From 880d51758e61970cce7acc5fea24838d32c91a77 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alexander Popov Date: Thu, 2 May 2024 15:15:44 +0300 Subject: [PATCH] Style fixes, should be no functional changes --- kernel_hardening_checker/checks.py | 22 +++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel_hardening_checker/checks.py b/kernel_hardening_checker/checks.py index 56efe25..fa664e0 100644 --- a/kernel_hardening_checker/checks.py +++ b/kernel_hardening_checker/checks.py @@ -664,33 +664,33 @@ def add_sysctl_checks(l, _arch): # SysctlCheck(reason, decision, name, expected) # Use an omnipresent kconfig symbol to see if we have a kconfig file for checking - have_config_file = KconfigCheck('-', '-', 'LOCALVERSION', 'is present') + have_kconfig = KconfigCheck('-', '-', 'LOCALVERSION', 'is present') l += [OR(SysctlCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'net.core.bpf_jit_harden', '2'), AND(KconfigCheck('-', '-', 'BPF_JIT', 'is not set'), - have_config_file))] + have_kconfig))] l += [SysctlCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'kernel.dmesg_restrict', '1')] l += [SysctlCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'kernel.perf_event_paranoid', '3')] # with a custom patch, see https://lwn.net/Articles/696216/ - l += [OR(SysctlCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'kernel.kexec_load_disabled', '1'), - AND(KconfigCheck('-', '-', 'KEXEC_CORE', 'is not set'), - have_config_file))] l += [SysctlCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'user.max_user_namespaces', '0')] # may break the upower daemon in Ubuntu l += [SysctlCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'dev.tty.ldisc_autoload', '0')] - l += [OR(SysctlCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled', '1'), - AND(KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'lockdown', 'BPF_SYSCALL', 'is not set'), - have_config_file))] l += [SysctlCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'kernel.kptr_restrict', '2')] l += [SysctlCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'dev.tty.legacy_tiocsti', '0')] + l += [OR(SysctlCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'kernel.kexec_load_disabled', '1'), + AND(KconfigCheck('-', '-', 'KEXEC_CORE', 'is not set'), + have_kconfig))] + l += [OR(SysctlCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled', '1'), + AND(KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'lockdown', 'BPF_SYSCALL', 'is not set'), + have_kconfig))] l += [OR(SysctlCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'vm.unprivileged_userfaultfd', '0'), AND(KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'grsec', 'USERFAULTFD', 'is not set'), - have_config_file))] + have_kconfig))] # At first, it disabled unprivileged userfaultfd, # and since v5.11 it enables unprivileged userfaultfd for user-mode only. - l += [OR(SysctlCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'clipos', 'kernel.modules_disabled', '1'), # radical, but may be useful in some cases + l += [OR(SysctlCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'clipos', 'kernel.modules_disabled', '1'), AND(KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'MODULES', 'is not set'), - have_config_file))] + have_kconfig))] # radical, but may be useful in some cases l += [SysctlCheck('harden_userspace', 'kspp', 'fs.protected_symlinks', '1')] l += [SysctlCheck('harden_userspace', 'kspp', 'fs.protected_hardlinks', '1')] -- 2.31.1