2 BlueZ - Bluetooth protocol stack for Linux
3 Copyright (C) 2011 Nokia Corporation and/or its subsidiary(-ies).
5 This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
6 it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
7 published by the Free Software Foundation;
9 THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS
10 OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
11 FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT OF THIRD PARTY RIGHTS.
12 IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER(S) AND AUTHOR(S) BE LIABLE FOR ANY
13 CLAIM, OR ANY SPECIAL INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, OR ANY DAMAGES
14 WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
15 ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
16 OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
18 ALL LIABILITY, INCLUDING LIABILITY FOR INFRINGEMENT OF ANY PATENTS,
19 COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS OR OTHER RIGHTS, RELATING TO USE OF THIS
20 SOFTWARE IS DISCLAIMED.
23 #include <linux/debugfs.h>
24 #include <linux/scatterlist.h>
25 #include <linux/crypto.h>
26 #include <crypto/aes.h>
27 #include <crypto/algapi.h>
28 #include <crypto/b128ops.h>
29 #include <crypto/hash.h>
30 #include <crypto/kpp.h>
32 #include <net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h>
33 #include <net/bluetooth/hci_core.h>
34 #include <net/bluetooth/l2cap.h>
35 #include <net/bluetooth/mgmt.h>
37 #include "ecdh_helper.h"
40 #define SMP_DEV(hdev) \
41 ((struct smp_dev *)((struct l2cap_chan *)((hdev)->smp_data))->data)
43 /* Low-level debug macros to be used for stuff that we don't want
44 * accidentially in dmesg, i.e. the values of the various crypto keys
45 * and the inputs & outputs of crypto functions.
48 #define SMP_DBG(fmt, ...) printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: " fmt, __func__, \
51 #define SMP_DBG(fmt, ...) no_printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: " fmt, __func__, \
55 #define SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, code) set_bit(code, &smp->allow_cmd)
57 /* Keys which are not distributed with Secure Connections */
58 #define SMP_SC_NO_DIST (SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY);
60 #define SMP_TIMEOUT msecs_to_jiffies(30000)
62 #define AUTH_REQ_MASK(dev) (hci_dev_test_flag(dev, HCI_SC_ENABLED) ? \
64 #define KEY_DIST_MASK 0x07
66 /* Maximum message length that can be passed to aes_cmac */
67 #define CMAC_MSG_MAX 80
79 SMP_FLAG_DHKEY_PENDING,
86 /* Secure Connections OOB data */
92 struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac;
93 struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh;
97 struct l2cap_conn *conn;
98 struct delayed_work security_timer;
99 unsigned long allow_cmd; /* Bitmask of allowed commands */
101 u8 preq[7]; /* SMP Pairing Request */
102 u8 prsp[7]; /* SMP Pairing Response */
103 u8 prnd[16]; /* SMP Pairing Random (local) */
104 u8 rrnd[16]; /* SMP Pairing Random (remote) */
105 u8 pcnf[16]; /* SMP Pairing Confirm */
106 u8 tk[16]; /* SMP Temporary Key */
107 u8 rr[16]; /* Remote OOB ra/rb value */
108 u8 lr[16]; /* Local OOB ra/rb value */
114 struct smp_csrk *csrk;
115 struct smp_csrk *responder_csrk;
117 struct smp_ltk *responder_ltk;
118 struct smp_irk *remote_irk;
124 /* Secure Connections variables */
130 struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac;
131 struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh;
134 /* These debug key values are defined in the SMP section of the core
135 * specification. debug_pk is the public debug key and debug_sk the
138 static const u8 debug_pk[64] = {
139 0xe6, 0x9d, 0x35, 0x0e, 0x48, 0x01, 0x03, 0xcc,
140 0xdb, 0xfd, 0xf4, 0xac, 0x11, 0x91, 0xf4, 0xef,
141 0xb9, 0xa5, 0xf9, 0xe9, 0xa7, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x5e,
142 0x2c, 0xbe, 0x97, 0xf2, 0xd2, 0x03, 0xb0, 0x20,
144 0x8b, 0xd2, 0x89, 0x15, 0xd0, 0x8e, 0x1c, 0x74,
145 0x24, 0x30, 0xed, 0x8f, 0xc2, 0x45, 0x63, 0x76,
146 0x5c, 0x15, 0x52, 0x5a, 0xbf, 0x9a, 0x32, 0x63,
147 0x6d, 0xeb, 0x2a, 0x65, 0x49, 0x9c, 0x80, 0xdc,
150 static const u8 debug_sk[32] = {
151 0xbd, 0x1a, 0x3c, 0xcd, 0xa6, 0xb8, 0x99, 0x58,
152 0x99, 0xb7, 0x40, 0xeb, 0x7b, 0x60, 0xff, 0x4a,
153 0x50, 0x3f, 0x10, 0xd2, 0xe3, 0xb3, 0xc9, 0x74,
154 0x38, 0x5f, 0xc5, 0xa3, 0xd4, 0xf6, 0x49, 0x3f,
157 static inline void swap_buf(const u8 *src, u8 *dst, size_t len)
161 for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
162 dst[len - 1 - i] = src[i];
165 /* The following functions map to the LE SC SMP crypto functions
166 * AES-CMAC, f4, f5, f6, g2 and h6.
169 static int aes_cmac(struct crypto_shash *tfm, const u8 k[16], const u8 *m,
170 size_t len, u8 mac[16])
172 uint8_t tmp[16], mac_msb[16], msg_msb[CMAC_MSG_MAX];
175 if (len > CMAC_MSG_MAX)
179 BT_ERR("tfm %p", tfm);
183 /* Swap key and message from LSB to MSB */
184 swap_buf(k, tmp, 16);
185 swap_buf(m, msg_msb, len);
187 SMP_DBG("msg (len %zu) %*phN", len, (int) len, m);
188 SMP_DBG("key %16phN", k);
190 err = crypto_shash_setkey(tfm, tmp, 16);
192 BT_ERR("cipher setkey failed: %d", err);
196 err = crypto_shash_tfm_digest(tfm, msg_msb, len, mac_msb);
198 BT_ERR("Hash computation error %d", err);
202 swap_buf(mac_msb, mac, 16);
204 SMP_DBG("mac %16phN", mac);
209 static int smp_f4(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 u[32],
210 const u8 v[32], const u8 x[16], u8 z, u8 res[16])
215 SMP_DBG("u %32phN", u);
216 SMP_DBG("v %32phN", v);
217 SMP_DBG("x %16phN z %02x", x, z);
220 memcpy(m + 1, v, 32);
221 memcpy(m + 33, u, 32);
223 err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, x, m, sizeof(m), res);
227 SMP_DBG("res %16phN", res);
232 static int smp_f5(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 w[32],
233 const u8 n1[16], const u8 n2[16], const u8 a1[7],
234 const u8 a2[7], u8 mackey[16], u8 ltk[16])
236 /* The btle, salt and length "magic" values are as defined in
237 * the SMP section of the Bluetooth core specification. In ASCII
238 * the btle value ends up being 'btle'. The salt is just a
239 * random number whereas length is the value 256 in little
242 const u8 btle[4] = { 0x65, 0x6c, 0x74, 0x62 };
243 const u8 salt[16] = { 0xbe, 0x83, 0x60, 0x5a, 0xdb, 0x0b, 0x37, 0x60,
244 0x38, 0xa5, 0xf5, 0xaa, 0x91, 0x83, 0x88, 0x6c };
245 const u8 length[2] = { 0x00, 0x01 };
249 SMP_DBG("w %32phN", w);
250 SMP_DBG("n1 %16phN n2 %16phN", n1, n2);
251 SMP_DBG("a1 %7phN a2 %7phN", a1, a2);
253 err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, salt, w, 32, t);
257 SMP_DBG("t %16phN", t);
259 memcpy(m, length, 2);
260 memcpy(m + 2, a2, 7);
261 memcpy(m + 9, a1, 7);
262 memcpy(m + 16, n2, 16);
263 memcpy(m + 32, n1, 16);
264 memcpy(m + 48, btle, 4);
266 m[52] = 0; /* Counter */
268 err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, t, m, sizeof(m), mackey);
272 SMP_DBG("mackey %16phN", mackey);
274 m[52] = 1; /* Counter */
276 err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, t, m, sizeof(m), ltk);
280 SMP_DBG("ltk %16phN", ltk);
285 static int smp_f6(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 w[16],
286 const u8 n1[16], const u8 n2[16], const u8 r[16],
287 const u8 io_cap[3], const u8 a1[7], const u8 a2[7],
293 SMP_DBG("w %16phN", w);
294 SMP_DBG("n1 %16phN n2 %16phN", n1, n2);
295 SMP_DBG("r %16phN io_cap %3phN a1 %7phN a2 %7phN", r, io_cap, a1, a2);
298 memcpy(m + 7, a1, 7);
299 memcpy(m + 14, io_cap, 3);
300 memcpy(m + 17, r, 16);
301 memcpy(m + 33, n2, 16);
302 memcpy(m + 49, n1, 16);
304 err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, w, m, sizeof(m), res);
308 SMP_DBG("res %16phN", res);
313 static int smp_g2(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 u[32], const u8 v[32],
314 const u8 x[16], const u8 y[16], u32 *val)
319 SMP_DBG("u %32phN", u);
320 SMP_DBG("v %32phN", v);
321 SMP_DBG("x %16phN y %16phN", x, y);
324 memcpy(m + 16, v, 32);
325 memcpy(m + 48, u, 32);
327 err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, x, m, sizeof(m), tmp);
331 *val = get_unaligned_le32(tmp);
334 SMP_DBG("val %06u", *val);
339 static int smp_h6(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 w[16],
340 const u8 key_id[4], u8 res[16])
344 SMP_DBG("w %16phN key_id %4phN", w, key_id);
346 err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, w, key_id, 4, res);
350 SMP_DBG("res %16phN", res);
355 static int smp_h7(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 w[16],
356 const u8 salt[16], u8 res[16])
360 SMP_DBG("w %16phN salt %16phN", w, salt);
362 err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, salt, w, 16, res);
366 SMP_DBG("res %16phN", res);
371 /* The following functions map to the legacy SMP crypto functions e, c1,
375 static int smp_e(const u8 *k, u8 *r)
377 struct crypto_aes_ctx ctx;
378 uint8_t tmp[16], data[16];
381 SMP_DBG("k %16phN r %16phN", k, r);
383 /* The most significant octet of key corresponds to k[0] */
384 swap_buf(k, tmp, 16);
386 err = aes_expandkey(&ctx, tmp, 16);
388 BT_ERR("cipher setkey failed: %d", err);
392 /* Most significant octet of plaintextData corresponds to data[0] */
393 swap_buf(r, data, 16);
395 aes_encrypt(&ctx, data, data);
397 /* Most significant octet of encryptedData corresponds to data[0] */
398 swap_buf(data, r, 16);
400 SMP_DBG("r %16phN", r);
402 memzero_explicit(&ctx, sizeof (ctx));
406 static int smp_c1(const u8 k[16],
407 const u8 r[16], const u8 preq[7], const u8 pres[7], u8 _iat,
408 const bdaddr_t *ia, u8 _rat, const bdaddr_t *ra, u8 res[16])
413 SMP_DBG("k %16phN r %16phN", k, r);
414 SMP_DBG("iat %u ia %6phN rat %u ra %6phN", _iat, ia, _rat, ra);
415 SMP_DBG("preq %7phN pres %7phN", preq, pres);
419 /* p1 = pres || preq || _rat || _iat */
422 memcpy(p1 + 2, preq, 7);
423 memcpy(p1 + 9, pres, 7);
425 SMP_DBG("p1 %16phN", p1);
428 u128_xor((u128 *) res, (u128 *) r, (u128 *) p1);
430 /* res = e(k, res) */
433 BT_ERR("Encrypt data error");
437 /* p2 = padding || ia || ra */
439 memcpy(p2 + 6, ia, 6);
440 memset(p2 + 12, 0, 4);
442 SMP_DBG("p2 %16phN", p2);
444 /* res = res XOR p2 */
445 u128_xor((u128 *) res, (u128 *) res, (u128 *) p2);
447 /* res = e(k, res) */
450 BT_ERR("Encrypt data error");
455 static int smp_s1(const u8 k[16],
456 const u8 r1[16], const u8 r2[16], u8 _r[16])
460 /* Just least significant octets from r1 and r2 are considered */
462 memcpy(_r + 8, r1, 8);
466 BT_ERR("Encrypt data error");
471 static int smp_ah(const u8 irk[16], const u8 r[3], u8 res[3])
476 /* r' = padding || r */
478 memset(_res + 3, 0, 13);
480 err = smp_e(irk, _res);
482 BT_ERR("Encrypt error");
486 /* The output of the random address function ah is:
487 * ah(k, r) = e(k, r') mod 2^24
488 * The output of the security function e is then truncated to 24 bits
489 * by taking the least significant 24 bits of the output of e as the
492 memcpy(res, _res, 3);
497 bool smp_irk_matches(struct hci_dev *hdev, const u8 irk[16],
498 const bdaddr_t *bdaddr)
500 struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data;
504 if (!chan || !chan->data)
507 bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "RPA %pMR IRK %*phN", bdaddr, 16, irk);
509 err = smp_ah(irk, &bdaddr->b[3], hash);
513 return !crypto_memneq(bdaddr->b, hash, 3);
516 int smp_generate_rpa(struct hci_dev *hdev, const u8 irk[16], bdaddr_t *rpa)
518 struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data;
521 if (!chan || !chan->data)
524 get_random_bytes(&rpa->b[3], 3);
526 rpa->b[5] &= 0x3f; /* Clear two most significant bits */
527 rpa->b[5] |= 0x40; /* Set second most significant bit */
529 err = smp_ah(irk, &rpa->b[3], rpa->b);
533 bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "RPA %pMR", rpa);
538 int smp_generate_oob(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 hash[16], u8 rand[16])
540 struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data;
544 if (!chan || !chan->data)
549 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_USE_DEBUG_KEYS)) {
550 bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "Using debug keys");
551 err = set_ecdh_privkey(smp->tfm_ecdh, debug_sk);
554 memcpy(smp->local_pk, debug_pk, 64);
555 smp->debug_key = true;
558 /* Generate key pair for Secure Connections */
559 err = generate_ecdh_keys(smp->tfm_ecdh, smp->local_pk);
563 /* This is unlikely, but we need to check that
564 * we didn't accidentially generate a debug key.
