X-Git-Url: https://jxself.org/git/?a=blobdiff_plain;f=kconfig_hardened_check%2Fchecks.py;h=8e52fd8fc27e98cbaa0af8c4c92ecd35b0408a9f;hb=4d5de9965b33f1eff1e15cb794fe0cfa734325fb;hp=c087bbc5d229b7e3e451f2dc418b432473022d56;hpb=f19835dbf0afafdb446567d950de3000f0c0c4ad;p=kconfig-hardened-check.git diff --git a/kconfig_hardened_check/checks.py b/kconfig_hardened_check/checks.py index c087bbc..8e52fd8 100644 --- a/kconfig_hardened_check/checks.py +++ b/kconfig_hardened_check/checks.py @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ This module contains knowledge for checks. # kernel.perf_event_paranoid=2 (or 3 with a custom patch, see https://lwn.net/Articles/696216/) # kernel.kexec_load_disabled=1 # kernel.yama.ptrace_scope=3 -# user.max_user_namespaces=0 +# user.max_user_namespaces=0 (for Debian, also see kernel.unprivileged_userns_clone) # what about bpf_jit_enable? # kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled=1 # net.core.bpf_jit_harden=2 @@ -34,6 +34,9 @@ This module contains knowledge for checks. # kernel.randomize_va_space=2 # nosmt sysfs control file # dev.tty.legacy_tiocsti=0 +# vm.mmap_rnd_bits=max (?) +# kernel.sysrq=0 +# abi.vsyscall32 (any value except 2) # # Think of these boot params: # module.sig_enforce=1 @@ -163,9 +166,9 @@ def add_kconfig_checks(l, arch): hardened_usercopy_is_set = KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'HARDENED_USERCOPY', 'y') l += [hardened_usercopy_is_set] l += [AND(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'HARDENED_USERCOPY_FALLBACK', 'is not set'), - hardened_usercopy_is_set)] + hardened_usercopy_is_set)] # usercopy whitelist violations should be prohibited l += [AND(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'HARDENED_USERCOPY_PAGESPAN', 'is not set'), - hardened_usercopy_is_set)] + hardened_usercopy_is_set)] # this debugging for HARDENED_USERCOPY is not needed for security l += [AND(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY', 'y'), gcc_plugins_support_is_set)] l += [OR(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'MODULE_SIG', 'y'), @@ -253,9 +256,9 @@ def add_kconfig_checks(l, arch): # 'security_policy' if arch in ('X86_64', 'ARM64', 'X86_32'): - l += [KconfigCheck('security_policy', 'defconfig', 'SECURITY', 'y')] # and choose your favourite LSM + l += [KconfigCheck('security_policy', 'defconfig', 'SECURITY', 'y')] if arch == 'ARM': - l += [KconfigCheck('security_policy', 'kspp', 'SECURITY', 'y')] # and choose your favourite LSM + l += [KconfigCheck('security_policy', 'kspp', 'SECURITY', 'y')] l += [KconfigCheck('security_policy', 'kspp', 'SECURITY_YAMA', 'y')] l += [KconfigCheck('security_policy', 'kspp', 'SECURITY_LANDLOCK', 'y')] l += [KconfigCheck('security_policy', 'kspp', 'SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE', 'is not set')] @@ -265,6 +268,10 @@ def add_kconfig_checks(l, arch): l += [KconfigCheck('security_policy', 'kspp', 'SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM_EARLY', 'y')] l += [KconfigCheck('security_policy', 'kspp', 'LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL_FORCE_CONFIDENTIALITY', 'y')] l += [KconfigCheck('security_policy', 'kspp', 'SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS', 'is not set')] # refers to SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE + l += [OR(KconfigCheck('security_policy', 'my', 'SECURITY_SELINUX', 'y'), + KconfigCheck('security_policy', 'my', 'SECURITY_APPARMOR', 'y'), + KconfigCheck('security_policy', 'my', 'SECURITY_SMACK', 'y'), + KconfigCheck('security_policy', 'my', 'SECURITY_TOMOYO', 'y'))] # one of major LSMs implementing MAC # 'cut_attack_surface', 'defconfig' l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'defconfig', 'SECCOMP', 'y')] @@ -282,7 +289,6 @@ def add_kconfig_checks(l, arch): l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'ACPI_CUSTOM_METHOD', 'is not set')] # refers to LOCKDOWN l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'COMPAT_BRK', 'is not set')] l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'DEVKMEM', 'is not set')] # refers to LOCKDOWN - l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'COMPAT_VDSO', 'is not set')] l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'BINFMT_MISC', 'is not set')] l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'INET_DIAG', 'is not set')] l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'KEXEC', 'is not set')] # refers to LOCKDOWN @@ -302,8 +308,10 @@ def add_kconfig_checks(l, arch): devmem_not_set)] # refers to LOCKDOWN l += [AND(KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'LDISC_AUTOLOAD', 'is not set'), KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'LDISC_AUTOLOAD', 'is present'))] - if arch == 'X86_64': - l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'LEGACY_VSYSCALL_NONE', 'y')] # 'vsyscall=none' + if arch in ('X86_64', 'X86_32'): + l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'COMPAT_VDSO', 'is not set')] + # CONFIG_COMPAT_VDSO disabled ASLR of vDSO only on X86_64 and X86_32; + # on ARM64 this option has different meaning if arch == 'ARM': l += [OR(KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'STRICT_DEVMEM', 'y'), devmem_not_set)] # refers to LOCKDOWN @@ -362,7 +370,6 @@ def add_kconfig_checks(l, arch): l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'clipos', 