;
394 rc = tls_push_partial_record(sk, tls_ctx, tx_flags);
398 /* Full record has been transmitted.
399 * Remove the head of tx_list
401 list_del(&rec->list);
402 sk_msg_free(sk, &rec->msg_plaintext);
406 /* Tx all ready records */
407 list_for_each_entry_safe(rec, tmp, &ctx->tx_list, list) {
408 if (READ_ONCE(rec->tx_ready)) {
410 tx_flags = rec->tx_flags;
414 msg_en = &rec->msg_encrypted;
415 rc = tls_push_sg(sk, tls_ctx,
416 &msg_en->sg.data[msg_en->sg.curr],
421 list_del(&rec->list);
422 sk_msg_free(sk, &rec->msg_plaintext);
430 if (rc < 0 && rc != -EAGAIN)
431 tls_err_abort(sk, -EBADMSG);
436 static void tls_encrypt_done(struct crypto_async_request *req, int err)
438 struct aead_request *aead_req = (struct aead_request *)req;
439 struct sock *sk = req->data;
440 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
441 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
442 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
443 struct scatterlist *sge;
444 struct sk_msg *msg_en;
449 rec = container_of(aead_req, struct tls_rec, aead_req);
450 msg_en = &rec->msg_encrypted;
452 sge = sk_msg_elem(msg_en, msg_en->sg.curr);
453 sge->offset -= prot->prepend_size;
454 sge->length += prot->prepend_size;
456 /* Check if error is previously set on socket */
457 if (err || sk->sk_err) {
460 /* If err is already set on socket, return the same code */
462 ctx->async_wait.err = -sk->sk_err;
464 ctx->async_wait.err = err;
465 tls_err_abort(sk, err);
470 struct tls_rec *first_rec;
472 /* Mark the record as ready for transmission */
473 smp_store_mb(rec->tx_ready, true);
475 /* If received record is at head of tx_list, schedule tx */
476 first_rec = list_first_entry(&ctx->tx_list,
477 struct tls_rec, list);
478 if (rec == first_rec)
482 spin_lock_bh(&ctx->encrypt_compl_lock);
483 pending = atomic_dec_return(&ctx->encrypt_pending);
485 if (!pending && ctx->async_notify)
486 complete(&ctx->async_wait.completion);
487 spin_unlock_bh(&ctx->encrypt_compl_lock);
492 /* Schedule the transmission */
493 if (!test_and_set_bit(BIT_TX_SCHEDULED, &ctx->tx_bitmask))
494 schedule_delayed_work(&ctx->tx_work.work, 1);
497 static int tls_do_encryption(struct sock *sk,
498 struct tls_context *tls_ctx,
499 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx,
500 struct aead_request *aead_req,
501 size_t data_len, u32 start)
503 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
504 struct tls_rec *rec = ctx->open_rec;
505 struct sk_msg *msg_en = &rec->msg_encrypted;
506 struct scatterlist *sge = sk_msg_elem(msg_en, start);
507 int rc, iv_offset = 0;
509 /* For CCM based ciphers, first byte of IV is a constant */
510 if (prot->cipher_type == TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128) {
511 rec->iv_data[0] = TLS_AES_CCM_IV_B0_BYTE;
515 memcpy(&rec->iv_data[iv_offset], tls_ctx->tx.iv,
516 prot->iv_size + prot->salt_size);
518 xor_iv_with_seq(prot->version, rec->iv_data + iv_offset, tls_ctx->tx.rec_seq);
520 sge->offset += prot->prepend_size;
521 sge->length -= prot->prepend_size;
523 msg_en->sg.curr = start;
525 aead_request_set_tfm(aead_req, ctx->aead_send);
526 aead_request_set_ad(aead_req, prot->aad_size);
527 aead_request_set_crypt(aead_req, rec->sg_aead_in,
529 data_len, rec->iv_data);
531 aead_request_set_callback(aead_req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
532 tls_encrypt_done, sk);
534 /* Add the record in tx_list */
535 list_add_tail((struct list_head *)&rec->list, &ctx->tx_list);
536 atomic_inc(&ctx->encrypt_pending);
538 rc = crypto_aead_encrypt(aead_req);
539 if (!rc || rc != -EINPROGRESS) {
540 atomic_dec(&ctx->encrypt_pending);
541 sge->offset -= prot->prepend_size;
542 sge->length += prot->prepend_size;
546 WRITE_ONCE(rec->tx_ready, true);
547 } else if (rc != -EINPROGRESS) {
548 list_del(&rec->list);
552 /* Unhook the record from context if encryption is not failure */
553 ctx->open_rec = NULL;
554 tls_advance_record_sn(sk, prot, &tls_ctx->tx);
558 static int tls_split_open_record(struct sock *sk, struct tls_rec *from,
559 struct tls_rec **to, struct sk_msg *msg_opl,
560 struct sk_msg *msg_oen, u32 split_point,
561 u32 tx_overhead_size, u32 *orig_end)
563 u32 i, j, bytes = 0, apply = msg_opl->apply_bytes;
564 struct scatterlist *sge, *osge, *nsge;
565 u32 orig_size = msg_opl->sg.size;
566 struct scatterlist tmp = { };
567 struct sk_msg *msg_npl;
571 new = tls_get_rec(sk);
574 ret = sk_msg_alloc(sk, &new->msg_encrypted, msg_opl->sg.size +
575 tx_overhead_size, 0);
577 tls_free_rec(sk, new);
581 *orig_end = msg_opl->sg.end;
582 i = msg_opl->sg.start;
583 sge = sk_msg_elem(msg_opl, i);
584 while (apply && sge->length) {
585 if (sge->length > apply) {
586 u32 len = sge->length - apply;
588 get_page(sg_page(sge));
589 sg_set_page(&tmp, sg_page(sge), len,
590 sge->offset + apply);
595 apply -= sge->length;
596 bytes += sge->length;
599 sk_msg_iter_var_next(i);
600 if (i == msg_opl->sg.end)
602 sge = sk_msg_elem(msg_opl, i);
606 msg_opl->sg.curr = i;
607 msg_opl->sg.copybreak = 0;
608 msg_opl->apply_bytes = 0;
609 msg_opl->sg.size = bytes;
611 msg_npl = &new->msg_plaintext;
612 msg_npl->apply_bytes = apply;
613 msg_npl->sg.size = orig_size - bytes;
615 j = msg_npl->sg.start;
616 nsge = sk_msg_elem(msg_npl, j);
618 memcpy(nsge, &tmp, sizeof(*nsge));
619 sk_msg_iter_var_next(j);
620 nsge = sk_msg_elem(msg_npl, j);
623 osge = sk_msg_elem(msg_opl, i);
624 while (osge->length) {
625 memcpy(nsge, osge, sizeof(*nsge));
627 sk_msg_iter_var_next(i);
628 sk_msg_iter_var_next(j);
631 osge = sk_msg_elem(msg_opl, i);
632 nsge = sk_msg_elem(msg_npl, j);
636 msg_npl->sg.curr = j;
637 msg_npl->sg.copybreak = 0;
643 static void tls_merge_open_record(struct sock *sk, struct tls_rec *to,
644 struct tls_rec *from, u32 orig_end)
646 struct sk_msg *msg_npl = &from->msg_plaintext;
