2 BlueZ - Bluetooth protocol stack for Linux
3 Copyright (C) 2011 Nokia Corporation and/or its subsidiary(-ies).
5 This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
6 it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
7 published by the Free Software Foundation;
9 THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS
10 OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
11 FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT OF THIRD PARTY RIGHTS.
12 IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER(S) AND AUTHOR(S) BE LIABLE FOR ANY
13 CLAIM, OR ANY SPECIAL INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, OR ANY DAMAGES
14 WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
15 ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
16 OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
18 ALL LIABILITY, INCLUDING LIABILITY FOR INFRINGEMENT OF ANY PATENTS,
19 COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS OR OTHER RIGHTS, RELATING TO USE OF THIS
20 SOFTWARE IS DISCLAIMED.
23 #include <linux/debugfs.h>
24 #include <linux/scatterlist.h>
25 #include <crypto/aes.h>
26 #include <crypto/hash.h>
27 #include <crypto/kpp.h>
28 #include <crypto/utils.h>
30 #include <net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h>
31 #include <net/bluetooth/hci_core.h>
32 #include <net/bluetooth/l2cap.h>
33 #include <net/bluetooth/mgmt.h>
35 #include "ecdh_helper.h"
38 #define SMP_DEV(hdev) \
39 ((struct smp_dev *)((struct l2cap_chan *)((hdev)->smp_data))->data)
41 /* Low-level debug macros to be used for stuff that we don't want
42 * accidentally in dmesg, i.e. the values of the various crypto keys
43 * and the inputs & outputs of crypto functions.
46 #define SMP_DBG(fmt, ...) printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: " fmt, __func__, \
49 #define SMP_DBG(fmt, ...) no_printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: " fmt, __func__, \
53 #define SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, code) set_bit(code, &smp->allow_cmd)
55 /* Keys which are not distributed with Secure Connections */
56 #define SMP_SC_NO_DIST (SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY)
58 #define SMP_TIMEOUT msecs_to_jiffies(30000)
60 #define ID_ADDR_TIMEOUT msecs_to_jiffies(200)
62 #define AUTH_REQ_MASK(dev) (hci_dev_test_flag(dev, HCI_SC_ENABLED) ? \
64 #define KEY_DIST_MASK 0x07
66 /* Maximum message length that can be passed to aes_cmac */
67 #define CMAC_MSG_MAX 80
79 SMP_FLAG_DHKEY_PENDING,
86 /* Secure Connections OOB data */
92 struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac;
93 struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh;
97 struct l2cap_conn *conn;
98 struct delayed_work security_timer;
99 unsigned long allow_cmd; /* Bitmask of allowed commands */
101 u8 preq[7]; /* SMP Pairing Request */
102 u8 prsp[7]; /* SMP Pairing Response */
103 u8 prnd[16]; /* SMP Pairing Random (local) */
104 u8 rrnd[16]; /* SMP Pairing Random (remote) */
105 u8 pcnf[16]; /* SMP Pairing Confirm */
106 u8 tk[16]; /* SMP Temporary Key */
107 u8 rr[16]; /* Remote OOB ra/rb value */
108 u8 lr[16]; /* Local OOB ra/rb value */
114 struct smp_csrk *csrk;
115 struct smp_csrk *responder_csrk;
117 struct smp_ltk *responder_ltk;
118 struct smp_irk *remote_irk;
124 /* Secure Connections variables */
130 struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac;
131 struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh;
134 /* These debug key values are defined in the SMP section of the core
135 * specification. debug_pk is the public debug key and debug_sk the
138 static const u8 debug_pk[64] = {
139 0xe6, 0x9d, 0x35, 0x0e, 0x48, 0x01, 0x03, 0xcc,
140 0xdb, 0xfd, 0xf4, 0xac, 0x11, 0x91, 0xf4, 0xef,
141 0xb9, 0xa5, 0xf9, 0xe9, 0xa7, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x5e,
142 0x2c, 0xbe, 0x97, 0xf2, 0xd2, 0x03, 0xb0, 0x20,
144 0x8b, 0xd2, 0x89, 0x15, 0xd0, 0x8e, 0x1c, 0x74,
145 0x24, 0x30, 0xed, 0x8f, 0xc2, 0x45, 0x63, 0x76,
146 0x5c, 0x15, 0x52, 0x5a, 0xbf, 0x9a, 0x32, 0x63,
147 0x6d, 0xeb, 0x2a, 0x65, 0x49, 0x9c, 0x80, 0xdc,
150 static const u8 debug_sk[32] = {
151 0xbd, 0x1a, 0x3c, 0xcd, 0xa6, 0xb8, 0x99, 0x58,
152 0x99, 0xb7, 0x40, 0xeb, 0x7b, 0x60, 0xff, 0x4a,
153 0x50, 0x3f, 0x10, 0xd2, 0xe3, 0xb3, 0xc9, 0x74,
154 0x38, 0x5f, 0xc5, 0xa3, 0xd4, 0xf6, 0x49, 0x3f,
157 static inline void swap_buf(const u8 *src, u8 *dst, size_t len)
161 for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
162 dst[len - 1 - i] = src[i];
165 /* The following functions map to the LE SC SMP crypto functions
166 * AES-CMAC, f4, f5, f6, g2 and h6.
169 static int aes_cmac(struct crypto_shash *tfm, const u8 k[16], const u8 *m,
170 size_t len, u8 mac[16])
172 uint8_t tmp[16], mac_msb[16], msg_msb[CMAC_MSG_MAX];
175 if (len > CMAC_MSG_MAX)
179 BT_ERR("tfm %p", tfm);
183 /* Swap key and message from LSB to MSB */
184 swap_buf(k, tmp, 16);
185 swap_buf(m, msg_msb, len);
187 SMP_DBG("msg (len %zu) %*phN", len, (int) len, m);
188 SMP_DBG("key %16phN", k);
190 err = crypto_shash_setkey(tfm, tmp, 16);
192 BT_ERR("cipher setkey failed: %d", err);
196 err = crypto_shash_tfm_digest(tfm, msg_msb, len, mac_msb);
198 BT_ERR("Hash computation error %d", err);
202 swap_buf(mac_msb, mac, 16);
204 SMP_DBG("mac %16phN", mac);
209 static int smp_f4(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 u[32],
210 const u8 v[32], const u8 x[16], u8 z, u8 res[16])
215 SMP_DBG("u %32phN", u);
216 SMP_DBG("v %32phN", v);
217 SMP_DBG("x %16phN z %02x", x, z);
220 memcpy(m + 1, v, 32);
221 memcpy(m + 33, u, 32);
223 err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, x, m, sizeof(m), res);
227 SMP_DBG("res %16phN", res);
232 static int smp_f5(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 w[32],
233 const u8 n1[16], const u8 n2[16], const u8 a1[7],
234 const u8 a2[7], u8 mackey[16], u8 ltk[16])
236 /* The btle, salt and length "magic" values are as defined in
237 * the SMP section of the Bluetooth core specification. In ASCII
238 * the btle value ends up being 'btle'. The salt is just a
239 * random number whereas length is the value 256 in little
242 const u8 btle[4] = { 0x65, 0x6c, 0x74, 0x62 };
243 const u8 salt[16] = { 0xbe, 0x83, 0x60, 0x5a, 0xdb, 0x0b, 0x37, 0x60,
244 0x38, 0xa5, 0xf5, 0xaa, 0x91, 0x83, 0x88, 0x6c };
245 const u8 length[2] = { 0x00, 0x01 };
249 SMP_DBG("w %32phN", w);
250 SMP_DBG("n1 %16phN n2 %16phN", n1, n2);
251 SMP_DBG("a1 %7phN a2 %7phN", a1, a2);
253 err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, salt, w, 32, t);
257 SMP_DBG("t %16phN", t);
259 memcpy(m, length, 2);
260 memcpy(m + 2, a2, 7);
261 memcpy(m + 9, a1, 7);
262 memcpy(m + 16, n2, 16);
263 memcpy(m + 32, n1, 16);
264 memcpy(m + 48, btle, 4);
266 m[52] = 0; /* Counter */
268 err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, t, m, sizeof(m), mackey);
272 SMP_DBG("mackey %16phN", mackey);
274 m[52] = 1; /* Counter */
276 err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, t, m, sizeof(m), ltk);
280 SMP_DBG("ltk %16phN", ltk);
285 static int smp_f6(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 w[16],
286 const u8 n1[16], const u8 n2[16], const u8 r[16],
287 const u8 io_cap[3], const u8 a1[7], const u8 a2[7],
293 SMP_DBG("w %16phN", w);
294 SMP_DBG("n1 %16phN n2 %16phN", n1, n2);
295 SMP_DBG("r %16phN io_cap %3phN a1 %7phN a2 %7phN", r, io_cap, a1, a2);
298 memcpy(m + 7, a1, 7);
299 memcpy(m + 14, io_cap, 3);
300 memcpy(m + 17, r, 16);
301 memcpy(m + 33, n2, 16);
302 memcpy(m + 49, n1, 16);
304 err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, w, m, sizeof(m), res);
308 SMP_DBG("res %16phN", res);
313 static int smp_g2(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 u[32], const u8 v[32],
314 const u8 x[16], const u8 y[16], u32 *val)
319 SMP_DBG("u %32phN", u);
320 SMP_DBG("v %32phN", v);
321 SMP_DBG("x %16phN y %16phN", x, y);
324 memcpy(m + 16, v, 32);
325 memcpy(m + 48, u, 32);
327 err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, x, m, sizeof(m), tmp);
331 *val = get_unaligned_le32(tmp);
334 SMP_DBG("val %06u", *val);
339 static int smp_h6(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 w[16],
340 const u8 key_id[4], u8 res[16])
344 SMP_DBG("w %16phN key_id %4phN", w, key_id);
346 err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, w, key_id, 4, res);
350 SMP_DBG("res %16phN", res);
355 static int smp_h7(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 w[16],
356 const u8 salt[16], u8 res[16])
360 SMP_DBG("w %16phN salt %16phN", w, salt);
362 err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, salt, w, 16, res);
366 SMP_DBG("res %16phN", res);
371 /* The following functions map to the legacy SMP crypto functions e, c1,
375 static int smp_e(const u8 *k, u8 *r)
377 struct crypto_aes_ctx ctx;
378 uint8_t tmp[16], data[16];
381 SMP_DBG("k %16phN r %16phN", k, r);
383 /* The most significant octet of key corresponds to k[0] */
384 swap_buf(k, tmp, 16);
386 err = aes_expandkey(&ctx, tmp, 16);
388 BT_ERR("cipher setkey failed: %d", err);
392 /* Most significant octet of plaintextData corresponds to data[0] */
393 swap_buf(r, data, 16);
395 aes_encrypt(&ctx, data, data);
397 /* Most significant octet of encryptedData corresponds to data[0] */
398 swap_buf(data, r, 16);
400 SMP_DBG("r %16phN", r);
402 memzero_explicit(&ctx, sizeof(ctx));
406 static int smp_c1(const u8 k[16],
407 const u8 r[16], const u8 preq[7], const u8 pres[7], u8 _iat,
408 const bdaddr_t *ia, u8 _rat, const bdaddr_t *ra, u8 res[16])
413 SMP_DBG("k %16phN r %16phN", k, r);
414 SMP_DBG("iat %u ia %6phN rat %u ra %6phN", _iat, ia, _rat, ra);
415 SMP_DBG("preq %7phN pres %7phN", preq, pres);
419 /* p1 = pres || preq || _rat || _iat */
422 memcpy(p1 + 2, preq, 7);
423 memcpy(p1 + 9, pres, 7);
425 SMP_DBG("p1 %16phN", p1);
428 crypto_xor_cpy(res, r, p1, sizeof(p1));
430 /* res = e(k, res) */
433 BT_ERR("Encrypt data error");
437 /* p2 = padding || ia || ra */
439 memcpy(p2 + 6, ia, 6);
440 memset(p2 + 12, 0, 4);
442 SMP_DBG("p2 %16phN", p2);
444 /* res = res XOR p2 */
445 crypto_xor(res, p2, sizeof(p2));
447 /* res = e(k, res) */
450 BT_ERR("Encrypt data error");
455 static int smp_s1(const u8 k[16],
456 const u8 r1[16], const u8 r2[16], u8 _r[16])
460 /* Just least significant octets from r1 and r2 are considered */
462 memcpy(_r + 8, r1, 8);
466 BT_ERR("Encrypt data error");
471 static int smp_ah(const u8 irk[16], const u8 r[3], u8 res[3])
476 /* r' = padding || r */
478 memset(_res + 3, 0, 13);
480 err = smp_e(irk, _res);
482 BT_ERR("Encrypt error");
486 /* The output of the random address function ah is:
487 * ah(k, r) = e(k, r') mod 2^24
488 * The output of the security function e is then truncated to 24 bits
489 * by taking the least significant 24 bits of the output of e as the
492 memcpy(res, _res, 3);
497 bool smp_irk_matches(struct hci_dev *hdev, const u8 irk[16],
498 const bdaddr_t *bdaddr)
500 struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data;
504 if (!chan || !chan->data)
507 bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "RPA %pMR IRK %*phN", bdaddr, 16, irk);
509 err = smp_ah(irk, &bdaddr->b[3], hash);
513 return !crypto_memneq(bdaddr->b, hash, 3);
516 int smp_generate_rpa(struct hci_dev *hdev, const u8 irk[16], bdaddr_t *rpa)
518 struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data;
521 if (!chan || !chan->data)
524 get_random_bytes(&rpa->b[3], 3);
526 rpa->b[5] &= 0x3f; /* Clear two most significant bits */
527 rpa->b[5] |= 0x40; /* Set second most significant bit */
529 err = smp_ah(irk, &rpa->b[3], rpa->b);
533 bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "RPA %pMR", rpa);
538 int smp_generate_oob(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 hash[16], u8 rand[16])
540 struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data;
544 if (!chan || !chan->data)
549 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_USE_DEBUG_KEYS)) {
550 bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "Using debug keys");
551 err = set_ecdh_privkey(smp->tfm_ecdh, debug_sk);
554 memcpy(smp->local_pk, debug_pk, 64);
555 smp->debug_key = true;
558 /* Generate key pair for Secure Connections */
559 err = generate_ecdh_keys(smp->tfm_ecdh, smp->local_pk);
563 /* This is unlikely, but we need to check that
564 * we didn't accidentally generate a debug key.