'STAGING', 'is not set')] l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'clipos', 'KSM', 'is not set')] # to prevent FLUSH+RELOAD attack l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'clipos', 'KALLSYMS', 'is not set')] - l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'clipos', 'X86_VSYSCALL_EMULATION', 'is not set')] l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'clipos', 'MAGIC_SYSRQ', 'is not set')] l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'clipos', 'KEXEC_FILE', 'is not set')] # refers to LOCKDOWN (permissive) l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'clipos', 'USER_NS', 'is not set')] # user.max_user_namespaces=0 @@ -372,6 +379,11 @@ def add_kconfig_checks(l, arch): l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'clipos', 'EFI_CUSTOM_SSDT_OVERLAYS', 'is not set')] l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'clipos', 'COREDUMP', 'is not set')] # cut userspace attack surface # l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'clipos', 'IKCONFIG', 'is not set')] # no, IKCONFIG is needed for this check :) + if arch == 'X86_64': + l += [OR(KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'clipos', 'X86_VSYSCALL_EMULATION', 'is not set'), + KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'LEGACY_VSYSCALL_NONE', 'y'))] + # disabling X86_VSYSCALL_EMULATION turns vsyscall off completely, + # and LEGACY_VSYSCALL_NONE can be changed at boot time via the cmdline parameter # 'cut_attack_surface', 'lockdown' l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'lockdown', 'EFI_TEST', 'is not set')] # refers to LOCKDOWN @@ -390,23 +402,17 @@ def add_kconfig_checks(l, arch): l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'my', 'INPUT_EVBUG', 'is not set')] # Can be used as a keylogger l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'my', 'KGDB', 'is not set')] l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'my', 'AIO', 'is not set')] + l += [KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'my', 'CORESIGHT', 'is not set')] l += [OR(KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'my', 'TRIM_UNUSED_KSYMS', 'y'), modules_not_set)] # 'harden_userspace' - if arch in ('X86_64', 'ARM64', 'X86_32'): - l += [KconfigCheck('harden_userspace', 'defconfig', 'INTEGRITY', 'y')] - if arch == 'ARM': - l += [KconfigCheck('harden_userspace', 'my', 'INTEGRITY', 'y')] if arch == 'ARM64': l += [KconfigCheck('harden_userspace', 'defconfig', 'ARM64_PTR_AUTH', 'y')] l += [KconfigCheck('harden_userspace', 'defconfig', 'ARM64_BTI', 'y')] if arch in ('ARM', 'X86_32'): l += [KconfigCheck('harden_userspace', 'defconfig', 'VMSPLIT_3G', 'y')] - if arch in ('X86_64', 'ARM64'): - l += [KconfigCheck('harden_userspace', 'clipos', 'ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS', '32')] - if arch in ('X86_32', 'ARM'): - l += [KconfigCheck('harden_userspace', 'my', 'ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS', '16')] + l += [KconfigCheck('harden_userspace', 'my', 'ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS', 'MAX')] # 'MAX' value is refined using ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MAX def add_cmdline_checks(l, arch): @@ -537,8 +543,21 @@ def add_cmdline_checks(l, arch): # 'cut_attack_surface', 'kspp' if arch == 'X86_64': l += [OR(CmdlineCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'vsyscall', 'none'), + KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'clipos', 'X86_VSYSCALL_EMULATION', 'is not set'), AND(KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'LEGACY_VSYSCALL_NONE', 'y'), CmdlineCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'vsyscall', 'is not set')))] + l += [OR(CmdlineCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'my', 'vdso32', '1'), + CmdlineCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'my', 'vdso32', '0'), + AND(KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'COMPAT_VDSO', 'is not set'), + CmdlineCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'my', 'vdso32', 'is not set')))] # the vdso32 parameter must not be 2 + if arch == 'X86_32': + l += [OR(CmdlineCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'my', 'vdso32', '1'), + CmdlineCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'my', 'vdso', '1'), + CmdlineCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'my', 'vdso32', '0'), + CmdlineCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'my', 'vdso', '0'), + AND(KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'COMPAT_VDSO', 'is not set'), + CmdlineCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'my', 'vdso32', 'is not set'), + CmdlineCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'my', 'vdso', 'is not set')))] # the vdso and vdso32 parameters must not be 2 # 'cut_attack_surface', 'grsec' # The cmdline checks compatible with the kconfig options disabled by grsecurity... @@ -548,6 +567,9 @@ def add_cmdline_checks(l, arch): # 'cut_attack_surface', 'my' l += [CmdlineCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'my', 'sysrq_always_enabled', 'is not set')] + # 'harden_userspace' + l += [CmdlineCheck('harden_userspace', 'defconfig', 'norandmaps', 'is not set')] + no_kstrtobool_options = [ 'debugfs', # See debugfs_kernel() in fs/debugfs/inode.c