647 struct sk_msg *msg_opl = &to->msg_plaintext;
648 struct scatterlist *osge, *nsge;
652 sk_msg_iter_var_prev(i);
653 j = msg_npl->sg.start;
655 osge = sk_msg_elem(msg_opl, i);
656 nsge = sk_msg_elem(msg_npl, j);
658 if (sg_page(osge) == sg_page(nsge) &&
659 osge->offset + osge->length == nsge->offset) {
660 osge->length += nsge->length;
661 put_page(sg_page(nsge));
664 msg_opl->sg.end = orig_end;
665 msg_opl->sg.curr = orig_end;
666 msg_opl->sg.copybreak = 0;
667 msg_opl->apply_bytes = msg_opl->sg.size + msg_npl->sg.size;
668 msg_opl->sg.size += msg_npl->sg.size;
670 sk_msg_free(sk, &to->msg_encrypted);
671 sk_msg_xfer_full(&to->msg_encrypted, &from->msg_encrypted);
676 static int tls_push_record(struct sock *sk, int flags,
677 unsigned char record_type)
679 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
680 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
681 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
682 struct tls_rec *rec = ctx->open_rec, *tmp = NULL;
683 u32 i, split_point, orig_end;
684 struct sk_msg *msg_pl, *msg_en;
685 struct aead_request *req;
692 msg_pl = &rec->msg_plaintext;
693 msg_en = &rec->msg_encrypted;
695 split_point = msg_pl->apply_bytes;
696 split = split_point && split_point < msg_pl->sg.size;
697 if (unlikely((!split &&
699 prot->overhead_size > msg_en->sg.size) ||
702 prot->overhead_size > msg_en->sg.size))) {
704 split_point = msg_en->sg.size;
707 rc = tls_split_open_record(sk, rec, &tmp, msg_pl, msg_en,
708 split_point, prot->overhead_size,
712 /* This can happen if above tls_split_open_record allocates
713 * a single large encryption buffer instead of two smaller
714 * ones. In this case adjust pointers and continue without
717 if (!msg_pl->sg.size) {
718 tls_merge_open_record(sk, rec, tmp, orig_end);
719 msg_pl = &rec->msg_plaintext;
720 msg_en = &rec->msg_encrypted;
723 sk_msg_trim(sk, msg_en, msg_pl->sg.size +
724 prot->overhead_size);
727 rec->tx_flags = flags;
728 req = &rec->aead_req;
731 sk_msg_iter_var_prev(i);
733 rec->content_type = record_type;
734 if (prot->version == TLS_1_3_VERSION) {
735 /* Add content type to end of message. No padding added */
736 sg_set_buf(&rec->sg_content_type, &rec->content_type, 1);
737 sg_mark_end(&rec->sg_content_type);
738 sg_chain(msg_pl->sg.data, msg_pl->sg.end + 1,
739 &rec->sg_content_type);
741 sg_mark_end(sk_msg_elem(msg_pl, i));
744 if (msg_pl->sg.end < msg_pl->sg.start) {
745 sg_chain(&msg_pl->sg.data[msg_pl->sg.start],
746 MAX_SKB_FRAGS - msg_pl->sg.start + 1,
750 i = msg_pl->sg.start;
751 sg_chain(rec->sg_aead_in, 2, &msg_pl->sg.data[i]);
754 sk_msg_iter_var_prev(i);
755 sg_mark_end(sk_msg_elem(msg_en, i));
757 i = msg_en->sg.start;
758 sg_chain(rec->sg_aead_out, 2, &msg_en->sg.data[i]);
760 tls_make_aad(rec->aad_space, msg_pl->sg.size + prot->tail_size,
761 tls_ctx->tx.rec_seq, prot->rec_seq_size,
762 record_type, prot->version);
764 tls_fill_prepend(tls_ctx,
765 page_address(sg_page(&msg_en->sg.data[i])) +
766 msg_en->sg.data[i].offset,
767 msg_pl->sg.size + prot->tail_size,
768 record_type, prot->version);
770 tls_ctx->pending_open_record_frags = false;
772 rc = tls_do_encryption(sk, tls_ctx, ctx, req,
773 msg_pl->sg.size + prot->tail_size, i);
775 if (rc != -EINPROGRESS) {
776 tls_err_abort(sk, -EBADMSG);
778 tls_ctx->pending_open_record_frags = true;
779 tls_merge_open_record(sk, rec, tmp, orig_end);
782 ctx->async_capable = 1;
785 msg_pl = &tmp->msg_plaintext;
786 msg_en = &tmp->msg_encrypted;
787 sk_msg_trim(sk, msg_en, msg_pl->sg.size + prot->overhead_size);
788 tls_ctx->pending_open_record_frags = true;
792 return tls_tx_records(sk, flags);
795 static int bpf_exec_tx_verdict(struct sk_msg *msg, struct sock *sk,
796 bool full_record, u8 record_type,
797 ssize_t *copied, int flags)
799 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
800 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
801 struct sk_msg msg_redir = { };
802 struct sk_psock *psock;
803 struct sock *sk_redir;
809 policy = !(flags & MSG_SENDPAGE_NOPOLICY);
810 psock = sk_psock_get(sk);
811 if (!psock || !policy) {
812 err = tls_push_record(sk, flags, record_type);
813 if (err && err != -EINPROGRESS && sk->sk_err == EBADMSG) {
814 *copied -= sk_msg_free(sk, msg);
815 tls_free_open_rec(sk);
819 sk_psock_put(sk, psock);
823 enospc = sk_msg_full(msg);
824 if (psock->eval == __SK_NONE) {
825 delta = msg->sg.size;
826 psock->eval = sk_psock_msg_verdict(sk, psock, msg);
827 delta -= msg->sg.size;
829 if (msg->cork_bytes && msg->cork_bytes > msg->sg.size &&
830 !enospc && !full_record) {
836 if (msg->apply_bytes && msg->apply_bytes < send)
837 send = msg->apply_bytes;
839 switch (psock->eval) {
841 err = tls_push_record(sk, flags, record_type);
842 if (err && err != -EINPROGRESS && sk->sk_err == EBADMSG) {
843 *copied -= sk_msg_free(sk, msg);
844 tls_free_open_rec(sk);
850 sk_redir = psock->sk_redir;
851 memcpy(&msg_redir, msg, sizeof(*msg));
852 if (msg->apply_bytes < send)
853 msg->apply_bytes = 0;
855 msg->apply_bytes -= send;
856 sk_msg_return_zero(sk, msg, send);
857 msg->sg.size -= send;
859 err = tcp_bpf_sendmsg_redir(sk_redir, &msg_redir, send, flags);
862 *copied -= sk_msg_free_nocharge(sk, &msg_redir);
865 if (msg->sg.size == 0)
866 tls_free_open_rec(sk);
870 sk_msg_free_partial(sk, msg, send);
871 if (msg->apply_bytes < send)
872 msg->apply_bytes = 0;
874 msg->apply_bytes -= send;
875 if (msg->sg.size == 0)
876 tls_free_open_rec(sk);
877 *copied -= (send + delta);
882 bool reset_eval = !ctx->open_rec;
886 msg = &rec->msg_plaintext;
887 if (!msg->apply_bytes)
891 psock->eval = __SK_NONE;
892 if (psock->sk_redir) {
893 sock_put(psock->sk_redir);
894 psock->sk_redir = NULL;
901 sk_psock_put(sk, psock);
905 static int tls_sw_push_pending_record(struct sock *sk, int flags)
907 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
