1 /* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support
2 * Handles all system-call specific auditing features.
4 * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
5 * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
6 * Copyright (C) 2005, 2006 IBM Corporation
9 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
10 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
11 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
12 * (at your option) any later version.
14 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
15 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
16 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
17 * GNU General Public License for more details.
19 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
20 * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
21 * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
23 * Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com>
25 * Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie,
26 * especially the idea of avoiding a copy by using getname.
28 * The method for actual interception of syscall entry and exit (not in
29 * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by
30 * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG.
32 * POSIX message queue support added by George Wilson <ltcgcw@us.ibm.com>,
35 * The support of additional filter rules compares (>, <, >=, <=) was
36 * added by Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>, 2005.
38 * Modified by Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com> to collect additional
39 * filesystem information.
41 * Subject and object context labeling support added by <danjones@us.ibm.com>
42 * and <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> for LSPP certification compliance.
45 #define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
47 #include <linux/init.h>
48 #include <asm/types.h>
49 #include <linux/atomic.h>
51 #include <linux/namei.h>
53 #include <linux/export.h>
54 #include <linux/slab.h>
55 #include <linux/mount.h>
56 #include <linux/socket.h>
57 #include <linux/mqueue.h>
58 #include <linux/audit.h>
59 #include <linux/personality.h>
60 #include <linux/time.h>
61 #include <linux/netlink.h>
62 #include <linux/compiler.h>
63 #include <asm/unistd.h>
64 #include <linux/security.h>
65 #include <linux/list.h>
66 #include <linux/binfmts.h>
67 #include <linux/highmem.h>
68 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
69 #include <asm/syscall.h>
70 #include <linux/capability.h>
71 #include <linux/fs_struct.h>
72 #include <linux/compat.h>
73 #include <linux/ctype.h>
74 #include <linux/string.h>
75 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
76 #include <linux/fsnotify_backend.h>
77 #include <uapi/linux/limits.h>
81 /* flags stating the success for a syscall */
82 #define AUDITSC_INVALID 0
83 #define AUDITSC_SUCCESS 1
84 #define AUDITSC_FAILURE 2
86 /* no execve audit message should be longer than this (userspace limits),
87 * see the note near the top of audit_log_execve_info() about this value */
88 #define MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN 7500
90 /* max length to print of cmdline/proctitle value during audit */
91 #define MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN 128
93 /* number of audit rules */
96 /* determines whether we collect data for signals sent */
99 struct audit_aux_data {
100 struct audit_aux_data *next;
104 #define AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM 0
106 /* Number of target pids per aux struct. */
107 #define AUDIT_AUX_PIDS 16
109 struct audit_aux_data_pids {
110 struct audit_aux_data d;
111 pid_t target_pid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
112 kuid_t target_auid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
113 kuid_t target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
114 unsigned int target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
115 u32 target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
116 char target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS][TASK_COMM_LEN];
120 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps {
121 struct audit_aux_data d;
122 struct audit_cap_data fcap;
123 unsigned int fcap_ver;
124 struct audit_cap_data old_pcap;
125 struct audit_cap_data new_pcap;
128 struct audit_tree_refs {
129 struct audit_tree_refs *next;
130 struct audit_chunk *c[31];
133 static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context *ctx, int mask)
140 switch (audit_classify_syscall(ctx->arch, n)) {
142 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
143 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE, n))
145 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
146 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ, n))
148 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
149 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR, n))
152 case 1: /* 32bit on biarch */
153 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
154 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE_32, n))
156 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
157 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ_32, n))
159 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
160 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR_32, n))
164 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[1]);
166 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[2]);
167 case 4: /* socketcall */
168 return ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && ctx->argv[0] == SYS_BIND);
170 return mask & AUDIT_PERM_EXEC;
176 static int audit_match_filetype(struct audit_context *ctx, int val)
178 struct audit_names *n;
179 umode_t mode = (umode_t)val;
184 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
185 if ((n->ino != AUDIT_INO_UNSET) &&
186 ((n->mode & S_IFMT) == mode))
194 * We keep a linked list of fixed-sized (31 pointer) arrays of audit_chunk *;
195 * ->first_trees points to its beginning, ->trees - to the current end of data.
196 * ->tree_count is the number of free entries in array pointed to by ->trees.
197 * Original condition is (NULL, NULL, 0); as soon as it grows we never revert to NULL,
198 * "empty" becomes (p, p, 31) afterwards. We don't shrink the list (and seriously,
199 * it's going to remain 1-element for almost any setup) until we free context itself.
200 * References in it _are_ dropped - at the same time we free/drop aux stuff.
203 static void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context *ctx)
207 ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT;
211 static int put_tree_ref(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_chunk *chunk)
213 struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
214 int left = ctx->tree_count;
216 p->c[--left] = chunk;
217 ctx->tree_count = left;
226 ctx->tree_count = 30;
232 static int grow_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
234 struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
235 ctx->trees = kzalloc(sizeof(struct audit_tree_refs), GFP_KERNEL);
241 p->next = ctx->trees;
243 ctx->first_trees = ctx->trees;
244 ctx->tree_count = 31;
248 static void unroll_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx,
249 struct audit_tree_refs *p, int count)
251 struct audit_tree_refs *q;
254 /* we started with empty chain */
255 p = ctx->first_trees;
257 /* if the very first allocation has failed, nothing to do */
262 for (q = p; q != ctx->trees; q = q->next, n = 31) {
264 audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
268 while (n-- > ctx->tree_count) {
269 audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
273 ctx->tree_count = count;
276 static void free_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
278 struct audit_tree_refs *p, *q;
279 for (p = ctx->first_trees; p; p = q) {
285 static int match_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_tree *tree)
287 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
292 for (p = ctx->first_trees; p != ctx->trees; p = p->next) {
293 for (n = 0; n < 31; n++)
294 if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
299 for (n = ctx->tree_count; n < 31; n++)
300 if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
306 static int audit_compare_uid(kuid_t uid,
307 struct audit_names *name,
308 struct audit_field *f,
309 struct audit_context *ctx)
311 struct audit_names *n;
315 rc = audit_uid_comparator(uid, f->op, name->uid);
321 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
322 rc = audit_uid_comparator(uid, f->op, n->uid);
330 static int audit_compare_gid(kgid_t gid,
331 struct audit_names *name,
332 struct audit_field *f,
333 struct audit_context *ctx)
335 struct audit_names *n;
339 rc = audit_gid_comparator(gid, f->op, name->gid);
345 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
346 rc = audit_gid_comparator(gid, f->op, n->gid);
354 static int audit_field_compare(struct task_struct *tsk,
355 const struct cred *cred,
356 struct audit_field *f,
357 struct audit_context *ctx,
358 struct audit_names *name)
361 /* process to file object comparisons */
362 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_OBJ_UID:
363 return audit_compare_uid(cred->uid, name, f, ctx);
364 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_OBJ_GID:
365 return audit_compare_gid(cred->gid, name, f, ctx);
366 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
367 return audit_compare_uid(cred->euid, name, f, ctx);
368 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_OBJ_GID:
369 return audit_compare_gid(cred->egid, name, f, ctx);
370 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
371 return audit_compare_uid(audit_get_loginuid(tsk), name, f, ctx);
372 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
373 return audit_compare_uid(cred->suid, name, f, ctx);
374 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SGID_TO_OBJ_GID:
375 return audit_compare_gid(cred->sgid, name, f, ctx);
376 case AUDIT_COMPARE_FSUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