566 if (crypto_memneq(smp->local_pk, debug_pk, 64))
569 smp->debug_key = false;
572 SMP_DBG("OOB Public Key X: %32phN", smp->local_pk);
573 SMP_DBG("OOB Public Key Y: %32phN", smp->local_pk + 32);
575 get_random_bytes(smp->local_rand, 16);
577 err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->local_pk, smp->local_pk,
578 smp->local_rand, 0, hash);
582 memcpy(rand, smp->local_rand, 16);
584 smp->local_oob = true;
589 static void smp_send_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 code, u16 len, void *data)
591 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
592 struct smp_chan *smp;
599 bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "code 0x%2.2x", code);
601 iv[0].iov_base = &code;
604 iv[1].iov_base = data;
607 memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg));
609 iov_iter_kvec(&msg.msg_iter, WRITE, iv, 2, 1 + len);
611 l2cap_chan_send(chan, &msg, 1 + len);
618 cancel_delayed_work_sync(&smp->security_timer);
619 schedule_delayed_work(&smp->security_timer, SMP_TIMEOUT);
622 static u8 authreq_to_seclevel(u8 authreq)
624 if (authreq & SMP_AUTH_MITM) {
625 if (authreq & SMP_AUTH_SC)
626 return BT_SECURITY_FIPS;
628 return BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
630 return BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM;
634 static __u8 seclevel_to_authreq(__u8 sec_level)
637 case BT_SECURITY_FIPS:
638 case BT_SECURITY_HIGH:
639 return SMP_AUTH_MITM | SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
640 case BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM:
641 return SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
643 return SMP_AUTH_NONE;
647 static void build_pairing_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
648 struct smp_cmd_pairing *req,
649 struct smp_cmd_pairing *rsp, __u8 authreq)
651 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
652 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
653 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
654 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
655 u8 local_dist = 0, remote_dist = 0, oob_flag = SMP_OOB_NOT_PRESENT;
657 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_BONDABLE)) {
658 local_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN;
659 remote_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN;
660 authreq |= SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
662 authreq &= ~SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
665 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_RPA_RESOLVING))
666 remote_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
668 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_PRIVACY))
669 local_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
671 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ENABLED) &&
672 (authreq & SMP_AUTH_SC)) {
673 struct oob_data *oob_data;
676 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SSP_ENABLED)) {
677 local_dist |= SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY;
678 remote_dist |= SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY;
681 if (hcon->dst_type == ADDR_LE_DEV_PUBLIC)
682 bdaddr_type = BDADDR_LE_PUBLIC;
684 bdaddr_type = BDADDR_LE_RANDOM;
686 oob_data = hci_find_remote_oob_data(hdev, &hcon->dst,
688 if (oob_data && oob_data->present) {
689 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_OOB, &smp->flags);
690 oob_flag = SMP_OOB_PRESENT;
691 memcpy(smp->rr, oob_data->rand256, 16);
692 memcpy(smp->pcnf, oob_data->hash256, 16);
693 SMP_DBG("OOB Remote Confirmation: %16phN", smp->pcnf);
694 SMP_DBG("OOB Remote Random: %16phN", smp->rr);
698 authreq &= ~SMP_AUTH_SC;
702 req->io_capability = conn->hcon->io_capability;
703 req->oob_flag = oob_flag;
704 req->max_key_size = hdev->le_max_key_size;
705 req->init_key_dist = local_dist;
706 req->resp_key_dist = remote_dist;
707 req->auth_req = (authreq & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev));
709 smp->remote_key_dist = remote_dist;
713 rsp->io_capability = conn->hcon->io_capability;
714 rsp->oob_flag = oob_flag;
715 rsp->max_key_size = hdev->le_max_key_size;
716 rsp->init_key_dist = req->init_key_dist & remote_dist;
717 rsp->resp_key_dist = req->resp_key_dist & local_dist;
718 rsp->auth_req = (authreq & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev));
720 smp->remote_key_dist = rsp->init_key_dist;
723 static u8 check_enc_key_size(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 max_key_size)
725 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
726 struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
727 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
729 if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level == BT_SECURITY_FIPS &&
730 max_key_size != SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE)
731 return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
733 if (max_key_size > hdev->le_max_key_size ||
734 max_key_size < SMP_MIN_ENC_KEY_SIZE)
735 return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
737 smp->enc_key_size = max_key_size;
742 static void smp_chan_destroy(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
744 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
745 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
746 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
751 cancel_delayed_work_sync(&smp->security_timer);
753 complete = test_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags);
754 mgmt_smp_complete(hcon, complete);
756 kfree_sensitive(smp->csrk);
757 kfree_sensitive(smp->responder_csrk);
758 kfree_sensitive(smp->link_key);
760 crypto_free_shash(smp->tfm_cmac);
761 crypto_free_kpp(smp->tfm_ecdh);
763 /* Ensure that we don't leave any debug key around if debug key
764 * support hasn't been explicitly enabled.
766 if (smp->ltk && smp->ltk->type == SMP_LTK_P256_DEBUG &&
767 !hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_KEEP_DEBUG_KEYS)) {
768 list_del_rcu(&smp->ltk->list);
769 kfree_rcu(smp->ltk, rcu);
773 /* If pairing failed clean up any keys we might have */
776 list_del_rcu(&smp->ltk->list);
777 kfree_rcu(smp->ltk, rcu);
780 if (smp->responder_ltk) {
781 list_del_rcu(&smp->responder_ltk->list);
782 kfree_rcu(smp->responder_ltk, rcu);
785 if (smp->remote_irk) {
786 list_del_rcu(&smp->remote_irk->list);
787 kfree_rcu(smp->remote_irk, rcu);
792 kfree_sensitive(smp);
796 static void smp_failure(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 reason)
798 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
799 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
802 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL, sizeof(reason),
805 mgmt_auth_failed(hcon, HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE);
808 smp_chan_destroy(conn);
811 #define JUST_WORKS 0x00
812 #define JUST_CFM 0x01
813 #define REQ_PASSKEY 0x02
814 #define CFM_PASSKEY 0x03
816 #define DSP_PASSKEY 0x05
819 static const u8 gen_method[5][5] = {
820 { JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, REQ_PASSKEY },
821 { JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, REQ_PASSKEY },
822 { CFM_PASSKEY, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, CFM_PASSKEY },
823 { JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, JUST_WORKS, JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM },
824 { CFM_PASSKEY, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, OVERLAP },
827 static const u8 sc_method[5][5] = {
828 { JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, REQ_PASSKEY },
829 { JUST_WORKS, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, CFM_PASSKEY },
830 { DSP_PASSKEY, DSP_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, DSP_PASSKEY },
831 { JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, JUST_WORKS, JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM },
832 { DSP_PASSKEY, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, CFM_PASSKEY },
835 static u8 get_auth_method(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 local_io, u8 remote_io)
837 /* If either side has unknown io_caps, use JUST_CFM (which gets
838 * converted later to JUST_WORKS if we're initiators.
840 if (local_io > SMP_IO_KEYBOARD_DISPLAY ||
841 remote_io > SMP_IO_KEYBOARD_DISPLAY)
844 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags))
845 return sc_method[remote_io][local_io];
847 return gen_method[remote_io][local_io];
850 static int tk_request(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 remote_oob, u8 auth,
851 u8 local_io, u8 remote_io)
853 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
854 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
855 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
859 /* Initialize key for JUST WORKS */
860 memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk));
861 clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags);
863 bt_dev_dbg(hcon->hdev, "auth:%d lcl:%d rem:%d", auth, local_io,
866 /* If neither side wants MITM, either "just" confirm an incoming
867 * request or use just-works for outgoing ones. The JUST_CFM
868 * will be converted to JUST_WORKS if necessary later in this
869 * function. If either side has MITM look up the method from the
872 if (!(auth & SMP_AUTH_MITM))
873 smp->method = JUST_CFM;
875 smp->method = get_auth_method(smp, local_io, remote_io);
877 /* Don't confirm locally initiated pairing attempts */
878 if (smp->method == JUST_CFM && test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR,
880 smp->method = JUST_WORKS;
882 /* Don't bother user space with no IO capabilities */
883 if (smp->method == JUST_CFM &&
884 hcon->io_capability == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT)
885 smp->method = JUST_WORKS;
887 /* If Just Works, Continue with Zero TK and ask user-space for
889 if (smp->method == JUST_WORKS) {
890 ret = mgmt_user_confirm_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst,
896 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags);
900 /* If this function is used for SC -> legacy fallback we
901 * can only recover the just-works case.
903 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags))
906 /* Not Just Works/Confirm results in MITM Authentication */
907 if (smp->method != JUST_CFM) {
908 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_MITM_AUTH, &smp->flags);
909 if (hcon->pending_sec_level < BT_SECURITY_HIGH)
910 hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
913 /* If both devices have Keyboard-Display I/O, the initiator
914 * Confirms and the responder Enters the passkey.