908 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
909 struct tls_rec *rec = ctx->open_rec;
910 struct sk_msg *msg_pl;
916 msg_pl = &rec->msg_plaintext;
917 copied = msg_pl->sg.size;
921 return bpf_exec_tx_verdict(msg_pl, sk, true, TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA,
925 int tls_sw_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size)
927 long timeo = sock_sndtimeo(sk, msg->msg_flags & MSG_DONTWAIT);
928 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
929 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
930 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
931 bool async_capable = ctx->async_capable;
932 unsigned char record_type = TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA;
933 bool is_kvec = iov_iter_is_kvec(&msg->msg_iter);
934 bool eor = !(msg->msg_flags & MSG_MORE);
937 struct sk_msg *msg_pl, *msg_en;
948 if (msg->msg_flags & ~(MSG_MORE | MSG_DONTWAIT | MSG_NOSIGNAL |
952 ret = mutex_lock_interruptible(&tls_ctx->tx_lock);
957 if (unlikely(msg->msg_controllen)) {
958 ret = tls_proccess_cmsg(sk, msg, &record_type);
960 if (ret == -EINPROGRESS)
962 else if (ret != -EAGAIN)
967 while (msg_data_left(msg)) {
976 rec = ctx->open_rec = tls_get_rec(sk);
982 msg_pl = &rec->msg_plaintext;
983 msg_en = &rec->msg_encrypted;
985 orig_size = msg_pl->sg.size;
987 try_to_copy = msg_data_left(msg);
988 record_room = TLS_MAX_PAYLOAD_SIZE - msg_pl->sg.size;
989 if (try_to_copy >= record_room) {
990 try_to_copy = record_room;
994 required_size = msg_pl->sg.size + try_to_copy +
997 if (!sk_stream_memory_free(sk))
998 goto wait_for_sndbuf;
1001 ret = tls_alloc_encrypted_msg(sk, required_size);
1004 goto wait_for_memory;
1006 /* Adjust try_to_copy according to the amount that was
1007 * actually allocated. The difference is due
1008 * to max sg elements limit
1010 try_to_copy -= required_size - msg_en->sg.size;
1014 if (!is_kvec && (full_record || eor) && !async_capable) {
1015 u32 first = msg_pl->sg.end;
1017 ret = sk_msg_zerocopy_from_iter(sk, &msg->msg_iter,
1018 msg_pl, try_to_copy);
1020 goto fallback_to_reg_send;
1023 copied += try_to_copy;
1025 sk_msg_sg_copy_set(msg_pl, first);
1026 ret = bpf_exec_tx_verdict(msg_pl, sk, full_record,
1027 record_type, &copied,
1030 if (ret == -EINPROGRESS)
1032 else if (ret == -ENOMEM)
1033 goto wait_for_memory;
1034 else if (ctx->open_rec && ret == -ENOSPC)
1036 else if (ret != -EAGAIN)
1041 copied -= try_to_copy;
1042 sk_msg_sg_copy_clear(msg_pl, first);
1043 iov_iter_revert(&msg->msg_iter,
1044 msg_pl->sg.size - orig_size);
1045 fallback_to_reg_send:
1046 sk_msg_trim(sk, msg_pl, orig_size);
1049 required_size = msg_pl->sg.size + try_to_copy;
1051 ret = tls_clone_plaintext_msg(sk, required_size);
1056 /* Adjust try_to_copy according to the amount that was
1057 * actually allocated. The difference is due
1058 * to max sg elements limit
1060 try_to_copy -= required_size - msg_pl->sg.size;
1062 sk_msg_trim(sk, msg_en,
1063 msg_pl->sg.size + prot->overhead_size);
1067 ret = sk_msg_memcopy_from_iter(sk, &msg->msg_iter,
1068 msg_pl, try_to_copy);
1073 /* Open records defined only if successfully copied, otherwise
1074 * we would trim the sg but not reset the open record frags.
1076 tls_ctx->pending_open_record_frags = true;
1077 copied += try_to_copy;
1078 if (full_record || eor) {
1079 ret = bpf_exec_tx_verdict(msg_pl, sk, full_record,
1080 record_type, &copied,
1083 if (ret == -EINPROGRESS)
1085 else if (ret == -ENOMEM)
1086 goto wait_for_memory;
1087 else if (ret != -EAGAIN) {
1098 set_bit(SOCK_NOSPACE, &sk->sk_socket->flags);
1100 ret = sk_stream_wait_memory(sk, &timeo);
1104 tls_trim_both_msgs(sk, orig_size);
1108 if (ctx->open_rec && msg_en->sg.size < required_size)
1109 goto alloc_encrypted;
1114 } else if (num_zc) {
1115 /* Wait for pending encryptions to get completed */
1116 spin_lock_bh(&ctx->encrypt_compl_lock);
1117 ctx->async_notify = true;
1119 pending = atomic_read(&ctx->encrypt_pending);
1120 spin_unlock_bh(&ctx->encrypt_compl_lock);
1122 crypto_wait_req(-EINPROGRESS, &ctx->async_wait);
1124 reinit_completion(&ctx->async_wait.completion);
1126 /* There can be no concurrent accesses, since we have no
1127 * pending encrypt operations
1129 WRITE_ONCE(ctx->async_notify, false);
1131 if (ctx->async_wait.err) {
1132 ret = ctx->async_wait.err;
1137 /* Transmit if any encryptions have completed */
1138 if (test_and_clear_bit(BIT_TX_SCHEDULED, &ctx->tx_bitmask)) {
1139 cancel_delayed_work(&ctx->tx_work.work);
1140 tls_tx_records(sk, msg->msg_flags);
1144 ret = sk_stream_error(sk, msg->msg_flags, ret);
1147 mutex_unlock(&tls_ctx->tx_lock);
1148 return copied > 0 ? copied : ret;
1151 static int tls_sw_do_sendpage(struct sock *sk, struct page *page,
1152 int offset, size_t size, int flags)
1154 long timeo = sock_sndtimeo(sk, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT);
1155 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
1156 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
1157 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
1158 unsigned char record_type = TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA;
1159 struct sk_msg *msg_pl;
1160 struct tls_rec *rec;
1168 eor = !(flags & MSG_SENDPAGE_NOTLAST);
1169 sk_clear_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_NOSPACE, sk);
1171 /* Call the sk_stream functions to manage the sndbuf mem. */
1173 size_t copy, required_size;
1181 rec = ctx->open_rec;
1183 rec = ctx->open_rec = tls_get_rec(sk);
1189 msg_pl = &rec->msg_plaintext;
1191 full_record = false;
1192 record_room = TLS_MAX_PAYLOAD_SIZE - msg_pl->sg.size;
1194 if (copy >= record_room) {
1199 required_size = msg_pl->sg.size + copy + prot->overhead_size;
1201 if (!sk_stream_memory_free(sk))
1202 goto wait_for_sndbuf;
1204 ret = tls_alloc_encrypted_msg(sk, required_size);