377 return audit_compare_uid(cred->fsuid, name, f, ctx);
378 case AUDIT_COMPARE_FSGID_TO_OBJ_GID:
379 return audit_compare_gid(cred->fsgid, name, f, ctx);
380 /* uid comparisons */
381 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_AUID:
382 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op,
383 audit_get_loginuid(tsk));
384 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_EUID:
385 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->euid);
386 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_SUID:
387 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->suid);
388 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_FSUID:
389 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
390 /* auid comparisons */
391 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_EUID:
392 return audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(tsk), f->op,
394 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_SUID:
395 return audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(tsk), f->op,
397 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_FSUID:
398 return audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(tsk), f->op,
400 /* euid comparisons */
401 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_SUID:
402 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, cred->suid);
403 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_FSUID:
404 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
405 /* suid comparisons */
406 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SUID_TO_FSUID:
407 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->suid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
408 /* gid comparisons */
409 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_EGID:
410 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->egid);
411 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_SGID:
412 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->sgid);
413 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_FSGID:
414 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->fsgid);
415 /* egid comparisons */
416 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_SGID:
417 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, cred->sgid);
418 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_FSGID:
419 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, cred->fsgid);
420 /* sgid comparison */
421 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SGID_TO_FSGID:
422 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, cred->fsgid);
424 WARN(1, "Missing AUDIT_COMPARE define. Report as a bug\n");
430 /* Determine if any context name data matches a rule's watch data */
431 /* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0
434 * If task_creation is true, this is an explicit indication that we are
435 * filtering a task rule at task creation time. This and tsk == current are
436 * the only situations where tsk->cred may be accessed without an rcu read lock.
438 static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
439 struct audit_krule *rule,
440 struct audit_context *ctx,
441 struct audit_names *name,
442 enum audit_state *state,
445 const struct cred *cred;
448 unsigned int sessionid;
450 cred = rcu_dereference_check(tsk->cred, tsk == current || task_creation);
452 for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
453 struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
454 struct audit_names *n;
460 pid = task_tgid_nr(tsk);
461 result = audit_comparator(pid, f->op, f->val);
466 ctx->ppid = task_ppid_nr(tsk);
467 result = audit_comparator(ctx->ppid, f->op, f->val);
471 result = audit_exe_compare(tsk, rule->exe);
472 if (f->op == Audit_not_equal)
476 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, f->uid);
479 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, f->uid);
482 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->suid, f->op, f->uid);
485 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->fsuid, f->op, f->uid);
488 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, f->gid);
489 if (f->op == Audit_equal) {
491 result = groups_search(cred->group_info, f->gid);
492 } else if (f->op == Audit_not_equal) {
494 result = !groups_search(cred->group_info, f->gid);
498 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, f->gid);
499 if (f->op == Audit_equal) {
501 result = groups_search(cred->group_info, f->gid);
502 } else if (f->op == Audit_not_equal) {
504 result = !groups_search(cred->group_info, f->gid);
508 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, f->gid);
511 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->fsgid, f->op, f->gid);
513 case AUDIT_SESSIONID:
514 sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(tsk);
515 result = audit_comparator(sessionid, f->op, f->val);
518 result = audit_comparator(tsk->personality, f->op, f->val);
522 result = audit_comparator(ctx->arch, f->op, f->val);
526 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid)
527 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_code, f->op, f->val);
530 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) {
532 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_SUCCESS);
534 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_FAILURE);
539 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
540 audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->rdev), f->op, f->val))
543 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
544 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(n->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
545 audit_comparator(MAJOR(n->rdev), f->op, f->val)) {
554 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(name->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
555 audit_comparator(MINOR(name->rdev), f->op, f->val))
558 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
559 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(n->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
560 audit_comparator(MINOR(n->rdev), f->op, f->val)) {
569 result = audit_comparator(name->ino, f->op, f->val);
571 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
572 if (audit_comparator(n->ino, f->op, f->val)) {
581 result = audit_uid_comparator(name->uid, f->op, f->uid);
583 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
584 if (audit_uid_comparator(n->uid, f->op, f->uid)) {
593 result = audit_gid_comparator(name->gid, f->op, f->gid);
595 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
596 if (audit_gid_comparator(n->gid, f->op, f->gid)) {
605 result = audit_watch_compare(rule->watch,
608 if (f->op == Audit_not_equal)
614 result = match_tree_refs(ctx, rule->tree);
615 if (f->op == Audit_not_equal)
620 result = audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(tsk),
623 case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET:
624 result = audit_comparator(audit_loginuid_set(tsk), f->op, f->val);
626 case AUDIT_SADDR_FAM:
627 if (ctx && ctx->sockaddr)
628 result = audit_comparator(ctx->sockaddr->ss_family,
631 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
632 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
633 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
636 /* NOTE: this may return negative values indicating
637 a temporary error. We simply treat this as a
638 match for now to avoid losing information that
639 may be wanted. An error message will also be
643 security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
646 result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
654 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
655 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
656 /* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
659 /* Find files that match */
661 result = security_audit_rule_match(
667 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
668 if (security_audit_rule_match(
678 /* Find ipc objects that match */
679 if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC)
681 if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid,
692 result = audit_comparator(ctx->argv[f->type-AUDIT_ARG0], f->op, f->val);
694 case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
695 /* ignore this field for filtering */
699 result = audit_match_perm(ctx, f->val);
700 if (f->op == Audit_not_equal)
704 result = audit_match_filetype(ctx, f->val);
705 if (f->op == Audit_not_equal)
708 case AUDIT_FIELD_COMPARE:
709 result = audit_field_compare(tsk, cred, f, ctx, name);
717 if (rule->prio <= ctx->prio)
719 if (rule->filterkey) {
720 kfree(ctx->filterkey);
721 ctx->filterkey = kstrdup(rule->filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
723 ctx->prio = rule->prio;
725 switch (rule->action) {
727 *state = AUDIT_DISABLED;
730 *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT;
736 /* At process creation time, we can determine if system-call auditing is
737 * completely disabled for this task. Since we only have the task
738 * structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid.
740 static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk, char **key)
742 struct audit_entry *e;
743 enum audit_state state;
746 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) {
747 if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, NULL,
749 if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
750 *key = kstrdup(e->rule.filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
756 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
759 static int audit_in_mask(const struct audit_krule *rule, unsigned long val)
763 if (val > 0xffffffff)
766 word = AUDIT_WORD(val);
767 if (word >= AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE)
770 bit = AUDIT_BIT(val);
772 return rule->mask[word] & bit;
775 /* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the
776 * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is
777 * also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit
778 * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT).