566 if (crypto_memneq(smp->local_pk, debug_pk, 64))
569 smp->debug_key = false;
572 SMP_DBG("OOB Public Key X: %32phN", smp->local_pk);
573 SMP_DBG("OOB Public Key Y: %32phN", smp->local_pk + 32);
575 get_random_bytes(smp->local_rand, 16);
577 err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->local_pk, smp->local_pk,
578 smp->local_rand, 0, hash);
582 memcpy(rand, smp->local_rand, 16);
584 smp->local_oob = true;
589 static void smp_send_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 code, u16 len, void *data)
591 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
592 struct smp_chan *smp;
599 bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "code 0x%2.2x", code);
601 iv[0].iov_base = &code;
604 iv[1].iov_base = data;
607 memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg));
609 iov_iter_kvec(&msg.msg_iter, ITER_SOURCE, iv, 2, 1 + len);
611 l2cap_chan_send(chan, &msg, 1 + len);
618 cancel_delayed_work_sync(&smp->security_timer);
619 schedule_delayed_work(&smp->security_timer, SMP_TIMEOUT);
622 static u8 authreq_to_seclevel(u8 authreq)
624 if (authreq & SMP_AUTH_MITM) {
625 if (authreq & SMP_AUTH_SC)
626 return BT_SECURITY_FIPS;
628 return BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
630 return BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM;
634 static __u8 seclevel_to_authreq(__u8 sec_level)
637 case BT_SECURITY_FIPS:
638 case BT_SECURITY_HIGH:
639 return SMP_AUTH_MITM | SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
640 case BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM:
641 return SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
643 return SMP_AUTH_NONE;
647 static void build_pairing_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
648 struct smp_cmd_pairing *req,
649 struct smp_cmd_pairing *rsp, __u8 authreq)
651 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
652 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
653 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
654 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
655 u8 local_dist = 0, remote_dist = 0, oob_flag = SMP_OOB_NOT_PRESENT;
657 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_BONDABLE)) {
658 local_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN;
659 remote_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN;
660 authreq |= SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
662 authreq &= ~SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
665 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_RPA_RESOLVING))
666 remote_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
668 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_PRIVACY))
669 local_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
671 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ENABLED) &&
672 (authreq & SMP_AUTH_SC)) {
673 struct oob_data *oob_data;
676 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SSP_ENABLED)) {
677 local_dist |= SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY;
678 remote_dist |= SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY;
681 if (hcon->dst_type == ADDR_LE_DEV_PUBLIC)
682 bdaddr_type = BDADDR_LE_PUBLIC;
684 bdaddr_type = BDADDR_LE_RANDOM;
686 oob_data = hci_find_remote_oob_data(hdev, &hcon->dst,
688 if (oob_data && oob_data->present) {
689 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_OOB, &smp->flags);
690 oob_flag = SMP_OOB_PRESENT;
691 memcpy(smp->rr, oob_data->rand256, 16);
692 memcpy(smp->pcnf, oob_data->hash256, 16);
693 SMP_DBG("OOB Remote Confirmation: %16phN", smp->pcnf);
694 SMP_DBG("OOB Remote Random: %16phN", smp->rr);
698 authreq &= ~SMP_AUTH_SC;
702 req->io_capability = conn->hcon->io_capability;
703 req->oob_flag = oob_flag;
704 req->max_key_size = hdev->le_max_key_size;
705 req->init_key_dist = local_dist;
706 req->resp_key_dist = remote_dist;
707 req->auth_req = (authreq & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev));
709 smp->remote_key_dist = remote_dist;
713 rsp->io_capability = conn->hcon->io_capability;
714 rsp->oob_flag = oob_flag;
715 rsp->max_key_size = hdev->le_max_key_size;
716 rsp->init_key_dist = req->init_key_dist & remote_dist;
717 rsp->resp_key_dist = req->resp_key_dist & local_dist;
718 rsp->auth_req = (authreq & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev));
720 smp->remote_key_dist = rsp->init_key_dist;
723 static u8 check_enc_key_size(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 max_key_size)
725 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
726 struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
727 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
729 if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level == BT_SECURITY_FIPS &&
730 max_key_size != SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE)
731 return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
733 if (max_key_size > hdev->le_max_key_size ||
734 max_key_size < SMP_MIN_ENC_KEY_SIZE)
735 return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
737 smp->enc_key_size = max_key_size;
742 static void smp_chan_destroy(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
744 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
745 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
746 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
751 cancel_delayed_work_sync(&smp->security_timer);
753 complete = test_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags);
754 mgmt_smp_complete(hcon, complete);
756 kfree_sensitive(smp->csrk);
757 kfree_sensitive(smp->responder_csrk);
758 kfree_sensitive(smp->link_key);
760 crypto_free_shash(smp->tfm_cmac);
761 crypto_free_kpp(smp->tfm_ecdh);
763 /* Ensure that we don't leave any debug key around if debug key
764 * support hasn't been explicitly enabled.
766 if (smp->ltk && smp->ltk->type == SMP_LTK_P256_DEBUG &&
767 !hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_KEEP_DEBUG_KEYS)) {
768 list_del_rcu(&smp->ltk->list);
769 kfree_rcu(smp->ltk, rcu);
773 /* If pairing failed clean up any keys we might have */
776 list_del_rcu(&smp->ltk->list);
777 kfree_rcu(smp->ltk, rcu);
780 if (smp->responder_ltk) {
781 list_del_rcu(&smp->responder_ltk->list);
782 kfree_rcu(smp->responder_ltk, rcu);
785 if (smp->remote_irk) {
786 list_del_rcu(&smp->remote_irk->list);
787 kfree_rcu(smp->remote_irk, rcu);
792 kfree_sensitive(smp);
796 static void smp_failure(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 reason)
798 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
799 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
802 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL, sizeof(reason),
805 mgmt_auth_failed(hcon, HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE);
808 smp_chan_destroy(conn);
811 #define JUST_WORKS 0x00
812 #define JUST_CFM 0x01
813 #define REQ_PASSKEY 0x02
814 #define CFM_PASSKEY 0x03
816 #define DSP_PASSKEY 0x05
819 static const u8 gen_method[5][5] = {
820 { JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, REQ_PASSKEY },
821 { JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, REQ_PASSKEY },
822 { CFM_PASSKEY, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, CFM_PASSKEY },
823 { JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, JUST_WORKS, JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM },
824 { CFM_PASSKEY, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, OVERLAP },
827 static const u8 sc_method[5][5] = {
828 { JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, REQ_PASSKEY },
829 { JUST_WORKS, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, CFM_PASSKEY },
830 { DSP_PASSKEY, DSP_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, DSP_PASSKEY },
831 { JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, JUST_WORKS, JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM },
832 { DSP_PASSKEY, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, CFM_PASSKEY },
835 static u8 get_auth_method(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 local_io, u8 remote_io)
837 /* If either side has unknown io_caps, use JUST_CFM (which gets
838 * converted later to JUST_WORKS if we're initiators.
840 if (local_io > SMP_IO_KEYBOARD_DISPLAY ||
841 remote_io > SMP_IO_KEYBOARD_DISPLAY)
844 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags))
845 return sc_method[remote_io][local_io];
847 return gen_method[remote_io][local_io];
850 static int tk_request(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 remote_oob, u8 auth,
851 u8 local_io, u8 remote_io)
853 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
854 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
855 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
859 /* Initialize key for JUST WORKS */
860 memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk));
861 clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags);
863 bt_dev_dbg(hcon->hdev, "auth:%u lcl:%u rem:%u", auth, local_io,
866 /* If neither side wants MITM, either "just" confirm an incoming
867 * request or use just-works for outgoing ones. The JUST_CFM
868 * will be converted to JUST_WORKS if necessary later in this
869 * function. If either side has MITM look up the method from the
872 if (!(auth & SMP_AUTH_MITM))
873 smp->method = JUST_CFM;
875 smp->method = get_auth_method(smp, local_io, remote_io);
877 /* Don't confirm locally initiated pairing attempts */
878 if (smp->method == JUST_CFM && test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR,
880 smp->method = JUST_WORKS;
882 /* Don't bother user space with no IO capabilities */
883 if (smp->method == JUST_CFM &&
884 hcon->io_capability == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT)
885 smp->method = JUST_WORKS;
887 /* If Just Works, Continue with Zero TK and ask user-space for
889 if (smp->method == JUST_WORKS) {
890 ret = mgmt_user_confirm_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst,
896 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags);
900 /* If this function is used for SC -> legacy fallback we
901 * can only recover the just-works case.
903 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags))
906 /* Not Just Works/Confirm results in MITM Authentication */
907 if (smp->method != JUST_CFM) {
908 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_MITM_AUTH, &smp->flags);
909 if (hcon->pending_sec_level < BT_SECURITY_HIGH)
910 hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
913 /* If both devices have Keyboard-Display I/O, the initiator
914 * Confirms and the responder Enters the passkey.