1207 goto wait_for_memory;
1209 /* Adjust copy according to the amount that was
1210 * actually allocated. The difference is due
1211 * to max sg elements limit
1213 copy -= required_size - msg_pl->sg.size;
1217 sk_msg_page_add(msg_pl, page, copy, offset);
1218 msg_pl->sg.copybreak = 0;
1219 msg_pl->sg.curr = msg_pl->sg.end;
1220 sk_mem_charge(sk, copy);
1226 tls_ctx->pending_open_record_frags = true;
1227 if (full_record || eor || sk_msg_full(msg_pl)) {
1228 ret = bpf_exec_tx_verdict(msg_pl, sk, full_record,
1229 record_type, &copied, flags);
1231 if (ret == -EINPROGRESS)
1233 else if (ret == -ENOMEM)
1234 goto wait_for_memory;
1235 else if (ret != -EAGAIN) {
1244 set_bit(SOCK_NOSPACE, &sk->sk_socket->flags);
1246 ret = sk_stream_wait_memory(sk, &timeo);
1249 tls_trim_both_msgs(sk, msg_pl->sg.size);
1258 /* Transmit if any encryptions have completed */
1259 if (test_and_clear_bit(BIT_TX_SCHEDULED, &ctx->tx_bitmask)) {
1260 cancel_delayed_work(&ctx->tx_work.work);
1261 tls_tx_records(sk, flags);
1265 ret = sk_stream_error(sk, flags, ret);
1266 return copied > 0 ? copied : ret;
1269 int tls_sw_sendpage_locked(struct sock *sk, struct page *page,
1270 int offset, size_t size, int flags)
1272 if (flags & ~(MSG_MORE | MSG_DONTWAIT | MSG_NOSIGNAL |
1273 MSG_SENDPAGE_NOTLAST | MSG_SENDPAGE_NOPOLICY |
1274 MSG_NO_SHARED_FRAGS))
1277 return tls_sw_do_sendpage(sk, page, offset, size, flags);
1280 int tls_sw_sendpage(struct sock *sk, struct page *page,
1281 int offset, size_t size, int flags)
1283 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
1286 if (flags & ~(MSG_MORE | MSG_DONTWAIT | MSG_NOSIGNAL |
1287 MSG_SENDPAGE_NOTLAST | MSG_SENDPAGE_NOPOLICY))
1290 ret = mutex_lock_interruptible(&tls_ctx->tx_lock);
1294 ret = tls_sw_do_sendpage(sk, page, offset, size, flags);
1296 mutex_unlock(&tls_ctx->tx_lock);
1300 static struct sk_buff *tls_wait_data(struct sock *sk, struct sk_psock *psock,
1301 bool nonblock, long timeo, int *err)
1303 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
1304 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
1305 struct sk_buff *skb;
1306 DEFINE_WAIT_FUNC(wait, woken_wake_function);
1308 while (!(skb = ctx->recv_pkt) && sk_psock_queue_empty(psock)) {
1310 *err = sock_error(sk);
1314 if (!skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_receive_queue)) {
1315 __strp_unpause(&ctx->strp);
1317 return ctx->recv_pkt;
1320 if (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN)
1323 if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DONE))
1326 if (nonblock || !timeo) {
1331 add_wait_queue(sk_sleep(sk), &wait);
1332 sk_set_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_WAITDATA, sk);
1333 sk_wait_event(sk, &timeo,
1334 ctx->recv_pkt != skb ||
1335 !sk_psock_queue_empty(psock),
1337 sk_clear_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_WAITDATA, sk);
1338 remove_wait_queue(sk_sleep(sk), &wait);
1340 /* Handle signals */
1341 if (signal_pending(current)) {
1342 *err = sock_intr_errno(timeo);
1350 static int tls_setup_from_iter(struct sock *sk, struct iov_iter *from,
1351 int length, int *pages_used,
1352 unsigned int *size_used,
1353 struct scatterlist *to,
1356 int rc = 0, i = 0, num_elem = *pages_used, maxpages;
1357 struct page *pages[MAX_SKB_FRAGS];
1358 unsigned int size = *size_used;
1359 ssize_t copied, use;
1362 while (length > 0) {
1364 maxpages = to_max_pages - num_elem;
1365 if (maxpages == 0) {
1369 copied = iov_iter_get_pages(from, pages,
1377 iov_iter_advance(from, copied);
1382 use = min_t(int, copied, PAGE_SIZE - offset);
1384 sg_set_page(&to[num_elem],
1385 pages[i], use, offset);
1386 sg_unmark_end(&to[num_elem]);
1387 /* We do not uncharge memory from this API */
1396 /* Mark the end in the last sg entry if newly added */
1397 if (num_elem > *pages_used)
1398 sg_mark_end(&to[num_elem - 1]);
1401 iov_iter_revert(from, size - *size_used);
1403 *pages_used = num_elem;
1408 /* This function decrypts the input skb into either out_iov or in out_sg
1409 * or in skb buffers itself. The input parameter 'zc' indicates if
1410 * zero-copy mode needs to be tried or not. With zero-copy mode, either
1411 * out_iov or out_sg must be non-NULL. In case both out_iov and out_sg are
1412 * NULL, then the decryption happens inside skb buffers itself, i.e.
1413 * zero-copy gets disabled and 'zc' is updated.
1416 static int decrypt_internal(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
1417 struct iov_iter *out_iov,
1418 struct scatterlist *out_sg,
1419 int *chunk, bool *zc, bool async)
1421 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
1422 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
1423 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
1424 struct strp_msg *rxm = strp_msg(skb);
1425 int n_sgin, n_sgout, nsg, mem_size, aead_size, err, pages = 0;
1426 struct aead_request *aead_req;
1427 struct sk_buff *unused;
1428 u8 *aad, *iv, *mem = NULL;
1429 struct scatterlist *sgin = NULL;
1430 struct scatterlist *sgout = NULL;
1431 const int data_len = rxm->full_len - prot->overhead_size +
1435 if (*zc && (out_iov || out_sg)) {
1437 n_sgout = iov_iter_npages(out_iov, INT_MAX) + 1;
1439 n_sgout = sg_nents(out_sg);
1440 n_sgin = skb_nsg(skb, rxm->offset + prot->prepend_size,
1441 rxm->full_len - prot->prepend_size);
1445 n_sgin = skb_cow_data(skb, 0, &unused);
1451 /* Increment to accommodate AAD */
1452 n_sgin = n_sgin + 1;
1454 nsg = n_sgin + n_sgout;
1456 aead_size = sizeof(*aead_req) + crypto_aead_reqsize(ctx->aead_recv);
1457 mem_size = aead_size + (nsg * sizeof(struct scatterlist));
1458 mem_size = mem_size + prot->aad_size;
1459 mem_size = mem_size + crypto_aead_ivsize(ctx->aead_recv);
1461 /* Allocate a single block of memory which contains
1462 * aead_req || sgin[] || sgout[] || aad || iv.