780 static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
781 struct audit_context *ctx,
782 struct list_head *list)
784 struct audit_entry *e;
785 enum audit_state state;
787 if (auditd_test_task(tsk))
788 return AUDIT_DISABLED;
791 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
792 if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) &&
793 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL,
796 ctx->current_state = state;
801 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
805 * Given an audit_name check the inode hash table to see if they match.
806 * Called holding the rcu read lock to protect the use of audit_inode_hash
808 static int audit_filter_inode_name(struct task_struct *tsk,
809 struct audit_names *n,
810 struct audit_context *ctx) {
811 int h = audit_hash_ino((u32)n->ino);
812 struct list_head *list = &audit_inode_hash[h];
813 struct audit_entry *e;
814 enum audit_state state;
816 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
817 if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) &&
818 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state, false)) {
819 ctx->current_state = state;
826 /* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if any audit_names have been
827 * collected during syscall processing. We only check rules in sublists at hash
828 * buckets applicable to the inode numbers in audit_names.
829 * Regarding audit_state, same rules apply as for audit_filter_syscall().
831 void audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_context *ctx)
833 struct audit_names *n;
835 if (auditd_test_task(tsk))
840 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
841 if (audit_filter_inode_name(tsk, n, ctx))
847 static inline void audit_proctitle_free(struct audit_context *context)
849 kfree(context->proctitle.value);
850 context->proctitle.value = NULL;
851 context->proctitle.len = 0;
854 static inline void audit_free_module(struct audit_context *context)
856 if (context->type == AUDIT_KERN_MODULE) {
857 kfree(context->module.name);
858 context->module.name = NULL;
861 static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context)
863 struct audit_names *n, *next;
865 list_for_each_entry_safe(n, next, &context->names_list, list) {
872 context->name_count = 0;
873 path_put(&context->pwd);
874 context->pwd.dentry = NULL;
875 context->pwd.mnt = NULL;
878 static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context)
880 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
882 while ((aux = context->aux)) {
883 context->aux = aux->next;
886 while ((aux = context->aux_pids)) {
887 context->aux_pids = aux->next;
892 static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state)
894 struct audit_context *context;
896 context = kzalloc(sizeof(*context), GFP_KERNEL);
899 context->state = state;
900 context->prio = state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0;
901 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->killed_trees);
902 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->names_list);
907 * audit_alloc - allocate an audit context block for a task
910 * Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context
911 * if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the
912 * specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is
915 int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)
917 struct audit_context *context;
918 enum audit_state state;
921 if (likely(!audit_ever_enabled))
922 return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */
924 state = audit_filter_task(tsk, &key);
925 if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED) {
926 clear_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT);
930 if (!(context = audit_alloc_context(state))) {
932 audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc");
935 context->filterkey = key;
937 audit_set_context(tsk, context);
938 set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT);
942 static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
944 audit_free_module(context);
945 audit_free_names(context);
946 unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0);
947 free_tree_refs(context);
948 audit_free_aux(context);
949 kfree(context->filterkey);
950 kfree(context->sockaddr);
951 audit_proctitle_free(context);
955 static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
956 kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid, unsigned int sessionid,
959 struct audit_buffer *ab;
964 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
968 audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid,
969 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
970 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
972 if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) {
973 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
976 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
977 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
980 audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
981 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, comm);
987 static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_context *context,
988 struct audit_buffer **ab)
1002 const char __user *p = (const char __user *)current->mm->arg_start;
1004 /* NOTE: this buffer needs to be large enough to hold all the non-arg
1005 * data we put in the audit record for this argument (see the
1006 * code below) ... at this point in time 96 is plenty */
1009 /* NOTE: we set MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN to a rather arbitrary limit, the
1010 * current value of 7500 is not as important as the fact that it
1011 * is less than 8k, a setting of 7500 gives us plenty of wiggle
1012 * room if we go over a little bit in the logging below */
1013 WARN_ON_ONCE(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN > 7500);
1014 len_max = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN;
1016 /* scratch buffer to hold the userspace args */
1017 buf_head = kmalloc(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
1019 audit_panic("out of memory for argv string");
1024 audit_log_format(*ab, "argc=%d", context->execve.argc);
1029 require_data = true;
1034 /* NOTE: we don't ever want to trust this value for anything
1035 * serious, but the audit record format insists we
1036 * provide an argument length for really long arguments,
1037 * e.g. > MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN, so we have no choice but
1038 * to use strncpy_from_user() to obtain this value for
1039 * recording in the log, although we don't use it
1040 * anywhere here to avoid a double-fetch problem */
1042 len_full = strnlen_user(p, MAX_ARG_STRLEN) - 1;
1044 /* read more data from userspace */
1046 /* can we make more room in the buffer? */
1047 if (buf != buf_head) {
1048 memmove(buf_head, buf, len_buf);
1052 /* fetch as much as we can of the argument */
1053 len_tmp = strncpy_from_user(&buf_head[len_buf], p,
1055 if (len_tmp == -EFAULT) {
1056 /* unable to copy from userspace */
1057 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
1059 } else if (len_tmp == (len_max - len_buf)) {
1060 /* buffer is not large enough */
1061 require_data = true;
1062 /* NOTE: if we are going to span multiple
1063 * buffers force the encoding so we stand
1064 * a chance at a sane len_full value and
1065 * consistent record encoding */
1067 len_full = len_full * 2;
1070 require_data = false;
1072 encode = audit_string_contains_control(
1074 /* try to use a trusted value for len_full */
1075 if (len_full < len_max)
1076 len_full = (encode ?