916 if (smp->method == OVERLAP) {
917 if (hcon->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
918 smp->method = CFM_PASSKEY;
920 smp->method = REQ_PASSKEY;
923 /* Generate random passkey. */
924 if (smp->method == CFM_PASSKEY) {
925 memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk));
926 get_random_bytes(&passkey, sizeof(passkey));
928 put_unaligned_le32(passkey, smp->tk);
929 bt_dev_dbg(hcon->hdev, "PassKey: %u", passkey);
930 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags);
933 if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY)
934 ret = mgmt_user_passkey_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst,
935 hcon->type, hcon->dst_type);
936 else if (smp->method == JUST_CFM)
937 ret = mgmt_user_confirm_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst,
938 hcon->type, hcon->dst_type,
941 ret = mgmt_user_passkey_notify(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst,
942 hcon->type, hcon->dst_type,
948 static u8 smp_confirm(struct smp_chan *smp)
950 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
951 struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cp;
954 bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "conn %p", conn);
956 ret = smp_c1(smp->tk, smp->prnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp,
957 conn->hcon->init_addr_type, &conn->hcon->init_addr,
958 conn->hcon->resp_addr_type, &conn->hcon->resp_addr,
961 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
963 clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags);
965 smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cp), &cp);
968 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
970 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
975 static u8 smp_random(struct smp_chan *smp)
977 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
978 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
982 bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "conn %p %s", conn,
983 conn->hcon->out ? "initiator" : "responder");
985 ret = smp_c1(smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp,
986 hcon->init_addr_type, &hcon->init_addr,
987 hcon->resp_addr_type, &hcon->resp_addr, confirm);
989 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
991 if (crypto_memneq(smp->pcnf, confirm, sizeof(smp->pcnf))) {
992 bt_dev_err(hcon->hdev, "pairing failed "
993 "(confirmation values mismatch)");
994 return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED;
1002 smp_s1(smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->prnd, stk);
1004 if (test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &hcon->flags))
1005 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
1007 hci_le_start_enc(hcon, ediv, rand, stk, smp->enc_key_size);
1008 hcon->enc_key_size = smp->enc_key_size;
1009 set_bit(HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags);
1015 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
1018 smp_s1(smp->tk, smp->prnd, smp->rrnd, stk);
1020 if (hcon->pending_sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH)
1025 /* Even though there's no _RESPONDER suffix this is the
1026 * responder STK we're adding for later lookup (the initiator
1027 * STK never needs to be stored).
1029 hci_add_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
1030 SMP_STK, auth, stk, smp->enc_key_size, ediv, rand);
1036 static void smp_notify_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
1038 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
1039 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
1040 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
1041 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
1042 struct smp_cmd_pairing *req = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
1043 struct smp_cmd_pairing *rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
1046 if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK) {
1047 if (hcon->key_type == HCI_LK_DEBUG_COMBINATION)
1050 persistent = !test_bit(HCI_CONN_FLUSH_KEY,
1053 /* The LTKs, IRKs and CSRKs should be persistent only if
1054 * both sides had the bonding bit set in their
1055 * authentication requests.
1057 persistent = !!((req->auth_req & rsp->auth_req) &
1061 if (smp->remote_irk) {
1062 smp->remote_irk->link_type = hcon->type;
1063 mgmt_new_irk(hdev, smp->remote_irk, persistent);
1065 /* Now that user space can be considered to know the
1066 * identity address track the connection based on it
1067 * from now on (assuming this is an LE link).
1069 if (hcon->type == LE_LINK) {
1070 bacpy(&hcon->dst, &smp->remote_irk->bdaddr);
1071 hcon->dst_type = smp->remote_irk->addr_type;
1072 /* Use a short delay to make sure the new address is
1073 * propagated _before_ the channels.
1075 queue_delayed_work(hdev->workqueue,
1076 &conn->id_addr_timer,
1082 smp->csrk->link_type = hcon->type;
1083 smp->csrk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
1084 bacpy(&smp->csrk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
1085 mgmt_new_csrk(hdev, smp->csrk, persistent);
1088 if (smp->responder_csrk) {
1089 smp->responder_csrk->link_type = hcon->type;
1090 smp->responder_csrk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
1091 bacpy(&smp->responder_csrk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
1092 mgmt_new_csrk(hdev, smp->responder_csrk, persistent);
1096 smp->ltk->link_type = hcon->type;
1097 smp->ltk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
1098 bacpy(&smp->ltk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
1099 mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->ltk, persistent);
1102 if (smp->responder_ltk) {
1103 smp->responder_ltk->link_type = hcon->type;
1104 smp->responder_ltk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
1105 bacpy(&smp->responder_ltk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
1106 mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->responder_ltk, persistent);
1109 if (smp->link_key) {
1110 struct link_key *key;
1113 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags))
1114 type = HCI_LK_DEBUG_COMBINATION;
1115 else if (hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_FIPS)
1116 type = HCI_LK_AUTH_COMBINATION_P256;
1118 type = HCI_LK_UNAUTH_COMBINATION_P256;
1120 key = hci_add_link_key(hdev, smp->conn->hcon, &hcon->dst,
1121 smp->link_key, type, 0, &persistent);
1123 key->link_type = hcon->type;
1124 key->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
1125 mgmt_new_link_key(hdev, key, persistent);
1127 /* Don't keep debug keys around if the relevant
1130 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_KEEP_DEBUG_KEYS) &&
1131 key->type == HCI_LK_DEBUG_COMBINATION) {
1132 list_del_rcu(&key->list);
1133 kfree_rcu(key, rcu);
1139 static void sc_add_ltk(struct smp_chan *smp)
1141 struct hci_conn *hcon = smp->conn->hcon;
1144 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags))
1145 key_type = SMP_LTK_P256_DEBUG;
1147 key_type = SMP_LTK_P256;
1149 if (hcon->pending_sec_level == BT_SECURITY_FIPS)
1154 smp->ltk = hci_add_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
1155 key_type, auth, smp->tk, smp->enc_key_size,
1159 static void sc_generate_link_key(struct smp_chan *smp)
1161 /* From core spec. Spells out in ASCII as 'lebr'. */
1162 const u8 lebr[4] = { 0x72, 0x62, 0x65, 0x6c };
1164 smp->link_key = kzalloc(16, GFP_KERNEL);
1168 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_CT2, &smp->flags)) {
1169 /* SALT = 0x000000000000000000000000746D7031 */
1170 const u8 salt[16] = { 0x31, 0x70, 0x6d, 0x74 };
1172 if (smp_h7(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->tk, salt, smp->link_key)) {
1173 kfree_sensitive(smp->link_key);
1174 smp->link_key = NULL;
1178 /* From core spec. Spells out in ASCII as 'tmp1'. */
1179 const u8 tmp1[4] = { 0x31, 0x70, 0x6d, 0x74 };
1181 if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->tk, tmp1, smp->link_key)) {
1182 kfree_sensitive(smp->link_key);
1183 smp->link_key = NULL;
1188 if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->link_key, lebr, smp->link_key)) {
1189 kfree_sensitive(smp->link_key);
1190 smp->link_key = NULL;
1195 static void smp_allow_key_dist(struct smp_chan *smp)
1197 /* Allow the first expected phase 3 PDU. The rest of the PDUs
1198 * will be allowed in each PDU handler to ensure we receive
1199 * them in the correct order.
1201 if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY)
1202 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO);
1203 else if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY)
1204 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO);
1205 else if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_SIGN)
1206 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO);
1209 static void sc_generate_ltk(struct smp_chan *smp)
1211 /* From core spec. Spells out in ASCII as 'brle'. */
1212 const u8 brle[4] = { 0x65, 0x6c, 0x72, 0x62 };
1213 struct hci_conn *hcon = smp->conn->hcon;
1214 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
1215 struct link_key *key;
1217 key = hci_find_link_key(hdev, &hcon->dst);
1219 bt_dev_err(hdev, "no Link Key found to generate LTK");
1223 if (key->type == HCI_LK_DEBUG_COMBINATION)
1224 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags);
1226 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_CT2, &smp->flags)) {
1227 /* SALT = 0x000000000000000000000000746D7032 */
1228 const u8 salt[16] = { 0x32, 0x70, 0x6d, 0x74 };
1230 if (smp_h7(smp->tfm_cmac, key->val, salt, smp->tk))
1233 /* From core spec. Spells out in ASCII as 'tmp2'. */
1234 const u8 tmp2[4] = { 0x32, 0x70, 0x6d, 0x74 };
1236 if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, key->val, tmp2, smp->tk))
1240 if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->tk, brle, smp->tk))
1246 static void smp_distribute_keys(struct smp_chan *smp)
1248 struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp;
1249 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
1250 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
1251 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
1254 bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "conn %p", conn);
1256 rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
1258 /* The responder sends its keys first */
1259 if (hcon->out && (smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK)) {
1260 smp_allow_key_dist(smp);
1264 req = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
1267 keydist = &rsp->init_key_dist;
1268 *keydist &= req->init_key_dist;
1270 keydist = &rsp->resp_key_dist;
1271 *keydist &= req->resp_key_dist;
1274 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) {
1275 if (hcon->type == LE_LINK && (*keydist & SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY))
1276 sc_generate_link_key(smp);
1277 if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK && (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY))
1278 sc_generate_ltk(smp);
1280 /* Clear the keys which are generated but not distributed */
1281 *keydist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST;
1284 bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "keydist 0x%x", *keydist);
1286 if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY) {
1287 struct smp_cmd_encrypt_info enc;
1288 struct smp_cmd_initiator_ident ident;
1289 struct smp_ltk *ltk;
1294 /* Make sure we generate only the significant amount of
1295 * bytes based on the encryption key size, and set the rest
1296 * of the value to zeroes.
1298 get_random_bytes(enc.ltk, smp->enc_key_size);
1299 memset(enc.ltk + smp->enc_key_size, 0,
1300 sizeof(enc.ltk) - smp->enc_key_size);
1302 get_random_bytes(&ediv, sizeof(ediv));
1303 get_random_bytes(&rand, sizeof(rand));
1305 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO, sizeof(enc), &enc);
1307 authenticated = hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
1308 ltk = hci_add_ltk(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
1309 SMP_LTK_RESPONDER, authenticated, enc.ltk,
1310 smp->enc_key_size, ediv, rand);
1311 smp->responder_ltk = ltk;
1316 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_INITIATOR_IDENT, sizeof(ident),
1319 *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY;
1322 if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY) {
1323 struct smp_cmd_ident_addr_info addrinfo;
1324 struct smp_cmd_ident_info idinfo;
1326 memcpy(idinfo.irk, hdev->irk, sizeof(idinfo.irk));
1328 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO, sizeof(idinfo), &idinfo);
1330 /* The hci_conn contains the local identity address
1331 * after the connection has been established.
1333 * This is true even when the connection has been
1334 * established using a resolvable random address.
