X-Git-Url: https://jxself.org/git/?a=blobdiff_plain;ds=inline;f=kconfig_hardened_check%2Fchecks.py;h=cec143e4fd8ae4e573c115da84adaa29c338c596;hb=9653013a77da4113e69d27992520394e1239a01e;hp=43a4c648bba53fed54727838f518e6b4ed616d3f;hpb=22728555223c98630180c2f642cc7e369424bd8a;p=kconfig-hardened-check.git diff --git a/kconfig_hardened_check/checks.py b/kconfig_hardened_check/checks.py index 43a4c64..cec143e 100644 --- a/kconfig_hardened_check/checks.py +++ b/kconfig_hardened_check/checks.py @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ This module contains knowledge for checks. # kernel.perf_event_paranoid=2 (or 3 with a custom patch, see https://lwn.net/Articles/696216/) # kernel.kexec_load_disabled=1 # kernel.yama.ptrace_scope=3 -# user.max_user_namespaces=0 +# user.max_user_namespaces=0 (for Debian, also see kernel.unprivileged_userns_clone) # what about bpf_jit_enable? # kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled=1 # net.core.bpf_jit_harden=2 @@ -36,6 +36,9 @@ This module contains knowledge for checks. # dev.tty.legacy_tiocsti=0 # vm.mmap_rnd_bits=max (?) # kernel.sysrq=0 +# abi.vsyscall32 (any value except 2) +# kernel.oops_limit (think about a proper value) +# kernel.warn_limit (think about a proper value) # # Think of these boot params: # module.sig_enforce=1 @@ -45,6 +48,7 @@ This module contains knowledge for checks. # intel_iommu=on # amd_iommu=on # efi=disable_early_pci_dma +# cfi= # pylint: disable=missing-function-docstring,line-too-long,invalid-name # pylint: disable=too-many-branches,too-many-statements @@ -113,6 +117,7 @@ def add_kconfig_checks(l, arch): if arch == 'X86_64': l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION', 'y')] l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'RANDOMIZE_MEMORY', 'y')] + l += [KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'X86_KERNEL_IBT', 'y')] l += [AND(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'INTEL_IOMMU', 'y'), iommu_support_is_set)] l += [AND(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'defconfig', 'AMD_IOMMU', 'y'), @@ -165,9 +170,9 @@ def add_kconfig_checks(l, arch): hardened_usercopy_is_set = KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'HARDENED_USERCOPY', 'y') l += [hardened_usercopy_is_set] l += [AND(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'HARDENED_USERCOPY_FALLBACK', 'is not set'), - hardened_usercopy_is_set)] + hardened_usercopy_is_set)] # usercopy whitelist violations should be prohibited l += [AND(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'HARDENED_USERCOPY_PAGESPAN', 'is not set'), - hardened_usercopy_is_set)] + hardened_usercopy_is_set)] # this debugging for HARDENED_USERCOPY is not needed for security l += [AND(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY', 'y'), gcc_plugins_support_is_set)] l += [OR(KconfigCheck('self_protection', 'kspp', 'MODULE_SIG', 'y'), @@ -545,6 +550,18 @@ def add_cmdline_checks(l, arch): KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'clipos', 'X86_VSYSCALL_EMULATION', 'is not set'), AND(KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'LEGACY_VSYSCALL_NONE', 'y'), CmdlineCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'vsyscall', 'is not set')))] + l += [OR(CmdlineCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'my', 'vdso32', '1'), + CmdlineCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'my', 'vdso32', '0'), + AND(KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'COMPAT_VDSO', 'is not set'), + CmdlineCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'my', 'vdso32', 'is not set')))] # the vdso32 parameter must not be 2 + if arch == 'X86_32': + l += [OR(CmdlineCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'my', 'vdso32', '1'), + CmdlineCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'my', 'vdso', '1'), + CmdlineCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'my', 'vdso32', '0'), + CmdlineCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'my', 'vdso', '0'), + AND(KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'kspp', 'COMPAT_VDSO', 'is not set'), + CmdlineCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'my', 'vdso32', 'is not set'), + CmdlineCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'my', 'vdso', 'is not set')))] # the vdso and vdso32 parameters must not be 2 # 'cut_attack_surface', 'grsec' # The cmdline checks compatible with the kconfig options disabled by grsecurity...