1077 len_tmp * 2 : len_tmp);
1081 buf_head[len_buf] = '\0';
1083 /* length of the buffer in the audit record? */
1084 len_abuf = (encode ? len_buf * 2 : len_buf + 2);
1087 /* write as much as we can to the audit log */
1089 /* NOTE: some magic numbers here - basically if we
1090 * can't fit a reasonable amount of data into the
1091 * existing audit buffer, flush it and start with
1093 if ((sizeof(abuf) + 8) > len_rem) {
1096 *ab = audit_log_start(context,
1097 GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EXECVE);
1102 /* create the non-arg portion of the arg record */
1104 if (require_data || (iter > 0) ||
1105 ((len_abuf + sizeof(abuf)) > len_rem)) {
1107 len_tmp += snprintf(&abuf[len_tmp],
1108 sizeof(abuf) - len_tmp,
1112 len_tmp += snprintf(&abuf[len_tmp],
1113 sizeof(abuf) - len_tmp,
1114 " a%d[%d]=", arg, iter++);
1116 len_tmp += snprintf(&abuf[len_tmp],
1117 sizeof(abuf) - len_tmp,
1119 WARN_ON(len_tmp >= sizeof(abuf));
1120 abuf[sizeof(abuf) - 1] = '\0';
1122 /* log the arg in the audit record */
1123 audit_log_format(*ab, "%s", abuf);
1127 if (len_abuf > len_rem)
1128 len_tmp = len_rem / 2; /* encoding */
1129 audit_log_n_hex(*ab, buf, len_tmp);
1130 len_rem -= len_tmp * 2;
1131 len_abuf -= len_tmp * 2;
1133 if (len_abuf > len_rem)
1134 len_tmp = len_rem - 2; /* quotes */
1135 audit_log_n_string(*ab, buf, len_tmp);
1136 len_rem -= len_tmp + 2;
1137 /* don't subtract the "2" because we still need
1138 * to add quotes to the remaining string */
1139 len_abuf -= len_tmp;
1145 /* ready to move to the next argument? */
1146 if ((len_buf == 0) && !require_data) {
1150 require_data = true;
1153 } while (arg < context->execve.argc);
1155 /* NOTE: the caller handles the final audit_log_end() call */
1161 static void audit_log_cap(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *prefix,
1166 if (cap_isclear(*cap)) {
1167 audit_log_format(ab, " %s=0", prefix);
1170 audit_log_format(ab, " %s=", prefix);
1172 audit_log_format(ab, "%08x", cap->cap[CAP_LAST_U32 - i]);
1175 static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name)
1177 if (name->fcap_ver == -1) {
1178 audit_log_format(ab, " cap_fe=? cap_fver=? cap_fp=? cap_fi=?");
1181 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fp", &name->fcap.permitted);
1182 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fi", &name->fcap.inheritable);
1183 audit_log_format(ab, " cap_fe=%d cap_fver=%x cap_frootid=%d",
1184 name->fcap.fE, name->fcap_ver,
1185 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, name->fcap.rootid));
1188 static void audit_log_time(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_buffer **ab)
1190 const struct audit_ntp_data *ntp = &context->time.ntp_data;
1191 const struct timespec64 *tk = &context->time.tk_injoffset;
1192 static const char * const ntp_name[] = {
1202 if (context->type == AUDIT_TIME_ADJNTPVAL) {
1203 for (type = 0; type < AUDIT_NTP_NVALS; type++) {
1204 if (ntp->vals[type].newval != ntp->vals[type].oldval) {
1206 *ab = audit_log_start(context,
1208 AUDIT_TIME_ADJNTPVAL);
1212 audit_log_format(*ab, "op=%s old=%lli new=%lli",
1214 ntp->vals[type].oldval,
1215 ntp->vals[type].newval);
1221 if (tk->tv_sec != 0 || tk->tv_nsec != 0) {
1223 *ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL,
1224 AUDIT_TIME_INJOFFSET);
1228 audit_log_format(*ab, "sec=%lli nsec=%li",
1229 (long long)tk->tv_sec, tk->tv_nsec);
1235 static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
1237 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1240 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, context->type);
1244 switch (context->type) {
1245 case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: {
1246 int nargs = context->socketcall.nargs;
1247 audit_log_format(ab, "nargs=%d", nargs);
1248 for (i = 0; i < nargs; i++)
1249 audit_log_format(ab, " a%d=%lx", i,
1250 context->socketcall.args[i]);
1253 u32 osid = context->ipc.osid;
1255 audit_log_format(ab, "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
1256 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.uid),
1257 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.gid),
1262 if (security_secid_to_secctx(osid, &ctx, &len)) {
1263 audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
1266 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
1267 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
1270 if (context->ipc.has_perm) {
1272 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL,
1273 AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM);
1276 audit_log_format(ab,
1277 "qbytes=%lx ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
1278 context->ipc.qbytes,
1279 context->ipc.perm_uid,
1280 context->ipc.perm_gid,
1281 context->ipc.perm_mode);
1285 audit_log_format(ab,
1286 "oflag=0x%x mode=%#ho mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld "
1287 "mq_msgsize=%ld mq_curmsgs=%ld",
1288 context->mq_open.oflag, context->mq_open.mode,
1289 context->mq_open.attr.mq_flags,
1290 context->mq_open.attr.mq_maxmsg,
1291 context->mq_open.attr.mq_msgsize,
1292 context->mq_open.attr.mq_curmsgs);
1294 case AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV:
1295 audit_log_format(ab,
1296 "mqdes=%d msg_len=%zd msg_prio=%u "
1297 "abs_timeout_sec=%lld abs_timeout_nsec=%ld",
1298 context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes,
1299 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len,
1300 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio,
1301 (long long) context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_sec,
1302 context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_nsec);
1304 case AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY:
1305 audit_log_format(ab, "mqdes=%d sigev_signo=%d",
1306 context->mq_notify.mqdes,
1307 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo);
1309 case AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR: {
1310 struct mq_attr *attr = &context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat;
1311 audit_log_format(ab,
1312 "mqdes=%d mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld mq_msgsize=%ld "
1314 context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes,
1315 attr->mq_flags, attr->mq_maxmsg,
1316 attr->mq_msgsize, attr->mq_curmsgs);
1319 audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d", context->capset.pid);
1320 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pi", &context->capset.cap.inheritable);
1321 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pp", &context->capset.cap.permitted);
1322 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pe", &context->capset.cap.effective);
1323 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pa", &context->capset.cap.ambient);
1326 audit_log_format(ab, "fd=%d flags=0x%x", context->mmap.fd,
1327 context->mmap.flags);
1330 audit_log_execve_info(context, &ab);
1332 case AUDIT_KERN_MODULE:
1333 audit_log_format(ab, "name=");
1334 if (context->module.name) {
1335 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, context->module.name);
1337 audit_log_format(ab, "(null)");
1340 case AUDIT_TIME_ADJNTPVAL:
1341 case AUDIT_TIME_INJOFFSET:
1342 /* this call deviates from the rest, eating the buffer */
1343 audit_log_time(context, &ab);
1349 static inline int audit_proctitle_rtrim(char *proctitle, int len)
1351 char *end = proctitle + len - 1;
1352 while (end > proctitle && !isprint(*end))
1355 /* catch the case where proctitle is only 1 non-print character */
1356 len = end - proctitle + 1;
1357 len -= isprint(proctitle[len-1]) == 0;
1362 * audit_log_name - produce AUDIT_PATH record from struct audit_names
1363 * @context: audit_context for the task
1364 * @n: audit_names structure with reportable details
1365 * @path: optional path to report instead of audit_names->name
1366 * @record_num: record number to report when handling a list of names
1367 * @call_panic: optional pointer to int that will be updated if secid fails
1369 static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
1370 const struct path *path, int record_num, int *call_panic)
1372 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1374 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PATH);
1378 audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", record_num);
1381 audit_log_d_path(ab, " name=", path);
1383 switch (n->name_len) {
1384 case AUDIT_NAME_FULL:
1385 /* log the full path */
1386 audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
1387 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, n->name->name);
1390 /* name was specified as a relative path and the
1391 * directory component is the cwd
1393 audit_log_d_path(ab, " name=", &context->pwd);
1396 /* log the name's directory component */
1397 audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
1398 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, n->name->name,
1402 audit_log_format(ab, " name=(null)");
1404 if (n->ino != AUDIT_INO_UNSET)
