1 ==========================
2 Trusted and Encrypted Keys
3 ==========================
5 Trusted and Encrypted Keys are two new key types added to the existing kernel
6 key ring service. Both of these new types are variable length symmetric keys,
7 and in both cases all keys are created in the kernel, and user space sees,
8 stores, and loads only encrypted blobs. Trusted Keys require the availability
9 of a Trust Source for greater security, while Encrypted Keys can be used on any
10 system. All user level blobs, are displayed and loaded in hex ASCII for
11 convenience, and are integrity verified.
17 A trust source provides the source of security for Trusted Keys. This
18 section lists currently supported trust sources, along with their security
19 considerations. Whether or not a trust source is sufficiently safe depends
20 on the strength and correctness of its implementation, as well as the threat
21 environment for a specific use case. Since the kernel doesn't know what the
22 environment is, and there is no metric of trust, it is dependent on the
23 consumer of the Trusted Keys to determine if the trust source is sufficiently
26 * Root of trust for storage
28 (1) TPM (Trusted Platform Module: hardware device)
30 Rooted to Storage Root Key (SRK) which never leaves the TPM that
31 provides crypto operation to establish root of trust for storage.
33 (2) TEE (Trusted Execution Environment: OP-TEE based on Arm TrustZone)
35 Rooted to Hardware Unique Key (HUK) which is generally burnt in on-chip
36 fuses and is accessible to TEE only.
42 Fixed set of operations running in isolated execution environment.
46 Customizable set of operations running in isolated execution
47 environment verified via Secure/Trusted boot process.
49 * Optional binding to platform integrity state
53 Keys can be optionally sealed to specified PCR (integrity measurement)
54 values, and only unsealed by the TPM, if PCRs and blob integrity
55 verifications match. A loaded Trusted Key can be updated with new
56 (future) PCR values, so keys are easily migrated to new PCR values,
57 such as when the kernel and initramfs are updated. The same key can
58 have many saved blobs under different PCR values, so multiple boots are
63 Relies on Secure/Trusted boot process for platform integrity. It can
64 be extended with TEE based measured boot process.
70 TPMs have well-documented, standardized interfaces and APIs.
74 TEEs have well-documented, standardized client interface and APIs. For
75 more details refer to ``Documentation/staging/tee.rst``.
80 The strength and appropriateness of a particular TPM or TEE for a given
81 purpose must be assessed when using them to protect security-relevant data.
90 New keys are created from random numbers. They are encrypted/decrypted using
91 a child key in the storage key hierarchy. Encryption and decryption of the
92 child key must be protected by a strong access control policy within the
93 trust source. The random number generator in use differs according to the
94 selected trust source:
96 * TPM: hardware device based RNG
98 Keys are generated within the TPM. Strength of random numbers may vary
99 from one device manufacturer to another.
101 * TEE: OP-TEE based on Arm TrustZone based RNG
103 RNG is customizable as per platform needs. It can either be direct output
104 from platform specific hardware RNG or a software based Fortuna CSPRNG
105 which can be seeded via multiple entropy sources.
107 Users may override this by specifying ``trusted.rng=kernel`` on the kernel
108 command-line to override the used RNG with the kernel's random number pool.
113 Encrypted keys do not depend on a trust source, and are faster, as they use AES
114 for encryption/decryption. New keys are created from kernel-generated random
115 numbers, and are encrypted/decrypted using a specified ‘master’ key. The
116 ‘master’ key can either be a trusted-key or user-key type. The main disadvantage
117 of encrypted keys is that if they are not rooted in a trusted key, they are only
118 as secure as the user key encrypting them. The master user key should therefore
119 be loaded in as secure a way as possible, preferably early in boot.
125 Trusted Keys usage: TPM
126 -----------------------
128 TPM 1.2: By default, trusted keys are sealed under the SRK, which has the
129 default authorization value (20 bytes of 0s). This can be set at takeownership
130 time with the TrouSerS utility: "tpm_takeownership -u -z".
132 TPM 2.0: The user must first create a storage key and make it persistent, so the
133 key is available after reboot. This can be done using the following commands.
135 With the IBM TSS 2 stack::
137 #> tsscreateprimary -hi o -st
139 #> tssevictcontrol -hi o -ho 80000000 -hp 81000001
141 Or with the Intel TSS 2 stack::
143 #> tpm2_createprimary --hierarchy o -G rsa2048 -c key.ctxt
145 #> tpm2_evictcontrol -c key.ctxt 0x81000001
146 persistentHandle: 0x81000001
150 keyctl add trusted name "new keylen [options]" ring
151 keyctl add trusted name "load hex_blob [pcrlock=pcrnum]" ring
152 keyctl update key "update [options]"
156 keyhandle= ascii hex value of sealing key
157 TPM 1.2: default 0x40000000 (SRK)
158 TPM 2.0: no default; must be passed every time
159 keyauth= ascii hex auth for sealing key default 0x00...i
161 blobauth= ascii hex auth for sealed data default 0x00...