916 if (smp->method == OVERLAP) {
917 if (hcon->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
918 smp->method = CFM_PASSKEY;
920 smp->method = REQ_PASSKEY;
923 /* Generate random passkey. */
924 if (smp->method == CFM_PASSKEY) {
925 memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk));
926 get_random_bytes(&passkey, sizeof(passkey));
928 put_unaligned_le32(passkey, smp->tk);
929 bt_dev_dbg(hcon->hdev, "PassKey: %d", passkey);
930 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags);
933 if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY)
934 ret = mgmt_user_passkey_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst,
935 hcon->type, hcon->dst_type);
936 else if (smp->method == JUST_CFM)
937 ret = mgmt_user_confirm_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst,
938 hcon->type, hcon->dst_type,
941 ret = mgmt_user_passkey_notify(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst,
942 hcon->type, hcon->dst_type,
948 static u8 smp_confirm(struct smp_chan *smp)
950 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
951 struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cp;
954 bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "conn %p", conn);
956 ret = smp_c1(smp->tk, smp->prnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp,
957 conn->hcon->init_addr_type, &conn->hcon->init_addr,
958 conn->hcon->resp_addr_type, &conn->hcon->resp_addr,
961 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
963 clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags);
965 smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cp), &cp);
968 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
970 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
975 static u8 smp_random(struct smp_chan *smp)
977 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
978 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
982 bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "conn %p %s", conn,
983 conn->hcon->out ? "initiator" : "responder");
985 ret = smp_c1(smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp,
986 hcon->init_addr_type, &hcon->init_addr,
987 hcon->resp_addr_type, &hcon->resp_addr, confirm);
989 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
991 if (crypto_memneq(smp->pcnf, confirm, sizeof(smp->pcnf))) {
992 bt_dev_err(hcon->hdev, "pairing failed "
993 "(confirmation values mismatch)");
994 return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED;
1002 smp_s1(smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->prnd, stk);
1004 if (test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &hcon->flags))
1005 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
1007 hci_le_start_enc(hcon, ediv, rand, stk, smp->enc_key_size);
1008 hcon->enc_key_size = smp->enc_key_size;
1009 set_bit(HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags);
1015 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
1018 smp_s1(smp->tk, smp->prnd, smp->rrnd, stk);
1020 if (hcon->pending_sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH)
1025 /* Even though there's no _RESPONDER suffix this is the
1026 * responder STK we're adding for later lookup (the initiator
1027 * STK never needs to be stored).
1029 hci_add_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
1030 SMP_STK, auth, stk, smp->enc_key_size, ediv, rand);
1036 static void smp_notify_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
1038 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
1039 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
1040 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
1041 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
1042 struct smp_cmd_pairing *req = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
1043 struct smp_cmd_pairing *rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
1046 if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK) {
1047 if (hcon->key_type == HCI_LK_DEBUG_COMBINATION)
1050 persistent = !test_bit(HCI_CONN_FLUSH_KEY,
1053 /* The LTKs, IRKs and CSRKs should be persistent only if
1054 * both sides had the bonding bit set in their
1055 * authentication requests.
1057 persistent = !!((req->auth_req & rsp->auth_req) &
1061 if (smp->remote_irk) {
1062 smp->remote_irk->link_type = hcon->type;
1063 mgmt_new_irk(hdev, smp->remote_irk, persistent);
1065 /* Now that user space can be considered to know the
1066 * identity address track the connection based on it
1067 * from now on (assuming this is an LE link).
1069 if (hcon->type == LE_LINK) {
1070 bacpy(&hcon->dst, &smp->remote_irk->bdaddr);
1071 hcon->dst_type = smp->remote_irk->addr_type;
1072 queue_work(hdev->workqueue, &conn->id_addr_update_work);
1077 smp->csrk->link_type = hcon->type;
1078 smp->csrk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
1079 bacpy(&smp->csrk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
1080 mgmt_new_csrk(hdev, smp->csrk, persistent);
1083 if (smp->responder_csrk) {
1084 smp->responder_csrk->link_type = hcon->type;
1085 smp->responder_csrk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
1086 bacpy(&smp->responder_csrk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
1087 mgmt_new_csrk(hdev, smp->responder_csrk, persistent);
1091 smp->ltk->link_type = hcon->type;
1092 smp->ltk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
1093 bacpy(&smp->ltk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
1094 mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->ltk, persistent);
1097 if (smp->responder_ltk) {
1098 smp->responder_ltk->link_type = hcon->type;
1099 smp->responder_ltk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
1100 bacpy(&smp->responder_ltk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
1101 mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->responder_ltk, persistent);
1104 if (smp->link_key) {
1105 struct link_key *key;
1108 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags))
1109 type = HCI_LK_DEBUG_COMBINATION;
1110 else if (hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_FIPS)
1111 type = HCI_LK_AUTH_COMBINATION_P256;
1113 type = HCI_LK_UNAUTH_COMBINATION_P256;
1115 key = hci_add_link_key(hdev, smp->conn->hcon, &hcon->dst,
1116 smp->link_key, type, 0, &persistent);
1118 key->link_type = hcon->type;
1119 key->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
1120 mgmt_new_link_key(hdev, key, persistent);
1122 /* Don't keep debug keys around if the relevant
1125 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_KEEP_DEBUG_KEYS) &&
1126 key->type == HCI_LK_DEBUG_COMBINATION) {
1127 list_del_rcu(&key->list);
1128 kfree_rcu(key, rcu);
1134 static void sc_add_ltk(struct smp_chan *smp)
1136 struct hci_conn *hcon = smp->conn->hcon;
1139 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags))
1140 key_type = SMP_LTK_P256_DEBUG;
1142 key_type = SMP_LTK_P256;
1144 if (hcon->pending_sec_level == BT_SECURITY_FIPS)
1149 smp->ltk = hci_add_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
1150 key_type, auth, smp->tk, smp->enc_key_size,
1154 static void sc_generate_link_key(struct smp_chan *smp)
1156 /* From core spec. Spells out in ASCII as 'lebr'. */
1157 const u8 lebr[4] = { 0x72, 0x62, 0x65, 0x6c };
1159 smp->link_key = kzalloc(16, GFP_KERNEL);
1163 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_CT2, &smp->flags)) {
1164 /* SALT = 0x000000000000000000000000746D7031 */
1165 const u8 salt[16] = { 0x31, 0x70, 0x6d, 0x74 };
1167 if (smp_h7(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->tk, salt, smp->link_key)) {
1168 kfree_sensitive(smp->link_key);
1169 smp->link_key = NULL;
1173 /* From core spec. Spells out in ASCII as 'tmp1'. */
1174 const u8 tmp1[4] = { 0x31, 0x70, 0x6d, 0x74 };
1176 if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->tk, tmp1, smp->link_key)) {
1177 kfree_sensitive(smp->link_key);
1178 smp->link_key = NULL;
1183 if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->link_key, lebr, smp->link_key)) {
1184 kfree_sensitive(smp->link_key);
1185 smp->link_key = NULL;
1190 static void smp_allow_key_dist(struct smp_chan *smp)
1192 /* Allow the first expected phase 3 PDU. The rest of the PDUs
1193 * will be allowed in each PDU handler to ensure we receive
1194 * them in the correct order.
1196 if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY)
1197 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO);
1198 else if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY)
1199 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO);
1200 else if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_SIGN)
1201 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO);
1204 static void sc_generate_ltk(struct smp_chan *smp)
1206 /* From core spec. Spells out in ASCII as 'brle'. */
1207 const u8 brle[4] = { 0x65, 0x6c, 0x72, 0x62 };
1208 struct hci_conn *hcon = smp->conn->hcon;
1209 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
1210 struct link_key *key;
1212 key = hci_find_link_key(hdev, &hcon->dst);
1214 bt_dev_err(hdev, "no Link Key found to generate LTK");
1218 if (key->type == HCI_LK_DEBUG_COMBINATION)
1219 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags);
1221 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_CT2, &smp->flags)) {
1222 /* SALT = 0x000000000000000000000000746D7032 */
1223 const u8 salt[16] = { 0x32, 0x70, 0x6d, 0x74 };
1225 if (smp_h7(smp->tfm_cmac, key->val, salt, smp->tk))
1228 /* From core spec. Spells out in ASCII as 'tmp2'. */
1229 const u8 tmp2[4] = { 0x32, 0x70, 0x6d, 0x74 };
1231 if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, key->val, tmp2, smp->tk))
1235 if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->tk, brle, smp->tk))
1241 static void smp_distribute_keys(struct smp_chan *smp)
1243 struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp;
1244 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
1245 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
1246 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
1249 bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "conn %p", conn);
1251 rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
1253 /* The responder sends its keys first */
1254 if (hcon->out && (smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK)) {
1255 smp_allow_key_dist(smp);
1259 req = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
1262 keydist = &rsp->init_key_dist;
1263 *keydist &= req->init_key_dist;
1265 keydist = &rsp->resp_key_dist;
1266 *keydist &= req->resp_key_dist;
1269 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) {
1270 if (hcon->type == LE_LINK && (*keydist & SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY))
1271 sc_generate_link_key(smp);
1272 if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK && (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY))
1273 sc_generate_ltk(smp);
1275 /* Clear the keys which are generated but not distributed */
1276 *keydist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST;
1279 bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "keydist 0x%x", *keydist);
1281 if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY) {
1282 struct smp_cmd_encrypt_info enc;
1283 struct smp_cmd_initiator_ident ident;
1284 struct smp_ltk *ltk;
1289 /* Make sure we generate only the significant amount of
1290 * bytes based on the encryption key size, and set the rest
1291 * of the value to zeroes.
1293 get_random_bytes(enc.ltk, smp->enc_key_size);
1294 memset(enc.ltk + smp->enc_key_size, 0,
1295 sizeof(enc.ltk) - smp->enc_key_size);
1297 get_random_bytes(&ediv, sizeof(ediv));
1298 get_random_bytes(&rand, sizeof(rand));
1300 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO, sizeof(enc), &enc);
1302 authenticated = hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
1303 ltk = hci_add_ltk(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
1304 SMP_LTK_RESPONDER, authenticated, enc.ltk,
1305 smp->enc_key_size, ediv, rand);
1306 smp->responder_ltk = ltk;
1311 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_INITIATOR_IDENT, sizeof(ident),
1314 *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY;
1317 if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY) {
1318 struct smp_cmd_ident_addr_info addrinfo;
1319 struct smp_cmd_ident_info idinfo;
1321 memcpy(idinfo.irk, hdev->irk, sizeof(idinfo.irk));
1323 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO, sizeof(idinfo), &idinfo);
1325 /* The hci_conn contains the local identity address
1326 * after the connection has been established.
1328 * This is true even when the connection has been
1329 * established using a resolvable random address.
1331 bacpy(&addrinfo.bdaddr, &hcon->src);
1332 addrinfo.addr_type = hcon->src_type;
1334 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO, sizeof(addrinfo),
1337 *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
1340 if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_SIGN) {
1341 struct smp_cmd_sign_info sign;
1342 struct smp_csrk *csrk;
1344 /* Generate a new random key */
1345 get_random_bytes(sign.csrk, sizeof(sign.csrk));
1347 csrk = kzalloc(sizeof(*csrk), GFP_KERNEL);
1349 if (hcon->sec_level > BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM)
1350 csrk->type = MGMT_CSRK_LOCAL_AUTHENTICATED;
1352 csrk->type = MGMT_CSRK_LOCAL_UNAUTHENTICATED;
1353 memcpy(csrk->val, sign.csrk, sizeof(csrk->val));
1355 smp->responder_csrk = csrk;
1357 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO, sizeof(sign), &sign);
1359 *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_SIGN;
1362 /* If there are still keys to be received wait for them */
1363 if (smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK) {
1364 smp_allow_key_dist(smp);
1368 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags);
1369 smp_notify_keys(conn);
1371 smp_chan_destroy(conn);
1374 static void smp_timeout(struct work_struct *work)
1376 struct smp_chan *smp = container_of(work, struct smp_chan,
1377 security_timer.work);
1378 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
1380 bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "conn %p", conn);
1382 hci_disconnect(conn->hcon, HCI_ERROR_REMOTE_USER_TERM);
1385 static struct smp_chan *smp_chan_create(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
1387 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
1388 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
1389 struct smp_chan *smp;
1391 smp = kzalloc(sizeof(*smp), GFP_ATOMIC);
1395 smp->tfm_cmac = crypto_alloc_shash("cmac(aes)", 0, 0);
1396 if (IS_ERR(smp->tfm_cmac)) {
1397 bt_dev_err(hcon->hdev, "Unable to create CMAC crypto context");
1401 smp->tfm_ecdh = crypto_alloc_kpp("ecdh", 0, 0);
1402 if (IS_ERR(smp->tfm_ecdh)) {
1403 bt_dev_err(hcon->hdev, "Unable to create ECDH crypto context");
1410 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL);
1412 INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&smp->security_timer, smp_timeout);
1414 hci_conn_hold(hcon);
1419 crypto_free_shash(smp->tfm_cmac);
1421 kfree_sensitive(smp);
1425 static int sc_mackey_and_ltk(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 mackey[16], u8 ltk[16])
1427 struct hci_conn *hcon = smp->conn->hcon;
1428 u8 *na, *nb, a[7], b[7];
1438 memcpy(a, &hcon->init_addr, 6);
1439 memcpy(b, &hcon->resp_addr, 6);
1440 a[6] = hcon->init_addr_type;
1441 b[6] = hcon->resp_addr_type;
1443 return smp_f5(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->dhkey, na, nb, a, b, mackey, ltk);
1446 static void sc_dhkey_check(struct smp_chan *smp)
1448 struct hci_conn *hcon = smp->conn->hcon;
1449 struct smp_cmd_dhkey_check check;
1450 u8 a[7], b[7], *local_addr, *remote_addr;
1451 u8 io_cap[3], r[16];
1453 memcpy(a, &hcon->init_addr, 6);
1454 memcpy(b, &hcon->resp_addr, 6);
1455 a[6] = hcon->init_addr_type;
1456 b[6] = hcon->resp_addr_type;
1461 memcpy(io_cap, &smp->preq[1], 3);
1465 memcpy(io_cap, &smp->prsp[1], 3);
1468 memset(r, 0, sizeof(r));
1470 if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY)
1471 put_unaligned_le32(hcon->passkey_notify, r);
1473 if (smp->method == REQ_OOB)
1474 memcpy(r, smp->rr, 16);
1476 smp_f6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->mackey, smp->prnd, smp->rrnd, r, io_cap,
1477 local_addr, remote_addr, check.e);
1479 smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK, sizeof(check), &check);
1482 static u8 sc_passkey_send_confirm(struct smp_chan *smp)
1484 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
1485 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
1486 struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cfm;
1489 r = ((hcon->passkey_notify >> smp->passkey_round) & 0x01);
1492 get_random_bytes(smp->prnd, sizeof(smp->prnd));
1494 if (smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->local_pk, smp->remote_pk, smp->prnd, r,
1496 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
1498 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cfm), &cfm);
1503 static u8 sc_passkey_round(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 smp_op)
1505 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
1506 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
1507 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
1510 /* Ignore the PDU if we've already done 20 rounds (0 - 19) */
1511 if (smp->passkey_round >= 20)
1515 case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM:
1516 r = ((hcon->passkey_notify >> smp->passkey_round) & 0x01);
1519 if (smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->remote_pk, smp->local_pk,
1521 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
1523 if (crypto_memneq(smp->pcnf, cfm, 16))
1524 return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED;
1526 smp->passkey_round++;
1528 if (smp->passkey_round == 20) {
1529 /* Generate MacKey and LTK */
1530 if (sc_mackey_and_ltk(smp, smp->mackey, smp->tk))
1531 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
1534 /* The round is only complete when the initiator
1535 * receives pairing random.