1405 audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#ho ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x",
1410 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, n->uid),
1411 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, n->gid),
1418 if (security_secid_to_secctx(
1419 n->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
1420 audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
1424 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
1425 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
1429 /* log the audit_names record type */
1431 case AUDIT_TYPE_NORMAL:
1432 audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=NORMAL");
1434 case AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT:
1435 audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=PARENT");
1437 case AUDIT_TYPE_CHILD_DELETE:
1438 audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=DELETE");
1440 case AUDIT_TYPE_CHILD_CREATE:
1441 audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=CREATE");
1444 audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=UNKNOWN");
1448 audit_log_fcaps(ab, n);
1452 static void audit_log_proctitle(void)
1456 char *msg = "(null)";
1457 int len = strlen(msg);
1458 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
1459 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1461 if (!context || context->dummy)
1464 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PROCTITLE);
1466 return; /* audit_panic or being filtered */
1468 audit_log_format(ab, "proctitle=");
1471 if (!context->proctitle.value) {
1472 buf = kmalloc(MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN, GFP_KERNEL);
1475 /* Historically called this from procfs naming */
1476 res = get_cmdline(current, buf, MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN);
1481 res = audit_proctitle_rtrim(buf, res);
1486 context->proctitle.value = buf;
1487 context->proctitle.len = res;
1489 msg = context->proctitle.value;
1490 len = context->proctitle.len;
1492 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, msg, len);
1496 static void audit_log_exit(void)
1498 int i, call_panic = 0;
1499 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
1500 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1501 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
1502 struct audit_names *n;
1504 context->personality = current->personality;
1506 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
1508 return; /* audit_panic has been called */
1509 audit_log_format(ab, "arch=%x syscall=%d",
1510 context->arch, context->major);
1511 if (context->personality != PER_LINUX)
1512 audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality);
1513 if (context->return_valid)
1514 audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld",
1515 (context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no",
1516 context->return_code);
1518 audit_log_format(ab,
1519 " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d",
1524 context->name_count);
1526 audit_log_task_info(ab);
1527 audit_log_key(ab, context->filterkey);
1530 for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) {
1532 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, aux->type);
1534 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
1536 switch (aux->type) {
1538 case AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS: {
1539 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *axs = (void *)aux;
1540 audit_log_format(ab, "fver=%x", axs->fcap_ver);
1541 audit_log_cap(ab, "fp", &axs->fcap.permitted);
1542 audit_log_cap(ab, "fi", &axs->fcap.inheritable);
1543 audit_log_format(ab, " fe=%d", axs->fcap.fE);
1544 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pp", &axs->old_pcap.permitted);
1545 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pi", &axs->old_pcap.inheritable);
1546 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pe", &axs->old_pcap.effective);
1547 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pa", &axs->old_pcap.ambient);
1548 audit_log_cap(ab, "pp", &axs->new_pcap.permitted);
1549 audit_log_cap(ab, "pi", &axs->new_pcap.inheritable);
1550 audit_log_cap(ab, "pe", &axs->new_pcap.effective);
1551 audit_log_cap(ab, "pa", &axs->new_pcap.ambient);
1552 audit_log_format(ab, " frootid=%d",
1553 from_kuid(&init_user_ns,
1562 show_special(context, &call_panic);
1564 if (context->fds[0] >= 0) {
1565 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_FD_PAIR);
1567 audit_log_format(ab, "fd0=%d fd1=%d",
1568 context->fds[0], context->fds[1]);
1573 if (context->sockaddr_len) {
1574 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SOCKADDR);
1576 audit_log_format(ab, "saddr=");
1577 audit_log_n_hex(ab, (void *)context->sockaddr,
1578 context->sockaddr_len);
1583 for (aux = context->aux_pids; aux; aux = aux->next) {
1584 struct audit_aux_data_pids *axs = (void *)aux;
1586 for (i = 0; i < axs->pid_count; i++)
1587 if (audit_log_pid_context(context, axs->target_pid[i],
1588 axs->target_auid[i],
1590 axs->target_sessionid[i],
1592 axs->target_comm[i]))
1596 if (context->target_pid &&
1597 audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid,
1598 context->target_auid, context->target_uid,
1599 context->target_sessionid,
1600 context->target_sid, context->target_comm))
1603 if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) {
1604 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD);
1606 audit_log_d_path(ab, "cwd=", &context->pwd);
1612 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
1615 audit_log_name(context, n, NULL, i++, &call_panic);
1618 audit_log_proctitle();
1620 /* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */
1621 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EOE);
1625 audit_panic("error converting sid to string");
1629 * __audit_free - free a per-task audit context
1630 * @tsk: task whose audit context block to free
1632 * Called from copy_process and do_exit
1634 void __audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
1636 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
1641 if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees))
1642 audit_kill_trees(context);
1644 /* We are called either by do_exit() or the fork() error handling code;
1645 * in the former case tsk == current and in the latter tsk is a
1646 * random task_struct that doesn't doesn't have any meaningful data we
1647 * need to log via audit_log_exit().
1649 if (tsk == current && !context->dummy && context->in_syscall) {
1650 context->return_valid = 0;
1651 context->return_code = 0;
1653 audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context,
1654 &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]);
1655 audit_filter_inodes(tsk, context);
1656 if (context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
1660 audit_set_context(tsk, NULL);
1661 audit_free_context(context);
1665 * __audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry
1666 * @major: major syscall type (function)
1667 * @a1: additional syscall register 1
1668 * @a2: additional syscall register 2
1669 * @a3: additional syscall register 3
1670 * @a4: additional syscall register 4
1672 * Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the
1673 * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or
1674 * filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the
1675 * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT,
1676 * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it
1677 * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
1680 void __audit_syscall_entry(int major, unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
1681 unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4)
1683 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
1684 enum audit_state state;
1686 if (!audit_enabled || !context)
1689 BUG_ON(context->in_syscall || context->name_count);
1691 state = context->state;
1692 if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED)
1695 context->dummy = !audit_n_rules;
1696 if (!context->dummy && state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT) {
1698 if (auditd_test_task(current))
1702 context->arch = syscall_get_arch(current);
1703 context->major = major;
1704 context->argv[0] = a1;
1705 context->argv[1] = a2;
1706 context->argv[2] = a3;
1707 context->argv[3] = a4;
1708 context->serial = 0;
1709 context->in_syscall = 1;
1710 context->current_state = state;
1712 ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64(&context->ctime);
1716 * __audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call
1717 * @success: success value of the syscall
1718 * @return_code: return value of the syscall
1720 * Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as
1721 * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from
1722 * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel wrote an audit
1723 * message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases,
1724 * free the names stored from getname().