1336 bacpy(&addrinfo.bdaddr, &hcon->src);
1337 addrinfo.addr_type = hcon->src_type;
1339 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO, sizeof(addrinfo),
1342 *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
1345 if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_SIGN) {
1346 struct smp_cmd_sign_info sign;
1347 struct smp_csrk *csrk;
1349 /* Generate a new random key */
1350 get_random_bytes(sign.csrk, sizeof(sign.csrk));
1352 csrk = kzalloc(sizeof(*csrk), GFP_KERNEL);
1354 if (hcon->sec_level > BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM)
1355 csrk->type = MGMT_CSRK_LOCAL_AUTHENTICATED;
1357 csrk->type = MGMT_CSRK_LOCAL_UNAUTHENTICATED;
1358 memcpy(csrk->val, sign.csrk, sizeof(csrk->val));
1360 smp->responder_csrk = csrk;
1362 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO, sizeof(sign), &sign);
1364 *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_SIGN;
1367 /* If there are still keys to be received wait for them */
1368 if (smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK) {
1369 smp_allow_key_dist(smp);
1373 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags);
1374 smp_notify_keys(conn);
1376 smp_chan_destroy(conn);
1379 static void smp_timeout(struct work_struct *work)
1381 struct smp_chan *smp = container_of(work, struct smp_chan,
1382 security_timer.work);
1383 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
1385 bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "conn %p", conn);
1387 hci_disconnect(conn->hcon, HCI_ERROR_REMOTE_USER_TERM);
1390 static struct smp_chan *smp_chan_create(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
1392 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
1393 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
1394 struct smp_chan *smp;
1396 smp = kzalloc(sizeof(*smp), GFP_ATOMIC);
1400 smp->tfm_cmac = crypto_alloc_shash("cmac(aes)", 0, 0);
1401 if (IS_ERR(smp->tfm_cmac)) {
1402 bt_dev_err(hcon->hdev, "Unable to create CMAC crypto context");
1406 smp->tfm_ecdh = crypto_alloc_kpp("ecdh-nist-p256", 0, 0);
1407 if (IS_ERR(smp->tfm_ecdh)) {
1408 bt_dev_err(hcon->hdev, "Unable to create ECDH crypto context");
1415 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL);
1417 INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&smp->security_timer, smp_timeout);
1419 hci_conn_hold(hcon);
1424 crypto_free_shash(smp->tfm_cmac);
1426 kfree_sensitive(smp);
1430 static int sc_mackey_and_ltk(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 mackey[16], u8 ltk[16])
1432 struct hci_conn *hcon = smp->conn->hcon;
1433 u8 *na, *nb, a[7], b[7];
1443 memcpy(a, &hcon->init_addr, 6);
1444 memcpy(b, &hcon->resp_addr, 6);
1445 a[6] = hcon->init_addr_type;
1446 b[6] = hcon->resp_addr_type;
1448 return smp_f5(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->dhkey, na, nb, a, b, mackey, ltk);
1451 static void sc_dhkey_check(struct smp_chan *smp)
1453 struct hci_conn *hcon = smp->conn->hcon;
1454 struct smp_cmd_dhkey_check check;
1455 u8 a[7], b[7], *local_addr, *remote_addr;
1456 u8 io_cap[3], r[16];
1458 memcpy(a, &hcon->init_addr, 6);
1459 memcpy(b, &hcon->resp_addr, 6);
1460 a[6] = hcon->init_addr_type;
1461 b[6] = hcon->resp_addr_type;
1466 memcpy(io_cap, &smp->preq[1], 3);
1470 memcpy(io_cap, &smp->prsp[1], 3);
1473 memset(r, 0, sizeof(r));
1475 if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY)
1476 put_unaligned_le32(hcon->passkey_notify, r);
1478 if (smp->method == REQ_OOB)
1479 memcpy(r, smp->rr, 16);
1481 smp_f6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->mackey, smp->prnd, smp->rrnd, r, io_cap,
1482 local_addr, remote_addr, check.e);
1484 smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK, sizeof(check), &check);
1487 static u8 sc_passkey_send_confirm(struct smp_chan *smp)
1489 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
1490 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
1491 struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cfm;
1494 r = ((hcon->passkey_notify >> smp->passkey_round) & 0x01);
1497 get_random_bytes(smp->prnd, sizeof(smp->prnd));
1499 if (smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->local_pk, smp->remote_pk, smp->prnd, r,
1501 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
1503 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cfm), &cfm);
1508 static u8 sc_passkey_round(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 smp_op)
1510 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
1511 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
1512 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
1515 /* Ignore the PDU if we've already done 20 rounds (0 - 19) */
1516 if (smp->passkey_round >= 20)
1520 case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM:
1521 r = ((hcon->passkey_notify >> smp->passkey_round) & 0x01);
1524 if (smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->remote_pk, smp->local_pk,
1526 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
1528 if (crypto_memneq(smp->pcnf, cfm, 16))
1529 return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED;
1531 smp->passkey_round++;
1533 if (smp->passkey_round == 20) {
1534 /* Generate MacKey and LTK */
1535 if (sc_mackey_and_ltk(smp, smp->mackey, smp->tk))
1536 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
1539 /* The round is only complete when the initiator
1540 * receives pairing random.
1543 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM,
1544 sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd);
1545 if (smp->passkey_round == 20)
1546 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
1548 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
1552 /* Start the next round */
1553 if (smp->passkey_round != 20)
1554 return sc_passkey_round(smp, 0);
1556 /* Passkey rounds are complete - start DHKey Check */
1557 sc_dhkey_check(smp);
1558 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
1562 case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM:
1563 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags)) {
1564 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags);
1568 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
1571 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM,
1572 sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd);
1576 return sc_passkey_send_confirm(smp);
1578 case SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY:
1580 /* Initiating device starts the round */
1584 bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "Starting passkey round %u",
1585 smp->passkey_round + 1);
1587 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
1589 return sc_passkey_send_confirm(smp);
1595 static int sc_user_reply(struct smp_chan *smp, u16 mgmt_op, __le32 passkey)
1597 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
1598 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
1601 clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags);
1604 case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_NEG_REPLY:
1605 smp_failure(smp->conn, SMP_PASSKEY_ENTRY_FAILED);
1607 case MGMT_OP_USER_CONFIRM_NEG_REPLY:
1608 smp_failure(smp->conn, SMP_NUMERIC_COMP_FAILED);
1610 case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_REPLY:
1611 hcon->passkey_notify = le32_to_cpu(passkey);
1612 smp->passkey_round = 0;
1614 if (test_and_clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags))
1615 smp_op = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM;
1619 if (sc_passkey_round(smp, smp_op))
1625 /* Initiator sends DHKey check first */
1627 sc_dhkey_check(smp);
1628 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
1629 } else if (test_and_clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_DHKEY_PENDING, &smp->flags)) {
1630 sc_dhkey_check(smp);
1637 int smp_user_confirm_reply(struct hci_conn *hcon, u16 mgmt_op, __le32 passkey)
1639 struct l2cap_conn *conn = hcon->l2cap_data;
1640 struct l2cap_chan *chan;
1641 struct smp_chan *smp;
1648 bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "");
1654 l2cap_chan_lock(chan);
1662 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) {
1663 err = sc_user_reply(smp, mgmt_op, passkey);
1668 case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_REPLY:
1669 value = le32_to_cpu(passkey);
1670 memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk));
1671 bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "PassKey: %u", value);
1672 put_unaligned_le32(value, smp->tk);
1674 case MGMT_OP_USER_CONFIRM_REPLY:
1675 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags);
1677 case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_NEG_REPLY:
1678 case MGMT_OP_USER_CONFIRM_NEG_REPLY:
1679 smp_failure(conn, SMP_PASSKEY_ENTRY_FAILED);
1683 smp_failure(conn, SMP_PASSKEY_ENTRY_FAILED);
1690 /* If it is our turn to send Pairing Confirm, do so now */
1691 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags)) {
1692 u8 rsp = smp_confirm(smp);
1694 smp_failure(conn, rsp);
1698 l2cap_chan_unlock(chan);
1702 static void build_bredr_pairing_cmd(struct smp_chan *smp,
1703 struct smp_cmd_pairing *req,
1704 struct smp_cmd_pairing *rsp)
1706 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
1707 struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
1708 u8 local_dist = 0, remote_dist = 0;
1710 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_BONDABLE)) {
1711 local_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN;
1712 remote_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN;
1715 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_RPA_RESOLVING))
1716 remote_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
1718 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_PRIVACY))
1719 local_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
1722 memset(req, 0, sizeof(*req));
1724 req->auth_req = SMP_AUTH_CT2;
1725 req->init_key_dist = local_dist;
1726 req->resp_key_dist = remote_dist;
1727 req->max_key_size = conn->hcon->enc_key_size;
1729 smp->remote_key_dist = remote_dist;
1734 memset(rsp, 0, sizeof(*rsp));
1736 rsp->auth_req = SMP_AUTH_CT2;
1737 rsp->max_key_size = conn->hcon->enc_key_size;
1738 rsp->init_key_dist = req->init_key_dist & remote_dist;
1739 rsp->resp_key_dist = req->resp_key_dist & local_dist;
1741 smp->remote_key_dist = rsp->init_key_dist;
1744 static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
1746 struct smp_cmd_pairing rsp, *req = (void *) skb->data;
1747 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
1748 struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
1749 struct smp_chan *smp;
1750 u8 key_size, auth, sec_level;
1753 bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "conn %p", conn);
1755 if (skb->len < sizeof(*req))
1756 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
1758 if (conn->hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_SLAVE)
1759 return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
1762 smp = smp_chan_create(conn);
1767 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
1769 /* We didn't start the pairing, so match remote */
1770 auth = req->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev);
1772 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_BONDABLE) &&
1773 (auth & SMP_AUTH_BONDING))
1774 return SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP;
1776 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ONLY) && !(auth & SMP_AUTH_SC))
1777 return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
1779 smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
1780 memcpy(&smp->preq[1], req, sizeof(*req));
1781 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*req));
1783 /* If the remote side's OOB flag is set it means it has
1784 * successfully received our local OOB data - therefore set the
1785 * flag to indicate that local OOB is in use.
1787 if (req->oob_flag == SMP_OOB_PRESENT && SMP_DEV(hdev)->local_oob)
1788 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags);
1790 /* SMP over BR/EDR requires special treatment */
1791 if (conn->hcon->type == ACL_LINK) {
1792 /* We must have a BR/EDR SC link */
1793 if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_AES_CCM, &conn->hcon->flags) &&
1794 !hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP))
1795 return SMP_CROSS_TRANSP_NOT_ALLOWED;
1797 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags);
1799 build_bredr_pairing_cmd(smp, req, &rsp);
1801 if (req->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_CT2)
1802 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CT2, &smp->flags);
1804 key_size = min(req->max_key_size, rsp.max_key_size);
1805 if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size))
1806 return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
1808 /* Clear bits which are generated but not distributed */
1809 smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST;
1811 smp->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP;
1812 memcpy(&smp->prsp[1], &rsp, sizeof(rsp));
1813 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP, sizeof(rsp), &rsp);
1815 smp_distribute_keys(smp);
1819 build_pairing_cmd(conn, req, &rsp, auth);
1821 if (rsp.auth_req & SMP_AUTH_SC) {
1822 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags);
1824 if (rsp.auth_req & SMP_AUTH_CT2)
1825 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CT2, &smp->flags);
1828 if (conn->hcon->io_capability == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT)
1829 sec_level = BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM;
1831 sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(auth);
1833 if (sec_level > conn->hcon->pending_sec_level)
1834 conn->hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level;
1836 /* If we need MITM check that it can be achieved */
1837 if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level >= BT_SECURITY_HIGH) {
1840 method = get_auth_method(smp, conn->hcon->io_capability,
1841 req->io_capability);
1842 if (method == JUST_WORKS || method == JUST_CFM)
1843 return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
1846 key_size = min(req->max_key_size, rsp.max_key_size);
1847 if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size))
1848 return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
1850 get_random_bytes(smp->prnd, sizeof(smp->prnd));
1852 smp->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP;
1853 memcpy(&smp->prsp[1], &rsp, sizeof(rsp));
1855 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP, sizeof(rsp), &rsp);
1857 clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags);
1859 /* Strictly speaking we shouldn't allow Pairing Confirm for the
1860 * SC case, however some implementations incorrectly copy RFU auth
1861 * req bits from our security request, which may create a false
1862 * positive SC enablement.
1864 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
1866 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) {
1867 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY);
1868 /* Clear bits which are generated but not distributed */
1869 smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST;
1870 /* Wait for Public Key from Initiating Device */
1874 /* Request setup of TK */
1875 ret = tk_request(conn, 0, auth, rsp.io_capability, req->io_capability);
1877 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
1882 static u8 sc_send_public_key(struct smp_chan *smp)
1884 struct hci_dev *hdev = smp->conn->hcon->hdev;
1886 bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "");
1888 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags)) {
1889 struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data;
1890 struct smp_dev *smp_dev;
1892 if (!chan || !chan->data)
1893 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
1895 smp_dev = chan->data;
1897 memcpy(smp->local_pk, smp_dev->local_pk, 64);
1898 memcpy(smp->lr, smp_dev->local_rand, 16);
1900 if (smp_dev->debug_key)
1901 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags);
1906 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_USE_DEBUG_KEYS)) {
1907 bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "Using debug keys");
1908 if (set_ecdh_privkey(smp->tfm_ecdh, debug_sk))
1909 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
1910 memcpy(smp->local_pk, debug_pk, 64);
1911 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags);
1914 /* Generate key pair for Secure Connections */
1915 if (generate_ecdh_keys(smp->tfm_ecdh, smp->local_pk))
1916 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
1918 /* This is unlikely, but we need to check that
1919 * we didn't accidentally generate a debug key.