1463 * This order achieves correct alignment for aead_req, sgin, sgout.
1465 mem = kmalloc(mem_size, sk->sk_allocation);
1469 /* Segment the allocated memory */
1470 aead_req = (struct aead_request *)mem;
1471 sgin = (struct scatterlist *)(mem + aead_size);
1472 sgout = sgin + n_sgin;
1473 aad = (u8 *)(sgout + n_sgout);
1474 iv = aad + prot->aad_size;
1476 /* For CCM based ciphers, first byte of nonce+iv is always '2' */
1477 if (prot->cipher_type == TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128) {
1483 err = skb_copy_bits(skb, rxm->offset + TLS_HEADER_SIZE,
1484 iv + iv_offset + prot->salt_size,
1490 if (prot->version == TLS_1_3_VERSION)
1491 memcpy(iv + iv_offset, tls_ctx->rx.iv,
1492 prot->iv_size + prot->salt_size);
1494 memcpy(iv + iv_offset, tls_ctx->rx.iv, prot->salt_size);
1496 xor_iv_with_seq(prot->version, iv + iv_offset, tls_ctx->rx.rec_seq);
1499 tls_make_aad(aad, rxm->full_len - prot->overhead_size +
1501 tls_ctx->rx.rec_seq, prot->rec_seq_size,
1502 ctx->control, prot->version);
1505 sg_init_table(sgin, n_sgin);
1506 sg_set_buf(&sgin[0], aad, prot->aad_size);
1507 err = skb_to_sgvec(skb, &sgin[1],
1508 rxm->offset + prot->prepend_size,
1509 rxm->full_len - prot->prepend_size);
1517 sg_init_table(sgout, n_sgout);
1518 sg_set_buf(&sgout[0], aad, prot->aad_size);
1521 err = tls_setup_from_iter(sk, out_iov, data_len,
1522 &pages, chunk, &sgout[1],
1525 goto fallback_to_reg_recv;
1526 } else if (out_sg) {
1527 memcpy(sgout, out_sg, n_sgout * sizeof(*sgout));
1529 goto fallback_to_reg_recv;
1532 fallback_to_reg_recv:
1539 /* Prepare and submit AEAD request */
1540 err = tls_do_decryption(sk, skb, sgin, sgout, iv,
1541 data_len, aead_req, async);
1542 if (err == -EINPROGRESS)
1545 /* Release the pages in case iov was mapped to pages */
1546 for (; pages > 0; pages--)
1547 put_page(sg_page(&sgout[pages]));
1553 static int decrypt_skb_update(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
1554 struct iov_iter *dest, int *chunk, bool *zc,
1557 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
1558 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
1559 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
1560 struct strp_msg *rxm = strp_msg(skb);
1563 if (!ctx->decrypted) {
1564 if (tls_ctx->rx_conf == TLS_HW) {
1565 err = tls_device_decrypted(sk, tls_ctx, skb, rxm);
1570 /* Still not decrypted after tls_device */
1571 if (!ctx->decrypted) {
1572 err = decrypt_internal(sk, skb, dest, NULL, chunk, zc,
1575 if (err == -EINPROGRESS)
1576 tls_advance_record_sn(sk, prot,
1578 else if (err == -EBADMSG)
1579 TLS_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk),
1580 LINUX_MIB_TLSDECRYPTERROR);
1587 pad = padding_length(ctx, prot, skb);
1591 rxm->full_len -= pad;
1592 rxm->offset += prot->prepend_size;
1593 rxm->full_len -= prot->overhead_size;
1594 tls_advance_record_sn(sk, prot, &tls_ctx->rx);
1596 ctx->saved_data_ready(sk);
1604 int decrypt_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
1605 struct scatterlist *sgout)
1610 return decrypt_internal(sk, skb, NULL, sgout, &chunk, &zc, false);
1613 static bool tls_sw_advance_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
1616 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
1617 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
1620 struct strp_msg *rxm = strp_msg(skb);
1622 if (len < rxm->full_len) {
1624 rxm->full_len -= len;
1630 /* Finished with message */
1631 ctx->recv_pkt = NULL;
1632 __strp_unpause(&ctx->strp);
1637 /* This function traverses the rx_list in tls receive context to copies the
1638 * decrypted records into the buffer provided by caller zero copy is not
1639 * true. Further, the records are removed from the rx_list if it is not a peek
1640 * case and the record has been consumed completely.
1642 static int process_rx_list(struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx,
1651 struct sk_buff *skb = skb_peek(&ctx->rx_list);
1654 struct tls_msg *tlm;
1657 /* Set the record type in 'control' if caller didn't pass it */
1660 ctrl = tlm->control;
1663 while (skip && skb) {
1664 struct strp_msg *rxm = strp_msg(skb);
1667 /* Cannot process a record of different type */
1668 if (ctrl != tlm->control)
1671 if (skip < rxm->full_len)
1674 skip = skip - rxm->full_len;
1675 skb = skb_peek_next(skb, &ctx->rx_list);
1678 while (len && skb) {
1679 struct sk_buff *next_skb;
1680 struct strp_msg *rxm = strp_msg(skb);
1681 int chunk = min_t(unsigned int, rxm->full_len - skip, len);
1685 /* Cannot process a record of different type */
1686 if (ctrl != tlm->control)
1689 /* Set record type if not already done. For a non-data record,
1690 * do not proceed if record type could not be copied.
1693 int cerr = put_cmsg(msg, SOL_TLS, TLS_GET_RECORD_TYPE,
1694 sizeof(ctrl), &ctrl);
1696 if (ctrl != TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA) {
1697 if (cerr || msg->msg_flags & MSG_CTRUNC)
1704 if (!zc || (rxm->full_len - skip) > len) {
1705 int err = skb_copy_datagram_msg(skb, rxm->offset + skip,
1712 copied = copied + chunk;
1714 /* Consume the data from record if it is non-peek case*/
1716 rxm->offset = rxm->offset + chunk;
1717 rxm->full_len = rxm->full_len - chunk;
1719 /* Return if there is unconsumed data in the record */
1720 if (rxm->full_len - skip)
1724 /* The remaining skip-bytes must lie in 1st record in rx_list.
1725 * So from the 2nd record, 'skip' should be 0.