1538 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM,
1539 sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd);
1540 if (smp->passkey_round == 20)
1541 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
1543 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
1547 /* Start the next round */
1548 if (smp->passkey_round != 20)
1549 return sc_passkey_round(smp, 0);
1551 /* Passkey rounds are complete - start DHKey Check */
1552 sc_dhkey_check(smp);
1553 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
1557 case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM:
1558 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags)) {
1559 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags);
1563 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
1566 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM,
1567 sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd);
1571 return sc_passkey_send_confirm(smp);
1573 case SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY:
1575 /* Initiating device starts the round */
1579 bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "Starting passkey round %u",
1580 smp->passkey_round + 1);
1582 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
1584 return sc_passkey_send_confirm(smp);
1590 static int sc_user_reply(struct smp_chan *smp, u16 mgmt_op, __le32 passkey)
1592 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
1593 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
1596 clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags);
1599 case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_NEG_REPLY:
1600 smp_failure(smp->conn, SMP_PASSKEY_ENTRY_FAILED);
1602 case MGMT_OP_USER_CONFIRM_NEG_REPLY:
1603 smp_failure(smp->conn, SMP_NUMERIC_COMP_FAILED);
1605 case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_REPLY:
1606 hcon->passkey_notify = le32_to_cpu(passkey);
1607 smp->passkey_round = 0;
1609 if (test_and_clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags))
1610 smp_op = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM;
1614 if (sc_passkey_round(smp, smp_op))
1620 /* Initiator sends DHKey check first */
1622 sc_dhkey_check(smp);
1623 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
1624 } else if (test_and_clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_DHKEY_PENDING, &smp->flags)) {
1625 sc_dhkey_check(smp);
1632 int smp_user_confirm_reply(struct hci_conn *hcon, u16 mgmt_op, __le32 passkey)
1634 struct l2cap_conn *conn = hcon->l2cap_data;
1635 struct l2cap_chan *chan;
1636 struct smp_chan *smp;
1640 bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "");
1649 l2cap_chan_lock(chan);
1657 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) {
1658 err = sc_user_reply(smp, mgmt_op, passkey);
1663 case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_REPLY:
1664 value = le32_to_cpu(passkey);
1665 memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk));
1666 bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "PassKey: %d", value);
1667 put_unaligned_le32(value, smp->tk);
1669 case MGMT_OP_USER_CONFIRM_REPLY:
1670 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags);
1672 case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_NEG_REPLY:
1673 case MGMT_OP_USER_CONFIRM_NEG_REPLY:
1674 smp_failure(conn, SMP_PASSKEY_ENTRY_FAILED);
1678 smp_failure(conn, SMP_PASSKEY_ENTRY_FAILED);
1685 /* If it is our turn to send Pairing Confirm, do so now */
1686 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags)) {
1687 u8 rsp = smp_confirm(smp);
1689 smp_failure(conn, rsp);
1693 l2cap_chan_unlock(chan);
1697 static void build_bredr_pairing_cmd(struct smp_chan *smp,
1698 struct smp_cmd_pairing *req,
1699 struct smp_cmd_pairing *rsp)
1701 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
1702 struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
1703 u8 local_dist = 0, remote_dist = 0;
1705 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_BONDABLE)) {
1706 local_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN;
1707 remote_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN;
1710 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_RPA_RESOLVING))
1711 remote_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
1713 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_PRIVACY))
1714 local_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
1717 memset(req, 0, sizeof(*req));
1719 req->auth_req = SMP_AUTH_CT2;
1720 req->init_key_dist = local_dist;
1721 req->resp_key_dist = remote_dist;
1722 req->max_key_size = conn->hcon->enc_key_size;
1724 smp->remote_key_dist = remote_dist;
1729 memset(rsp, 0, sizeof(*rsp));
1731 rsp->auth_req = SMP_AUTH_CT2;
1732 rsp->max_key_size = conn->hcon->enc_key_size;
1733 rsp->init_key_dist = req->init_key_dist & remote_dist;
1734 rsp->resp_key_dist = req->resp_key_dist & local_dist;
1736 smp->remote_key_dist = rsp->init_key_dist;
1739 static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
1741 struct smp_cmd_pairing rsp, *req = (void *) skb->data;
1742 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
1743 struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
1744 struct smp_chan *smp;
1745 u8 key_size, auth, sec_level;
1748 bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "conn %p", conn);
1750 if (skb->len < sizeof(*req))
1751 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
1753 if (conn->hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_SLAVE)
1754 return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
1757 smp = smp_chan_create(conn);
1762 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
1764 /* We didn't start the pairing, so match remote */
1765 auth = req->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev);
1767 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_BONDABLE) &&
1768 (auth & SMP_AUTH_BONDING))
1769 return SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP;
1771 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ONLY) && !(auth & SMP_AUTH_SC))
1772 return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
1774 smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
1775 memcpy(&smp->preq[1], req, sizeof(*req));
1776 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*req));
1778 /* If the remote side's OOB flag is set it means it has
1779 * successfully received our local OOB data - therefore set the
1780 * flag to indicate that local OOB is in use.
1782 if (req->oob_flag == SMP_OOB_PRESENT && SMP_DEV(hdev)->local_oob)
1783 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags);
1785 /* SMP over BR/EDR requires special treatment */
1786 if (conn->hcon->type == ACL_LINK) {
1787 /* We must have a BR/EDR SC link */
1788 if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_AES_CCM, &conn->hcon->flags) &&
1789 !hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP))
1790 return SMP_CROSS_TRANSP_NOT_ALLOWED;
1792 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags);
1794 build_bredr_pairing_cmd(smp, req, &rsp);
1796 if (req->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_CT2)
1797 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CT2, &smp->flags);
1799 key_size = min(req->max_key_size, rsp.max_key_size);
1800 if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size))
1801 return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
1803 /* Clear bits which are generated but not distributed */
1804 smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST;
1806 smp->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP;
1807 memcpy(&smp->prsp[1], &rsp, sizeof(rsp));
1808 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP, sizeof(rsp), &rsp);
1810 smp_distribute_keys(smp);
1814 build_pairing_cmd(conn, req, &rsp, auth);
1816 if (rsp.auth_req & SMP_AUTH_SC) {
1817 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags);
1819 if (rsp.auth_req & SMP_AUTH_CT2)
1820 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CT2, &smp->flags);
1823 if (conn->hcon->io_capability == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT)
1824 sec_level = BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM;
1826 sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(auth);
1828 if (sec_level > conn->hcon->pending_sec_level)
1829 conn->hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level;
1831 /* If we need MITM check that it can be achieved */
1832 if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level >= BT_SECURITY_HIGH) {
1835 method = get_auth_method(smp, conn->hcon->io_capability,
1836 req->io_capability);
1837 if (method == JUST_WORKS || method == JUST_CFM)
1838 return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
1841 key_size = min(req->max_key_size, rsp.max_key_size);
1842 if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size))
1843 return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
1845 get_random_bytes(smp->prnd, sizeof(smp->prnd));
1847 smp->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP;
1848 memcpy(&smp->prsp[1], &rsp, sizeof(rsp));
1850 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP, sizeof(rsp), &rsp);
1852 clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags);
1854 /* Strictly speaking we shouldn't allow Pairing Confirm for the
1855 * SC case, however some implementations incorrectly copy RFU auth
1856 * req bits from our security request, which may create a false
1857 * positive SC enablement.
1859 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
1861 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) {
1862 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY);
1863 /* Clear bits which are generated but not distributed */
1864 smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST;
1865 /* Wait for Public Key from Initiating Device */
1869 /* Request setup of TK */
1870 ret = tk_request(conn, 0, auth, rsp.io_capability, req->io_capability);
1872 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
1877 static u8 sc_send_public_key(struct smp_chan *smp)
1879 struct hci_dev *hdev = smp->conn->hcon->hdev;
1881 bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "");
1883 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags)) {
1884 struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data;
1885 struct smp_dev *smp_dev;
1887 if (!chan || !chan->data)
1888 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
1890 smp_dev = chan->data;
1892 memcpy(smp->local_pk, smp_dev->local_pk, 64);
1893 memcpy(smp->lr, smp_dev->local_rand, 16);
1895 if (smp_dev->debug_key)
1896 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags);
1901 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_USE_DEBUG_KEYS)) {
1902 bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "Using debug keys");
1903 if (set_ecdh_privkey(smp->tfm_ecdh, debug_sk))
1904 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
1905 memcpy(smp->local_pk, debug_pk, 64);
1906 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags);
1909 /* Generate key pair for Secure Connections */
1910 if (generate_ecdh_keys(smp->tfm_ecdh, smp->local_pk))
1911 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
1913 /* This is unlikely, but we need to check that
1914 * we didn't accidentially generate a debug key.
1916 if (crypto_memneq(smp->local_pk, debug_pk, 64))
1922 SMP_DBG("Local Public Key X: %32phN", smp->local_pk);
1923 SMP_DBG("Local Public Key Y: %32phN", smp->local_pk + 32);
1925 smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY, 64, smp->local_pk);
1930 static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
1932 struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp = (void *) skb->data;
1933 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
1934 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
1935 struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
1939 bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "conn %p", conn);
1941 if (skb->len < sizeof(*rsp))
1942 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
1944 if (conn->hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
1945 return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
1947 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rsp));
1949 req = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
1951 key_size = min(req->max_key_size, rsp->max_key_size);
1952 if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size))
1953 return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
1955 auth = rsp->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev);
1957 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ONLY) && !(auth & SMP_AUTH_SC))
1958 return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
1960 /* If the remote side's OOB flag is set it means it has
1961 * successfully received our local OOB data - therefore set the
1962 * flag to indicate that local OOB is in use.