1921 if (crypto_memneq(smp->local_pk, debug_pk, 64))
1927 SMP_DBG("Local Public Key X: %32phN", smp->local_pk);
1928 SMP_DBG("Local Public Key Y: %32phN", smp->local_pk + 32);
1930 smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY, 64, smp->local_pk);
1935 static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
1937 struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp = (void *) skb->data;
1938 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
1939 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
1940 struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
1944 bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "conn %p", conn);
1946 if (skb->len < sizeof(*rsp))
1947 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
1949 if (conn->hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
1950 return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
1952 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rsp));
1954 req = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
1956 key_size = min(req->max_key_size, rsp->max_key_size);
1957 if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size))
1958 return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
1960 auth = rsp->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev);
1962 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ONLY) && !(auth & SMP_AUTH_SC))
1963 return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
1965 /* If the remote side's OOB flag is set it means it has
1966 * successfully received our local OOB data - therefore set the
1967 * flag to indicate that local OOB is in use.
1969 if (rsp->oob_flag == SMP_OOB_PRESENT && SMP_DEV(hdev)->local_oob)
1970 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags);
1972 smp->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP;
1973 memcpy(&smp->prsp[1], rsp, sizeof(*rsp));
1975 /* Update remote key distribution in case the remote cleared
1976 * some bits that we had enabled in our request.
1978 smp->remote_key_dist &= rsp->resp_key_dist;
1980 if ((req->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_CT2) && (auth & SMP_AUTH_CT2))
1981 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CT2, &smp->flags);
1983 /* For BR/EDR this means we're done and can start phase 3 */
1984 if (conn->hcon->type == ACL_LINK) {
1985 /* Clear bits which are generated but not distributed */
1986 smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST;
1987 smp_distribute_keys(smp);
1991 if ((req->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_SC) && (auth & SMP_AUTH_SC))
1992 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags);
1993 else if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level > BT_SECURITY_HIGH)
1994 conn->hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
1996 /* If we need MITM check that it can be achieved */
1997 if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level >= BT_SECURITY_HIGH) {
2000 method = get_auth_method(smp, req->io_capability,
2001 rsp->io_capability);
2002 if (method == JUST_WORKS || method == JUST_CFM)
2003 return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
2006 get_random_bytes(smp->prnd, sizeof(smp->prnd));
2008 /* Update remote key distribution in case the remote cleared
2009 * some bits that we had enabled in our request.
2011 smp->remote_key_dist &= rsp->resp_key_dist;
2013 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) {
2014 /* Clear bits which are generated but not distributed */
2015 smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST;
2016 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY);
2017 return sc_send_public_key(smp);
2020 auth |= req->auth_req;
2022 ret = tk_request(conn, 0, auth, req->io_capability, rsp->io_capability);
2024 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2026 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags);
2028 /* Can't compose response until we have been confirmed */
2029 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags))
2030 return smp_confirm(smp);
2035 static u8 sc_check_confirm(struct smp_chan *smp)
2037 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
2039 bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "");
2041 if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY)
2042 return sc_passkey_round(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
2044 if (conn->hcon->out) {
2045 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
2047 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
2053 /* Work-around for some implementations that incorrectly copy RFU bits
2054 * from our security request and thereby create the impression that
2055 * we're doing SC when in fact the remote doesn't support it.
2057 static int fixup_sc_false_positive(struct smp_chan *smp)
2059 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
2060 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2061 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
2062 struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp;
2065 /* The issue is only observed when we're in responder role */
2067 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2069 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ONLY)) {
2070 bt_dev_err(hdev, "refusing legacy fallback in SC-only mode");
2071 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2074 bt_dev_err(hdev, "trying to fall back to legacy SMP");
2076 req = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
2077 rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
2079 /* Rebuild key dist flags which may have been cleared for SC */
2080 smp->remote_key_dist = (req->init_key_dist & rsp->resp_key_dist);
2082 auth = req->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev);
2084 if (tk_request(conn, 0, auth, rsp->io_capability, req->io_capability)) {
2085 bt_dev_err(hdev, "failed to fall back to legacy SMP");
2086 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2089 clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags);
2094 static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
2096 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
2097 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
2098 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2099 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
2101 bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "conn %p %s", conn,
2102 hcon->out ? "initiator" : "responder");
2104 if (skb->len < sizeof(smp->pcnf))
2105 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2107 memcpy(smp->pcnf, skb->data, sizeof(smp->pcnf));
2108 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(smp->pcnf));
2110 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) {
2113 /* Public Key exchange must happen before any other steps */
2114 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_PK, &smp->flags))
2115 return sc_check_confirm(smp);
2117 bt_dev_err(hdev, "Unexpected SMP Pairing Confirm");
2119 ret = fixup_sc_false_positive(smp);
2124 if (conn->hcon->out) {
2125 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
2127 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
2131 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags))
2132 return smp_confirm(smp);
2134 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags);
2139 static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
2141 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
2142 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
2143 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2144 u8 *pkax, *pkbx, *na, *nb, confirm_hint;
2148 bt_dev_dbg(hcon->hdev, "conn %p", conn);
2150 if (skb->len < sizeof(smp->rrnd))
2151 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2153 memcpy(smp->rrnd, skb->data, sizeof(smp->rrnd));
2154 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(smp->rrnd));
2156 if (!test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags))
2157 return smp_random(smp);
2160 pkax = smp->local_pk;
2161 pkbx = smp->remote_pk;
2165 pkax = smp->remote_pk;
2166 pkbx = smp->local_pk;
2171 if (smp->method == REQ_OOB) {
2173 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM,
2174 sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd);
2175 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
2176 goto mackey_and_ltk;
2179 /* Passkey entry has special treatment */
2180 if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY)
2181 return sc_passkey_round(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
2186 err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->remote_pk, smp->local_pk,
2189 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2191 if (crypto_memneq(smp->pcnf, cfm, 16))
2192 return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED;
2194 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
2196 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
2198 /* Only Just-Works pairing requires extra checks */
2199 if (smp->method != JUST_WORKS)
2200 goto mackey_and_ltk;
2202 /* If there already exists long term key in local host, leave
2203 * the decision to user space since the remote device could
2204 * be legitimate or malicious.
2206 if (hci_find_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
2208 /* Set passkey to 0. The value can be any number since
2209 * it'll be ignored anyway.
2218 /* Generate MacKey and LTK */
2219 err = sc_mackey_and_ltk(smp, smp->mackey, smp->tk);
2221 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2223 if (smp->method == REQ_OOB) {
2225 sc_dhkey_check(smp);
2226 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
2231 err = smp_g2(smp->tfm_cmac, pkax, pkbx, na, nb, &passkey);
2233 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2238 if (smp->method == JUST_WORKS)
2241 err = mgmt_user_confirm_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->type,
2242 hcon->dst_type, passkey, confirm_hint);
2244 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2246 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags);
2251 static bool smp_ltk_encrypt(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 sec_level)
2253 struct smp_ltk *key;
2254 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2256 key = hci_find_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, hcon->role);
2260 if (smp_ltk_sec_level(key) < sec_level)
2263 if (test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &hcon->flags))
2266 hci_le_start_enc(hcon, key->ediv, key->rand, key->val, key->enc_size);
2267 hcon->enc_key_size = key->enc_size;
2269 /* We never store STKs for initiator role, so clear this flag */
2270 clear_bit(HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags);
2275 bool smp_sufficient_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, u8 sec_level,
2276 enum smp_key_pref key_pref)
2278 if (sec_level == BT_SECURITY_LOW)
2281 /* If we're encrypted with an STK but the caller prefers using
2282 * LTK claim insufficient security. This way we allow the
2283 * connection to be re-encrypted with an LTK, even if the LTK
2284 * provides the same level of security. Only exception is if we
2285 * don't have an LTK (e.g. because of key distribution bits).
2287 if (key_pref == SMP_USE_LTK &&
2288 test_bit(HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags) &&
2289 hci_find_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, hcon->role))
2292 if (hcon->sec_level >= sec_level)
2298 static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
2300 struct smp_cmd_security_req *rp = (void *) skb->data;
2301 struct smp_cmd_pairing cp;
2302 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2303 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
2304 struct smp_chan *smp;
2307 bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "conn %p", conn);
2309 if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp))
2310 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2312 if (hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
2313 return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
2315 auth = rp->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev);
2317 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ONLY) && !(auth & SMP_AUTH_SC))
2318 return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
2320 if (hcon->io_capability == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT)
2321 sec_level = BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM;
2323 sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(auth);
2325 if (smp_sufficient_security(hcon, sec_level, SMP_USE_LTK)) {
2326 /* If link is already encrypted with sufficient security we
2327 * still need refresh encryption as per Core Spec 5.0 Vol 3,
2330 smp_ltk_encrypt(conn, hcon->sec_level);
2334 if (sec_level > hcon->pending_sec_level)
2335 hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level;
2337 if (smp_ltk_encrypt(conn, hcon->pending_sec_level))
2340 smp = smp_chan_create(conn);
2342 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2344 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_BONDABLE) &&
2345 (auth & SMP_AUTH_BONDING))
2346 return SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP;
2348 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
2350 memset(&cp, 0, sizeof(cp));
2351 build_pairing_cmd(conn, &cp, NULL, auth);
2353 smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
2354 memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &cp, sizeof(cp));
2356 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
2357 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP);
2362 int smp_conn_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, __u8 sec_level)
2364 struct l2cap_conn *conn = hcon->l2cap_data;
2365 struct l2cap_chan *chan;
2366 struct smp_chan *smp;
2370 bt_dev_dbg(hcon->hdev, "conn %p hcon %p level 0x%2.2x", conn, hcon,
2373 /* This may be NULL if there's an unexpected disconnection */
2377 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_LE_ENABLED))
2380 if (smp_sufficient_security(hcon, sec_level, SMP_USE_LTK))
2383 if (sec_level > hcon->pending_sec_level)
2384 hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level;
2386 if (hcon->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
2387 if (smp_ltk_encrypt(conn, hcon->pending_sec_level))
2392 bt_dev_err(hcon->hdev, "security requested but not available");
2396 l2cap_chan_lock(chan);
2398 /* If SMP is already in progress ignore this request */
2404 smp = smp_chan_create(conn);
2410 authreq = seclevel_to_authreq(sec_level);
2412 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_SC_ENABLED)) {
2413 authreq |= SMP_AUTH_SC;
2414 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_SSP_ENABLED))
2415 authreq |= SMP_AUTH_CT2;
2418 /* Don't attempt to set MITM if setting is overridden by debugfs
2419 * Needed to pass certification test SM/MAS/PKE/BV-01-C
2421 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_FORCE_NO_MITM)) {
2422 /* Require MITM if IO Capability allows or the security level
2425 if (hcon->io_capability != HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT ||
2426 hcon->pending_sec_level > BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM)
2427 authreq |= SMP_AUTH_MITM;
2430 if (hcon->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER) {
2431 struct smp_cmd_pairing cp;
2433 build_pairing_cmd(conn, &cp, NULL, authreq);
2434 smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
2435 memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &cp, sizeof(cp));
2437 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
2438 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP);
2440 struct smp_cmd_security_req cp;
2441 cp.auth_req = authreq;
2442 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
2443 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ);
2446 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags);
2450 l2cap_chan_unlock(chan);
2454 int smp_cancel_and_remove_pairing(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr,
2457 struct hci_conn *hcon;
2458 struct l2cap_conn *conn;
2459 struct l2cap_chan *chan;
2460 struct smp_chan *smp;
2463 err = hci_remove_ltk(hdev, bdaddr, addr_type);
2464 hci_remove_irk(hdev, bdaddr, addr_type);
2466 hcon = hci_conn_hash_lookup_le(hdev, bdaddr, addr_type);
2470 conn = hcon->l2cap_data;
2478 l2cap_chan_lock(chan);
2482 /* Set keys to NULL to make sure smp_failure() does not try to
2483 * remove and free already invalidated rcu list entries. */
2485 smp->responder_ltk = NULL;
2486 smp->remote_irk = NULL;
2488 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags))
2489 smp_failure(conn, 0);
2491 smp_failure(conn, SMP_UNSPECIFIED);
2495 l2cap_chan_unlock(chan);
2501 static int smp_cmd_encrypt_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
2503 struct smp_cmd_encrypt_info *rp = (void *) skb->data;
2504 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
2505 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
2507 bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "conn %p", conn);
2509 if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp))
2510 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2512 /* Pairing is aborted if any blocked keys are distributed */
2513 if (hci_is_blocked_key(conn->hcon->hdev, HCI_BLOCKED_KEY_TYPE_LTK,
2515 bt_dev_warn_ratelimited(conn->hcon->hdev,
2516 "LTK blocked for %pMR",
2518 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2521 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_INITIATOR_IDENT);
2523 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
2525 memcpy(smp->tk, rp->ltk, sizeof(smp->tk));
2530 static int smp_cmd_initiator_ident(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
2532 struct smp_cmd_initiator_ident *rp = (void *)skb->data;
2533 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
2534 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
2535 struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
2536 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2537 struct smp_ltk *ltk;
2540 bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "conn %p", conn);
2542 if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp))
2543 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2545 /* Mark the information as received */
2546 smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY;
2548 if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY)
2549 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO);
2550 else if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_SIGN)
2551 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO);
2553 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
2555 authenticated = (hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH);
2556 ltk = hci_add_ltk(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, SMP_LTK,
2557 authenticated, smp->tk, smp->enc_key_size,
2558 rp->ediv, rp->rand);
2560 if (!(smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK))
2561 smp_distribute_keys(smp);
2566 static int smp_cmd_ident_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
2568 struct smp_cmd_ident_info *info = (void *) skb->data;
2569 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
2570 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
2572 bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "");
2574 if (skb->len < sizeof(*info))
2575 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2577 /* Pairing is aborted if any blocked keys are distributed */
2578 if (hci_is_blocked_key(conn->hcon->hdev, HCI_BLOCKED_KEY_TYPE_IRK,
2580 bt_dev_warn_ratelimited(conn->hcon->hdev,
2581 "Identity key blocked for %pMR",
2583 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2586 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO);
2588 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*info));
2590 memcpy(smp->irk, info->irk, 16);
2595 static int smp_cmd_ident_addr_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
2596 struct sk_buff *skb)
2598 struct smp_cmd_ident_addr_info *info = (void *) skb->data;
2599 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
2600 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
2601 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2604 bt_dev_dbg(hcon->hdev, "");
2606 if (skb->len < sizeof(*info))
2607 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2609 /* Mark the information as received */
2610 smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
2612 if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_SIGN)
2613 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO);
2615 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*info));
2617 /* Strictly speaking the Core Specification (4.1) allows sending
2618 * an empty address which would force us to rely on just the IRK
2619 * as "identity information". However, since such
2620 * implementations are not known of and in order to not over
2621 * complicate our implementation, simply pretend that we never
2622 * received an IRK for such a device.