1730 msg->msg_flags |= MSG_EOR;
1732 next_skb = skb_peek_next(skb, &ctx->rx_list);
1735 skb_unlink(skb, &ctx->rx_list);
1746 int tls_sw_recvmsg(struct sock *sk,
1753 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
1754 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
1755 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
1756 struct sk_psock *psock;
1757 int num_async, pending;
1758 unsigned char control = 0;
1759 ssize_t decrypted = 0;
1760 struct strp_msg *rxm;
1761 struct tls_msg *tlm;
1762 struct sk_buff *skb;
1765 int target, err = 0;
1767 bool is_kvec = iov_iter_is_kvec(&msg->msg_iter);
1768 bool is_peek = flags & MSG_PEEK;
1769 bool bpf_strp_enabled;
1773 if (unlikely(flags & MSG_ERRQUEUE))
1774 return sock_recv_errqueue(sk, msg, len, SOL_IP, IP_RECVERR);
1776 psock = sk_psock_get(sk);
1778 bpf_strp_enabled = sk_psock_strp_enabled(psock);
1780 /* Process pending decrypted records. It must be non-zero-copy */
1781 err = process_rx_list(ctx, msg, &control, &cmsg, 0, len, false,
1784 tls_err_abort(sk, err);
1789 if (len <= copied || (copied && control != TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA))
1792 target = sock_rcvlowat(sk, flags & MSG_WAITALL, len);
1794 timeo = sock_rcvtimeo(sk, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT);
1798 while (len && (decrypted + copied < target || ctx->recv_pkt)) {
1799 bool retain_skb = false;
1806 skb = tls_wait_data(sk, psock, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, timeo, &err);
1809 int ret = __tcp_bpf_recvmsg(sk, psock,
1821 if (prot->version == TLS_1_3_VERSION)
1824 tlm->control = ctx->control;
1827 rxm = strp_msg(skb);
1829 to_decrypt = rxm->full_len - prot->overhead_size;
1831 if (to_decrypt <= len && !is_kvec && !is_peek &&
1832 ctx->control == TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA &&
1833 prot->version != TLS_1_3_VERSION &&
1837 /* Do not use async mode if record is non-data */
1838 if (ctx->control == TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA && !bpf_strp_enabled)
1839 async_capable = ctx->async_capable;
1841 async_capable = false;
1843 err = decrypt_skb_update(sk, skb, &msg->msg_iter,
1844 &chunk, &zc, async_capable);
1845 if (err < 0 && err != -EINPROGRESS) {
1846 tls_err_abort(sk, -EBADMSG);
1850 if (err == -EINPROGRESS) {
1853 } else if (prot->version == TLS_1_3_VERSION) {
1854 tlm->control = ctx->control;
1857 /* If the type of records being processed is not known yet,
1858 * set it to record type just dequeued. If it is already known,
1859 * but does not match the record type just dequeued, go to end.
1860 * We always get record type here since for tls1.2, record type
1861 * is known just after record is dequeued from stream parser.
1862 * For tls1.3, we disable async.
1866 control = tlm->control;
1867 else if (control != tlm->control)
1873 cerr = put_cmsg(msg, SOL_TLS, TLS_GET_RECORD_TYPE,
1874 sizeof(control), &control);
1876 if (control != TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA) {
1877 if (cerr || msg->msg_flags & MSG_CTRUNC) {
1885 goto pick_next_record;
1888 if (bpf_strp_enabled) {
1889 err = sk_psock_tls_strp_read(psock, skb);
1890 if (err != __SK_PASS) {
1891 rxm->offset = rxm->offset + rxm->full_len;
1893 if (err == __SK_DROP)
1895 ctx->recv_pkt = NULL;
1896 __strp_unpause(&ctx->strp);
1901 if (rxm->full_len > len) {
1905 chunk = rxm->full_len;
1908 err = skb_copy_datagram_msg(skb, rxm->offset,
1914 rxm->offset = rxm->offset + chunk;
1915 rxm->full_len = rxm->full_len - chunk;
1926 /* For async or peek case, queue the current skb */
1927 if (async || is_peek || retain_skb) {
1928 skb_queue_tail(&ctx->rx_list, skb);
1932 if (tls_sw_advance_skb(sk, skb, chunk)) {
1933 /* Return full control message to
1934 * userspace before trying to parse
1935 * another message type
1937 msg->msg_flags |= MSG_EOR;
1938 if (control != TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA)
1947 /* Wait for all previously submitted records to be decrypted */
1948 spin_lock_bh(&ctx->decrypt_compl_lock);
1949 ctx->async_notify = true;
1950 pending = atomic_read(&ctx->decrypt_pending);
1951 spin_unlock_bh(&ctx->decrypt_compl_lock);
1953 err = crypto_wait_req(-EINPROGRESS, &ctx->async_wait);
1955 /* one of async decrypt failed */
1956 tls_err_abort(sk, err);
1962 reinit_completion(&ctx->async_wait.completion);
1965 /* There can be no concurrent accesses, since we have no
1966 * pending decrypt operations
1968 WRITE_ONCE(ctx->async_notify, false);
1970 /* Drain records from the rx_list & copy if required */
1971 if (is_peek || is_kvec)
1972 err = process_rx_list(ctx, msg, &control, &cmsg, copied,
1973 decrypted, false, is_peek);
1975 err = process_rx_list(ctx, msg, &control, &cmsg, 0,
1976 decrypted, true, is_peek);
1978 tls_err_abort(sk, err);
1984 copied += decrypted;
1989 sk_psock_put(sk, psock);
1990 return copied ? : err;
1993 ssize_t tls_sw_splice_read(struct socket *sock, loff_t *ppos,
1994 struct pipe_inode_info *pipe,
1995 size_t len, unsigned int flags)
1997 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sock->sk);
1998 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
1999 struct strp_msg *rxm = NULL;
2000 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
2001 struct sk_buff *skb;
2010 timeo = sock_rcvtimeo(sk, flags & SPLICE_F_NONBLOCK);
2012 skb = tls_wait_data(sk, NULL, flags & SPLICE_F_NONBLOCK, timeo, &err);
2014 goto splice_read_end;
2016 err = decrypt_skb_update(sk, skb, NULL, &chunk, &zc, false);
2018 tls_err_abort(sk, -EBADMSG);
2019 goto splice_read_end;
2022 /* splice does not support reading control messages */
2023 if (ctx->control != TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA) {
2025 goto splice_read_end;
2028 rxm = strp_msg(skb);
2030 chunk = min_t(unsigned int, rxm->full_len, len);
2031 copied = skb_splice_bits(skb, sk, rxm->offset, pipe, chunk, flags);
2033 goto splice_read_end;
2035 if (likely(!(flags & MSG_PEEK)))
2036 tls_sw_advance_skb(sk, skb, copied);
2040 return copied ? : err;
2043 bool tls_sw_stream_read(const struct sock *sk)
2045 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