1964 if (rsp->oob_flag == SMP_OOB_PRESENT && SMP_DEV(hdev)->local_oob)
1965 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags);
1967 smp->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP;
1968 memcpy(&smp->prsp[1], rsp, sizeof(*rsp));
1970 /* Update remote key distribution in case the remote cleared
1971 * some bits that we had enabled in our request.
1973 smp->remote_key_dist &= rsp->resp_key_dist;
1975 if ((req->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_CT2) && (auth & SMP_AUTH_CT2))
1976 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CT2, &smp->flags);
1978 /* For BR/EDR this means we're done and can start phase 3 */
1979 if (conn->hcon->type == ACL_LINK) {
1980 /* Clear bits which are generated but not distributed */
1981 smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST;
1982 smp_distribute_keys(smp);
1986 if ((req->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_SC) && (auth & SMP_AUTH_SC))
1987 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags);
1988 else if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level > BT_SECURITY_HIGH)
1989 conn->hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
1991 /* If we need MITM check that it can be achieved */
1992 if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level >= BT_SECURITY_HIGH) {
1995 method = get_auth_method(smp, req->io_capability,
1996 rsp->io_capability);
1997 if (method == JUST_WORKS || method == JUST_CFM)
1998 return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
2001 get_random_bytes(smp->prnd, sizeof(smp->prnd));
2003 /* Update remote key distribution in case the remote cleared
2004 * some bits that we had enabled in our request.
2006 smp->remote_key_dist &= rsp->resp_key_dist;
2008 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) {
2009 /* Clear bits which are generated but not distributed */
2010 smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST;
2011 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY);
2012 return sc_send_public_key(smp);
2015 auth |= req->auth_req;
2017 ret = tk_request(conn, 0, auth, req->io_capability, rsp->io_capability);
2019 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2021 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags);
2023 /* Can't compose response until we have been confirmed */
2024 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags))
2025 return smp_confirm(smp);
2030 static u8 sc_check_confirm(struct smp_chan *smp)
2032 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
2034 bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "");
2036 if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY)
2037 return sc_passkey_round(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
2039 if (conn->hcon->out) {
2040 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
2042 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
2048 /* Work-around for some implementations that incorrectly copy RFU bits
2049 * from our security request and thereby create the impression that
2050 * we're doing SC when in fact the remote doesn't support it.
2052 static int fixup_sc_false_positive(struct smp_chan *smp)
2054 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
2055 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2056 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
2057 struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp;
2060 /* The issue is only observed when we're in responder role */
2062 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2064 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ONLY)) {
2065 bt_dev_err(hdev, "refusing legacy fallback in SC-only mode");
2066 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2069 bt_dev_err(hdev, "trying to fall back to legacy SMP");
2071 req = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
2072 rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
2074 /* Rebuild key dist flags which may have been cleared for SC */
2075 smp->remote_key_dist = (req->init_key_dist & rsp->resp_key_dist);
2077 auth = req->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev);
2079 if (tk_request(conn, 0, auth, rsp->io_capability, req->io_capability)) {
2080 bt_dev_err(hdev, "failed to fall back to legacy SMP");
2081 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2084 clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags);
2089 static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
2091 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
2092 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
2093 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2094 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
2096 bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "conn %p %s", conn,
2097 hcon->out ? "initiator" : "responder");
2099 if (skb->len < sizeof(smp->pcnf))
2100 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2102 memcpy(smp->pcnf, skb->data, sizeof(smp->pcnf));
2103 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(smp->pcnf));
2105 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) {
2108 /* Public Key exchange must happen before any other steps */
2109 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_PK, &smp->flags))
2110 return sc_check_confirm(smp);
2112 bt_dev_err(hdev, "Unexpected SMP Pairing Confirm");
2114 ret = fixup_sc_false_positive(smp);
2119 if (conn->hcon->out) {
2120 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
2122 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
2126 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags))
2127 return smp_confirm(smp);
2129 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags);
2134 static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
2136 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
2137 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
2138 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2139 u8 *pkax, *pkbx, *na, *nb, confirm_hint;
2143 bt_dev_dbg(hcon->hdev, "conn %p", conn);
2145 if (skb->len < sizeof(smp->rrnd))
2146 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2148 memcpy(smp->rrnd, skb->data, sizeof(smp->rrnd));
2149 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(smp->rrnd));
2151 if (!test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags))
2152 return smp_random(smp);
2155 pkax = smp->local_pk;
2156 pkbx = smp->remote_pk;
2160 pkax = smp->remote_pk;
2161 pkbx = smp->local_pk;
2166 if (smp->method == REQ_OOB) {
2168 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM,
2169 sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd);
2170 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
2171 goto mackey_and_ltk;
2174 /* Passkey entry has special treatment */
2175 if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY)
2176 return sc_passkey_round(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
2181 err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->remote_pk, smp->local_pk,
2184 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2186 if (crypto_memneq(smp->pcnf, cfm, 16))
2187 return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED;
2189 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
2191 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
2193 /* Only Just-Works pairing requires extra checks */
2194 if (smp->method != JUST_WORKS)
2195 goto mackey_and_ltk;
2197 /* If there already exists long term key in local host, leave
2198 * the decision to user space since the remote device could
2199 * be legitimate or malicious.
2201 if (hci_find_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
2203 /* Set passkey to 0. The value can be any number since
2204 * it'll be ignored anyway.
2213 /* Generate MacKey and LTK */
2214 err = sc_mackey_and_ltk(smp, smp->mackey, smp->tk);
2216 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2218 if (smp->method == REQ_OOB) {
2220 sc_dhkey_check(smp);
2221 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
2226 err = smp_g2(smp->tfm_cmac, pkax, pkbx, na, nb, &passkey);
2228 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2233 if (smp->method == JUST_WORKS)
2236 err = mgmt_user_confirm_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->type,
2237 hcon->dst_type, passkey, confirm_hint);
2239 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2241 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags);
2246 static bool smp_ltk_encrypt(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 sec_level)
2248 struct smp_ltk *key;
2249 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2251 key = hci_find_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, hcon->role);
2255 if (smp_ltk_sec_level(key) < sec_level)
2258 if (test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &hcon->flags))
2261 hci_le_start_enc(hcon, key->ediv, key->rand, key->val, key->enc_size);
2262 hcon->enc_key_size = key->enc_size;
2264 /* We never store STKs for initiator role, so clear this flag */
2265 clear_bit(HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags);
2270 bool smp_sufficient_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, u8 sec_level,
2271 enum smp_key_pref key_pref)
2273 if (sec_level == BT_SECURITY_LOW)
2276 /* If we're encrypted with an STK but the caller prefers using
2277 * LTK claim insufficient security. This way we allow the
2278 * connection to be re-encrypted with an LTK, even if the LTK
2279 * provides the same level of security. Only exception is if we
2280 * don't have an LTK (e.g. because of key distribution bits).
2282 if (key_pref == SMP_USE_LTK &&
2283 test_bit(HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags) &&
2284 hci_find_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, hcon->role))
2287 if (hcon->sec_level >= sec_level)
2293 static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
2295 struct smp_cmd_security_req *rp = (void *) skb->data;
2296 struct smp_cmd_pairing cp;
2297 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2298 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
2299 struct smp_chan *smp;
2302 bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "conn %p", conn);
2304 if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp))
2305 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2307 if (hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
2308 return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
2310 auth = rp->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev);
2312 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ONLY) && !(auth & SMP_AUTH_SC))
2313 return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
2315 if (hcon->io_capability == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT)
2316 sec_level = BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM;
2318 sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(auth);
2320 if (smp_sufficient_security(hcon, sec_level, SMP_USE_LTK)) {
2321 /* If link is already encrypted with sufficient security we
2322 * still need refresh encryption as per Core Spec 5.0 Vol 3,
2325 smp_ltk_encrypt(conn, hcon->sec_level);
2329 if (sec_level > hcon->pending_sec_level)
2330 hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level;
2332 if (smp_ltk_encrypt(conn, hcon->pending_sec_level))
2335 smp = smp_chan_create(conn);
2337 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2339 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_BONDABLE) &&
2340 (auth & SMP_AUTH_BONDING))
2341 return SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP;
2343 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
2345 memset(&cp, 0, sizeof(cp));
2346 build_pairing_cmd(conn, &cp, NULL, auth);
2348 smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
2349 memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &cp, sizeof(cp));
2351 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
2352 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP);
2357 int smp_conn_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, __u8 sec_level)
2359 struct l2cap_conn *conn = hcon->l2cap_data;
2360 struct l2cap_chan *chan;
2361 struct smp_chan *smp;
2365 bt_dev_dbg(hcon->hdev, "conn %p hcon %p level 0x%2.2x", conn, hcon,
2368 /* This may be NULL if there's an unexpected disconnection */
2372 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_LE_ENABLED))
2375 if (smp_sufficient_security(hcon, sec_level, SMP_USE_LTK))
2378 if (sec_level > hcon->pending_sec_level)
2379 hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level;
2381 if (hcon->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
2382 if (smp_ltk_encrypt(conn, hcon->pending_sec_level))
2387 bt_dev_err(hcon->hdev, "security requested but not available");
2391 l2cap_chan_lock(chan);
2393 /* If SMP is already in progress ignore this request */
2399 smp = smp_chan_create(conn);
2405 authreq = seclevel_to_authreq(sec_level);
2407 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_SC_ENABLED)) {
2408 authreq |= SMP_AUTH_SC;
2409 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_SSP_ENABLED))
2410 authreq |= SMP_AUTH_CT2;
2413 /* Don't attempt to set MITM if setting is overridden by debugfs
2414 * Needed to pass certification test SM/MAS/PKE/BV-01-C
2416 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_FORCE_NO_MITM)) {
2417 /* Require MITM if IO Capability allows or the security level
2420 if (hcon->io_capability != HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT ||
2421 hcon->pending_sec_level > BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM)
2422 authreq |= SMP_AUTH_MITM;
2425 if (hcon->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER) {
2426 struct smp_cmd_pairing cp;
2428 build_pairing_cmd(conn, &cp, NULL, authreq);
2429 smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
2430 memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &cp, sizeof(cp));
2432 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
2433 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP);
2435 struct smp_cmd_security_req cp;
2436 cp.auth_req = authreq;
2437 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
2438 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ);
2441 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags);
2445 l2cap_chan_unlock(chan);
2449 int smp_cancel_and_remove_pairing(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr,
2452 struct hci_conn *hcon;
2453 struct l2cap_conn *conn;
2454 struct l2cap_chan *chan;
2455 struct smp_chan *smp;
2458 err = hci_remove_ltk(hdev, bdaddr, addr_type);
2459 hci_remove_irk(hdev, bdaddr, addr_type);
2461 hcon = hci_conn_hash_lookup_le(hdev, bdaddr, addr_type);
2465 conn = hcon->l2cap_data;
2473 l2cap_chan_lock(chan);
2477 /* Set keys to NULL to make sure smp_failure() does not try to
2478 * remove and free already invalidated rcu list entries. */
2480 smp->responder_ltk = NULL;
2481 smp->remote_irk = NULL;
2483 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags))
2484 smp_failure(conn, 0);
2486 smp_failure(conn, SMP_UNSPECIFIED);
2490 l2cap_chan_unlock(chan);
2496 static int smp_cmd_encrypt_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
2498 struct smp_cmd_encrypt_info *rp = (void *) skb->data;
2499 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
2500 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
2502 bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "conn %p", conn);
2504 if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp))
2505 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2507 /* Pairing is aborted if any blocked keys are distributed */
2508 if (hci_is_blocked_key(conn->hcon->hdev, HCI_BLOCKED_KEY_TYPE_LTK,
2510 bt_dev_warn_ratelimited(conn->hcon->hdev,
2511 "LTK blocked for %pMR",
2513 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2516 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_INITIATOR_IDENT);
2518 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
2520 memcpy(smp->tk, rp->ltk, sizeof(smp->tk));
2525 static int smp_cmd_initiator_ident(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
2527 struct smp_cmd_initiator_ident *rp = (void *)skb->data;
2528 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
2529 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
2530 struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
2531 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2532 struct smp_ltk *ltk;
2535 bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "conn %p", conn);
2537 if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp))
2538 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2540 /* Mark the information as received */
2541 smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY;
2543 if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY)
2544 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO);
2545 else if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_SIGN)
2546 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO);
2548 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
2550 authenticated = (hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH);
2551 ltk = hci_add_ltk(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, SMP_LTK,
2552 authenticated, smp->tk, smp->enc_key_size,
2553 rp->ediv, rp->rand);
2555 if (!(smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK))
2556 smp_distribute_keys(smp);
2561 static int smp_cmd_ident_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
2563 struct smp_cmd_ident_info *info = (void *) skb->data;
2564 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
2565 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
2567 bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "");
2569 if (skb->len < sizeof(*info))
2570 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2572 /* Pairing is aborted if any blocked keys are distributed */
2573 if (hci_is_blocked_key(conn->hcon->hdev, HCI_BLOCKED_KEY_TYPE_IRK,
2575 bt_dev_warn_ratelimited(conn->hcon->hdev,
2576 "Identity key blocked for %pMR",
2578 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2581 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO);
2583 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*info));
2585 memcpy(smp->irk, info->irk, 16);
2590 static int smp_cmd_ident_addr_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
2591 struct sk_buff *skb)
2593 struct smp_cmd_ident_addr_info *info = (void *) skb->data;
2594 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
2595 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
2596 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2599 bt_dev_dbg(hcon->hdev, "");
2601 if (skb->len < sizeof(*info))
2602 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2604 /* Mark the information as received */
2605 smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
2607 if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_SIGN)
2608 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO);
2610 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*info));
2612 /* Strictly speaking the Core Specification (4.1) allows sending
2613 * an empty address which would force us to rely on just the IRK
2614 * as "identity information". However, since such
2615 * implementations are not known of and in order to not over
2616 * complicate our implementation, simply pretend that we never
2617 * received an IRK for such a device.