2624 * The Identity Address must also be a Static Random or Public
2625 * Address, which hci_is_identity_address() checks for.
2627 if (!bacmp(&info->bdaddr, BDADDR_ANY) ||
2628 !hci_is_identity_address(&info->bdaddr, info->addr_type)) {
2629 bt_dev_err(hcon->hdev, "ignoring IRK with no identity address");
2633 /* Drop IRK if peer is using identity address during pairing but is
2634 * providing different address as identity information.
2636 * Microsoft Surface Precision Mouse is known to have this bug.
2638 if (hci_is_identity_address(&hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type) &&
2639 (bacmp(&info->bdaddr, &hcon->dst) ||
2640 info->addr_type != hcon->dst_type)) {
2641 bt_dev_err(hcon->hdev,
2642 "ignoring IRK with invalid identity address");
2646 bacpy(&smp->id_addr, &info->bdaddr);
2647 smp->id_addr_type = info->addr_type;
2649 if (hci_bdaddr_is_rpa(&hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type))
2650 bacpy(&rpa, &hcon->dst);
2652 bacpy(&rpa, BDADDR_ANY);
2654 smp->remote_irk = hci_add_irk(conn->hcon->hdev, &smp->id_addr,
2655 smp->id_addr_type, smp->irk, &rpa);
2658 if (!(smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK))
2659 smp_distribute_keys(smp);
2664 static int smp_cmd_sign_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
2666 struct smp_cmd_sign_info *rp = (void *) skb->data;
2667 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
2668 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
2669 struct smp_csrk *csrk;
2671 bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "conn %p", conn);
2673 if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp))
2674 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2676 /* Mark the information as received */
2677 smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_DIST_SIGN;
2679 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
2681 csrk = kzalloc(sizeof(*csrk), GFP_KERNEL);
2683 if (conn->hcon->sec_level > BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM)
2684 csrk->type = MGMT_CSRK_REMOTE_AUTHENTICATED;
2686 csrk->type = MGMT_CSRK_REMOTE_UNAUTHENTICATED;
2687 memcpy(csrk->val, rp->csrk, sizeof(csrk->val));
2690 smp_distribute_keys(smp);
2695 static u8 sc_select_method(struct smp_chan *smp)
2697 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
2698 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2699 struct smp_cmd_pairing *local, *remote;
2700 u8 local_mitm, remote_mitm, local_io, remote_io, method;
2702 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_OOB, &smp->flags) ||
2703 test_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags))
2706 /* The preq/prsp contain the raw Pairing Request/Response PDUs
2707 * which are needed as inputs to some crypto functions. To get
2708 * the "struct smp_cmd_pairing" from them we need to skip the
2709 * first byte which contains the opcode.
2712 local = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
2713 remote = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
2715 local = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
2716 remote = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
2719 local_io = local->io_capability;
2720 remote_io = remote->io_capability;
2722 local_mitm = (local->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_MITM);
2723 remote_mitm = (remote->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_MITM);
2725 /* If either side wants MITM, look up the method from the table,
2726 * otherwise use JUST WORKS.
2728 if (local_mitm || remote_mitm)
2729 method = get_auth_method(smp, local_io, remote_io);
2731 method = JUST_WORKS;
2733 /* Don't confirm locally initiated pairing attempts */
2734 if (method == JUST_CFM && test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags))
2735 method = JUST_WORKS;
2740 static int smp_cmd_public_key(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
2742 struct smp_cmd_public_key *key = (void *) skb->data;
2743 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2744 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
2745 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
2746 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
2747 struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh;
2748 struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cfm;
2751 bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "conn %p", conn);
2753 if (skb->len < sizeof(*key))
2754 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2756 /* Check if remote and local public keys are the same and debug key is
2759 if (!test_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags) &&
2760 !crypto_memneq(key, smp->local_pk, 64)) {
2761 bt_dev_err(hdev, "Remote and local public keys are identical");
2762 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2765 memcpy(smp->remote_pk, key, 64);
2767 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_OOB, &smp->flags)) {
2768 err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->remote_pk, smp->remote_pk,
2769 smp->rr, 0, cfm.confirm_val);
2771 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2773 if (crypto_memneq(cfm.confirm_val, smp->pcnf, 16))
2774 return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED;
2777 /* Non-initiating device sends its public key after receiving
2778 * the key from the initiating device.
2781 err = sc_send_public_key(smp);
2786 SMP_DBG("Remote Public Key X: %32phN", smp->remote_pk);
2787 SMP_DBG("Remote Public Key Y: %32phN", smp->remote_pk + 32);
2789 /* Compute the shared secret on the same crypto tfm on which the private
2790 * key was set/generated.
2792 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags)) {
2793 struct l2cap_chan *hchan = hdev->smp_data;
2794 struct smp_dev *smp_dev;
2796 if (!hchan || !hchan->data)
2797 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2799 smp_dev = hchan->data;
2801 tfm_ecdh = smp_dev->tfm_ecdh;
2803 tfm_ecdh = smp->tfm_ecdh;
2806 if (compute_ecdh_secret(tfm_ecdh, smp->remote_pk, smp->dhkey))
2807 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2809 SMP_DBG("DHKey %32phN", smp->dhkey);
2811 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_PK, &smp->flags);
2813 smp->method = sc_select_method(smp);
2815 bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "selected method 0x%02x", smp->method);
2817 /* JUST_WORKS and JUST_CFM result in an unauthenticated key */
2818 if (smp->method == JUST_WORKS || smp->method == JUST_CFM)
2819 hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM;
2821 hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_FIPS;
2823 if (!crypto_memneq(debug_pk, smp->remote_pk, 64))
2824 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags);
2826 if (smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY) {
2827 get_random_bytes(&hcon->passkey_notify,
2828 sizeof(hcon->passkey_notify));
2829 hcon->passkey_notify %= 1000000;
2830 hcon->passkey_entered = 0;
2831 smp->passkey_round = 0;
2832 if (mgmt_user_passkey_notify(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->type,
2834 hcon->passkey_notify,
2835 hcon->passkey_entered))
2836 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2837 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
2838 return sc_passkey_round(smp, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY);
2841 if (smp->method == REQ_OOB) {
2843 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM,
2844 sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd);
2846 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
2852 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
2854 if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY) {
2855 if (mgmt_user_passkey_request(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->type,
2857 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2858 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
2859 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags);
2863 /* The Initiating device waits for the non-initiating device to
2864 * send the confirm value.
2866 if (conn->hcon->out)
2869 err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->local_pk, smp->remote_pk, smp->prnd,
2870 0, cfm.confirm_val);
2872 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2874 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cfm), &cfm);
2875 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
2880 static int smp_cmd_dhkey_check(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
2882 struct smp_cmd_dhkey_check *check = (void *) skb->data;
2883 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
2884 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2885 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
2886 u8 a[7], b[7], *local_addr, *remote_addr;
2887 u8 io_cap[3], r[16], e[16];
2890 bt_dev_dbg(hcon->hdev, "conn %p", conn);
2892 if (skb->len < sizeof(*check))
2893 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2895 memcpy(a, &hcon->init_addr, 6);
2896 memcpy(b, &hcon->resp_addr, 6);
2897 a[6] = hcon->init_addr_type;
2898 b[6] = hcon->resp_addr_type;
2903 memcpy(io_cap, &smp->prsp[1], 3);
2907 memcpy(io_cap, &smp->preq[1], 3);
2910 memset(r, 0, sizeof(r));
2912 if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY)
2913 put_unaligned_le32(hcon->passkey_notify, r);
2914 else if (smp->method == REQ_OOB)
2915 memcpy(r, smp->lr, 16);
2917 err = smp_f6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->mackey, smp->rrnd, smp->prnd, r,
2918 io_cap, remote_addr, local_addr, e);
2920 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2922 if (crypto_memneq(check->e, e, 16))
2923 return SMP_DHKEY_CHECK_FAILED;
2926 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags)) {
2927 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DHKEY_PENDING, &smp->flags);
2931 /* Responder sends DHKey check as response to initiator */
2932 sc_dhkey_check(smp);
2938 hci_le_start_enc(hcon, 0, 0, smp->tk, smp->enc_key_size);
2939 hcon->enc_key_size = smp->enc_key_size;
2945 static int smp_cmd_keypress_notify(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
2946 struct sk_buff *skb)
2948 struct smp_cmd_keypress_notify *kp = (void *) skb->data;
2950 bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "value 0x%02x", kp->value);
2955 static int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb)
2957 struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
2958 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2959 struct smp_chan *smp;
2966 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_LE_ENABLED)) {
2967 reason = SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP;
2971 code = skb->data[0];
2972 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(code));
2976 if (code > SMP_CMD_MAX)
2979 if (smp && !test_and_clear_bit(code, &smp->allow_cmd))
2982 /* If we don't have a context the only allowed commands are
2983 * pairing request and security request.