2046 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
2047 bool ingress_empty = true;
2048 struct sk_psock *psock;
2051 psock = sk_psock(sk);
2053 ingress_empty = list_empty(&psock->ingress_msg);
2056 return !ingress_empty || ctx->recv_pkt ||
2057 !skb_queue_empty(&ctx->rx_list);
2060 static int tls_read_size(struct strparser *strp, struct sk_buff *skb)
2062 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(strp->sk);
2063 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
2064 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
2065 char header[TLS_HEADER_SIZE + MAX_IV_SIZE];
2066 struct strp_msg *rxm = strp_msg(skb);
2067 size_t cipher_overhead;
2068 size_t data_len = 0;
2071 /* Verify that we have a full TLS header, or wait for more data */
2072 if (rxm->offset + prot->prepend_size > skb->len)
2075 /* Sanity-check size of on-stack buffer. */
2076 if (WARN_ON(prot->prepend_size > sizeof(header))) {
2081 /* Linearize header to local buffer */
2082 ret = skb_copy_bits(skb, rxm->offset, header, prot->prepend_size);
2087 ctx->control = header[0];
2089 data_len = ((header[4] & 0xFF) | (header[3] << 8));
2091 cipher_overhead = prot->tag_size;
2092 if (prot->version != TLS_1_3_VERSION)
2093 cipher_overhead += prot->iv_size;
2095 if (data_len > TLS_MAX_PAYLOAD_SIZE + cipher_overhead +
2100 if (data_len < cipher_overhead) {
2105 /* Note that both TLS1.3 and TLS1.2 use TLS_1_2 version here */
2106 if (header[1] != TLS_1_2_VERSION_MINOR ||
2107 header[2] != TLS_1_2_VERSION_MAJOR) {
2112 tls_device_rx_resync_new_rec(strp->sk, data_len + TLS_HEADER_SIZE,
2113 TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq + rxm->offset);
2114 return data_len + TLS_HEADER_SIZE;
2117 tls_err_abort(strp->sk, ret);
2122 static void tls_queue(struct strparser *strp, struct sk_buff *skb)
2124 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(strp->sk);
2125 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
2129 ctx->recv_pkt = skb;
2132 ctx->saved_data_ready(strp->sk);
2135 static void tls_data_ready(struct sock *sk)
2137 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
2138 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
2139 struct sk_psock *psock;
2141 strp_data_ready(&ctx->strp);
2143 psock = sk_psock_get(sk);
2145 if (!list_empty(&psock->ingress_msg))
2146 ctx->saved_data_ready(sk);
2147 sk_psock_put(sk, psock);
2151 void tls_sw_cancel_work_tx(struct tls_context *tls_ctx)
2153 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
2155 set_bit(BIT_TX_CLOSING, &ctx->tx_bitmask);
2156 set_bit(BIT_TX_SCHEDULED, &ctx->tx_bitmask);
2157 cancel_delayed_work_sync(&ctx->tx_work.work);
2160 void tls_sw_release_resources_tx(struct sock *sk)
2162 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
2163 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
2164 struct tls_rec *rec, *tmp;
2167 /* Wait for any pending async encryptions to complete */
2168 spin_lock_bh(&ctx->encrypt_compl_lock);
2169 ctx->async_notify = true;
2170 pending = atomic_read(&ctx->encrypt_pending);
2171 spin_unlock_bh(&ctx->encrypt_compl_lock);
2174 crypto_wait_req(-EINPROGRESS, &ctx->async_wait);
2176 tls_tx_records(sk, -1);
2178 /* Free up un-sent records in tx_list. First, free
2179 * the partially sent record if any at head of tx_list.
2181 if (tls_ctx->partially_sent_record) {
2182 tls_free_partial_record(sk, tls_ctx);
2183 rec = list_first_entry(&ctx->tx_list,
2184 struct tls_rec, list);
2185 list_del(&rec->list);
2186 sk_msg_free(sk, &rec->msg_plaintext);
2190 list_for_each_entry_safe(rec, tmp, &ctx->tx_list, list) {
2191 list_del(&rec->list);
2192 sk_msg_free(sk, &rec->msg_encrypted);
2193 sk_msg_free(sk, &rec->msg_plaintext);
2197 crypto_free_aead(ctx->aead_send);
2198 tls_free_open_rec(sk);
2201 void tls_sw_free_ctx_tx(struct tls_context *tls_ctx)
2203 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
2208 void tls_sw_release_resources_rx(struct sock *sk)
2210 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
2211 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
2213 kfree(tls_ctx->rx.rec_seq);
2214 kfree(tls_ctx->rx.iv);
2216 if (ctx->aead_recv) {
2217 kfree_skb(ctx->recv_pkt);
2218 ctx->recv_pkt = NULL;
2219 skb_queue_purge(&ctx->rx_list);
2220 crypto_free_aead(ctx->aead_recv);
2221 strp_stop(&ctx->strp);
2222 /* If tls_sw_strparser_arm() was not called (cleanup paths)
2223 * we still want to strp_stop(), but sk->sk_data_ready was
2226 if (ctx->saved_data_ready) {
2227 write_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
2228 sk->sk_data_ready = ctx->saved_data_ready;
2229 write_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
2234 void tls_sw_strparser_done(struct tls_context *tls_ctx)
2236 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
2238 strp_done(&ctx->strp);
2241 void tls_sw_free_ctx_rx(struct tls_context *tls_ctx)
2243 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
2248 void tls_sw_free_resources_rx(struct sock *sk)
2250 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
2252 tls_sw_release_resources_rx(sk);
2253 tls_sw_free_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
2256 /* The work handler to transmitt the encrypted records in tx_list */
2257 static void tx_work_handler(struct work_struct *work)
2259 struct delayed_work *delayed_work = to_delayed_work(work);
2260 struct tx_work *tx_work = container_of(delayed_work,
2261 struct tx_work, work);
2262 struct sock *sk = tx_work->sk;
2263 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
2264 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx;
2266 if (unlikely(!tls_ctx))
2269 ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
2270 if (test_bit(BIT_TX_CLOSING, &ctx->tx_bitmask))
2273 if (!test_and_clear_bit(BIT_TX_SCHEDULED, &ctx->tx_bitmask))
2276 if (mutex_trylock(&tls_ctx->tx_lock)) {
2278 tls_tx_records(sk, -1);
2280 mutex_unlock(&tls_ctx->tx_lock);
2281 } else if (!test_and_set_bit(BIT_TX_SCHEDULED, &ctx->tx_bitmask)) {
2282 /* Someone is holding the tx_lock, they will likely run Tx
2283 * and cancel the work on their way out of the lock section.
2284 * Schedule a long delay just in case.