1726 void __audit_syscall_exit(int success, long return_code)
1728 struct audit_context *context;
1730 context = audit_context();
1734 if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees))
1735 audit_kill_trees(context);
1737 if (!context->dummy && context->in_syscall) {
1739 context->return_valid = AUDITSC_SUCCESS;
1741 context->return_valid = AUDITSC_FAILURE;
1744 * we need to fix up the return code in the audit logs if the
1745 * actual return codes are later going to be fixed up by the
1746 * arch specific signal handlers
1748 * This is actually a test for:
1749 * (rc == ERESTARTSYS ) || (rc == ERESTARTNOINTR) ||
1750 * (rc == ERESTARTNOHAND) || (rc == ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK)
1752 * but is faster than a bunch of ||
1754 if (unlikely(return_code <= -ERESTARTSYS) &&
1755 (return_code >= -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK) &&
1756 (return_code != -ENOIOCTLCMD))
1757 context->return_code = -EINTR;
1759 context->return_code = return_code;
1761 audit_filter_syscall(current, context,
1762 &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]);
1763 audit_filter_inodes(current, context);
1764 if (context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
1768 context->in_syscall = 0;
1769 context->prio = context->state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0;
1771 audit_free_module(context);
1772 audit_free_names(context);
1773 unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0);
1774 audit_free_aux(context);
1775 context->aux = NULL;
1776 context->aux_pids = NULL;
1777 context->target_pid = 0;
1778 context->target_sid = 0;
1779 context->sockaddr_len = 0;
1781 context->fds[0] = -1;
1782 if (context->state != AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) {
1783 kfree(context->filterkey);
1784 context->filterkey = NULL;
1788 static inline void handle_one(const struct inode *inode)
1790 struct audit_context *context;
1791 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
1792 struct audit_chunk *chunk;
1794 if (likely(!inode->i_fsnotify_marks))
1796 context = audit_context();
1798 count = context->tree_count;
1800 chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
1804 if (likely(put_tree_ref(context, chunk)))
1806 if (unlikely(!grow_tree_refs(context))) {
1807 pr_warn("out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
1808 audit_set_auditable(context);
1809 audit_put_chunk(chunk);
1810 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1813 put_tree_ref(context, chunk);
1816 static void handle_path(const struct dentry *dentry)
1818 struct audit_context *context;
1819 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
1820 const struct dentry *d, *parent;
1821 struct audit_chunk *drop;
1825 context = audit_context();
1827 count = context->tree_count;
1832 seq = read_seqbegin(&rename_lock);
1834 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(d);
1835 if (inode && unlikely(inode->i_fsnotify_marks)) {
1836 struct audit_chunk *chunk;
1837 chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
1839 if (unlikely(!put_tree_ref(context, chunk))) {
1845 parent = d->d_parent;
1850 if (unlikely(read_seqretry(&rename_lock, seq) || drop)) { /* in this order */
1853 /* just a race with rename */
1854 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1857 audit_put_chunk(drop);
1858 if (grow_tree_refs(context)) {
1859 /* OK, got more space */
1860 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1864 pr_warn("out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
1865 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1866 audit_set_auditable(context);
1872 static struct audit_names *audit_alloc_name(struct audit_context *context,
1875 struct audit_names *aname;
1877 if (context->name_count < AUDIT_NAMES) {
1878 aname = &context->preallocated_names[context->name_count];
1879 memset(aname, 0, sizeof(*aname));
1881 aname = kzalloc(sizeof(*aname), GFP_NOFS);
1884 aname->should_free = true;
1887 aname->ino = AUDIT_INO_UNSET;
1889 list_add_tail(&aname->list, &context->names_list);
1891 context->name_count++;
1896 * __audit_reusename - fill out filename with info from existing entry
1897 * @uptr: userland ptr to pathname
1899 * Search the audit_names list for the current audit context. If there is an
1900 * existing entry with a matching "uptr" then return the filename
1901 * associated with that audit_name. If not, return NULL.
1904 __audit_reusename(const __user char *uptr)
1906 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
1907 struct audit_names *n;
1909 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
1912 if (n->name->uptr == uptr) {
1921 * __audit_getname - add a name to the list
1922 * @name: name to add
1924 * Add a name to the list of audit names for this context.
1925 * Called from fs/namei.c:getname().
1927 void __audit_getname(struct filename *name)
1929 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
1930 struct audit_names *n;
1932 if (!context->in_syscall)
1935 n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN);
1940 n->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
1944 if (!context->pwd.dentry)
1945 get_fs_pwd(current->fs, &context->pwd);
1948 static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name,
1949 const struct dentry *dentry)
1951 struct cpu_vfs_cap_data caps;
1957 rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry, &caps);
1961 name->fcap.permitted = caps.permitted;
1962 name->fcap.inheritable = caps.inheritable;
1963 name->fcap.fE = !!(caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE);
1964 name->fcap.rootid = caps.rootid;
1965 name->fcap_ver = (caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >>
1966 VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT;
1971 /* Copy inode data into an audit_names. */
1972 static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name,
1973 const struct dentry *dentry,
1974 struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags)
1976 name->ino = inode->i_ino;
1977 name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
1978 name->mode = inode->i_mode;
1979 name->uid = inode->i_uid;
1980 name->gid = inode->i_gid;
1981 name->rdev = inode->i_rdev;
1982 security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->osid);
1983 if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL) {
1984 name->fcap_ver = -1;
1987 audit_copy_fcaps(name, dentry);
1991 * __audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup
1992 * @name: name being audited
1993 * @dentry: dentry being audited
1994 * @flags: attributes for this particular entry
1996 void __audit_inode(struct filename *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
1999 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2000 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
2001 struct audit_names *n;
2002 bool parent = flags & AUDIT_INODE_PARENT;
2003 struct audit_entry *e;
2004 struct list_head *list = &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_FS];
2007 if (!context->in_syscall)
2011 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
2012 for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) {
2013 struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
2015 if (f->type == AUDIT_FSTYPE
2016 && audit_comparator(inode->i_sb->s_magic,
2018 && e->rule.action == AUDIT_NEVER) {
2030 * If we have a pointer to an audit_names entry already, then we can
2031 * just use it directly if the type is correct.