2985 if (!smp && code != SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ && code != SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ)
2989 case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ:
2990 reason = smp_cmd_pairing_req(conn, skb);
2993 case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL:
2994 smp_failure(conn, 0);
2998 case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP:
2999 reason = smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(conn, skb);
3002 case SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ:
3003 reason = smp_cmd_security_req(conn, skb);
3006 case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM:
3007 reason = smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(conn, skb);
3010 case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM:
3011 reason = smp_cmd_pairing_random(conn, skb);
3014 case SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO:
3015 reason = smp_cmd_encrypt_info(conn, skb);
3018 case SMP_CMD_INITIATOR_IDENT:
3019 reason = smp_cmd_initiator_ident(conn, skb);
3022 case SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO:
3023 reason = smp_cmd_ident_info(conn, skb);
3026 case SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO:
3027 reason = smp_cmd_ident_addr_info(conn, skb);
3030 case SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO:
3031 reason = smp_cmd_sign_info(conn, skb);
3034 case SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY:
3035 reason = smp_cmd_public_key(conn, skb);
3038 case SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK:
3039 reason = smp_cmd_dhkey_check(conn, skb);
3042 case SMP_CMD_KEYPRESS_NOTIFY:
3043 reason = smp_cmd_keypress_notify(conn, skb);
3047 bt_dev_dbg(hcon->hdev, "Unknown command code 0x%2.2x", code);
3048 reason = SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
3055 smp_failure(conn, reason);
3062 bt_dev_err(hcon->hdev, "unexpected SMP command 0x%02x from %pMR",
3068 static void smp_teardown_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, int err)
3070 struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
3072 bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "chan %p", chan);
3075 smp_chan_destroy(conn);
3078 l2cap_chan_put(chan);
3081 static void bredr_pairing(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
3083 struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
3084 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
3085 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
3086 struct smp_cmd_pairing req;
3087 struct smp_chan *smp;
3089 bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "chan %p", chan);
3091 /* Only new pairings are interesting */
3092 if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_NEW_LINK_KEY, &hcon->flags))
3095 /* Don't bother if we're not encrypted */
3096 if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags))
3099 /* Only initiator may initiate SMP over BR/EDR */
3100 if (hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
3103 /* Secure Connections support must be enabled */
3104 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ENABLED))
3107 /* BR/EDR must use Secure Connections for SMP */
3108 if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_AES_CCM, &hcon->flags) &&
3109 !hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP))
3112 /* If our LE support is not enabled don't do anything */
3113 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_LE_ENABLED))
3116 /* Don't bother if remote LE support is not enabled */
3117 if (!lmp_host_le_capable(hcon))
3120 /* Remote must support SMP fixed chan for BR/EDR */
3121 if (!(conn->remote_fixed_chan & L2CAP_FC_SMP_BREDR))
3124 /* Don't bother if SMP is already ongoing */
3128 smp = smp_chan_create(conn);
3130 bt_dev_err(hdev, "unable to create SMP context for BR/EDR");
3134 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags);
3136 bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "starting SMP over BR/EDR");
3138 /* Prepare and send the BR/EDR SMP Pairing Request */
3139 build_bredr_pairing_cmd(smp, &req, NULL);
3141 smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
3142 memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &req, sizeof(req));
3144 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(req), &req);
3145 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP);
3148 static void smp_resume_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
3150 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
3151 struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
3152 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
3154 bt_dev_dbg(hcon->hdev, "chan %p", chan);
3156 if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK) {
3157 bredr_pairing(chan);
3164 if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags))
3167 cancel_delayed_work(&smp->security_timer);
3169 smp_distribute_keys(smp);
3172 static void smp_ready_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
3174 struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
3175 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
3177 bt_dev_dbg(hcon->hdev, "chan %p", chan);
3179 /* No need to call l2cap_chan_hold() here since we already own
3180 * the reference taken in smp_new_conn_cb(). This is just the
3181 * first time that we tie it to a specific pointer. The code in
3182 * l2cap_core.c ensures that there's no risk this function wont
3183 * get called if smp_new_conn_cb was previously called.
3187 if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK && test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags))
3188 bredr_pairing(chan);
3191 static int smp_recv_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb)
3195 bt_dev_dbg(chan->conn->hcon->hdev, "chan %p", chan);
3197 err = smp_sig_channel(chan, skb);
3199 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
3202 cancel_delayed_work_sync(&smp->security_timer);
3204 hci_disconnect(chan->conn->hcon, HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE);
3210 static struct sk_buff *smp_alloc_skb_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan,
3211 unsigned long hdr_len,
3212 unsigned long len, int nb)
3214 struct sk_buff *skb;
3216 skb = bt_skb_alloc(hdr_len + len, GFP_KERNEL);
3218 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
3220 skb->priority = HCI_PRIO_MAX;
3221 bt_cb(skb)->l2cap.chan = chan;
3226 static const struct l2cap_ops smp_chan_ops = {
3227 .name = "Security Manager",
3228 .ready = smp_ready_cb,
3229 .recv = smp_recv_cb,
3230 .alloc_skb = smp_alloc_skb_cb,
3231 .teardown = smp_teardown_cb,
3232 .resume = smp_resume_cb,
3234 .new_connection = l2cap_chan_no_new_connection,
3235 .state_change = l2cap_chan_no_state_change,
3236 .close = l2cap_chan_no_close,
3237 .defer = l2cap_chan_no_defer,
3238 .suspend = l2cap_chan_no_suspend,
3239 .set_shutdown = l2cap_chan_no_set_shutdown,
3240 .get_sndtimeo = l2cap_chan_no_get_sndtimeo,
3243 static inline struct l2cap_chan *smp_new_conn_cb(struct l2cap_chan *pchan)
3245 struct l2cap_chan *chan;
3247 BT_DBG("pchan %p", pchan);
3249 chan = l2cap_chan_create();
3253 chan->chan_type = pchan->chan_type;
3254 chan->ops = &smp_chan_ops;
3255 chan->scid = pchan->scid;
3256 chan->dcid = chan->scid;
3257 chan->imtu = pchan->imtu;
3258 chan->omtu = pchan->omtu;
3259 chan->mode = pchan->mode;
3261 /* Other L2CAP channels may request SMP routines in order to
3262 * change the security level. This means that the SMP channel
3263 * lock must be considered in its own category to avoid lockdep
3266 atomic_set(&chan->nesting, L2CAP_NESTING_SMP);
3268 BT_DBG("created chan %p", chan);
3273 static const struct l2cap_ops smp_root_chan_ops = {
3274 .name = "Security Manager Root",
3275 .new_connection = smp_new_conn_cb,
3277 /* None of these are implemented for the root channel */
3278 .close = l2cap_chan_no_close,
3279 .alloc_skb = l2cap_chan_no_alloc_skb,
3280 .recv = l2cap_chan_no_recv,
3281 .state_change = l2cap_chan_no_state_change,
3282 .teardown = l2cap_chan_no_teardown,
3283 .ready = l2cap_chan_no_ready,
3284 .defer = l2cap_chan_no_defer,
3285 .suspend = l2cap_chan_no_suspend,
3286 .resume = l2cap_chan_no_resume,
3287 .set_shutdown = l2cap_chan_no_set_shutdown,
3288 .get_sndtimeo = l2cap_chan_no_get_sndtimeo,
3291 static struct l2cap_chan *smp_add_cid(struct hci_dev *hdev, u16 cid)
3293 struct l2cap_chan *chan;
3294 struct smp_dev *smp;
3295 struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac;
3296 struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh;
3298 if (cid == L2CAP_CID_SMP_BREDR) {
3303 smp = kzalloc(sizeof(*smp), GFP_KERNEL);
3305 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
3307 tfm_cmac = crypto_alloc_shash("cmac(aes)", 0, 0);
3308 if (IS_ERR(tfm_cmac)) {
3309 bt_dev_err(hdev, "Unable to create CMAC crypto context");
3310 kfree_sensitive(smp);
3311 return ERR_CAST(tfm_cmac);
3314 tfm_ecdh = crypto_alloc_kpp("ecdh-nist-p256", 0, 0);
3315 if (IS_ERR(tfm_ecdh)) {
3316 bt_dev_err(hdev, "Unable to create ECDH crypto context");
3317 crypto_free_shash(tfm_cmac);
3318 kfree_sensitive(smp);
3319 return ERR_CAST(tfm_ecdh);
3322 smp->local_oob = false;
3323 smp->tfm_cmac = tfm_cmac;
3324 smp->tfm_ecdh = tfm_ecdh;
3327 chan = l2cap_chan_create();
3330 crypto_free_shash(smp->tfm_cmac);
3331 crypto_free_kpp(smp->tfm_ecdh);
3332 kfree_sensitive(smp);
3334 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
3339 l2cap_add_scid(chan, cid);
3341 l2cap_chan_set_defaults(chan);
3343 if (cid == L2CAP_CID_SMP) {
3346 hci_copy_identity_address(hdev, &chan->src, &bdaddr_type);
3348 if (bdaddr_type == ADDR_LE_DEV_PUBLIC)
3349 chan->src_type = BDADDR_LE_PUBLIC;
3351 chan->src_type = BDADDR_LE_RANDOM;
3353 bacpy(&chan->src, &hdev->bdaddr);
3354 chan->src_type = BDADDR_BREDR;
3357 chan->state = BT_LISTEN;
3358 chan->mode = L2CAP_MODE_BASIC;
3359 chan->imtu = L2CAP_DEFAULT_MTU;
3360 chan->ops = &smp_root_chan_ops;
3362 /* Set correct nesting level for a parent/listening channel */
3363 atomic_set(&chan->nesting, L2CAP_NESTING_PARENT);
3368 static void smp_del_chan(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
3370 struct smp_dev *smp;
3372 BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
3377 crypto_free_shash(smp->tfm_cmac);
3378 crypto_free_kpp(smp->tfm_ecdh);
3379 kfree_sensitive(smp);
3382 l2cap_chan_put(chan);
3385 int smp_force_bredr(struct hci_dev *hdev, bool enable)
3387 if (enable == hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP))
3391 struct l2cap_chan *chan;
3393 chan = smp_add_cid(hdev, L2CAP_CID_SMP_BREDR);
3395 return PTR_ERR(chan);
3397 hdev->smp_bredr_data = chan;
3399 struct l2cap_chan *chan;
3401 chan = hdev->smp_bredr_data;
3402 hdev->smp_bredr_data = NULL;
3406 hci_dev_change_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP);
3411 int smp_register(struct hci_dev *hdev)
3413 struct l2cap_chan *chan;
3415 bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "");
3417 /* If the controller does not support Low Energy operation, then
3418 * there is also no need to register any SMP channel.
