From: Alexander Popov Date: Sat, 17 Jun 2023 17:15:06 +0000 (+0300) Subject: Move the draft of the security hardening sysctls to a proper place X-Git-Tag: v0.6.6~136 X-Git-Url: https://jxself.org/git/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=9503bb6ed5150171095d65aa7eb0ff787322638c;p=kconfig-hardened-check.git Move the draft of the security hardening sysctls to a proper place Refers to #65 --- diff --git a/kconfig_hardened_check/checks.py b/kconfig_hardened_check/checks.py index 31a5b12..3a58c70 100644 --- a/kconfig_hardened_check/checks.py +++ b/kconfig_hardened_check/checks.py @@ -8,46 +8,6 @@ Author: Alexander Popov This module contains knowledge for checks. """ -# N.B. Hardening sysctls: -# kernel.kptr_restrict=2 (or 1?) -# kernel.dmesg_restrict=1 (also see the kconfig option) -# kernel.perf_event_paranoid=2 (or 3 with a custom patch, see https://lwn.net/Articles/696216/) -# kernel.kexec_load_disabled=1 -# kernel.yama.ptrace_scope=3 -# user.max_user_namespaces=0 (for Debian, also see kernel.unprivileged_userns_clone) -# what about bpf_jit_enable? -# kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled=1 -# net.core.bpf_jit_harden=2 -# vm.unprivileged_userfaultfd=0 -# (at first, it disabled unprivileged userfaultfd, -# and since v5.11 it enables unprivileged userfaultfd for user-mode only) -# vm.mmap_min_addr has a good value -# dev.tty.ldisc_autoload=0 -# fs.protected_symlinks=1 -# fs.protected_hardlinks=1 -# fs.protected_fifos=2 -# fs.protected_regular=2 -# fs.suid_dumpable=0 -# kernel.modules_disabled=1 -# kernel.randomize_va_space=2 -# nosmt sysfs control file -# dev.tty.legacy_tiocsti=0 -# vm.mmap_rnd_bits=max (?) -# kernel.sysrq=0 -# abi.vsyscall32 (any value except 2) -# kernel.oops_limit (think about a proper value) -# kernel.warn_limit (think about a proper value) -# -# Think of these boot params: -# module.sig_enforce=1 -# lockdown=confidentiality -# mce=0 -# nosmt=force -# intel_iommu=on -# amd_iommu=on -# efi=disable_early_pci_dma -# cfi= - # pylint: disable=missing-function-docstring,line-too-long,invalid-name # pylint: disable=too-many-branches,too-many-statements @@ -611,3 +571,36 @@ def normalize_cmdline_options(option, value): # Preserve unique values return value + + +# def add_sysctl_checks(l, arch): +# TODO: draft of security hardening sysctls: +# kernel.kptr_restrict=2 (or 1?) +# kernel.dmesg_restrict=1 (also see the kconfig option) +# kernel.perf_event_paranoid=2 (or 3 with a custom patch, see https://lwn.net/Articles/696216/) +# kernel.kexec_load_disabled=1 +# kernel.yama.ptrace_scope=3 +# user.max_user_namespaces=0 (for Debian, also see kernel.unprivileged_userns_clone) +# what about bpf_jit_enable? +# kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled=1 +# net.core.bpf_jit_harden=2 +# vm.unprivileged_userfaultfd=0 +# (at first, it disabled unprivileged userfaultfd, +# and since v5.11 it enables unprivileged userfaultfd for user-mode only) +# vm.mmap_min_addr has a good value +# dev.tty.ldisc_autoload=0 +# fs.protected_symlinks=1 +# fs.protected_hardlinks=1 +# fs.protected_fifos=2 +# fs.protected_regular=2 +# fs.suid_dumpable=0 +# kernel.modules_disabled=1 +# kernel.randomize_va_space=2 +# nosmt sysfs control file +# dev.tty.legacy_tiocsti=0 +# vm.mmap_rnd_bits=max (?) +# kernel.sysrq=0 +# abi.vsyscall32 (any value except 2) +# kernel.oops_limit (think about a proper value) +# kernel.warn_limit (think about a proper value) +# net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies=1 (?)