2036 if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT ||
2037 n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)
2040 if (n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT)
2045 list_for_each_entry_reverse(n, &context->names_list, list) {
2047 /* valid inode number, use that for the comparison */
2048 if (n->ino != inode->i_ino ||
2049 n->dev != inode->i_sb->s_dev)
2051 } else if (n->name) {
2052 /* inode number has not been set, check the name */
2053 if (strcmp(n->name->name, name->name))
2056 /* no inode and no name (?!) ... this is odd ... */
2059 /* match the correct record type */
2061 if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT ||
2062 n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)
2065 if (n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT)
2071 /* unable to find an entry with both a matching name and type */
2072 n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN);
2082 n->name_len = n->name ? parent_len(n->name->name) : AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
2083 n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT;
2084 if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_HIDDEN)
2087 n->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
2088 n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_NORMAL;
2090 handle_path(dentry);
2091 audit_copy_inode(n, dentry, inode, flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL);
2094 void __audit_file(const struct file *file)
2096 __audit_inode(NULL, file->f_path.dentry, 0);
2100 * __audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects
2101 * @parent: inode of dentry parent
2102 * @dentry: dentry being audited
2103 * @type: AUDIT_TYPE_* value that we're looking for
2105 * For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode
2106 * can only collect information for the filesystem object's parent.
2107 * This call updates the audit context with the child's information.
2108 * Syscalls that create a new filesystem object must be hooked after
2109 * the object is created. Syscalls that remove a filesystem object
2110 * must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during
2111 * unsuccessful attempts.
2113 void __audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent,
2114 const struct dentry *dentry,
2115 const unsigned char type)
2117 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2118 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
2119 const struct qstr *dname = &dentry->d_name;
2120 struct audit_names *n, *found_parent = NULL, *found_child = NULL;
2121 struct audit_entry *e;
2122 struct list_head *list = &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_FS];
2125 if (!context->in_syscall)
2129 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
2130 for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) {
2131 struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
2133 if (f->type == AUDIT_FSTYPE
2134 && audit_comparator(parent->i_sb->s_magic,
2136 && e->rule.action == AUDIT_NEVER) {
2147 /* look for a parent entry first */
2148 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
2150 (n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT &&
2151 n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN))
2154 if (n->ino == parent->i_ino && n->dev == parent->i_sb->s_dev &&
2155 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname,
2156 n->name->name, n->name_len)) {
2157 if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)
2158 n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT;
2166 /* is there a matching child entry? */
2167 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
2168 /* can only match entries that have a name */
2170 (n->type != type && n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN))
2173 if (!strcmp(dname->name, n->name->name) ||
2174 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name->name,
2176 found_parent->name_len :
2178 if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)
2185 if (!found_parent) {
2186 /* create a new, "anonymous" parent record */
2187 n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT);
2190 audit_copy_inode(n, NULL, parent, 0);
2194 found_child = audit_alloc_name(context, type);
2198 /* Re-use the name belonging to the slot for a matching parent
2199 * directory. All names for this context are relinquished in
2200 * audit_free_names() */
2202 found_child->name = found_parent->name;
2203 found_child->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
2204 found_child->name->refcnt++;
2209 audit_copy_inode(found_child, dentry, inode, 0);
2211 found_child->ino = AUDIT_INO_UNSET;
2213 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_inode_child);
2216 * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values
2217 * @ctx: audit_context for the task
2218 * @t: timespec64 to store time recorded in the audit_context
2219 * @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context
2221 * Also sets the context as auditable.
2223 int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
2224 struct timespec64 *t, unsigned int *serial)
2226 if (!ctx->in_syscall)
2229 ctx->serial = audit_serial();
2230 t->tv_sec = ctx->ctime.tv_sec;
2231 t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec;
2232 *serial = ctx->serial;
2235 ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT;
2241 * __audit_mq_open - record audit data for a POSIX MQ open
2244 * @attr: queue attributes
2247 void __audit_mq_open(int oflag, umode_t mode, struct mq_attr *attr)
2249 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2252 memcpy(&context->mq_open.attr, attr, sizeof(struct mq_attr));
2254 memset(&context->mq_open.attr, 0, sizeof(struct mq_attr));
2256 context->mq_open.oflag = oflag;
2257 context->mq_open.mode = mode;
2259 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_OPEN;
2263 * __audit_mq_sendrecv - record audit data for a POSIX MQ timed send/receive
2264 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2265 * @msg_len: Message length
2266 * @msg_prio: Message priority
2267 * @abs_timeout: Message timeout in absolute time
2270 void __audit_mq_sendrecv(mqd_t mqdes, size_t msg_len, unsigned int msg_prio,
2271 const struct timespec64 *abs_timeout)
2273 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2274 struct timespec64 *p = &context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout;
2277 memcpy(p, abs_timeout, sizeof(*p));
2279 memset(p, 0, sizeof(*p));
2281 context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes = mqdes;
2282 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len = msg_len;
2283 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio = msg_prio;
2285 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV;
2289 * __audit_mq_notify - record audit data for a POSIX MQ notify
2290 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2291 * @notification: Notification event
2295 void __audit_mq_notify(mqd_t mqdes, const struct sigevent *notification)
2297 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2300 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = notification->sigev_signo;
2302 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = 0;
2304 context->mq_notify.mqdes = mqdes;
2305 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY;
2309 * __audit_mq_getsetattr - record audit data for a POSIX MQ get/set attribute
2310 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2314 void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)
2316 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2317 context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes = mqdes;
2318 context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat = *mqstat;
2319 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR;
2323 * __audit_ipc_obj - record audit data for ipc object
2324 * @ipcp: ipc permissions
2327 void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
2329 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2330 context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid;
2331 context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid;
2332 context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode;
2333 context->ipc.has_perm = 0;
2334 security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &context->ipc.osid);
2335 context->type = AUDIT_IPC;
2339 * __audit_ipc_set_perm - record audit data for new ipc permissions
2340 * @qbytes: msgq bytes
2341 * @uid: msgq user id
2342 * @gid: msgq group id
2343 * @mode: msgq mode (permissions)
2345 * Called only after audit_ipc_obj().
2347 void __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, umode_t mode)
2349 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2351 context->ipc.qbytes = qbytes;
2352 context->ipc.perm_uid = uid;
2353 context->ipc.perm_gid = gid;
2354 context->ipc.perm_mode = mode;
2355 context->ipc.has_perm = 1;
2358 void __audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2360 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2362 context->type = AUDIT_EXECVE;
2363 context->execve.argc = bprm->argc;
2368 * __audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall
2369 * @nargs: number of args, which should not be more than AUDITSC_ARGS.
2373 int __audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args)
2375 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2377 if (nargs <= 0 || nargs > AUDITSC_ARGS || !args)
2379 context->type = AUDIT_SOCKETCALL;
2380 context->socketcall.nargs = nargs;
2381 memcpy(context->socketcall.args, args, nargs * sizeof(unsigned long));
2386 * __audit_fd_pair - record audit data for pipe and socketpair
2387 * @fd1: the first file descriptor
2388 * @fd2: the second file descriptor
2391 void __audit_fd_pair(int fd1, int fd2)
2393 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2394 context->fds[0] = fd1;
2395 context->fds[1] = fd2;
2399 * __audit_sockaddr - record audit data for sys_bind, sys_connect, sys_sendto
2400 * @len: data length in user space
2401 * @a: data address in kernel space
2403 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2405 int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
2407 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2409 if (!context->sockaddr) {
2410 void *p = kmalloc(sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage), GFP_KERNEL);
2413 context->sockaddr = p;
2416 context->sockaddr_len = len;
2417 memcpy(context->sockaddr, a, len);
2421 void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
2423 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2425 context->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t);
2426 context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2427 context->target_uid = task_uid(t);
2428 context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2429 security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_sid);
2430 memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2434 * audit_signal_info_syscall - record signal info for syscalls
2435 * @t: task being signaled
2437 * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid)
2438 * and uid that is doing that.