3420 if (!lmp_le_capable(hdev))
3423 if (WARN_ON(hdev->smp_data)) {
3424 chan = hdev->smp_data;
3425 hdev->smp_data = NULL;
3429 chan = smp_add_cid(hdev, L2CAP_CID_SMP);
3431 return PTR_ERR(chan);
3433 hdev->smp_data = chan;
3435 if (!lmp_sc_capable(hdev)) {
3436 /* Flag can be already set here (due to power toggle) */
3437 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP))
3441 if (WARN_ON(hdev->smp_bredr_data)) {
3442 chan = hdev->smp_bredr_data;
3443 hdev->smp_bredr_data = NULL;
3447 chan = smp_add_cid(hdev, L2CAP_CID_SMP_BREDR);
3449 int err = PTR_ERR(chan);
3450 chan = hdev->smp_data;
3451 hdev->smp_data = NULL;
3456 hdev->smp_bredr_data = chan;
3461 void smp_unregister(struct hci_dev *hdev)
3463 struct l2cap_chan *chan;
3465 if (hdev->smp_bredr_data) {
3466 chan = hdev->smp_bredr_data;
3467 hdev->smp_bredr_data = NULL;
3471 if (hdev->smp_data) {
3472 chan = hdev->smp_data;
3473 hdev->smp_data = NULL;
3478 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BT_SELFTEST_SMP)
3480 static int __init test_debug_key(struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh)
3485 err = set_ecdh_privkey(tfm_ecdh, debug_sk);
3489 err = generate_ecdh_public_key(tfm_ecdh, pk);
3493 if (crypto_memneq(pk, debug_pk, 64))
3499 static int __init test_ah(void)
3501 const u8 irk[16] = {
3502 0x9b, 0x7d, 0x39, 0x0a, 0xa6, 0x10, 0x10, 0x34,
3503 0x05, 0xad, 0xc8, 0x57, 0xa3, 0x34, 0x02, 0xec };
3504 const u8 r[3] = { 0x94, 0x81, 0x70 };
3505 const u8 exp[3] = { 0xaa, 0xfb, 0x0d };
3509 err = smp_ah(irk, r, res);
3513 if (crypto_memneq(res, exp, 3))
3519 static int __init test_c1(void)
3522 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
3523 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 };
3525 0xe0, 0x2e, 0x70, 0xc6, 0x4e, 0x27, 0x88, 0x63,
3526 0x0e, 0x6f, 0xad, 0x56, 0x21, 0xd5, 0x83, 0x57 };
3527 const u8 preq[7] = { 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x10, 0x07, 0x07 };
3528 const u8 pres[7] = { 0x02, 0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x08, 0x00, 0x05 };
3529 const u8 _iat = 0x01;
3530 const u8 _rat = 0x00;
3531 const bdaddr_t ra = { { 0xb6, 0xb5, 0xb4, 0xb3, 0xb2, 0xb1 } };
3532 const bdaddr_t ia = { { 0xa6, 0xa5, 0xa4, 0xa3, 0xa2, 0xa1 } };
3533 const u8 exp[16] = {
3534 0x86, 0x3b, 0xf1, 0xbe, 0xc5, 0x4d, 0xa7, 0xd2,
3535 0xea, 0x88, 0x89, 0x87, 0xef, 0x3f, 0x1e, 0x1e };
3539 err = smp_c1(k, r, preq, pres, _iat, &ia, _rat, &ra, res);
3543 if (crypto_memneq(res, exp, 16))
3549 static int __init test_s1(void)
3552 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
3553 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 };
3555 0x88, 0x77, 0x66, 0x55, 0x44, 0x33, 0x22, 0x11 };
3557 0x00, 0xff, 0xee, 0xdd, 0xcc, 0xbb, 0xaa, 0x99 };
3558 const u8 exp[16] = {
3559 0x62, 0xa0, 0x6d, 0x79, 0xae, 0x16, 0x42, 0x5b,
3560 0x9b, 0xf4, 0xb0, 0xe8, 0xf0, 0xe1, 0x1f, 0x9a };
3564 err = smp_s1(k, r1, r2, res);
3568 if (crypto_memneq(res, exp, 16))
3574 static int __init test_f4(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac)
3577 0xe6, 0x9d, 0x35, 0x0e, 0x48, 0x01, 0x03, 0xcc,
3578 0xdb, 0xfd, 0xf4, 0xac, 0x11, 0x91, 0xf4, 0xef,
3579 0xb9, 0xa5, 0xf9, 0xe9, 0xa7, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x5e,
3580 0x2c, 0xbe, 0x97, 0xf2, 0xd2, 0x03, 0xb0, 0x20 };
3582 0xfd, 0xc5, 0x7f, 0xf4, 0x49, 0xdd, 0x4f, 0x6b,
3583 0xfb, 0x7c, 0x9d, 0xf1, 0xc2, 0x9a, 0xcb, 0x59,
3584 0x2a, 0xe7, 0xd4, 0xee, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0x0a, 0x90,
3585 0x9a, 0xbb, 0xf6, 0x32, 0x3d, 0x8b, 0x18, 0x55 };
3587 0xab, 0xae, 0x2b, 0x71, 0xec, 0xb2, 0xff, 0xff,
3588 0x3e, 0x73, 0x77, 0xd1, 0x54, 0x84, 0xcb, 0xd5 };
3590 const u8 exp[16] = {
3591 0x2d, 0x87, 0x74, 0xa9, 0xbe, 0xa1, 0xed, 0xf1,
3592 0x1c, 0xbd, 0xa9, 0x07, 0xf1, 0x16, 0xc9, 0xf2 };
3596 err = smp_f4(tfm_cmac, u, v, x, z, res);
3600 if (crypto_memneq(res, exp, 16))
3606 static int __init test_f5(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac)
3609 0x98, 0xa6, 0xbf, 0x73, 0xf3, 0x34, 0x8d, 0x86,
3610 0xf1, 0x66, 0xf8, 0xb4, 0x13, 0x6b, 0x79, 0x99,
3611 0x9b, 0x7d, 0x39, 0x0a, 0xa6, 0x10, 0x10, 0x34,
3612 0x05, 0xad, 0xc8, 0x57, 0xa3, 0x34, 0x02, 0xec };
3614 0xab, 0xae, 0x2b, 0x71, 0xec, 0xb2, 0xff, 0xff,
3615 0x3e, 0x73, 0x77, 0xd1, 0x54, 0x84, 0xcb, 0xd5 };
3617 0xcf, 0xc4, 0x3d, 0xff, 0xf7, 0x83, 0x65, 0x21,
3618 0x6e, 0x5f, 0xa7, 0x25, 0xcc, 0xe7, 0xe8, 0xa6 };
3619 const u8 a1[7] = { 0xce, 0xbf, 0x37, 0x37, 0x12, 0x56, 0x00 };
3620 const u8 a2[7] = { 0xc1, 0xcf, 0x2d, 0x70, 0x13, 0xa7, 0x00 };
3621 const u8 exp_ltk[16] = {
3622 0x38, 0x0a, 0x75, 0x94, 0xb5, 0x22, 0x05, 0x98,
3623 0x23, 0xcd, 0xd7, 0x69, 0x11, 0x79, 0x86, 0x69 };
3624 const u8 exp_mackey[16] = {
3625 0x20, 0x6e, 0x63, 0xce, 0x20, 0x6a, 0x3f, 0xfd,
3626 0x02, 0x4a, 0x08, 0xa1, 0x76, 0xf1, 0x65, 0x29 };
3627 u8 mackey[16], ltk[16];
3630 err = smp_f5(tfm_cmac, w, n1, n2, a1, a2, mackey, ltk);
3634 if (crypto_memneq(mackey, exp_mackey, 16))
3637 if (crypto_memneq(ltk, exp_ltk, 16))
3643 static int __init test_f6(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac)
3646 0x20, 0x6e, 0x63, 0xce, 0x20, 0x6a, 0x3f, 0xfd,
3647 0x02, 0x4a, 0x08, 0xa1, 0x76, 0xf1, 0x65, 0x29 };
3649 0xab, 0xae, 0x2b, 0x71, 0xec, 0xb2, 0xff, 0xff,
3650 0x3e, 0x73, 0x77, 0xd1, 0x54, 0x84, 0xcb, 0xd5 };
3652 0xcf, 0xc4, 0x3d, 0xff, 0xf7, 0x83, 0x65, 0x21,
3653 0x6e, 0x5f, 0xa7, 0x25, 0xcc, 0xe7, 0xe8, 0xa6 };
3655 0xc8, 0x0f, 0x2d, 0x0c, 0xd2, 0x42, 0xda, 0x08,
3656 0x54, 0xbb, 0x53, 0xb4, 0x3b, 0x34, 0xa3, 0x12 };
3657 const u8 io_cap[3] = { 0x02, 0x01, 0x01 };
3658 const u8 a1[7] = { 0xce, 0xbf, 0x37, 0x37, 0x12, 0x56, 0x00 };
3659 const u8 a2[7] = { 0xc1, 0xcf, 0x2d, 0x70, 0x13, 0xa7, 0x00 };
3660 const u8 exp[16] = {
3661 0x61, 0x8f, 0x95, 0xda, 0x09, 0x0b, 0x6c, 0xd2,
3662 0xc5, 0xe8, 0xd0, 0x9c, 0x98, 0x73, 0xc4, 0xe3 };
3666 err = smp_f6(tfm_cmac, w, n1, n2, r, io_cap, a1, a2, res);
3670 if (crypto_memneq(res, exp, 16))
3676 static int __init test_g2(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac)
3679 0xe6, 0x9d, 0x35, 0x0e, 0x48, 0x01, 0x03, 0xcc,
3680 0xdb, 0xfd, 0xf4, 0xac, 0x11, 0x91, 0xf4, 0xef,
3681 0xb9, 0xa5, 0xf9, 0xe9, 0xa7, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x5e,
3682 0x2c, 0xbe, 0x97, 0xf2, 0xd2, 0x03, 0xb0, 0x20 };
3684 0xfd, 0xc5, 0x7f, 0xf4, 0x49, 0xdd, 0x4f, 0x6b,
3685 0xfb, 0x7c, 0x9d, 0xf1, 0xc2, 0x9a, 0xcb, 0x59,
3686 0x2a, 0xe7, 0xd4, 0xee, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0x0a, 0x90,
3687 0x9a, 0xbb, 0xf6, 0x32, 0x3d, 0x8b, 0x18, 0x55 };
3689 0xab, 0xae, 0x2b, 0x71, 0xec, 0xb2, 0xff, 0xff,
3690 0x3e, 0x73, 0x77, 0xd1, 0x54, 0x84, 0xcb, 0xd5 };
3692 0xcf, 0xc4, 0x3d, 0xff, 0xf7, 0x83, 0x65, 0x21,
3693 0x6e, 0x5f, 0xa7, 0x25, 0xcc, 0xe7, 0xe8, 0xa6 };
3694 const u32 exp_val = 0x2f9ed5ba % 1000000;
3698 err = smp_g2(tfm_cmac, u, v, x, y, &val);
3708 static int __init test_h6(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac)
3711 0x9b, 0x7d, 0x39, 0x0a, 0xa6, 0x10, 0x10, 0x34,
3712 0x05, 0xad, 0xc8, 0x57, 0xa3, 0x34, 0x02, 0xec };
3713 const u8 key_id[4] = { 0x72, 0x62, 0x65, 0x6c };
3714 const u8 exp[16] = {
3715 0x99, 0x63, 0xb1, 0x80, 0xe2, 0xa9, 0xd3, 0xe8,
3716 0x1c, 0xc9, 0x6d, 0xe7, 0x02, 0xe1, 0x9a, 0x2d };
3720 err = smp_h6(tfm_cmac, w, key_id, res);
3724 if (crypto_memneq(res, exp, 16))
3730 static char test_smp_buffer[32];
3732 static ssize_t test_smp_read(struct file *file, char __user *user_buf,
3733 size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
3735 return simple_read_from_buffer(user_buf, count, ppos, test_smp_buffer,
3736 strlen(test_smp_buffer));
3739 static const struct file_operations test_smp_fops = {
3740 .open = simple_open,
3741 .read = test_smp_read,
3742 .llseek = default_llseek,
3745 static int __init run_selftests(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac,
3746 struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh)
3748 ktime_t calltime, delta, rettime;
3749 unsigned long long duration;
3752 calltime = ktime_get();
3754 err = test_debug_key(tfm_ecdh);
3756 BT_ERR("debug_key test failed");
3762 BT_ERR("smp_ah test failed");
3768 BT_ERR("smp_c1 test failed");
3774 BT_ERR("smp_s1 test failed");
3778 err = test_f4(tfm_cmac);
3780 BT_ERR("smp_f4 test failed");
3784 err = test_f5(tfm_cmac);
3786 BT_ERR("smp_f5 test failed");
3790 err = test_f6(tfm_cmac);
3792 BT_ERR("smp_f6 test failed");
3796 err = test_g2(tfm_cmac);
3798 BT_ERR("smp_g2 test failed");
3802 err = test_h6(tfm_cmac);
3804 BT_ERR("smp_h6 test failed");
3808 rettime = ktime_get();
3809 delta = ktime_sub(rettime, calltime);
3810 duration = (unsigned long long) ktime_to_ns(delta) >> 10;
3812 BT_INFO("SMP test passed in %llu usecs", duration);
3816 snprintf(test_smp_buffer, sizeof(test_smp_buffer),
3817 "PASS (%llu usecs)\n", duration);
3819 snprintf(test_smp_buffer, sizeof(test_smp_buffer), "FAIL\n");
3821 debugfs_create_file("selftest_smp", 0444, bt_debugfs, NULL,
3827 int __init bt_selftest_smp(void)
3829 struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac;
3830 struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh;
3833 tfm_cmac = crypto_alloc_shash("cmac(aes)", 0, 0);
3834 if (IS_ERR(tfm_cmac)) {
3835 BT_ERR("Unable to create CMAC crypto context");
3836 return PTR_ERR(tfm_cmac);
3839 tfm_ecdh = crypto_alloc_kpp("ecdh-nist-p256", 0, 0);
3840 if (IS_ERR(tfm_ecdh)) {
3841 BT_ERR("Unable to create ECDH crypto context");
3842 crypto_free_shash(tfm_cmac);
3843 return PTR_ERR(tfm_ecdh);
3846 err = run_selftests(tfm_cmac, tfm_ecdh);
3848 crypto_free_shash(tfm_cmac);
3849 crypto_free_kpp(tfm_ecdh);