X-Git-Url: https://jxself.org/git/?a=blobdiff_plain;f=kconfig_hardened_check%2Fchecks.py;h=b83be112f2143e50ae2edfbd24c18614f7022559;hb=8c565d5f86789588dee14c01339dbead2d234502;hp=feba3649e9fcaeb6bb9956461191b71cc6b80cae;hpb=f45c60b649578dc6ded2f5ebfc5b3ed9c222cb9d;p=kconfig-hardened-check.git

diff --git a/kconfig_hardened_check/checks.py b/kconfig_hardened_check/checks.py
index feba364..b83be11 100644
--- a/kconfig_hardened_check/checks.py
+++ b/kconfig_hardened_check/checks.py
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ This module contains knowledge for checks.
 #    kernel.perf_event_paranoid=2 (or 3 with a custom patch, see https://lwn.net/Articles/696216/)
 #    kernel.kexec_load_disabled=1
 #    kernel.yama.ptrace_scope=3
-#    user.max_user_namespaces=0
+#    user.max_user_namespaces=0 (for Debian, also see kernel.unprivileged_userns_clone)
 #    what about bpf_jit_enable?
 #    kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled=1
 #    net.core.bpf_jit_harden=2
@@ -37,6 +37,8 @@ This module contains knowledge for checks.
 #    vm.mmap_rnd_bits=max (?)
 #    kernel.sysrq=0
 #    abi.vsyscall32 (any value except 2)
+#    kernel.oops_limit (think about a proper value)
+#    kernel.warn_limit (think about a proper value)
 #
 # Think of these boot params:
 #    module.sig_enforce=1
@@ -46,6 +48,7 @@ This module contains knowledge for checks.
 #    intel_iommu=on
 #    amd_iommu=on
 #    efi=disable_early_pci_dma
+#    cfi=
 
 # pylint: disable=missing-function-docstring,line-too-long,invalid-name
 # pylint: disable=too-many-branches,too-many-statements
@@ -114,6 +117,7 @@ def add_kconfig_checks(l, arch):
     if arch == 'X86_64':
         l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION', 'y')]
         l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'RANDOMIZE_MEMORY', 'y')]
+        l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'X86_KERNEL_IBT', 'y')]
         l += [AND(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'INTEL_IOMMU', 'y'),
                   iommu_support_is_set)]
         l += [AND(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'AMD_IOMMU', 'y'),
@@ -166,9 +170,9 @@ def add_kconfig_checks(l, arch):
     hardened_usercopy_is_set = KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'HARDENED_USERCOPY', 'y')
     l += [hardened_usercopy_is_set]
     l += [AND(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'HARDENED_USERCOPY_FALLBACK', 'is not set'),
-              hardened_usercopy_is_set)]
+              hardened_usercopy_is_set)] # usercopy whitelist violations should be prohibited
     l += [AND(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'HARDENED_USERCOPY_PAGESPAN', 'is not set'),
-              hardened_usercopy_is_set)]
+              hardened_usercopy_is_set)] # this debugging for HARDENED_USERCOPY is not needed for security
     l += [AND(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY', 'y'),
               gcc_plugins_support_is_set)]
     l += [OR(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'MODULE_SIG', 'y'),
@@ -584,6 +588,7 @@ no_kstrtobool_options = [
     'srbds', # See srbds_parse_cmdline() in arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
     'mmio_stale_data', # See mmio_stale_data_parse_cmdline() in arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
     'retbleed', # See retbleed_parse_cmdline() in arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+    'ssbd', # See parse_spectre_v4_param() in arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c
     'tsx' # See tsx_init() in arch/x86/kernel/cpu/tsx.c
 ]