2440 int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
2442 struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;
2443 struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context();
2444 kuid_t t_uid = task_uid(t);
2446 if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
2449 /* optimize the common case by putting first signal recipient directly
2450 * in audit_context */
2451 if (!ctx->target_pid) {
2452 ctx->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t);
2453 ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2454 ctx->target_uid = t_uid;
2455 ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2456 security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_sid);
2457 memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2461 axp = (void *)ctx->aux_pids;
2462 if (!axp || axp->pid_count == AUDIT_AUX_PIDS) {
2463 axp = kzalloc(sizeof(*axp), GFP_ATOMIC);
2467 axp->d.type = AUDIT_OBJ_PID;
2468 axp->d.next = ctx->aux_pids;
2469 ctx->aux_pids = (void *)axp;
2471 BUG_ON(axp->pid_count >= AUDIT_AUX_PIDS);
2473 axp->target_pid[axp->pid_count] = task_tgid_nr(t);
2474 axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2475 axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid;
2476 axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2477 security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
2478 memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2485 * __audit_log_bprm_fcaps - store information about a loading bprm and relevant fcaps
2486 * @bprm: pointer to the bprm being processed
2487 * @new: the proposed new credentials
2488 * @old: the old credentials
2490 * Simply check if the proc already has the caps given by the file and if not
2491 * store the priv escalation info for later auditing at the end of the syscall
2495 int __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
2496 const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
2498 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *ax;
2499 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2500 struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps;
2502 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
2506 ax->d.type = AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS;
2507 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2508 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2510 get_vfs_caps_from_disk(bprm->file->f_path.dentry, &vcaps);
2512 ax->fcap.permitted = vcaps.permitted;
2513 ax->fcap.inheritable = vcaps.inheritable;
2514 ax->fcap.fE = !!(vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE);
2515 ax->fcap.rootid = vcaps.rootid;
2516 ax->fcap_ver = (vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT;
2518 ax->old_pcap.permitted = old->cap_permitted;
2519 ax->old_pcap.inheritable = old->cap_inheritable;
2520 ax->old_pcap.effective = old->cap_effective;
2521 ax->old_pcap.ambient = old->cap_ambient;
2523 ax->new_pcap.permitted = new->cap_permitted;
2524 ax->new_pcap.inheritable = new->cap_inheritable;
2525 ax->new_pcap.effective = new->cap_effective;
2526 ax->new_pcap.ambient = new->cap_ambient;
2531 * __audit_log_capset - store information about the arguments to the capset syscall
2532 * @new: the new credentials
2533 * @old: the old (current) credentials
2535 * Record the arguments userspace sent to sys_capset for later printing by the
2536 * audit system if applicable
2538 void __audit_log_capset(const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
2540 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2541 context->capset.pid = task_tgid_nr(current);
2542 context->capset.cap.effective = new->cap_effective;
2543 context->capset.cap.inheritable = new->cap_effective;
2544 context->capset.cap.permitted = new->cap_permitted;
2545 context->capset.cap.ambient = new->cap_ambient;
2546 context->type = AUDIT_CAPSET;
2549 void __audit_mmap_fd(int fd, int flags)
2551 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2552 context->mmap.fd = fd;
2553 context->mmap.flags = flags;
2554 context->type = AUDIT_MMAP;
2557 void __audit_log_kern_module(char *name)
2559 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2561 context->module.name = kstrdup(name, GFP_KERNEL);
2562 if (!context->module.name)
2563 audit_log_lost("out of memory in __audit_log_kern_module");
2564 context->type = AUDIT_KERN_MODULE;
2567 void __audit_fanotify(unsigned int response)
2569 audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL,
2570 AUDIT_FANOTIFY, "resp=%u", response);
2573 void __audit_tk_injoffset(struct timespec64 offset)
2575 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2577 /* only set type if not already set by NTP */
2579 context->type = AUDIT_TIME_INJOFFSET;
2580 memcpy(&context->time.tk_injoffset, &offset, sizeof(offset));
2583 void __audit_ntp_log(const struct audit_ntp_data *ad)
2585 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2588 for (type = 0; type < AUDIT_NTP_NVALS; type++)
2589 if (ad->vals[type].newval != ad->vals[type].oldval) {
2590 /* unconditionally set type, overwriting TK */
2591 context->type = AUDIT_TIME_ADJNTPVAL;
2592 memcpy(&context->time.ntp_data, ad, sizeof(*ad));
2597 static void audit_log_task(struct audit_buffer *ab)
2601 unsigned int sessionid;
2602 char comm[sizeof(current->comm)];
2604 auid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
2605 sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
2606 current_uid_gid(&uid, &gid);
2608 audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u ses=%u",
2609 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
2610 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid),
2611 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, gid),
2613 audit_log_task_context(ab);
2614 audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", task_tgid_nr(current));
2615 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, get_task_comm(comm, current));
2616 audit_log_d_path_exe(ab, current->mm);
2620 * audit_core_dumps - record information about processes that end abnormally
2621 * @signr: signal value
2623 * If a process ends with a core dump, something fishy is going on and we
2624 * should record the event for investigation.
2626 void audit_core_dumps(long signr)
2628 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2633 if (signr == SIGQUIT) /* don't care for those */
2636 ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND);
2640 audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld res=1", signr);
2645 * audit_seccomp - record information about a seccomp action
2646 * @syscall: syscall number
2647 * @signr: signal value
2648 * @code: the seccomp action
2650 * Record the information associated with a seccomp action. Event filtering for
2651 * seccomp actions that are not to be logged is done in seccomp_log().
2652 * Therefore, this function forces auditing independent of the audit_enabled
2653 * and dummy context state because seccomp actions should be logged even when
2654 * audit is not in use.
2656 void audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long signr, int code)
2658 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2660 ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SECCOMP);
2664 audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld arch=%x syscall=%ld compat=%d ip=0x%lx code=0x%x",
2665 signr, syscall_get_arch(current), syscall,
2666 in_compat_syscall(), KSTK_EIP(current), code);
2670 void audit_seccomp_actions_logged(const char *names, const char *old_names,
2673 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2678 ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL,
2679 AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
2683 audit_log_format(ab,
2684 "op=seccomp-logging actions=%s old-actions=%s res=%d",
2685 names, old_names, res);
2689 struct list_head *audit_killed_trees(void)
2691 struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context();
2692 if (likely(!ctx || !ctx->in_syscall))
2694 return &ctx->killed_trees;