2619 * The Identity Address must also be a Static Random or Public
2620 * Address, which hci_is_identity_address() checks for.
2622 if (!bacmp(&info->bdaddr, BDADDR_ANY) ||
2623 !hci_is_identity_address(&info->bdaddr, info->addr_type)) {
2624 bt_dev_err(hcon->hdev, "ignoring IRK with no identity address");
2628 /* Drop IRK if peer is using identity address during pairing but is
2629 * providing different address as identity information.
2631 * Microsoft Surface Precision Mouse is known to have this bug.
2633 if (hci_is_identity_address(&hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type) &&
2634 (bacmp(&info->bdaddr, &hcon->dst) ||
2635 info->addr_type != hcon->dst_type)) {
2636 bt_dev_err(hcon->hdev,
2637 "ignoring IRK with invalid identity address");
2641 bacpy(&smp->id_addr, &info->bdaddr);
2642 smp->id_addr_type = info->addr_type;
2644 if (hci_bdaddr_is_rpa(&hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type))
2645 bacpy(&rpa, &hcon->dst);
2647 bacpy(&rpa, BDADDR_ANY);
2649 smp->remote_irk = hci_add_irk(conn->hcon->hdev, &smp->id_addr,
2650 smp->id_addr_type, smp->irk, &rpa);
2653 if (!(smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK))
2654 smp_distribute_keys(smp);
2659 static int smp_cmd_sign_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
2661 struct smp_cmd_sign_info *rp = (void *) skb->data;
2662 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
2663 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
2664 struct smp_csrk *csrk;
2666 bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "conn %p", conn);
2668 if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp))
2669 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2671 /* Mark the information as received */
2672 smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_DIST_SIGN;
2674 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
2676 csrk = kzalloc(sizeof(*csrk), GFP_KERNEL);
2678 if (conn->hcon->sec_level > BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM)
2679 csrk->type = MGMT_CSRK_REMOTE_AUTHENTICATED;
2681 csrk->type = MGMT_CSRK_REMOTE_UNAUTHENTICATED;
2682 memcpy(csrk->val, rp->csrk, sizeof(csrk->val));
2685 smp_distribute_keys(smp);
2690 static u8 sc_select_method(struct smp_chan *smp)
2692 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
2693 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2694 struct smp_cmd_pairing *local, *remote;
2695 u8 local_mitm, remote_mitm, local_io, remote_io, method;
2697 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_OOB, &smp->flags) ||
2698 test_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags))
2701 /* The preq/prsp contain the raw Pairing Request/Response PDUs
2702 * which are needed as inputs to some crypto functions. To get
2703 * the "struct smp_cmd_pairing" from them we need to skip the
2704 * first byte which contains the opcode.
2707 local = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
2708 remote = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
2710 local = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
2711 remote = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
2714 local_io = local->io_capability;
2715 remote_io = remote->io_capability;
2717 local_mitm = (local->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_MITM);
2718 remote_mitm = (remote->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_MITM);
2720 /* If either side wants MITM, look up the method from the table,
2721 * otherwise use JUST WORKS.
2723 if (local_mitm || remote_mitm)
2724 method = get_auth_method(smp, local_io, remote_io);
2726 method = JUST_WORKS;
2728 /* Don't confirm locally initiated pairing attempts */
2729 if (method == JUST_CFM && test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags))
2730 method = JUST_WORKS;
2735 static int smp_cmd_public_key(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
2737 struct smp_cmd_public_key *key = (void *) skb->data;
2738 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2739 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
2740 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
2741 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
2742 struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh;
2743 struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cfm;
2746 bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "conn %p", conn);
2748 if (skb->len < sizeof(*key))
2749 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2751 /* Check if remote and local public keys are the same and debug key is
2754 if (!test_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags) &&
2755 !crypto_memneq(key, smp->local_pk, 64)) {
2756 bt_dev_err(hdev, "Remote and local public keys are identical");
2757 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2760 memcpy(smp->remote_pk, key, 64);
2762 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_OOB, &smp->flags)) {
2763 err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->remote_pk, smp->remote_pk,
2764 smp->rr, 0, cfm.confirm_val);
2766 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2768 if (crypto_memneq(cfm.confirm_val, smp->pcnf, 16))
2769 return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED;
2772 /* Non-initiating device sends its public key after receiving
2773 * the key from the initiating device.
2776 err = sc_send_public_key(smp);
2781 SMP_DBG("Remote Public Key X: %32phN", smp->remote_pk);
2782 SMP_DBG("Remote Public Key Y: %32phN", smp->remote_pk + 32);
2784 /* Compute the shared secret on the same crypto tfm on which the private
2785 * key was set/generated.
2787 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags)) {
2788 struct l2cap_chan *hchan = hdev->smp_data;
2789 struct smp_dev *smp_dev;
2791 if (!hchan || !hchan->data)
2792 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2794 smp_dev = hchan->data;
2796 tfm_ecdh = smp_dev->tfm_ecdh;
2798 tfm_ecdh = smp->tfm_ecdh;
2801 if (compute_ecdh_secret(tfm_ecdh, smp->remote_pk, smp->dhkey))
2802 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2804 SMP_DBG("DHKey %32phN", smp->dhkey);
2806 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_PK, &smp->flags);
2808 smp->method = sc_select_method(smp);
2810 bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "selected method 0x%02x", smp->method);
2812 /* JUST_WORKS and JUST_CFM result in an unauthenticated key */
2813 if (smp->method == JUST_WORKS || smp->method == JUST_CFM)
2814 hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM;
2816 hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_FIPS;
2818 if (!crypto_memneq(debug_pk, smp->remote_pk, 64))
2819 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags);
2821 if (smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY) {
2822 get_random_bytes(&hcon->passkey_notify,
2823 sizeof(hcon->passkey_notify));
2824 hcon->passkey_notify %= 1000000;
2825 hcon->passkey_entered = 0;
2826 smp->passkey_round = 0;
2827 if (mgmt_user_passkey_notify(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->type,
2829 hcon->passkey_notify,
2830 hcon->passkey_entered))
2831 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2832 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
2833 return sc_passkey_round(smp, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY);
2836 if (smp->method == REQ_OOB) {
2838 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM,
2839 sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd);
2841 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
2847 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
2849 if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY) {
2850 if (mgmt_user_passkey_request(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->type,
2852 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2853 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
2854 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags);
2858 /* The Initiating device waits for the non-initiating device to
2859 * send the confirm value.
2861 if (conn->hcon->out)
2864 err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->local_pk, smp->remote_pk, smp->prnd,
2865 0, cfm.confirm_val);
2867 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2869 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cfm), &cfm);
2870 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
2875 static int smp_cmd_dhkey_check(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
2877 struct smp_cmd_dhkey_check *check = (void *) skb->data;
2878 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
2879 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2880 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
2881 u8 a[7], b[7], *local_addr, *remote_addr;
2882 u8 io_cap[3], r[16], e[16];
2885 bt_dev_dbg(hcon->hdev, "conn %p", conn);
2887 if (skb->len < sizeof(*check))
2888 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2890 memcpy(a, &hcon->init_addr, 6);
2891 memcpy(b, &hcon->resp_addr, 6);
2892 a[6] = hcon->init_addr_type;
2893 b[6] = hcon->resp_addr_type;
2898 memcpy(io_cap, &smp->prsp[1], 3);
2902 memcpy(io_cap, &smp->preq[1], 3);
2905 memset(r, 0, sizeof(r));
2907 if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY)
2908 put_unaligned_le32(hcon->passkey_notify, r);
2909 else if (smp->method == REQ_OOB)
2910 memcpy(r, smp->lr, 16);
2912 err = smp_f6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->mackey, smp->rrnd, smp->prnd, r,
2913 io_cap, remote_addr, local_addr, e);
2915 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2917 if (crypto_memneq(check->e, e, 16))
2918 return SMP_DHKEY_CHECK_FAILED;
2921 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags)) {
2922 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DHKEY_PENDING, &smp->flags);
2926 /* Responder sends DHKey check as response to initiator */
2927 sc_dhkey_check(smp);
2933 hci_le_start_enc(hcon, 0, 0, smp->tk, smp->enc_key_size);
2934 hcon->enc_key_size = smp->enc_key_size;
2940 static int smp_cmd_keypress_notify(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
2941 struct sk_buff *skb)
2943 struct smp_cmd_keypress_notify *kp = (void *) skb->data;
2945 bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "value 0x%02x", kp->value);
2950 static int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb)
2952 struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
2953 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2954 struct smp_chan *smp;
2961 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_LE_ENABLED)) {
2962 reason = SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP;
2966 code = skb->data[0];
2967 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(code));
2971 if (code > SMP_CMD_MAX)
2974 if (smp && !test_and_clear_bit(code, &smp->allow_cmd))
2977 /* If we don't have a context the only allowed commands are
2978 * pairing request and security request.