163 pcrinfo= ascii hex of PCR_INFO or PCR_INFO_LONG (no default)
164 pcrlock= pcr number to be extended to "lock" blob
165 migratable= 0|1 indicating permission to reseal to new PCR values,
166 default 1 (resealing allowed)
167 hash= hash algorithm name as a string. For TPM 1.x the only
168 allowed value is sha1. For TPM 2.x the allowed values
169 are sha1, sha256, sha384, sha512 and sm3-256.
170 policydigest= digest for the authorization policy. must be calculated
171 with the same hash algorithm as specified by the 'hash='
173 policyhandle= handle to an authorization policy session that defines the
174 same policy and with the same hash algorithm as was used to
177 "keyctl print" returns an ascii hex copy of the sealed key, which is in standard
178 TPM_STORED_DATA format. The key length for new keys are always in bytes.
179 Trusted Keys can be 32 - 128 bytes (256 - 1024 bits), the upper limit is to fit
180 within the 2048 bit SRK (RSA) keylength, with all necessary structure/padding.
182 Trusted Keys usage: TEE
183 -----------------------
187 keyctl add trusted name "new keylen" ring
188 keyctl add trusted name "load hex_blob" ring
191 "keyctl print" returns an ASCII hex copy of the sealed key, which is in format
192 specific to TEE device implementation. The key length for new keys is always
193 in bytes. Trusted Keys can be 32 - 128 bytes (256 - 1024 bits).
198 The decrypted portion of encrypted keys can contain either a simple symmetric
199 key or a more complex structure. The format of the more complex structure is
200 application specific, which is identified by 'format'.
204 keyctl add encrypted name "new [format] key-type:master-key-name keylen"
206 keyctl add encrypted name "load hex_blob" ring
207 keyctl update keyid "update key-type:master-key-name"
211 format:= 'default | ecryptfs | enc32'
212 key-type:= 'trusted' | 'user'
214 Examples of trusted and encrypted key usage
215 -------------------------------------------
217 Create and save a trusted key named "kmk" of length 32 bytes.
219 Note: When using a TPM 2.0 with a persistent key with handle 0x81000001,
220 append 'keyhandle=0x81000001' to statements between quotes, such as
221 "new 32 keyhandle=0x81000001".
225 $ keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32" @u
230 -3 --alswrv 500 500 keyring: _ses
231 97833714 --alswrv 500 -1 \_ keyring: _uid.500
232 440502848 --alswrv 500 500 \_ trusted: kmk
234 $ keyctl print 440502848
235 0101000000000000000001005d01b7e3f4a6be5709930f3b70a743cbb42e0cc95e18e915
236 3f60da455bbf1144ad12e4f92b452f966929f6105fd29ca28e4d4d5a031d068478bacb0b
237 27351119f822911b0a11ba3d3498ba6a32e50dac7f32894dd890eb9ad578e4e292c83722
238 a52e56a097e6a68b3f56f7a52ece0cdccba1eb62cad7d817f6dc58898b3ac15f36026fec
239 d568bd4a706cb60bb37be6d8f1240661199d640b66fb0fe3b079f97f450b9ef9c22c6d5d
240 dd379f0facd1cd020281dfa3c70ba21a3fa6fc2471dc6d13ecf8298b946f65345faa5ef0
241 f1f8fff03ad0acb083725535636addb08d73dedb9832da198081e5deae84bfaf0409c22b
242 e4a8aea2b607ec96931e6f4d4fe563ba
244 $ keyctl pipe 440502848 > kmk.blob
246 Load a trusted key from the saved blob::
248 $ keyctl add trusted kmk "load `cat kmk.blob`" @u
251 $ keyctl print 268728824
252 0101000000000000000001005d01b7e3f4a6be5709930f3b70a743cbb42e0cc95e18e915
253 3f60da455bbf1144ad12e4f92b452f966929f6105fd29ca28e4d4d5a031d068478bacb0b
254 27351119f822911b0a11ba3d3498ba6a32e50dac7f32894dd890eb9ad578e4e292c83722
255 a52e56a097e6a68b3f56f7a52ece0cdccba1eb62cad7d817f6dc58898b3ac15f36026fec
256 d568bd4a706cb60bb37be6d8f1240661199d640b66fb0fe3b079f97f450b9ef9c22c6d5d
257 dd379f0facd1cd020281dfa3c70ba21a3fa6fc2471dc6d13ecf8298b946f65345faa5ef0
258 f1f8fff03ad0acb083725535636addb08d73dedb9832da198081e5deae84bfaf0409c22b
259 e4a8aea2b607ec96931e6f4d4fe563ba
261 Reseal (TPM specific) a trusted key under new PCR values::
263 $ keyctl update 268728824 "update pcrinfo=`cat pcr.blob`"
264 $ keyctl print 268728824
265 010100000000002c0002800093c35a09b70fff26e7a98ae786c641e678ec6ffb6b46d805
266 77c8a6377aed9d3219c6dfec4b23ffe3000001005d37d472ac8a44023fbb3d18583a4f73
267 d3a076c0858f6f1dcaa39ea0f119911ff03f5406df4f7f27f41da8d7194f45c9f4e00f2e
268 df449f266253aa3f52e55c53de147773e00f0f9aca86c64d94c95382265968c354c5eab4