2286 schedule_delayed_work(&ctx->tx_work.work, msecs_to_jiffies(10));
2290 void tls_sw_write_space(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *ctx)
2292 struct tls_sw_context_tx *tx_ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(ctx);
2294 /* Schedule the transmission if tx list is ready */
2295 if (is_tx_ready(tx_ctx) &&
2296 !test_and_set_bit(BIT_TX_SCHEDULED, &tx_ctx->tx_bitmask))
2297 schedule_delayed_work(&tx_ctx->tx_work.work, 0);
2300 void tls_sw_strparser_arm(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *tls_ctx)
2302 struct tls_sw_context_rx *rx_ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
2304 write_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
2305 rx_ctx->saved_data_ready = sk->sk_data_ready;
2306 sk->sk_data_ready = tls_data_ready;
2307 write_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
2309 strp_check_rcv(&rx_ctx->strp);
2312 int tls_set_sw_offload(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *ctx, int tx)
2314 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
2315 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
2316 struct tls_crypto_info *crypto_info;
2317 struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_gcm_128 *gcm_128_info;
2318 struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_gcm_256 *gcm_256_info;
2319 struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_ccm_128 *ccm_128_info;
2320 struct tls_sw_context_tx *sw_ctx_tx = NULL;
2321 struct tls_sw_context_rx *sw_ctx_rx = NULL;
2322 struct cipher_context *cctx;
2323 struct crypto_aead **aead;
2324 struct strp_callbacks cb;
2325 u16 nonce_size, tag_size, iv_size, rec_seq_size, salt_size;
2326 struct crypto_tfm *tfm;
2327 char *iv, *rec_seq, *key, *salt, *cipher_name;
2337 if (!ctx->priv_ctx_tx) {
2338 sw_ctx_tx = kzalloc(sizeof(*sw_ctx_tx), GFP_KERNEL);
2343 ctx->priv_ctx_tx = sw_ctx_tx;
2346 (struct tls_sw_context_tx *)ctx->priv_ctx_tx;
2349 if (!ctx->priv_ctx_rx) {
2350 sw_ctx_rx = kzalloc(sizeof(*sw_ctx_rx), GFP_KERNEL);
2355 ctx->priv_ctx_rx = sw_ctx_rx;
2358 (struct tls_sw_context_rx *)ctx->priv_ctx_rx;
2363 crypto_init_wait(&sw_ctx_tx->async_wait);
2364 spin_lock_init(&sw_ctx_tx->encrypt_compl_lock);
2365 crypto_info = &ctx->crypto_send.info;
2367 aead = &sw_ctx_tx->aead_send;
2368 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sw_ctx_tx->tx_list);
2369 INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&sw_ctx_tx->tx_work.work, tx_work_handler);
2370 sw_ctx_tx->tx_work.sk = sk;
2372 crypto_init_wait(&sw_ctx_rx->async_wait);
2373 spin_lock_init(&sw_ctx_rx->decrypt_compl_lock);
2374 crypto_info = &ctx->crypto_recv.info;
2376 skb_queue_head_init(&sw_ctx_rx->rx_list);
2377 aead = &sw_ctx_rx->aead_recv;
2380 switch (crypto_info->cipher_type) {
2381 case TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128: {
2382 nonce_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_IV_SIZE;
2383 tag_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_TAG_SIZE;
2384 iv_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_IV_SIZE;
2385 iv = ((struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_gcm_128 *)crypto_info)->iv;
2386 rec_seq_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_REC_SEQ_SIZE;
2388 ((struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_gcm_128 *)crypto_info)->rec_seq;
2390 (struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_gcm_128 *)crypto_info;
2391 keysize = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_KEY_SIZE;
2392 key = gcm_128_info->key;
2393 salt = gcm_128_info->salt;
2394 salt_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_SALT_SIZE;
2395 cipher_name = "gcm(aes)";
2398 case TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_256: {
2399 nonce_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_256_IV_SIZE;
2400 tag_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_256_TAG_SIZE;
2401 iv_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_256_IV_SIZE;
2402 iv = ((struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_gcm_256 *)crypto_info)->iv;
2403 rec_seq_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_256_REC_SEQ_SIZE;
2405 ((struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_gcm_256 *)crypto_info)->rec_seq;
2407 (struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_gcm_256 *)crypto_info;
2408 keysize = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_256_KEY_SIZE;
2409 key = gcm_256_info->key;
2410 salt = gcm_256_info->salt;
2411 salt_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_256_SALT_SIZE;
2412 cipher_name = "gcm(aes)";
2415 case TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128: {
2416 nonce_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128_IV_SIZE;
2417 tag_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128_TAG_SIZE;
2418 iv_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128_IV_SIZE;
2419 iv = ((struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_ccm_128 *)crypto_info)->iv;
2420 rec_seq_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128_REC_SEQ_SIZE;
2422 ((struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_ccm_128 *)crypto_info)->rec_seq;
2424 (struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_ccm_128 *)crypto_info;
2425 keysize = TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128_KEY_SIZE;
2426 key = ccm_128_info->key;
2427 salt = ccm_128_info->salt;
2428 salt_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128_SALT_SIZE;
2429 cipher_name = "ccm(aes)";
2437 /* Sanity-check the sizes for stack allocations. */
2438 if (iv_size > MAX_IV_SIZE || nonce_size > MAX_IV_SIZE ||
2439 rec_seq_size > TLS_MAX_REC_SEQ_SIZE) {
2444 if (crypto_info->version == TLS_1_3_VERSION) {
2446 prot->aad_size = TLS_HEADER_SIZE;
2447 prot->tail_size = 1;
2449 prot->aad_size = TLS_AAD_SPACE_SIZE;
2450 prot->tail_size = 0;
2453 prot->version = crypto_info->version;
2454 prot->cipher_type = crypto_info->cipher_type;
2455 prot->prepend_size = TLS_HEADER_SIZE + nonce_size;
2456 prot->tag_size = tag_size;
2457 prot->overhead_size = prot->prepend_size +
2458 prot->tag_size + prot->tail_size;
2459 prot->iv_size = iv_size;
2460 prot->salt_size = salt_size;
2461 cctx->iv = kmalloc(iv_size + salt_size, GFP_KERNEL);
2466 /* Note: 128 & 256 bit salt are the same size */
2467 prot->rec_seq_size = rec_seq_size;
2468 memcpy(cctx->iv, salt, salt_size);
2469 memcpy(cctx->iv + salt_size, iv, iv_size);
2470 cctx->rec_seq = kmemdup(rec_seq, rec_seq_size, GFP_KERNEL);
2471 if (!cctx->rec_seq) {
2477 *aead = crypto_alloc_aead(cipher_name, 0, 0);
2478 if (IS_ERR(*aead)) {
2479 rc = PTR_ERR(*aead);
2485 ctx->push_pending_record = tls_sw_push_pending_record;
2487 rc = crypto_aead_setkey(*aead, key, keysize);
2492 rc = crypto_aead_setauthsize(*aead, prot->tag_size);
2497 tfm = crypto_aead_tfm(sw_ctx_rx->aead_recv);
2499 if (crypto_info->version == TLS_1_3_VERSION)
2500 sw_ctx_rx->async_capable = 0;
2502 sw_ctx_rx->async_capable =
2503 !!(tfm->__crt_alg->cra_flags &
2506 /* Set up strparser */
2507 memset(&cb, 0, sizeof(cb));
2508 cb.rcv_msg = tls_queue;
2509 cb.parse_msg = tls_read_size;
2511 strp_init(&sw_ctx_rx->strp, sk, &cb);
2517 crypto_free_aead(*aead);
2520 kfree(cctx->rec_seq);
2521 cctx->rec_seq = NULL;
2527 kfree(ctx->priv_ctx_tx);
2528 ctx->priv_ctx_tx = NULL;
2530 kfree(ctx->priv_ctx_rx);
2531 ctx->priv_ctx_rx = NULL;