2980 if (!smp && code != SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ && code != SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ)
2984 case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ:
2985 reason = smp_cmd_pairing_req(conn, skb);
2988 case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL:
2989 smp_failure(conn, 0);
2993 case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP:
2994 reason = smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(conn, skb);
2997 case SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ:
2998 reason = smp_cmd_security_req(conn, skb);
3001 case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM:
3002 reason = smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(conn, skb);
3005 case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM:
3006 reason = smp_cmd_pairing_random(conn, skb);
3009 case SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO:
3010 reason = smp_cmd_encrypt_info(conn, skb);
3013 case SMP_CMD_INITIATOR_IDENT:
3014 reason = smp_cmd_initiator_ident(conn, skb);
3017 case SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO:
3018 reason = smp_cmd_ident_info(conn, skb);
3021 case SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO:
3022 reason = smp_cmd_ident_addr_info(conn, skb);
3025 case SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO:
3026 reason = smp_cmd_sign_info(conn, skb);
3029 case SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY:
3030 reason = smp_cmd_public_key(conn, skb);
3033 case SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK:
3034 reason = smp_cmd_dhkey_check(conn, skb);
3037 case SMP_CMD_KEYPRESS_NOTIFY:
3038 reason = smp_cmd_keypress_notify(conn, skb);
3042 bt_dev_dbg(hcon->hdev, "Unknown command code 0x%2.2x", code);
3043 reason = SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
3050 smp_failure(conn, reason);
3057 bt_dev_err(hcon->hdev, "unexpected SMP command 0x%02x from %pMR",
3063 static void smp_teardown_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, int err)
3065 struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
3067 bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "chan %p", chan);
3070 smp_chan_destroy(conn);
3073 l2cap_chan_put(chan);
3076 static void bredr_pairing(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
3078 struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
3079 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
3080 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
3081 struct smp_cmd_pairing req;
3082 struct smp_chan *smp;
3084 bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "chan %p", chan);
3086 /* Only new pairings are interesting */
3087 if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_NEW_LINK_KEY, &hcon->flags))
3090 /* Don't bother if we're not encrypted */
3091 if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags))
3094 /* Only initiator may initiate SMP over BR/EDR */
3095 if (hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
3098 /* Secure Connections support must be enabled */
3099 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ENABLED))
3102 /* BR/EDR must use Secure Connections for SMP */
3103 if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_AES_CCM, &hcon->flags) &&
3104 !hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP))
3107 /* If our LE support is not enabled don't do anything */
3108 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_LE_ENABLED))
3111 /* Don't bother if remote LE support is not enabled */
3112 if (!lmp_host_le_capable(hcon))
3115 /* Remote must support SMP fixed chan for BR/EDR */
3116 if (!(conn->remote_fixed_chan & L2CAP_FC_SMP_BREDR))
3119 /* Don't bother if SMP is already ongoing */
3123 smp = smp_chan_create(conn);
3125 bt_dev_err(hdev, "unable to create SMP context for BR/EDR");
3129 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags);
3131 bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "starting SMP over BR/EDR");
3133 /* Prepare and send the BR/EDR SMP Pairing Request */
3134 build_bredr_pairing_cmd(smp, &req, NULL);
3136 smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
3137 memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &req, sizeof(req));
3139 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(req), &req);
3140 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP);
3143 static void smp_resume_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
3145 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
3146 struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
3147 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
3149 bt_dev_dbg(hcon->hdev, "chan %p", chan);
3151 if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK) {
3152 bredr_pairing(chan);
3159 if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags))
3162 cancel_delayed_work(&smp->security_timer);
3164 smp_distribute_keys(smp);
3167 static void smp_ready_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
3169 struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
3170 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
3172 bt_dev_dbg(hcon->hdev, "chan %p", chan);
3174 /* No need to call l2cap_chan_hold() here since we already own
3175 * the reference taken in smp_new_conn_cb(). This is just the
3176 * first time that we tie it to a specific pointer. The code in
3177 * l2cap_core.c ensures that there's no risk this function wont
3178 * get called if smp_new_conn_cb was previously called.
3182 if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK && test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags))
3183 bredr_pairing(chan);
3186 static int smp_recv_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb)
3190 bt_dev_dbg(chan->conn->hcon->hdev, "chan %p", chan);
3192 err = smp_sig_channel(chan, skb);
3194 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
3197 cancel_delayed_work_sync(&smp->security_timer);
3199 hci_disconnect(chan->conn->hcon, HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE);
3205 static struct sk_buff *smp_alloc_skb_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan,
3206 unsigned long hdr_len,
3207 unsigned long len, int nb)
3209 struct sk_buff *skb;
3211 skb = bt_skb_alloc(hdr_len + len, GFP_KERNEL);
3213 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
3215 skb->priority = HCI_PRIO_MAX;
3216 bt_cb(skb)->l2cap.chan = chan;
3221 static const struct l2cap_ops smp_chan_ops = {
3222 .name = "Security Manager",
3223 .ready = smp_ready_cb,
3224 .recv = smp_recv_cb,
3225 .alloc_skb = smp_alloc_skb_cb,
3226 .teardown = smp_teardown_cb,
3227 .resume = smp_resume_cb,
3229 .new_connection = l2cap_chan_no_new_connection,
3230 .state_change = l2cap_chan_no_state_change,
3231 .close = l2cap_chan_no_close,
3232 .defer = l2cap_chan_no_defer,
3233 .suspend = l2cap_chan_no_suspend,
3234 .set_shutdown = l2cap_chan_no_set_shutdown,
3235 .get_sndtimeo = l2cap_chan_no_get_sndtimeo,
3238 static inline struct l2cap_chan *smp_new_conn_cb(struct l2cap_chan *pchan)
3240 struct l2cap_chan *chan;
3242 BT_DBG("pchan %p", pchan);
3244 chan = l2cap_chan_create();
3248 chan->chan_type = pchan->chan_type;
3249 chan->ops = &smp_chan_ops;
3250 chan->scid = pchan->scid;
3251 chan->dcid = chan->scid;
3252 chan->imtu = pchan->imtu;
3253 chan->omtu = pchan->omtu;
3254 chan->mode = pchan->mode;
3256 /* Other L2CAP channels may request SMP routines in order to
3257 * change the security level. This means that the SMP channel
3258 * lock must be considered in its own category to avoid lockdep
3261 atomic_set(&chan->nesting, L2CAP_NESTING_SMP);
3263 BT_DBG("created chan %p", chan);
3268 static const struct l2cap_ops smp_root_chan_ops = {
3269 .name = "Security Manager Root",
3270 .new_connection = smp_new_conn_cb,
3272 /* None of these are implemented for the root channel */
3273 .close = l2cap_chan_no_close,
3274 .alloc_skb = l2cap_chan_no_alloc_skb,
3275 .recv = l2cap_chan_no_recv,
3276 .state_change = l2cap_chan_no_state_change,
3277 .teardown = l2cap_chan_no_teardown,
3278 .ready = l2cap_chan_no_ready,
3279 .defer = l2cap_chan_no_defer,
3280 .suspend = l2cap_chan_no_suspend,
3281 .resume = l2cap_chan_no_resume,
3282 .set_shutdown = l2cap_chan_no_set_shutdown,
3283 .get_sndtimeo = l2cap_chan_no_get_sndtimeo,
3286 static struct l2cap_chan *smp_add_cid(struct hci_dev *hdev, u16 cid)
3288 struct l2cap_chan *chan;
3289 struct smp_dev *smp;
3290 struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac;
3291 struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh;
3293 if (cid == L2CAP_CID_SMP_BREDR) {
3298 smp = kzalloc(sizeof(*smp), GFP_KERNEL);
3300 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
3302 tfm_cmac = crypto_alloc_shash("cmac(aes)", 0, 0);
3303 if (IS_ERR(tfm_cmac)) {
3304 bt_dev_err(hdev, "Unable to create CMAC crypto context");
3305 kfree_sensitive(smp);
3306 return ERR_CAST(tfm_cmac);
3309 tfm_ecdh = crypto_alloc_kpp("ecdh", 0, 0);
3310 if (IS_ERR(tfm_ecdh)) {
3311 bt_dev_err(hdev, "Unable to create ECDH crypto context");
3312 crypto_free_shash(tfm_cmac);
3313 kfree_sensitive(smp);
3314 return ERR_CAST(tfm_ecdh);
3317 smp->local_oob = false;
3318 smp->tfm_cmac = tfm_cmac;
3319 smp->tfm_ecdh = tfm_ecdh;
3322 chan = l2cap_chan_create();
3325 crypto_free_shash(smp->tfm_cmac);
3326 crypto_free_kpp(smp->tfm_ecdh);
3327 kfree_sensitive(smp);
3329 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
3334 l2cap_add_scid(chan, cid);
3336 l2cap_chan_set_defaults(chan);
3338 if (cid == L2CAP_CID_SMP) {
3341 hci_copy_identity_address(hdev, &chan->src, &bdaddr_type);
3343 if (bdaddr_type == ADDR_LE_DEV_PUBLIC)
3344 chan->src_type = BDADDR_LE_PUBLIC;
3346 chan->src_type = BDADDR_LE_RANDOM;
3348 bacpy(&chan->src, &hdev->bdaddr);
3349 chan->src_type = BDADDR_BREDR;
3352 chan->state = BT_LISTEN;
3353 chan->mode = L2CAP_MODE_BASIC;
3354 chan->imtu = L2CAP_DEFAULT_MTU;
3355 chan->ops = &smp_root_chan_ops;
3357 /* Set correct nesting level for a parent/listening channel */
3358 atomic_set(&chan->nesting, L2CAP_NESTING_PARENT);
3363 static void smp_del_chan(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
3365 struct smp_dev *smp;
3367 BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
3372 crypto_free_shash(smp->tfm_cmac);
3373 crypto_free_kpp(smp->tfm_ecdh);
3374 kfree_sensitive(smp);
3377 l2cap_chan_put(chan);
3380 static ssize_t force_bredr_smp_read(struct file *file,
3381 char __user *user_buf,
3382 size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
3384 struct hci_dev *hdev = file->private_data;
3387 buf[0] = hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP) ? 'Y': 'N';
3390 return simple_read_from_buffer(user_buf, count, ppos, buf, 2);
3393 static ssize_t force_bredr_smp_write(struct file *file,
3394 const char __user *user_buf,
3395 size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
3397 struct hci_dev *hdev = file->private_data;
3401 err = kstrtobool_from_user(user_buf, count, &enable);
3405 if (enable == hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP))
3409 struct l2cap_chan *chan;
3411 chan = smp_add_cid(hdev, L2CAP_CID_SMP_BREDR);
3413 return PTR_ERR(chan);
3415 hdev->smp_bredr_data = chan;
3417 struct l2cap_chan *chan;
3419 chan = hdev->smp_bredr_data;
3420 hdev->smp_bredr_data = NULL;
3424 hci_dev_change_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP);
3429 static const struct file_operations force_bredr_smp_fops = {
3430 .open = simple_open,
3431 .read = force_bredr_smp_read,
3432 .write = force_bredr_smp_write,
3433 .llseek = default_llseek,
3436 int smp_register(struct hci_dev *hdev)
3438 struct l2cap_chan *chan;
3440 bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "");
3442 /* If the controller does not support Low Energy operation, then
3443 * there is also no need to register any SMP channel.
3445 if (!lmp_le_capable(hdev))
3448 if (WARN_ON(hdev->smp_data)) {
3449 chan = hdev->smp_data;
3450 hdev->smp_data = NULL;
3454 chan = smp_add_cid(hdev, L2CAP_CID_SMP);
3456 return PTR_ERR(chan);
3458 hdev->smp_data = chan;
3460 /* If the controller does not support BR/EDR Secure Connections
3461 * feature, then the BR/EDR SMP channel shall not be present.
3463 * To test this with Bluetooth 4.0 controllers, create a debugfs
3464 * switch that allows forcing BR/EDR SMP support and accepting
3465 * cross-transport pairing on non-AES encrypted connections.