269 9638c5ae99c89de1e0997242edfb0b501744e11ff9762dfd951cffd93227cc513384e7e6
270 e782c29435c7ec2edafaa2f4c1fe6e7a781b59549ff5296371b42133777dcc5b8b971610
271 94bc67ede19e43ddb9dc2baacad374a36feaf0314d700af0a65c164b7082401740e489c9
272 7ef6a24defe4846104209bf0c3eced7fa1a672ed5b125fc9d8cd88b476a658a4434644ef
273 df8ae9a178e9f83ba9f08d10fa47e4226b98b0702f06b3b8
276 The initial consumer of trusted keys is EVM, which at boot time needs a high
277 quality symmetric key for HMAC protection of file metadata. The use of a
278 trusted key provides strong guarantees that the EVM key has not been
279 compromised by a user level problem, and when sealed to a platform integrity
280 state, protects against boot and offline attacks. Create and save an
281 encrypted key "evm" using the above trusted key "kmk":
283 option 1: omitting 'format'::
285 $ keyctl add encrypted evm "new trusted:kmk 32" @u
288 option 2: explicitly defining 'format' as 'default'::
290 $ keyctl add encrypted evm "new default trusted:kmk 32" @u
293 $ keyctl print 159771175
294 default trusted:kmk 32 2375725ad57798846a9bbd240de8906f006e66c03af53b1b3
295 82dbbc55be2a44616e4959430436dc4f2a7a9659aa60bb4652aeb2120f149ed197c564e0
296 24717c64 5972dcb82ab2dde83376d82b2e3c09ffc
298 $ keyctl pipe 159771175 > evm.blob
300 Load an encrypted key "evm" from saved blob::
302 $ keyctl add encrypted evm "load `cat evm.blob`" @u
305 $ keyctl print 831684262
306 default trusted:kmk 32 2375725ad57798846a9bbd240de8906f006e66c03af53b1b3
307 82dbbc55be2a44616e4959430436dc4f2a7a9659aa60bb4652aeb2120f149ed197c564e0
308 24717c64 5972dcb82ab2dde83376d82b2e3c09ffc
310 Other uses for trusted and encrypted keys, such as for disk and file encryption
311 are anticipated. In particular the new format 'ecryptfs' has been defined
312 in order to use encrypted keys to mount an eCryptfs filesystem. More details
313 about the usage can be found in the file
314 ``Documentation/security/keys/ecryptfs.rst``.
316 Another new format 'enc32' has been defined in order to support encrypted keys
317 with payload size of 32 bytes. This will initially be used for nvdimm security
318 but may expand to other usages that require 32 bytes payload.
321 TPM 2.0 ASN.1 Key Format
322 ------------------------
324 The TPM 2.0 ASN.1 key format is designed to be easily recognisable,
325 even in binary form (fixing a problem we had with the TPM 1.2 ASN.1
326 format) and to be extensible for additions like importable keys and
329 TPMKey ::= SEQUENCE {
330 type OBJECT IDENTIFIER
331 emptyAuth [0] EXPLICIT BOOLEAN OPTIONAL
337 type is what distinguishes the key even in binary form since the OID
338 is provided by the TCG to be unique and thus forms a recognizable
339 binary pattern at offset 3 in the key. The OIDs currently made
342 2.23.133.10.1.3 TPM Loadable key. This is an asymmetric key (Usually
343 RSA2048 or Elliptic Curve) which can be imported by a
344 TPM2_Load() operation.
346 2.23.133.10.1.4 TPM Importable Key. This is an asymmetric key (Usually
347 RSA2048 or Elliptic Curve) which can be imported by a
348 TPM2_Import() operation.
350 2.23.133.10.1.5 TPM Sealed Data. This is a set of data (up to 128
351 bytes) which is sealed by the TPM. It usually
352 represents a symmetric key and must be unsealed before
355 The trusted key code only uses the TPM Sealed Data OID.
357 emptyAuth is true if the key has well known authorization "". If it
358 is false or not present, the key requires an explicit authorization
359 phrase. This is used by most user space consumers to decide whether
360 to prompt for a password.
362 parent represents the parent key handle, either in the 0x81 MSO space,
363 like 0x81000001 for the RSA primary storage key. Userspace programmes
364 also support specifying the primary handle in the 0x40 MSO space. If
365 this happens the Elliptic Curve variant of the primary key using the
366 TCG defined template will be generated on the fly into a volatile
367 object and used as the parent. The current kernel code only supports
370 pubkey is the binary representation of TPM2B_PRIVATE excluding the
371 initial TPM2B header, which can be reconstructed from the ASN.1 octet
374 privkey is the binary representation of TPM2B_PUBLIC excluding the
375 initial TPM2B header which can be reconstructed from the ASN.1 octed