3467 if (!lmp_sc_capable(hdev)) {
3468 debugfs_create_file("force_bredr_smp", 0644, hdev->debugfs,
3469 hdev, &force_bredr_smp_fops);
3471 /* Flag can be already set here (due to power toggle) */
3472 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP))
3476 if (WARN_ON(hdev->smp_bredr_data)) {
3477 chan = hdev->smp_bredr_data;
3478 hdev->smp_bredr_data = NULL;
3482 chan = smp_add_cid(hdev, L2CAP_CID_SMP_BREDR);
3484 int err = PTR_ERR(chan);
3485 chan = hdev->smp_data;
3486 hdev->smp_data = NULL;
3491 hdev->smp_bredr_data = chan;
3496 void smp_unregister(struct hci_dev *hdev)
3498 struct l2cap_chan *chan;
3500 if (hdev->smp_bredr_data) {
3501 chan = hdev->smp_bredr_data;
3502 hdev->smp_bredr_data = NULL;
3506 if (hdev->smp_data) {
3507 chan = hdev->smp_data;
3508 hdev->smp_data = NULL;
3513 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BT_SELFTEST_SMP)
3515 static int __init test_debug_key(struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh)
3520 err = set_ecdh_privkey(tfm_ecdh, debug_sk);
3524 err = generate_ecdh_public_key(tfm_ecdh, pk);
3528 if (crypto_memneq(pk, debug_pk, 64))
3534 static int __init test_ah(void)
3536 const u8 irk[16] = {
3537 0x9b, 0x7d, 0x39, 0x0a, 0xa6, 0x10, 0x10, 0x34,
3538 0x05, 0xad, 0xc8, 0x57, 0xa3, 0x34, 0x02, 0xec };
3539 const u8 r[3] = { 0x94, 0x81, 0x70 };
3540 const u8 exp[3] = { 0xaa, 0xfb, 0x0d };
3544 err = smp_ah(irk, r, res);
3548 if (crypto_memneq(res, exp, 3))
3554 static int __init test_c1(void)
3557 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
3558 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 };
3560 0xe0, 0x2e, 0x70, 0xc6, 0x4e, 0x27, 0x88, 0x63,
3561 0x0e, 0x6f, 0xad, 0x56, 0x21, 0xd5, 0x83, 0x57 };
3562 const u8 preq[7] = { 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x10, 0x07, 0x07 };
3563 const u8 pres[7] = { 0x02, 0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x08, 0x00, 0x05 };
3564 const u8 _iat = 0x01;
3565 const u8 _rat = 0x00;
3566 const bdaddr_t ra = { { 0xb6, 0xb5, 0xb4, 0xb3, 0xb2, 0xb1 } };
3567 const bdaddr_t ia = { { 0xa6, 0xa5, 0xa4, 0xa3, 0xa2, 0xa1 } };
3568 const u8 exp[16] = {
3569 0x86, 0x3b, 0xf1, 0xbe, 0xc5, 0x4d, 0xa7, 0xd2,
3570 0xea, 0x88, 0x89, 0x87, 0xef, 0x3f, 0x1e, 0x1e };
3574 err = smp_c1(k, r, preq, pres, _iat, &ia, _rat, &ra, res);
3578 if (crypto_memneq(res, exp, 16))
3584 static int __init test_s1(void)
3587 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
3588 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 };
3590 0x88, 0x77, 0x66, 0x55, 0x44, 0x33, 0x22, 0x11 };
3592 0x00, 0xff, 0xee, 0xdd, 0xcc, 0xbb, 0xaa, 0x99 };
3593 const u8 exp[16] = {
3594 0x62, 0xa0, 0x6d, 0x79, 0xae, 0x16, 0x42, 0x5b,
3595 0x9b, 0xf4, 0xb0, 0xe8, 0xf0, 0xe1, 0x1f, 0x9a };
3599 err = smp_s1(k, r1, r2, res);
3603 if (crypto_memneq(res, exp, 16))
3609 static int __init test_f4(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac)
3612 0xe6, 0x9d, 0x35, 0x0e, 0x48, 0x01, 0x03, 0xcc,
3613 0xdb, 0xfd, 0xf4, 0xac, 0x11, 0x91, 0xf4, 0xef,
3614 0xb9, 0xa5, 0xf9, 0xe9, 0xa7, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x5e,
3615 0x2c, 0xbe, 0x97, 0xf2, 0xd2, 0x03, 0xb0, 0x20 };
3617 0xfd, 0xc5, 0x7f, 0xf4, 0x49, 0xdd, 0x4f, 0x6b,
3618 0xfb, 0x7c, 0x9d, 0xf1, 0xc2, 0x9a, 0xcb, 0x59,
3619 0x2a, 0xe7, 0xd4, 0xee, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0x0a, 0x90,
3620 0x9a, 0xbb, 0xf6, 0x32, 0x3d, 0x8b, 0x18, 0x55 };
3622 0xab, 0xae, 0x2b, 0x71, 0xec, 0xb2, 0xff, 0xff,
3623 0x3e, 0x73, 0x77, 0xd1, 0x54, 0x84, 0xcb, 0xd5 };
3625 const u8 exp[16] = {
3626 0x2d, 0x87, 0x74, 0xa9, 0xbe, 0xa1, 0xed, 0xf1,
3627 0x1c, 0xbd, 0xa9, 0x07, 0xf1, 0x16, 0xc9, 0xf2 };
3631 err = smp_f4(tfm_cmac, u, v, x, z, res);
3635 if (crypto_memneq(res, exp, 16))
3641 static int __init test_f5(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac)
3644 0x98, 0xa6, 0xbf, 0x73, 0xf3, 0x34, 0x8d, 0x86,
3645 0xf1, 0x66, 0xf8, 0xb4, 0x13, 0x6b, 0x79, 0x99,
3646 0x9b, 0x7d, 0x39, 0x0a, 0xa6, 0x10, 0x10, 0x34,
3647 0x05, 0xad, 0xc8, 0x57, 0xa3, 0x34, 0x02, 0xec };
3649 0xab, 0xae, 0x2b, 0x71, 0xec, 0xb2, 0xff, 0xff,
3650 0x3e, 0x73, 0x77, 0xd1, 0x54, 0x84, 0xcb, 0xd5 };
3652 0xcf, 0xc4, 0x3d, 0xff, 0xf7, 0x83, 0x65, 0x21,
3653 0x6e, 0x5f, 0xa7, 0x25, 0xcc, 0xe7, 0xe8, 0xa6 };
3654 const u8 a1[7] = { 0xce, 0xbf, 0x37, 0x37, 0x12, 0x56, 0x00 };
3655 const u8 a2[7] = { 0xc1, 0xcf, 0x2d, 0x70, 0x13, 0xa7, 0x00 };
3656 const u8 exp_ltk[16] = {
3657 0x38, 0x0a, 0x75, 0x94, 0xb5, 0x22, 0x05, 0x98,
3658 0x23, 0xcd, 0xd7, 0x69, 0x11, 0x79, 0x86, 0x69 };
3659 const u8 exp_mackey[16] = {
3660 0x20, 0x6e, 0x63, 0xce, 0x20, 0x6a, 0x3f, 0xfd,
3661 0x02, 0x4a, 0x08, 0xa1, 0x76, 0xf1, 0x65, 0x29 };
3662 u8 mackey[16], ltk[16];
3665 err = smp_f5(tfm_cmac, w, n1, n2, a1, a2, mackey, ltk);
3669 if (crypto_memneq(mackey, exp_mackey, 16))
3672 if (crypto_memneq(ltk, exp_ltk, 16))
3678 static int __init test_f6(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac)
3681 0x20, 0x6e, 0x63, 0xce, 0x20, 0x6a, 0x3f, 0xfd,
3682 0x02, 0x4a, 0x08, 0xa1, 0x76, 0xf1, 0x65, 0x29 };
3684 0xab, 0xae, 0x2b, 0x71, 0xec, 0xb2, 0xff, 0xff,
3685 0x3e, 0x73, 0x77, 0xd1, 0x54, 0x84, 0xcb, 0xd5 };
3687 0xcf, 0xc4, 0x3d, 0xff, 0xf7, 0x83, 0x65, 0x21,
3688 0x6e, 0x5f, 0xa7, 0x25, 0xcc, 0xe7, 0xe8, 0xa6 };
3690 0xc8, 0x0f, 0x2d, 0x0c, 0xd2, 0x42, 0xda, 0x08,
3691 0x54, 0xbb, 0x53, 0xb4, 0x3b, 0x34, 0xa3, 0x12 };
3692 const u8 io_cap[3] = { 0x02, 0x01, 0x01 };
3693 const u8 a1[7] = { 0xce, 0xbf, 0x37, 0x37, 0x12, 0x56, 0x00 };
3694 const u8 a2[7] = { 0xc1, 0xcf, 0x2d, 0x70, 0x13, 0xa7, 0x00 };
3695 const u8 exp[16] = {
3696 0x61, 0x8f, 0x95, 0xda, 0x09, 0x0b, 0x6c, 0xd2,
3697 0xc5, 0xe8, 0xd0, 0x9c, 0x98, 0x73, 0xc4, 0xe3 };
3701 err = smp_f6(tfm_cmac, w, n1, n2, r, io_cap, a1, a2, res);
3705 if (crypto_memneq(res, exp, 16))
3711 static int __init test_g2(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac)
3714 0xe6, 0x9d, 0x35, 0x0e, 0x48, 0x01, 0x03, 0xcc,
3715 0xdb, 0xfd, 0xf4, 0xac, 0x11, 0x91, 0xf4, 0xef,
3716 0xb9, 0xa5, 0xf9, 0xe9, 0xa7, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x5e,
3717 0x2c, 0xbe, 0x97, 0xf2, 0xd2, 0x03, 0xb0, 0x20 };
3719 0xfd, 0xc5, 0x7f, 0xf4, 0x49, 0xdd, 0x4f, 0x6b,
3720 0xfb, 0x7c, 0x9d, 0xf1, 0xc2, 0x9a, 0xcb, 0x59,
3721 0x2a, 0xe7, 0xd4, 0xee, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0x0a, 0x90,
3722 0x9a, 0xbb, 0xf6, 0x32, 0x3d, 0x8b, 0x18, 0x55 };
3724 0xab, 0xae, 0x2b, 0x71, 0xec, 0xb2, 0xff, 0xff,
3725 0x3e, 0x73, 0x77, 0xd1, 0x54, 0x84, 0xcb, 0xd5 };
3727 0xcf, 0xc4, 0x3d, 0xff, 0xf7, 0x83, 0x65, 0x21,
3728 0x6e, 0x5f, 0xa7, 0x25, 0xcc, 0xe7, 0xe8, 0xa6 };
3729 const u32 exp_val = 0x2f9ed5ba % 1000000;
3733 err = smp_g2(tfm_cmac, u, v, x, y, &val);
3743 static int __init test_h6(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac)
3746 0x9b, 0x7d, 0x39, 0x0a, 0xa6, 0x10, 0x10, 0x34,
3747 0x05, 0xad, 0xc8, 0x57, 0xa3, 0x34, 0x02, 0xec };
3748 const u8 key_id[4] = { 0x72, 0x62, 0x65, 0x6c };
3749 const u8 exp[16] = {
3750 0x99, 0x63, 0xb1, 0x80, 0xe2, 0xa9, 0xd3, 0xe8,
3751 0x1c, 0xc9, 0x6d, 0xe7, 0x02, 0xe1, 0x9a, 0x2d };
3755 err = smp_h6(tfm_cmac, w, key_id, res);
3759 if (crypto_memneq(res, exp, 16))
3765 static char test_smp_buffer[32];
3767 static ssize_t test_smp_read(struct file *file, char __user *user_buf,
3768 size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
3770 return simple_read_from_buffer(user_buf, count, ppos, test_smp_buffer,
3771 strlen(test_smp_buffer));
3774 static const struct file_operations test_smp_fops = {
3775 .open = simple_open,
3776 .read = test_smp_read,
3777 .llseek = default_llseek,
3780 static int __init run_selftests(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac,
3781 struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh)
3783 ktime_t calltime, delta, rettime;
3784 unsigned long long duration;
3787 calltime = ktime_get();
3789 err = test_debug_key(tfm_ecdh);
3791 BT_ERR("debug_key test failed");
3797 BT_ERR("smp_ah test failed");
3803 BT_ERR("smp_c1 test failed");
3809 BT_ERR("smp_s1 test failed");
3813 err = test_f4(tfm_cmac);
3815 BT_ERR("smp_f4 test failed");
3819 err = test_f5(tfm_cmac);
3821 BT_ERR("smp_f5 test failed");
3825 err = test_f6(tfm_cmac);
3827 BT_ERR("smp_f6 test failed");
3831 err = test_g2(tfm_cmac);
3833 BT_ERR("smp_g2 test failed");
3837 err = test_h6(tfm_cmac);
3839 BT_ERR("smp_h6 test failed");
3843 rettime = ktime_get();
3844 delta = ktime_sub(rettime, calltime);
3845 duration = (unsigned long long) ktime_to_ns(delta) >> 10;
3847 BT_INFO("SMP test passed in %llu usecs", duration);
3851 snprintf(test_smp_buffer, sizeof(test_smp_buffer),
3852 "PASS (%llu usecs)\n", duration);
3854 snprintf(test_smp_buffer, sizeof(test_smp_buffer), "FAIL\n");
3856 debugfs_create_file("selftest_smp", 0444, bt_debugfs, NULL,
3862 int __init bt_selftest_smp(void)
3864 struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac;
3865 struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh;
3868 tfm_cmac = crypto_alloc_shash("cmac(aes)", 0, 0);
3869 if (IS_ERR(tfm_cmac)) {
3870 BT_ERR("Unable to create CMAC crypto context");
3871 return PTR_ERR(tfm_cmac);
3874 tfm_ecdh = crypto_alloc_kpp("ecdh", 0, 0);
3875 if (IS_ERR(tfm_ecdh)) {
3876 BT_ERR("Unable to create ECDH crypto context");
3877 crypto_free_shash(tfm_cmac);
3878 return PTR_ERR(tfm_ecdh);
3881 err = run_selftests(tfm_cmac, tfm_ecdh);
3883 crypto_free_shash(tfm_cmac);
3884 crypto_free_kpp(tfm_ecdh);